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Dedication:
To my father, my mother and ail members of my family who devoted some of 
their precious time to support me, without their constant help and patience, this 
humble piece of work could not have seen the light.
"If it was not the opinion of Aristotle, you must not believe it is a true opinion ".
Ibn Rochd
"Better to be unborn than untaught, for ignorance is the root of all misfortune ".
Aristotle
"The material principle of existing things was a certain infinite nature. From it the 
heavens and the worlds in them come into being. It is eternal and ageless, and it 
surrounds all the worlds ".
Anaximander, Hippolytus Refutation of all Heresies, 
"Fear is the mother of all gods. "
Lucretius (De Rerum Naturae)
"The thirst for grasping the real meaning of things was indeed my habit and want 
from my early years and in the prime of my life.It was an instinctive, natural 
disposition placed in my makeup by Allah Most High, not something due to my own 
choosing and contriving. As a result, the fetters of servile conformism fell away from 
me, and inherited beliefs lost their hold on me, when I was quite young".
Al-Ghazali ^4.1-Munqidh min al-Dalal, (The Rescuer from Misguidance)
"If we need an atheist for a debate, I go to the philosophy department. The physics 
department isn't much use ".
Robert Griffiths
"We are survival machines, robot machines, blindly programmed to preserve the 
selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with 
astonishment" . Richard Dawkins (The Blind Watchman)
"The world and its workings were necessary and invariable because God Himself, by 
definition, had to be and did not change. Informed by the active intelligence of the 
deity, they could be scarcely be otherwise. The fantastic flight of the mind into a 
realm of the ultimate, immaterial reality was thereby arrested. A world which had to 
be could not be at the bottom of the scale of being".
Ibn Rochd
"Whatsoever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contrary 
to reason is absurd, and, ipso facto, to be rejected".
Baruch Spinoza
"Science without religion is lame and religion without science is blind. "
Albert Einstein
"Open theists do not know the comfort of trusting in God sovereignty and 
foreknowledge because they do not believe that He knows the end from the beginning 
and everything in between. They do not believe that God is the God of all comfort, 
whom we can always rely on to get us through life's struggle ".
(J.ligon dunkan table talk, Feb, 2003,(Vol.,27,No. 2), pp.52-53
"The theory of evolution is nothing but a deception imposed on us by the nominators 
of the world system ". Adnan Oktar (Harun Yahya), (The Evolution Deceit).
"A religion old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the universe as revealed by 
modern science, might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly 
tapped by the conventional faiths. Sooner or later, such a religion will emerge " .
Carl Sagan
"God does not play dice " .
Albert Einstein
"/believe in God, if by God is meant the embodiment of the laws of the 
universe."
Stephen Hawking
When Ibn Rochd died, Ernst Renan wrote, "Arab philosophy lost in him its last 
representative, and the triumph of the Qu 'ran over free thought was assured for at 
least six hundred years. "(Fauzi M.Najjar ,Ibn Ruchd (Averroes) and the Egyptian 
Enlightenment, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.2 (Nov. 2004), 
p.203.
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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we aim to explore whether the world is eternal or created through the eyes 
of the Hellenes and especially Aristotle and the Muslim theologians led by Ibn Rochd. 
Such exploration would be a sort of comparative study between religion and philosophy, 
and we do mean by religion here the monotheistic tenets represented by the Abrahamic 
religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam and we do mean by philosophy, mainly the 
ancient wisdom presented by the Greek philosophers. No one would deny that the doctrine 
of the eternity of the world is a complex doctrine, as there is a sort of overlap between all 
the subjects discussed within it. hi other words, these subjects are themselves doctrines 
inside the main doctrine, which is the eternity of the world. This overlap is obvious when 
we raise subjects like the architecture of the cosmos, the basic elements that the world is 
made up of, God's existence, God-world relationship, eternity of time and motion and the 
immortality of the soul. When we do look at all these topics, the first idea that jumps into 
our mind is the big convergence between all these topics, in the sense that the discussion of 
one of them entails the discussion of the other one in some way or another. In the middle of 
all these discussions, it is vital to raise the pluralist and monistic theories, the plurality of 
the worlds theory, Ibn Sina's necessary existent theory, Ibn Rochd's principle of 
corruptibility and Socrates' doctrine of the individuality and the transmigration of souls. 
Likewise, we have to raise Plotinus' theory of emanation, Aristotle's doctrine of the co- 
eternity of matter and God, the theory of substance and the theory of hylomorphism. After 
the exhibition of all these divergent stances and different views of the nature and the last 
fate of our astonishing universe, the result that we do come out with is that there is no 
opposition between philosophy and religion, as they are two different disciplines using 
different mental tools to achieve the same goals. Hence, the revealed materials can support 
the philosophical findings and vice versa. Revelation only interferes when philosophy fails 
to explain unseen phenomena or supernatural occurrences. That is why, the eternity of the 
world doctrine can never be well understood without the combination of what is religious 
and what is philosophical. The Holy Scriptures themselves do address the human mind and 
urge it to use reason and the weapon of observation and contemplation to achieve a better 
understanding of all incidents and events occurring around human beings. This 
compatibility between religion and philosophy in particular and all sciences in general was 
the magnum opus of Ibn Rochd who elaborated his doctrine of the agreement between 
religion and philosophy and passed it on to Western Scholasticism.
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Preface
It is worthwhile to mention that many of the names of philosophers and theologians who 
we will come across in this thesis are not actually their real names. It is a Judaic-Hispanic- 
Latin corruption of their Persian and Arabic names. Such a corruption came as a result of a 
series of partial alterations based on the translations of Arabic philosophical and 
theological works that were carried out in the middle of the seventeenth century in the 
Spanish town of Toledo.
If we do take, for instance, the metamorphosis of 'Ibn Roshd'-the father of Averroism- 
into Averroes, we would notice that such a linguistic transformation was due to this sort of 
corrupted translation. The Jews, by reading the word 'Ibn' -Which means 'son of ' in 
Arabic- they pronounced it as the Hebrew word 'Aben' which has the same meaning. The 
consonant 'V in Spanish -until today- is pronounced as the consonant 'B'. Hence, the 
name 'Ibn Rochd' is turned into 'aben Rochd', and by consonantal assimilation into 
'averroshd'. As the letter 'CH' do not exist in Latin, it is replaced by 'the blowing S' and 
the name of 'Ibn Roshd' is turned, all over again, into averrosd. The consonant 'D' is 
dropped and substituted by the consonant 'S' because it is accusative in Latin language. 
Eventually, the name of a proper Muslim Arabic origin 'Ibn Rochd' is transformed into 
Averroes. Consequently, the terminology averroism is derived from this disfigured name.
In the same grammatical and linguistic fashion, ' Ibn Sina' is turned into Avicenna 'Ibn 
Baddja' into Avempace or Avenpace, 'Ibn Zohr' into Avenzoar,' Ibn Khaldun' into 
Abenjaldun, 'Ibn Masara' into Abenmasarra, ' Ibn Tofail' into Abentofail and the list is so 
long and we would gradually cover it throughout the thesis. These names are Latinized in 
most sources especially the Spanish ones. As we mentioned before the consonant 'V is 
pronounced as 'B' and in many sources, it is written as 'B' as it is the case here in these last 
examples. Likewise, I will be using different vowels and consonants in the names of Arab 
theologians and philosophers. This would help non-Arab speakers to pronounce them in the 
correct way, so I will be using AL, ED, OU, E, and Y instead of El, AD, U, O, and /. 
Accordingly, I will be spelling Koran, or Alcoran as Qur 'an , Ibn Tofail as Ibn Tofayl, 
Ibn Ruchd as Ibn Rochd, Musa as Mousa, Yusuf as Yousef, Yunus as Younes, Maimonides 
as Maimon, Ibn Zuhr as Ibn Zohr, Ubaid as Ubayd, Muhammad as Mohammed, and Bin 
as Ibn. Likewise, for a good pronunciation of names, I will draw a distinction between the
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solar article in Arabic and the lunar one. The solar article in nouns such as az-Zahrawi and 
an-Nafis instead of Al-Zahrawi and Al-Nafis, and I will keep the lunar article as it is in 
most sources like Al-Kindi , Al-Biruni, etc. Throughout this thesis, I will be using the 
substantive Rochdism and the adjective Rochdian, and Rochdist instead of the substantive 
Averroism and the adjective Averroist. I am also using the substantive Ibn Sinian instead 
of Avicenian, Farabian instead of Farabusian, and Ghazalian instead of Gazelan .This 
distinction is of a paramount importance for non-Arab readers or researchers who do not 
know the real name of the philosophers and not familiar with these terms.
We have just to add that this corrupted translation did not reach only his name and the 
events of his life, but Ibn Rochd's works as well. Many of his works have come down to 
the hands of western scholars in a Hebrew translation of the Arabic text, composed by 
Samuel ben Judah in the early fourteenth century in Provence and preserved in eight 
manuscripts in varying states of completeness, hi addition to this Hebrew translation, there 
have been one Hebrew summary by Joseph Caspi in 1331 and 4 translations  two in Latin 
by Elia Del Medigo in 1491 and by Jacob Mantinus in 1539, and 2 in English. Samuel 
himself was aware of his shortcomings as a translator of Arabic philosophy; he made 
tremendous efforts to provide the reader with a translation that was faithful to Ibn Rochd' 
and intelligible to one who knew Hebrew but not Arabic2 . Definitely, these divergent 
translations will make us call into question the partiality and the capability of these 
translators standing between the original author and western scholars. That is why, many of 
Ibn Rochd's doctrines were distorted and others were attributed to him. We have to 
mention that in many stages of Ibn Rochd's life, he was accused of being the enemy of all 
religions and God himself. Moreover, towards the end of his life, he suffered the exile from 
his disciples because of the aggressiveness of fanatic masses. He was the target of the 
theologians' feverish attacks, and exposed to the satires of poets, mocking his name 
through versifications: 'you did not stay on the right path (Rochd)* son of the right path 
(Ibn Rochd)?'
'Rochd' means in Arabic the right path
2 ^verroes on Plato 's Republic, Trans. Ralph Lerner (preface) 
3IBN ROCHD (AVERROES), Leon Gauthier p. 3
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The importance of what Ibn Rochd4 wrote towards the end of the twelfth century in 
Cordoba came from the fact that the author is coming from that pure Islamic descent. Such 
descent intrigued many scholars and made them think about the motives, which urged 
Muslim scholars, and especially Ibn Rochd to study a pagan philosophy while they have an 
inestimable divine gift called Shari'a5 . Such interest may lead non-Muslims to consider 
Shari 'a law, which addresses all men as not complete or sufficient, and consequently, in 
need of a supplement and correction. We have to point out that despite Ibn Rochd's 
colossal efforts to study and analyse the works of Greek philosophers, his name -and in the 
majority of cases- was ignored and referred to as 'the commentator' especially by both 
Aquinas and Dante6 .
After Ibn Rochd's death, a legendary figure came into existence, he became so famous to 
the point that many partial scholars found it very hard to accept that he is coming from a 
pure Arabic and Islamic descent .They thought such an outstanding figure can only be a 
scholar coming from a Jewish descent and converted to Islam .
Fifty years ago, during a conversation with an outstanding master, professor of philosophy in one of the first 
French faculties, we pronounced the name of Ibn Rochd.
'Ibn Rochd', interrupted us our interlocutor, What is that? - Ibn Rochd, is Averroes.- how? It is Averroes! 
What a funny idea to call him Ibn Rochd?
Currently the Arabic name of Ibn Rochd starts to be a little known at least among the historians of 
philosophy. By the same token, and under the increasing influence of Arabized thinkers, we no longer write 
Mohamet, but Mohammed, Alcoran, but the Quran, Mecque but Mecca.(Leon, Gauthier.IBN ROCHD: 
AVERROES),p.2
5 The body of Islamic religious law
6 .Averroes on Plato 's Republic,Trans. Ralph Lerner .p.xiii
7 Leon Gauthier, IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p. 3
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Introduction: 
Part One
Historical and Cultural Context: 
1.1 The Islamic Contributions to Scientific Discoveries
No one would deny what the ancient Babylonian, Egyptian, Indian, Greek, Sumerian, 
Assyrian, Chinese, Roman, Persian Aztek, and Inka civilizations have brought to humanity 
regarding intellectual enlightenment and scientific discoveries. We all heard about Thales 
(624-546 BC), Pythagoras (569-475 BC), Empedocles (490 -430 BC), Socrates (469-399 
BC), Plato (427-347 BC.), Aristotle (384-322 BC), Ptolemy (85-165/168 AD), Galen (131- 
201 AD), Plotinus (204-270 AD), Proclus (412-485 AD), and Philoponus (490- 570 
AD).But a few of us have heard about Ibn Jubayr (665- 714 AD), Khalid ibn Yazid ( - d. 
704 AD ), Al-Asmai (740- 828 AD),A1- Khawarismi (Algorismus:780-850 AD),Al-Kindi 
(AJ -Kindus:796-873 AD), Mousa ibn Shakir (800-873 AD), Jabir ibn Hayyan ( Geber: 
ca.721-815 AD) Abbas ibn Firnas ( 810-887 AD), AJ-Dinawari (828-896 AD), Ahmed ibn 
Yousef ( 835-912 AD), Thabit ibn Qurra ( Thebit: 836-901 AD), AJ- Fargani (AJFraganus - 
d.861 AD),Ar-Razi (Rhazas:844-964 AD), AJ-Balkhi ( Albumasar :850-934 AD),A1- Battani 
(AJbategnius: 858-929 AD), AJ-Hallaj (858-922 AD), Al-Farabi (AJ- Pharabius:872-950 AD 
), Ibn Masara (883-931 AD), AJ- Masudi ( Herdotus :ca.896- 956 AD), Ibn al- Jazzar (898- 
980 AD), Abu Hamid al -Ustrulabi (- d.900 AD),As- Sufi (Azophi:903-986 AD), Ibrahim 
ibn Sinan (908-946 AD), Az- Zahrawi (AJbucasis: ca. 936-1013 AD), Abu al-Wafa al- 
Buzjani (940-998 AD), AJi ibn Isa (940-JOIO AD), Al-Majriti( - d. 1007/1008 AD) Ahmed 
ibn Younes (ca.950 -1009 AD), Ibn al- Haytham (Alhazen: 965-1039 AD),Ibn as-Saffar(- 
d.1035 AD), Ibn Labban ibn Gilani (971-1029 AD), AJ-Mawardi (AJboacen:972-1058 
AD),AJ-Biruni (973-1048 AD),Ibn Sina (Avicena:980-1037 AD), Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi 
(ca.980- 1037),Ibn Shuhayd ( 992-1035 AD) Ibn Hazm (994-1064 AD), Ibn al-Wafid( 
Abenguefit(ca. 997-1074 AD),Ali ibn Ridwan (998-1061/1067 AD), Az-Zarqali 
(Arzachel: 1029-1087 AD), Said al- Andalusi (1029-1070 AD), Ibn at-Tayyib 
(Abulpharagius: -d. 1043/1044 AD), Omar al-Khayyam (1044-1123/1124 AD),Ahmed as- 
Saraqusti(b.l046 - AD), Ibn Bassal (1038-1075 AD),Abu Said Ubaid Allah (- d.1058 AD), 
Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali (Al-Gazel: 1059-1111 AD), Malik ibn Wuhayb (1061-1130), Ad- 
Dani al-Andalusi(AJbuzale :ca,1068-1134 AD), Ibn Zohr (Avenzoar: 1091-1113 AD), Ibn 
Bassam (- d.1147 AD), Ash-Shahrastani (1086-1153 AD), Ibn as-Salah(- d.1153 AD), Al- 
Idrisi (Dreses:1099-1166 AD), Ibn Baja (Avempace:1100-1138 AD), Jabir ibn Aflah(Geber: 
1100-1150),Ibn Tofayl (Abubacer: 1100-1185 AD), Said ibn Hibbat AJlah (-1101/1102 AD),
- 1 -
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Abu-Abbas an-Nabati (Annabatca.l 165- 1239) AD), Ibn Rochd (Averroes :1128-1198 AD), 
Ibn Arabi (Abenarabi: 1165-1240 AD), Ibn Awwam (1170 - 1265), Al- Bitruji (Alpetragius: 
- d. 1204 AD), Ibn al-Baitar (Bitar: -d.1248 AD), Ibn an- Nafis (1213-1288 AD), At- Tusi 
(1201-1274 AD), Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (1207-1273 AD),Ibn Sabin (Avensabin: 1217-1270 
AD), Ibn Battutah (1304-1366/1377 AD), Ibn al-Khatib (1313-1374 AD), Ibn Khaldun 
(Abenjaldun: 1332-1406 AD), Al-Kashi (1390-1450 AD),Ibn Miskawiyah (932-1030 AD), 
the prominent twelfth century philosopher Abu al- Hakam- al-Kirmani, and the list is 
inexhaustible.
Nowadays the scientific contributions of these Muslim geniuses are rarely mentioned and 
under Latinized names to obscure their Islamic identity and obliterate their ethnicity. This is 
irrefutable evidence that the medieval period was not sterile and dark as described in many 
books of history. If we contemplate the names of this glittering civilization, we would notice 
that most of them lived between (750 and 1100 AD), which is a very short period to 
accommodate all these outstanding scientists. These Muslim scientists managed to catalogue 
and develop all branches of sciences from the physical cosmos to the invisible world of 
human body. This includes mathematics, medicine, physics, biology, geology, psychology, 
optics, botany, astronomy, astrology, engineering, agriculture, agronomy, geography, history 
architecture, chemistry, mineralogy, pharmacy, mechanics, poetry, zoology, sociology, 
music, logic and horticulture. This tremendous scientific revolution occurred between the 
seventh and the sixteenth centuries when the Ottoman Empire was on the wane. Western 
scholars identify this era as the period between the demise of the Roman Empire and the 
Renaissance. At that period, Western Europe was dominated by superstitious beliefs, and 
intellectual obscurantism, while Islam was encouraging the pursuit of knowledge and 
regarded it as a spiritual duty. As Arabs used to trade with merchants from remote places 
such as China and India even in the pre-Islamic period (al-Jahiliyyah), practicalities of 
trading over such long distances helped them to learn how to tell the time and navigate from 
the stars. That is how equipments of timing and the astrolabe instrument came into being. 
Likewise, Avicenna's medical works were taught in the West till the 17th century. Al -Tusi's 
astronomical theories were essential to Copernicus( 1473-1543 ) to challenge the authority of 
the church by proving that the Earth turns around the Sun. Copernicus was also inspired by 
the mathematical and the astronomical works of Ibn Aflah, and before him Regiomontanus 
(1436-1476 AD)whose "On Triangles' is teeming with materials taken from the famous
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works of Aflah who also invented the torquetum 1 . Al-Khawarismi gave birth to algebra and 
algorithms that are central to the development of modern computing. Ibn Al- Haytham's 
works on the vision and light helped Isaac Newton (1643-1727) to formulate his theories on 
optics and the discovery of the pulmonary circulation is recorded in the name of the great 
surgeon Ibn an-Nafis. In addition to az-Zahrawi who wrote a book of 1500 pages about the 
science of surgery that was used in Europe for 500 years. Besides, he is believed to be the 
first one who made a caesarean section, and invented the surgical forceps. As Islamic 
civilization spread further into Southern Europe, these scientific enlightenments were taken 
back to Baghdad (Iraq), Damascus (Syria), Cairo (Egypt) Gondeshapur, (Persia) and 
Cordoba (Andalucia).These scientific treasuries brought intellectual enlightenment to the 
Iberian Peninsula. No wonder the historian Said of Toledo stated in his book Tabaqat al - 
Umam (Categories of Nations) that:
"In early times, al - Andalus (Spain) was devoid of Science, none of its former dwellers 
achieved fame in this field except some ancient indications to separate topics erected by the 
Roman kings. Al-Andalus remained stripped of wisdom until the Muslims settled there. 
Muslims themselves gave importance first to religious sciences and the science of language 
until the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty that opened the gates to the real quest for all 
sciences2 ".
We have to admit that there were some Christian and Jewish thinkers who contributed to 
this Andalucian intellectual revolution. This did not happen when Muslims first came to 
Andalucia, but later on, when they co-existed with them through either the conversion to 
Islam or because of their ethnicity, as they were Muslims coming from Christian, Jewish or 
Arabic descents. The vivid example of those coming from Arabic descents are the famous 
theologian Theodore Abu Qurrah (ca.750-820 AD), the Monophysite Christian Al-Masawaih 
al-Mardini (- d.1015), and Ibn Butlan (- d.ca.1038 AD). Undoubtedly, Andalucia witnessed 
the Hebraic golden cultural age that was embroidered with the works of Dunash ben Labart 
(920-990 AD), Jonah ben Janah (ca.990-1050AD), Solomon ben Judah (Ben 
Gabirol:Avicebron: 1021-1058 AD), the vizier, Joseph ben Naghrela(1035-1066) Moses ben 
Ezra(ca. 1060-1138 AD), Judah Halevi(ca. 1075-1141 AD), Abraham ben Meir ben Izra(1092-
1167 AD), and Mousa ben Maimon (Moses ben Maimonides: 1138-1204 AD). That is why,
^t is an astronomical instrument used to take and convert measurements.
2Said ibn Ahmed al-AndalusiJKitab Tabaqatal-Umam,(Cotegories of Nations),p.62.
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Muslim scholars and historians alike prefer to call Andalucia jjiaJl^j-ijill 'the missing 
paradise'. We have to bear in mind that the Jewish community in Andalucia lived side by 
side with the Christians and the Muslims in an atmosphere characterized by interfaith 
tolerance and cultural indulgence. The treatment of the Jews in Andalucia was unique at that 
time, as they were oppressed elsewhere especially in Eastern Europe. There were some 
interrupted periods when the Jews have not received the same treatment not because of their 
ethnicity, but because they were accused of stirring up racial hatred, feeding insurrections, or 
igniting religious conflicts.
1.2 The Historical Circumstances Surrounding the Emergence of 
Philosophy in the Muslim World:
We have to point out that many Muslim scientists were excellent in other intellectual fields 
such as theology, jurisprudence and philosophy. However, some of them gave less interest to 
the latter and it was frowned by others because it was regarded as a complete waste of time, 
as it discusses matters already dealt with in the Holy Qur'an and the prophetic tradition. 
Early Muslim thinkers expressed their religious views in hundreds of outstanding works. 
However, they did not express their thoughts about the world and the secrets of nature and 
their sophisticated aspects until the great conquests brought them into close contact with 
other civilizations, especially the Persian one. The rational reasoning on the nature and 
attributes of God and His relation to man and universe led to the mushrooming of many 
politico- religious movements. The fact that led to the emergence of a new science of 
Muslim scholasticism called Ilm al-Kalam ^apologetic theology). The Mutazilites laid the 
foundation of this new science, as the first school in Muslim theology and made lasting 
contributions for its development .Orthodox Muslim opposed them and tried hard to refute 
their doctrines by traditional methods. Consequently, Maturidism appeared in central Asia in 
the second and third/ the eight and ninth centuries, Tahawism in Egypt in the third and 
fourth/ the ninth and tenth centuries and Asha 'rism in Iraq in the fourth and fifth/ tenth and 
eleventh centuries. These movements tried hard to reconcile disputed ideas and settle the 
theological problems of the time by adopting a system that is compatible with the basic 
teachings of Islam. There is no room for doubt that the thought of these movements, enriched
1 Al-Mutakallimin are a group of thinkers who appeared first in the 2nd century Hijri(AR) due to what the discussions raised 
about the Creed regarding the takfeer( accusation of unbelief) of those who commit kaba'iri major sins)/esurrection, 
judgement day and the free will and determinism. Among the First Mutakallimin Wasil Ibn Ata'( 700-748 AD ), Amr Ibn 
Ubayd( d. 761 AD) and Abu Hudayl al- Allaf ( died after 840 AD) ( Mohammed Basil al-Taee flakd Ibn Rochd li- 
Madhab Addarivyah Inda Al-Mutakallimin ( The Criticism of Ibn Rochd of Muslim Theologians' Atomism) ,p.3
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Muslim theology in particular and broadened the horizons of human knowledge in general. 
In this new atmosphere, many foreign and divergent ideas were introduced by these religious 
trends bringing with them conflicting ideas and antagonistic attitudes creating chaos and 
confusion in Muslim thought. This situation dominated the intellectual Muslim life until the 
third /ninth century that manifested the rise of many intellectuals who started to use 
observation, inquiry, and deduction coupled with contemplation and meditation. Only at this 
particular stage of history, we started to talk about the Islamic thought as Falsafa 
(philosophy). This term itself is borrowed from Greek philosophy and little is known about 
the origins of Falsafa in Muslim West. During the reign of al -Hakam II (915-976 AD) in 
the third quarter of the fourth /tenth century, works of philosophy had been introduced into 
al-Andalus, and scholars started to study them. Many Muslims considered philosophy as a 
resurrection of a rational attitude justified and implied with the revelation of the Holy 
Q'uran. Such a philosophy was an intellectual activity produced within the framework of 
Islamic culture. We have to mention here that Islamic philosophy is not concerned only with 
religious topics and Muslims do not exclusively produce it. It is a rich philosophy ranging 
from mystical philosophy represented by Ibn Arabi, illuminationist philosophy manifested in 
the works of al -Suhrawardi, Dawani's political philosophy to the eclectic philosophy of 
Ikhwan as -Safa (Brethren of purity). It is worthwhile to point out that Peripateticism and 
Neo-Platonism were always predominant in all these Islamic philosophies. 
1.3 The Flourishing of Philosophy in the Iberian Peninsula (AI-Andalus) 
As it was in the Eastern part of the Muslim world, philosophy flourished in the Western 
part of it, and precisely in al -Andalus (The Islamic part of the Iberian Peninsula) and North 
Africa and especially Morocco. At that period both Morocco and Andalusia were ruled by 
the Sultans of Al-Muwahiddun (the Almohad) dynasty and before that by Al- Murabitun 
(Almoravid) dynasty. The reason why we mentioned Morocco is for the geographical and 
affinities factors, blood ties and parental links between it and Andalusia. In the sense that the 
vast majority of philosophers, theologians and mystics are either purely Moroccans, coming 
from a mixed race in which the Moroccan one is a part of it, or at least studied, visited, lived 
or died in Morocco. The latter, as we previously pointed out, was ruled by the Almohads who 
encouraged teachers and students to devote themselves exclusively to education by every 
means, paying them monthly salaries and ensuring their accommodation. Some of the sultans
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themselves were poets, doctors and jurists. Libraries were established and books were 
brought from abroad. The Islamic philosophers, Eastern and Western alike took up the 
famous doctrines and theories of the ancient wisdom, simplified, criticised, rectified and 
developed them to fit pure Islamic patterns. Al-Farabi united the Aristotelian logical 
discipline to an emanatist schema of the world. Ibn Sina completed this fusion by extending 
it to intellectualist mysticism, while Abu-Hamid Al-Ghazali opposed syncretism; he rejected 
the mystics' science of the heart and replaced contemplation of the divine names with 
submission to the absolute being. Ibn baja drew an opposition between pure knowledge and 
semblances of the truth, which is only the other difference between the pure spiritual forms 
leading to knowledge and the individual spiritual form needed by the mystic. Ibn Masara and 
Ibn Tofayl established the harmony between reason and revelation. Al -Kindi went against 
the Hellenic philosophical tradition by propounding the ex-nihilo doctrine. Ibn- Arabi 
provided us with a detailed account of the types and essence of the philosophical truth and 
his concept of \vahdat al-wujud (the universal being). The Moroccan-Andalucian 
philosopher Ibn Rochd, the doyen of rationalist philosophy, the pioneer of the enlightenment 
movement, the towering intellectual pyramid and the giant of Arabic philosophy ^ ook from 
balanced rationalism the basis of his thought, as his philosophical works as a whole present 
apodictic demonstrations, Irrefutable evidences, avoiding innovation, modalities and barren 
comparisons. We must also mention the contributions of Malik ibn Wuhayb, Ibn Sabin and 
Ibn Zohr to this glittering intellectual arena. In all his philosophical debates, Ibn Rochd 
united what is given by the Ma 'qul ( reason) and what is provided by the Manq 'ul (tradition). 
He accomplished this task by drawing a distinction between the batin (hidden meaning) and 
the dahir (apparent meaning)2 . In all his works, from short and middle commentaries on 
Aristotle's works to Kashf Manahij al-Adilla (The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs), 
Fasl al- Maqal (The Decisive Treatise) and Tahafut al- Tahafiit (The Incoherence of the 
Incoherence), he employs techniques of internal criticism through the comparison of texts, 
the contemplation of the comments of translators, and the suggestion of correction to dispel 
confusions3 . As interest waned in the Muslim world, Ibn Rochd's philosophical systems 
found a new intellectual vigour in the works of Jewish and Christian philosophers. He played 
a magnificent role in the transmission of classical philosophy to the Western world. His
1 Fauzi MNajjar Jbn Ruchd and the Egyptian Enlightenment movement, p. 204
2 Dominique Urvoy Jbn Rushd(Averroes), trans. Olivia Stewart, p. 77 
3Ibidp.58.
-6-
Introduction
works heavily influenced Western Scholasticism, the aspects of renaissance thought and the 
Politico-religious reform movement established by Almohadism in Moorish Spain. Besides, 
he fully contributed to make al-Andalus grasp the heritage of the ancient wisdom. This goes 
beyond the eurocentrist standpoint regarding Ibn Rochd as a mere propagandist or just an 
intermediary between Aristotle and the Scholastics. 1 We are not denying that Ibn Rochd was 
a commentator of Aristotle, but in addition to his great commentaries, he was a an original 
and demanding thinker in his own right 2 .However, his works did not find the same 
importance among the Muslims of that critical period of Islamic history, and especially his 
'Exposition of the Methods of Proofs'. Even if he exposed his best intentions and reassuring 
phrases in this work, Ibn Roshd's criticisms were bound to raise dust and undermined his 
own standing in the community. His opponents publicly burnt his books; the teaching of his 
philosophy was banned throughout the realm of the Western Arab Caliphate. Moreover, he 
suffered banishment from his hometown in Cordoba3 . Ibn Rochd was a victim of the general 
atmosphere of the reign of Almohads, in whose time Ibn Rochd lived was marked by 
outbursts of intolerance. These outbursts increased with the reconquista4 (the re-conquest) of 
the Iberian Peninsula by Saint Ferdinand III (1199-1252 AD). This phenomenon did not 
strike only the Muslim world, it is also common among the Jews who opposed the 
philosophical teaching of Mousa ben Maimon and his followers, and tried all the available 
means to ban and condemn their works5 . The Andalucian intellectual atmosphere ignited the 
interest in debates and controversies. This paved the way for the emergence of a wide range 
of theological-philosophical doctrines on the universal of the intellect, anthropomorphism, 
fatalism, free determination, divine providence and the eternity of the world. The latter 
became so controversial and pivotal because it comprises many other theories and themes 
within itself like the origin of the world, God's existence, divine unicity and the immortality 
of the soul. Besides, it was the cause of disagreement between all the theological, 
philosophical and scientific schools. In this thesis, we would see how Hellenic philosophers 
and especially the Peripatetic ones regarded the status of the world? How was it received by 
the medieval Muslim philosophers in general and Ibn Rochd in particular? And to what 
extent the Islamization of such doctrine influenced the Christian and Jewish theologies?
1 Majid Fakhry, Ibn Ruchd: Faylasufu Qurtuba, p. 10.
2 Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, p.272.
3 Majid Fakhry, Ibn Ruchd: Faylasufu Qurtuba, p. 10
4 This is the Portuguese and the Spanish term of the Arabic word al-Istirdad :  > i-> 
5N. Golb, The Hebrew Translation ofAverroes'sFastal-Maqal, p.93.
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PART H: 
The Subject matter of the Thesis: The bone of Contention:
Before shedding more light on this controversial topic, we have to draw a distinction 
between the word eternal and the terms 'perpetual' and 'immortal'. The term' immortal' or 
'perpetual' implies a beginning but no end, while an eternal existent cannot begin or cease to 
exist. The difference between eternity and perpetuity lies in the fact that eternity is a closed 
circle with no beginning and no end and perpetuity is a circle with a spiral character and 
open by very reason of its contingency 1 . The eternity of the world is an old -brand -new 
conflict between religion and philosophy, between creationism and eternalism, between the 
sublunary world of the movement of alteration and the supralunary world of the unique 
circular movement of the eternal 2 . In short, this controversial issue led to the multiplicity of 
schools, trends, sects and philosophies. It was, and it is still, a controversial issue between 
Muslims themselves, Jewish and Christian scholars, as it was the case between the Hellenes 
themselves many centuries ago. The theory of the eternity of the world is an Aristotelian 
idea. Aristotle claimed that he was the first one-at least among the Hellenes- who 
emphasized that the world in which we are living as a small entity and the cosmos as an 
orderly whole is eternal. Many of the predecessors of Aristotle believed that the world had 
come into being either from a primitive matter or after a number of other worlds, whereas 
Aristotle does believe in the fmitude of causes because according to him, it is quite 
impossible that the movement should have started or can continue by itself. From this 
perspective, there must be a principle from which all movement derives. However, 
movement is eternal by itself If we do suppose that the world is eternal, there will be an 
infinite series of causes and an infinite series of movers, and consequently, we will never 
ever reach a first mover or cause. Aristotle holds that both time and movement are infinite 
and that every causal series must be finite. From this particular point of view emerges the 
opposition of Muslim scholars to the Peripatetic standpoint. Muslim scholars do consider 
God as the first mover of the movement of the universe and the only cause of everything. 
3 That is why, neither the Platonic eternal ideas, the eternal hypostases of Plotinus nor the 
eternal henads of Proclus 4 can bridge that gap existing between being and not being.
1 Arvind Sharma, The Eternality of the Vedas and the Qur 'an: A Comparative Study, p.269.
2 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A I -RRROES). p. 114
3 Simon Van Den Bergh .the Introduction of Ibn Rochd's, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol. 1 p.xvi 
4D. P. Walker, Eternity and the Afterlife.p.242.
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The contradiction in the idea of the possibility of an eternal creation does form the chief 
argument of Al- Ghazali who refutes Ibn Sina's evidence for God's existence based on the 
Peripatetic concept of'necessary by itself 1 . Al- Ghazali asserted, "Once the possibility of an 
infinite series of causes is admitted, there is no sense in positing a first cause2 ". If we go 
back to the Hellenes, we would find that the Christian commentator of Aristotle, John 
Philoponus, wrote a book entitled 'De Aeternitate Mundi'. This book was directed against 
another book written by the great Neo-Platonist Proclus who had given eighteen arguments 
to prove the eternity of the world. Plato, the other great pioneer of ancient wisdom, believed 
in the temporal creation of the world by what he called a 'Demiurge'. Plato's followers 
opposed their master regarding this interpretation, while the Stoics were the only post - 
Aristotelian school that assumed a periodical generation and destruction of the world. We 
have to point out that Theophrastus(ca.371-287 BC) tried hard to refute some of the Stoic 
arguments that were used by John Philoponus to defend the temporality of the world3 . Even 
if the book written by Proclus is lost, John Philoponus put it back into memory because as a 
Christian, who had a strong belief in the creation of the world, presented all Proclus's 
arguments in order to refute them in his book De Aeternitate Mundi. This book was 
translated into Arabic and it was the main source of medieval philosophy in general and for 
Muslim scholars in particular whenever this issue arises. John Philoponus wrote also another 
work about the temporal creation of the world against Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the 
world 4 .
Many Hellenes opposed later Islamic point of view about the eternity of the world, others 
supported it or supported at least some of it. Plotinus, for example, denies that God has the 
power to do one of two contraries, in the sense that God would necessarily choose the best, 
which implies that God necessarily will always do the best. In the meantime, Plotinus sees 
the world as the production of a natural necessity5 . In the middle of these hot controversies, 
we have to introduce Ibn Rochd's standpoint, which is of a paramount importance, as he is 
the famous commentator of Aristotle's works and the transmitter of ancient wisdom to the 
West. This equation led him to deny that infinite time involves an infinite causal series and
1 IbnRochd, The Introduction of ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence. vol. 1, p.xvii
2 Ibid.
4 Ibid., pp.xvii-xviii
5 Ibid., p.xviii
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the negation of a first cause 1 . However, Ibn Rochd regards the world as Mnhdath (eternally 
created) by God2 .Ibn Rochd was with the Peripatetic dictum stating that what has no 
beginning has no end. Accordingly, there is never an end of time and we cannot say that an 
infinite time is ended. Ibn Rochd was thinking that way because the series involved are only 
a temporal sequence and God is the essential cause. As mentioned before, this debate about 
the eternity of the world is very old and went back to the time of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers. Among them Parmenides(early 5th century BC) who went on to say that even if 
we do suppose that the world had a beginning, this means that before the existence of the 
world, there was an empty time in which there cannot be a motive for the supposed 
beginning . Consequently, there could be nothing that could incite God to start the creation 
altogether3 . If all Muslim philosophers believe that God is the creator of everything, many 
non-Muslim philosophers even if they do not agree with that, they thought that who created 
the world had to end up to a necessary being with its essence and they believed that 
necessary being had to be one and unique. However, they disagreed about the nature of that 
one, some philosophers considered it as the AI-Aql (The Intellect), other philosophers saw it 
in the basic elements and others in the celestial soul4 .
Many philosophers do support or refute the eternity of the world by means of proofs based 
on time, movement and possibility, which we will discuss in depth in the forthcoming 
chapters. In the light of the possible creation of the world built upon the notion of time, 
Aristotle argued that the world could not have to come, simply because there is no absolute 
becoming. Many philosophers, and among them Aristotle, were thinking that way, as they 
relied on the constant observation of different things and wonders happening in their daily 
life and concluded that everything that becomes, has to come from something 5 .Therefore, 
everything that comes to be is a development or evolution of something else that we are not 
always sure of. This analysis will lead us to talk about the famous dictum declared by the 
Eleatics* that there is no becoming, either it is or it is not, if it is, no need to become, and if it 
is not, nothing becomes out of nothing. This is exactly the Aristotelian dictum stating that
1 Ibn Rochd, the Introduction of ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol. 1 p.xx 
:Harry A.Wolfson .The Twice-RevealedAverroes. p.377
3 Simon Van Den Bergh ,the introduction of Ibn Rochd's 'The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol. 1. p.xx 
4Al-Shahrastani Nihayat al-AKadamfi Ilm al-Kalam,CYhs End of Steps in the Science of Theology) 
pp.54-55. 
Simon Van Den Bergh, The Introduction of Ibn Rochd's .The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol. 1 .p.xxi
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becoming is nothing but the actualization of a potentiality. There is another dilemma raised 
by the Megarians* who deny the potentiality. They argued that there is no potentiality in
nature, and accordingly, no becoming of things out of potencies. This dictum was taken over 
by the Ash 'arites, and Al -Ghazali was one of them. He believed with the Ash Writes, as the 
Megarians did, that things do not become, and consequently, the future does not lie in the 
present. Therefore, everything that occurs is completely new and has nothing to do with its 
predecessor1 . Theologians do believe that the world is not an independent entity or a self- 
subsistent system that has its own laws to develop by itself. That is why, it cannot be 
understood by itself, and always the mystery of becoming is connected to the mystery of 
God, as He is the source of all change in the world and the only one responsible for creation. 
Regardless of the existence and the non-existence of things, we have only to assert that God 
is in charge of the creation and the annihilation processes. This does not mean that these 
things become of each other, as there is no route or passage between being and not 
being2 . We have to mention here the importance of the problem of the incorruptibility of the 
world in defining eternalism. Many theologians, including Al -Ghazali regarded this 
problem as a synonym of its being uncreated. However, there is less opposition amongst 
theologians about the incorruptibility of the world than about its being uncreated. The 
Mu 'tazilites do believe that God is the only source of knowledge of the nature and the 
destiny of our world. It is thanks to divine norms that we do come to know that the nature of 
our world is creation and its destiny is annihilation, but without any irrefutable evidence of 
such annihilation3 . As mentioned previously, Ibn Rochd like Aristotle, tried to solve this 
problem of the corruptibility of the world by claiming that there is no difference between 
production and destruction .Ibn Rochd bolstered his claims by introducing three principles 
for them, which are form, matter and privation. He combines all these three principles in the 
production and destruction processes, in the sense that when a thing comes into being, its 
form arises, and its privation disappears. On the contrary, when it is destroyed, its privation 
arises and its form disappears. However, for both Aristotle and Ibn Rochd, these processes of 
production and destruction are eternal, circular and reversible4 . Al-Ghazali was against this 
Rochdian logic because the fact of saying that the processes of production and creation are
1 Simon Van Den Bergh, The Introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol 1. pp.xxi-xxii
2 Ibid., p.xxii
3 Ibid.xxiii 
4Ibid., p.xxiv
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eternal is contradictory since production and creation generate something after a non - 
existence state. Ibn Rochd does ague that the world is eternally produced out of something. It 
is worth noting that the statement of Giles of Rome (ca. 1247-1316 AD) that Ibn Rochd, by 
denying creatio ex nihilo (creation out of something) was reviling both the Muslim and the 
Christian religion is baseless 1 . Ibn Rochd did not deny the creation ex-nihilo, but he 
emphasized that there is no indication in Islam that God created out of nothing. This does not 
mean that God did not create out of nothing. As we are creatures and everything else around 
us seems to be created out of something, it is extremely hard to fathom the secrets of the 
creation from ex-nihilo. The theory of the creation regardless of its nature from ex-nihilo or 
from ex-materia (a pre-existing matter) leads us to discuss the Neo-Platonic emanation 
theory stating that the whole world was emanated from God's absolute Oneness2 .
Definitely, we are here facing the most controversial thorny issue in the history of 
philosophy and theology. Hot debates and intellectual conflicts emerged not only between 
the Hellenes who supported the eternity of the world and the Abrahamic philosophers who 
advocated its creation, but also between the Hellenes themselves. This is manifested in the 
differences between Plato and Aristotle and between the Abrahamic philosophers themselves 
such as the differences between Philoponus representing Christianity and Ibn Tofayl and Ibn 
Baja standing for Islam. The disagreement reached even philosophers of the same religion 
and the same creed and sect like the differences between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rochd. Such 
intellectual conflict would reach later on the scientists of all disciplines; they joined this 
intellectual arena to contribute to it with their theories especially those dedicated to the topic. 
We have to bear in mind that the fundamental principles of the Aristotelian philosophy are 
based upon the conception of the universe. Such a conception was completed by his 
successors Apollonius, Hiparque and Ptolemy. The philosophical and theological works of 
these outstanding thinkers remained dominant for more tha*n two thousand years. After that, 
the Muslim, Jewish and Christian thoughts started to take shape. Those thoughts were 
characterized by the physical, the metaphysical and the metaphysical-mathematic principles. 
Among these principles, we find the principle of the better or the final cause, the anteriority 
of the perfect, the superiority of the high over the low, the right over the left and the front 
over the back3 . This was the era when the conflict between philosophy and religion began to
1 Harry A.Wolfson ,The Twice-Revealed Averroes, p.375
2Simon Van Den Bergh, the Introduction of Ibn Rochd's , The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol. 1. p.xxv
3Leon Gauthier, IBN ROCHD(AVERROES),p. 113.
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loom to take different dimensions. Undoubtedly, the religious standpoint about the eternity 
of the world was different of that of the Hellenes. However, religious thinkers and 
theologians as a whole were fascinated by the Hellenistic way of thinking and their method 
of presenting evidence and refuting other theories. That is why, they tried hard to find some 
common points between them and the ancient wisdom 1 . They achieved some of these targets 
by making some of the dogmas of religion homogeneous with Greek philosophy. Divine 
intervention in the mechanism of the world was beyond question, but the conflict was about 
the nature of this intervention. Anaxagoras is believed to be the first philosopher who 
explained such an intervention as the organization of an anterior chaos. The two first biblical 
Verses of Genesis support this idea in which God appears to be the organiser of a pre- 
existent chaos.
This idea emerged in Judaism and it was later passed on to Christianity2 . In the Jewish 
tradition, God created the Sky and the Earth, the Earth was enforme (informe) and empty 
tohou va-bohou, and the spirit of God was flying at the surface of waters (or on the face of 
the...),then God, with his word, organized in six days or successive periods this tohu -bohu 3 . 
Later on in the Qur'an, as Ibn Rochd himself has pointed out, we find some echoes of this 
ancient Jewish tradition. "Moreover He comprehended in His design the Sky, and it had been 
(as) smoke: He said to it and to the Earth: 'Come ye together, willingly or unwillingly. ' They 
said: We do come (together), in willing obedience4". In the tenth century, the question 
whether God created the world from ex nihilo or from ex-materia was the same as whether 
'the non-existing' is 'nothing' or 'something'. Regarding the creation out of smoke, there is 
still thorny discussion about that meaning. Az-Zamakhsharr went on to say that the smoke 
proceeded from the waters under the throne of God, and according to Islamic tradition, the 
throne was one of the things created before the heavens and Earth. Ibn Rochd used this 
Qur'anic Verse to prove that the heavens were created from something eternal 6 .Ibn Rochd 
admitted that the path of creation and eternity is thorny, as in the Qur'an there is neither the 
term eternal nor an indication that God created the world from nothing. 7
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p. 198
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid
4 The Holy Qur'an: Chapter HaMim or Fussilat, 41, Verse: 11
5His real name is Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Umar az-Zamakhshari. Known widely as al-Zamakhshari ethnically, he was 
of Iranian origin, (in Arabic: i^j .'^^jil). Also called Jar Allah (Arabic for "God's neighbour") (1074 -1075 - 1143 - 1144) 
was a medieval Muslim scholar withA/« 'tazilite theological influences lived in the Arabian Empire
6 Harry A. Wolfson ,The Twice -RevealedAverroes, p.376
7 Ibn Rochd, M-Kashfan Manahij al-Adilla, ( The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),p. 81.
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All Abrahamic philosophers do believe unanimously in the creationism theory stating that 
God Almighty, in the beginning, created everything from either something or nothing. This 
occurred due to His free will and out of His pure goodness. Therefore, everything was 
created by His word and thanks to the divine exemplars existing in this word. However, there 
are many divergences between the three Abrahamic religions regarding such divine authority 
and the concept of eternity. Despite some differences between the Abrahamic philosophers 
regarding the nature of creationism, they all meet in considering God's existence as 
immutable and His knowledge of all lives and eternal objects as non- successive. This notion 
of God's essence is contradicted with the successive eternity or the Platonic one that consists 
only of eternal objects 1 .
Muslim philosophers, in discussing the eternity of the world, started with the rational and 
the theological proofs of the existence of God. This way led them to talk about the divine 
essence and consequently the divine attributes. Such a method paved the way for shedding 
more light on the God-world relationship. Eventually, we have to point out that the conflict 
was between not only religion and philosophy, but also between the Hellenes themselves. 
That is why, many Jewish, Christian and Muslim philosophers and theologians exploited 
these discrepancies in the Hellenistic views of the eternity of the world to their own interest 
in supporting or refuting other theories according to their compatibility with the dogmas of 
religion. Christian works about the eternity of the world appeared first by John Philoponus, 
while those of Jewish and Muslims are attributed to tens of thinkers and theologians. Ben 
Maimon taught temporal creation, and in the same time, emphasized that all creatures are 
continually dependent on the creator .Likewise, some Rabbinic traditions speak of the Torah 
as being in co-existence with God himself, whereas the Zohar stated that it existed even 
before the process of creation, ben Maimon stated, like Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-7-1274 
AD), in many occasions that there is no clear philosophical proof against or for the temporal 
creation and this dilemma can only be solved through revelation 2 . This stance is quite 
different from that of the Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410 AD), who believed 
that the eternal creation ex nihilo is necessary for the explanation of God's existence as a 
necessary being. Ibn Rochd went on to say that the Loquentes of the three laws that exist
1 D.P. Walker Eternity and the Afterlife, p.242
2 Tony Dodd ,The life and Thought ofSiger of Brabant, Thirteenth -Century Parisian Philosopher. An 
Examination of his Views on the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology,p.H2.
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today believe in the creation ex nihilo, which he rejected it. Likewise, the Loquentes of the 
three religions supported the ex nihilo creation. As it is the case of Hasdai Crescas, many 
Jewish philosophers of Muslim Spain described the creation as being ex-nihilo. The 
Christian Patristic and Scholastic philosophers maintained it as well. In Islam, in The Fikh 
Akbar II (Compendium of Muslim Texts), which may have originated in the middle of the 
tenth century, says in Article 5 "God has not created things from a pre-existing thing" 1 . In 
the same regard, Islamic teachings are manifested in the Holy Qur'an that indicates a 
temporal creation of the universe, which appeared also in the works of Islamic sects such as 
the Mu'tazilites who supported the created nature of the Qur'an and the Mutakallimin 
(Muslim Scholars) who asserted that the Holy Qur'an is uncreated. As a whole, many 
Muslim philosophers followed, with some reservation and different directions, the Greek 
tradition concerning the eternity of the world. Ibn Sina, for instance, relied upon Neo- 
Platonic reasoning based on the nature of necessary emanations, whereas Ibn Rochd, was 
heavily influenced by Aristotle's view of causality2 .What should be highlighted here is that 
we are not here just torn between eternalism and creationism, but also between the different 
scenarios of eternalism and those of creationism. eternalism includes three possible 
scenarios, the first one assumes a world with a beginning and an end and the second 
scenario, a world, which has a beginning but without an end, or what the scholastics call 
aeternitas a parte posteriori .
The third scenario presumes a successive eternity, which means a world that has no 
beginning and no end like in the Neo-Platonic scheme. Here and all over again, we are facing 
a real dilemma, why is the successive eternity on the right -hand side rather than the left? In 
the sense that why not an aeternitas a parte anteriori instead of post (beings who have no 
beginning, but an end)? Or why not both? It is obvious that anyone thinking in the Platonic 
way, would find the scenario of aeternitas a parte posteriori highly paradoxical, as it would 
give an inadequate image of the ideal, still eternity4 . Likewise, in creationism we are in front
1 Harry A. Wolfson ,The Twice-Revealed Averroes, p.375
2Tony Dodd ,The life and thought ofSiger of Brabant, Thirteenth -Century Parisian Philosopher. An
Examination of his Views on the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology, p,143
3 D.P. Walker fiternity and the Afterlife, p.246
4 Ibid.,246.
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of two scenarios, the first one supports the creation out of a pre-existing matter, the second 
one advocates the creation out of nothing. These are not the only problems facing us when 
studying the creationist status of the world. The adherents of creationism also disagreed 
about whether the world was created out of a necessity or it was a divine free will. Likewise, 
they disagreed about whether the world was created temporally or ab-aeterno(from eternity). 
However, all these scenarios discuss the status of the world within the scope of creatio ex- 
deo( creation from God).
* "He comprehended in His design the sky, and it had been (as) a smoke: He said to it and to the Earth "come 
yet together, willingly or unwillingly" They said "We do come (together): in willing obedience" so He 
completed them as seven firmaments in two days, and He assigned each heaven its duty and command. And we 
adorned the lower heaven with lights, and (provided it) with guard .Such is the decree of (Him) the exalted in 
might, Full of knowledge " ( The Holy Qur'an , Chapter Ha Mim orFussilat, 41,Verse .11).
*"Say: Is it that ye deny Him who created the Earth in two days? And do ye join equals with Him? He is the 
lord of (all) the worlds " (Ibid, Verse : 9).
* "one day the earth will be changed to a different earth, and so will be the heavens, and (men) be marshalled 
forth, before God, the one, the irresistible" (Ibid, Chapter Ibrahim : Abraham, 14, Verse .48).
*"Verilv your Lord is God, who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and is firmly established on the 
throne (of authority), regulating and governing all things. No intercessor (can plead with Him) except after His 
leave (hath been obtained). This is God your Lord; Him therefore sen'e ye: Will ye not receive 
admonition?(Ibid., Chapter Yonous: Jonah, 10, Verse.3)
* It is a school of philosophy founded in Greece at the beginning of the 4th century BC by Eucleides of 
Megara. It is noted more for its criticism of Aristotle and its influence upon Stoic logic than for any positive 
assertions. Although Eucleides was a pupil of Socrates and the author of Socratic dialogues, only imperfect 
glimpses of his thought survive. He is said to have held that "the good is one, though it is called by many 
names, sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and sometimes reason" and that "the contrary to the good has no 
reality". (Online Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/topic /373025/Megarian-school. Access date: 
07 Jun. 2007).
*In Eleatic philosophy , the assertion of Parmenides of Elea that Being is one (Greek: hen) and unique and that it is 
continuous, indivisible, and all that there is or ever will be. His deduction of the predicate one from his assertion that only 
Being exists is not adequately explicit; thus, later thinkers felt it necessary to fill in his argument. Aristotle, for example, 
wrote: "Claiming that besides Being that which is not is absolutely nothing, he thinks that Being is of necessity one, and 
there is nothing else." Aristotle suggested that, to Parmenides, Being must be all that there is (because other than Being 
there is only Not-Being), and there can therefore exist no second other thing. Moreover, one can ask what could divide 
Being from Being other than Not-Being? But because for Parmenides (as opposed later to the Atomists) Not-Being cannot 
be, it cannot divide Being from Being. It follows, then, that Being is whole, continuous, and "not divisible, since it is all 
alike."(Online : Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/topic/182278/ Eleatic- One : Access date: 14 Aug. 2007).
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ON THE HELLENIC VIEW OF THE ARCHITECTURE
OF THE WORLD;
1.1 Grounds for the Hellenistic Enlightenment:
There is no room for doubt that living memory goes back to earlier stages of history to 
what we call the pre-philosophic era. The latter influenced earlier philosophers and helped 
them to elaborate many of their doctrines and theories. The heritage of that age helped us to 
trace the intellectual ancestry of Greek philosophy and the conceptual forces that shaped the 
mind of Thales, Empedocles and Plato 1 . These are not the only factors that contributed to the 
advent of Greek wisdom. In the fifth century, the political and social upheaval caused by the 
Persian wars and the unceasing antagonise between Athens and Sparta contributed to the 
intellectual convergence between the two places. New ideas poured into Athens because of 
the influx of the Ionian thinkers into the Attic peninsula. This new situation made of Athens 
the intellectual capital of the Greek world. Therefore, a new era emerged to reject all the 
classical explanations and the traditional speculations of the nature of the world. As a result 
of this radical change, religious beliefs declined, in that the position of gods and goddesses 
was no longer outstanding, as it used to be one century earlier. The long Persian and the 
Peloponnesian wars taught people how to determine their destiny by their own actions and 
not 'Moira ' for instance. Consequently, many of the notions of right and wrong were called 
into question. All this intellectual enlightenment was expressed in both the Hellenic tragedy 
and comedy".
We have to bear in mind that not only the factors of affinities, convergence and interaction 
that led to this intellectual revolution, but also the creative and the innovational spirit of the 
Hellenes themselves. They used their energies to explain the mysteries of the nature of the 
world by resorting to history, tragedy, comedy, art and architecture. By the same creative 
mental tools, they invented the love of wisdom 'Philosophy'. All these occurred when the 
Hellenes became unsatisfied with the mythical and the supernatural explanations of the 
divergent phenomena of the natural world. This intellectual mutation in the Greek thought 
led the Hellenes to think that there must be rational and logical speculations of these 
unconvincing mythical explanations of the mysteries of the universe.
1 George F. Mclean, Patrick J.Aspell indent Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence, p.7
2 Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html. Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
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Whenever we do talk about ancient Greece and ancient wisdom, we have to talk about the 
5 l century. This is the age of the great historians, Herodotus (ca.485-425 BC.) and 
Thucydides (ca.460-.400 BQ.The former wrote a history that covered all the major events of 
the ancient Near East, Egypt and Greece. The latter firmly rejected any notion that gods 
intervene in human affairs, alternatively, he regards the fate of man in his own hands. This is 
also the age of great dynamists such as Sophocles (ca.496-406 BC.).He wrote a plenty of 
plays about the precedence of divine law over human defects to explain that human beings 
have to follow blindly the will of gods, as they stand for justice and order. Euripides (ca.480- 
406 BC.) made a new move by giving less importance to gods and considered them as 
inferior to human beings. Epicurus went further by discharging gods from their supposed 
role of running the world and replaced them by void and atoms as the ultimate causes of all 
natural phenomena 1 . Aeschylus (ca. 525-456 BC.) was the first dramatist to express in his 
trilogy of plays The Agamemnon' 'The Libation Bearers' and The Eumenides' the agony 
of individuals caught in conflict, whereas, Aristophanes (ca.448-380 BC) ,like many of his 
contemporaries, used art to dramatize his ideas on the right conduct of the citizens and the 
value of the polis2 . All these Hellenistic products were contributing to the development of 
the embryo carrying wisdom and sageness. A long time before the appearance of Thales, 
ideas were conceived and developed in a very mythical way by Homer (ca. 800 BC) and 
Hesiod (-776 BQ.When the earlier philosophers spoke of God and the soul, they were 
raising ideas that had a very long history in mythical representation. Those myths helped 
later philosophers to elaborate their views of reality3 .Not to mention the outstanding 
philosopher Socrates whose works would be exposed in different occasions throughout the 
thesis. This is the same age when the Greeks embraced their brilliant experiment in direct 
democracy. The amazing monuments to human achievements were built in Athens and all 
the other Hellenic cities. It is an age of great discoveries, human enlightenment and the birth 
of rational thought. Even though the early religious thought and knowledge of nature had 
been conveyed in a mythical manner, the Greek mind in general is so rich and versatile. No 
wonder that this mythical manner that contributed to the advent of rational and speculative 
philosophy. Aristotle compared these two ways of thinking by viewing Homer and Hesiod as
1 A. A. Long ,Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism, p.63
2Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
3 George F.Mclean, Patrick J.Aspell ^indent Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence, p.7
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the primitive theologians and the forerunners of philosophy. The reason why Aristotle 
called them so is that they articulated many doctrines like philosophers, but they were unlike 
them in their use of mythical ways 1 .Definitely, the shift from the mythical ways to 
philosophical thinking did not occur overnight, but rather, it was long and gradual. The 
evidence of that gradualness is found in some philosophers' works that combined what is 
rational and what is mythical such as Empedocles and Plato. Both used myths in a very 
philosophical way to reach facts and truths. Therefore, it is imperative to study the products 
of this pre-philosophic era based upon the nature of mythical thinking to achieve a better 
understating of rationality in Greek thinking and especially in both philosophy and 
theology2 .
Undoubtedly, mythical thinking is the outcome of an uncritical consciousness that 
conceives the world and everything related to it in a very symbolic meaning. When the pre- 
philosophic Greeks were faced by natural disasters such as earthquakes and storms, they did 
not resort to logical explanations and analytical inquiries to understand the hows and the 
whys of these phenomena. They employed intuitive and imaginative insights, for instance, 
they thought that thunder and lighting occurred when Zeus hurled his thunderbolt. We have 
to bear in mind that the tool of imagination has a bigger space of freedom in mythical 
thinking than it is in philosophical thought. Such freedom compelled the mythicist to face a 
big problem in his attempts to provide others with acceptable explanations. Obstacles and 
difficulties do not prevent the Greek mythical thinkers from approaching nature and fighting 
to explain its phenomena with all the available mythical tools. Their ways were not 
scientific, their imagination uncritical and their thought with no intellectual content. 
However, we do find, in some occasions, partial insight into the meaning of some particular 
events3 . What makes such mythical speculations of a paramount importance is that they 
covered all the aspects of natural life not like the pre-Greek view of the world that drew no 
clear distinction between the human and the non-human and between the animate and the 
inanimate. This means that everything that is alive is ensouled, and accordingly, of a divine 
nature . 
Hesiod's theogony is a vivid example of the rational inquiry into the origin of the world. He
1 George F.Mclean, Patrick J. Aspell ^Ancient Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence, pp.7-
2 Ibid.,p. 8
3 Ibid, 
"ibid.
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went beyond the sense experience of the external world and he sought to explain the origin 
of things. Hesiod is considered the greatest cosmogonist in Greek mythical thought, hi his 
attempts to trace the ancestry of gods in his theogony, he had to provide us with an account 
of the origin of the things:
"Aeons before the titans and Olympians even existed there came into being Chaos, a 
yawning gap or vast immeasurable abyss, followed by Gaia (Earth), Tartaros, and Eros. 
Erebus, and night conceived and bore Ether and day. Likewise, by a process of separation, 
Earth gave birth to an equal body starry Heaven, to the high mountains, and to Pontus, the 
sea. Earth and heaven were then reunited in marriage by the cosmis attraction of Eros, and 
his fritful union bore the ocean and the eldest gods or Titans, among whom were Cronus, 
Atlas, and Prometheus, the saviour of mankind. Eventually, the Titans were superseded by 
the more illustrious progeny of Heaven and earth, Zeus and the Olympians1 . "
We do deduce from this mythical passage that the pre-philosophic thinkers do think that the 
cosmos, which made the gods and not the opposite gods who made cosmos. It is obvious that 
Hesiod' theology does contain the seeds of a philosophic cosmology. In earth, the fiery 
Heaven, Sea and Night we would recall the four basic elements earth, fire, water and air. 
Besides, the notion of chaos, the unifying force and the separating one 2 would all appear 
later on as controversial objects. The philosophers who would come later scientifically 
explored all these mythical thoughts and insights. Mythical thought is not rational, albeit it is 
important, as it deals with the same objects as philosophy. In other words, it is providing 
philosophy with what we can call 'unverifiable truth' that3 has to be explored by 
philosophers, hi the sixth century BC, a religious movement among the Greeks named 
Orphism* inaugurated a new era of the consciousness of the self and a new look to human 
life. Homeric and Hesiodic Olympianism , with the doctrine of jealousy and the impassable 
gulf between gods and men exceeds the human needs and the human emotions. This 
religious movement provided man with the opportunity to take part in the divine. Orphism 
taught people that Zeus made man from the ashes of the Titans who killed and devoured 
Dionysus, the son of Zeus4 .
'George F.Mclean, Patrick J.Aspell .Ancient Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence, p. 11 
2Ibid
3 Ibid., pp.8-9
4 Ibid., pp. 11-12
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In the middle of all these debates, the fundamental principles of the Aristotelian philosophy 
are the most striking, as they came from the conception of the universe. The Peripatetic 
works that were completed by his successors Apollonius (ca. 262 .190 BC), Hipparchus 
(ca.190 -120 BC) and Ptolemy (ca.85 -165 AD) prevailed for more than two thousand years 
and dominated the Greek-Latin, Arabic, Jewish and Christian thought. These principles of 
metaphysical nature, mathematical metaphysics or physics are the principle of the best, or 
the final causes, the anteriority of the perfect, the excellence of the circular figure among 
surfaces, the spherical figure among the volumes, the superiority of the top over the bottom, 
the right over the left and the front over the rear. From these principles came the main 
consequences stating that as the circle is the most perfect figure, the circular movement is the 
most perfect movement, as it is continuous, uniform and eternal. It is the first movement 
because the perfect is anterior to the imperfect. Consequently, it is compatible with the first 
and the perfect body, which is the sky, the aether 1 . This Hellenic age of the Greek 
civilization shaped a specific Greek mind in which the individual and the rationalistic spirit 
were of a paramount importance. Even if Athens never united all Greece, its culture was 
unchallenged. The trade routes from the Aegean brought ideas from almost everywhere to 
the great cultural centre of Athens. Thanks to its economic initiative, the Athenian polis was 
very wealthy. It sponsored the production of dramas and urged wealthy citizens to pay the 
expenses of production.
* A Hellenistic mystic religion, thought to have been based on the teachings and songs of the legendary Greek musician 
Orpheus. No coherent description of such a religion can be constructed from historical evidence. Most scholars agree that 
by the 5th century BC there was at least an Orphic movement, with travelling priests who offered teaching and initiation, 
based on a body of legend and doctrine said to have been founded by Orpheus. Part of the Orphic ritual is thought to have 
involved the mimed or actual dismemberment of an individual representing the god Dionysus, who was then seen to be 
reborn. Orphic eschatology laid great stress on rewards and punishment after the death of the body, the soul then being freed 
to achieve its true life(Online Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/onJhism. Access Date: 12 of Jan 2006
* In the time of Pericles, that Athens enjoyed its greatest period of success. The period itself was dominated by the figure of 
Pericles and so the era has often been called the Age of Pericles (c.490-429 B.C.). Pericles offered many benefits to the 
common people of Athens and as a result, he earned their total support. Oddly enough, the benefits he conferred upon the 
common people had the result of weakening the aristocracy, the social class from which he came. As the historian 
Thucydides pointed out, "he controlled the masses, rather than letting them control him." From the 450s onward, Pericles 
rebuilt the city of Athens, a city ravaged by years of wars with the Persians. He used the public money from the Delian 
League to build several masterpieces of 5 th century Greek architecture, the Parthenon and the Propylaea It has been said that 
the Greeks are the first ancient society with which modern western society (since the Renaissance, that is) feels some sort of 
affinity. (Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007/
1 Leon Gauthier ,Ibn Rochd (Averroes), p. 113
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1.2. From Myths and Superstition to Rational Explanations Through 
The Great Three Phases of Greek Speculative Thought:
The early Ionic philosophers sought the origin of the universe in water, fire, earth and 
many other elements, and it is the inadequacy of these explanations that led to the growth of 
Greek intellect 1 . However, and like any other human thought, the Greek philosophical 
thinking passed through an embryonic stage represented in speculative thinking based on 
expressing human curiosity about the world and understanding the wonderment of life. Then, 
there was an intellectual mutation in the practical thinking that focused on the 
comprehension of the nature of life and its relation to human beings. The last phase of this 
intellectual development can be called the critical thinking because it involved minute 
explanations, thorough examinations and rational assessments of all sort of things 
surrounding us or interacting with us in this melodious universe. Each of these phases has a 
particular name and certain pioneers.
The first phase is known as the age of Mythos (....600 BC), during this period, the focus 
was on the world of men and gods accompanied with anthropomorphic explanations, 
mythopeotic language and supernatural arches. The great pioneer of this age was Homer (ca. 
750 BC) who claimed that Zeus created all things, as he is the king of gods. Homer saw all 
gods as human being with all the emotions and the vices, they interact mentally and 
physically with the ordinary humans with only one basic difference, the humans die but gods 
are eternal. Xenophanes, the first philosopher of religion, attacked this Homeric divine 
conception in a very satirical verses which only very few fragments remain".
In the second age named the pre-Socratic (ca.600-500 BC), philosophers came from the city 
of Miletus in the region of Ionia. Miletus was an outstanding trade depot and its dwellers 
have a direct contact with the ideas of the near East3 . In this age, the Milesian philosophers 
focused on nature built upon naturalistic explanations, universal questions and the extended 
exploration of the speculative issues. Unfortunately, only few recorded works were left, or 
they wrote little themselves. Whatever the case, their common tenet is that the entire 
complex world is emerged from a simple permanent thing. Thales of Miletus (ca. 624-548 
BC) was the representative of this age. Thales was the first systematic thinker who went on 
to say that water is the originating principle of all things. This standpoint was revolutionary
1 H.F. Hose, Lucretius, p. 161
2 Anthony Kenny ^Indent Philosophy, p.289
3 Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
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to the point that many scholars consider him as the world's first philosopher. Besides, by 
this natural explanation of the architecture of the world he omitted the notion of gods from 
this equation, as he did not give them any role in such architecture'. From this particular 
stage of history, human interpretation of the cosmos changed from the anthropomorphic 
analysis to the scientific one. This shift in interpretation gave birth to philosophy and the two 
main routes of rational inquiry: the beginning of rational thinking led to the emergence of 
science, and consequently, the natural philosophy dealing with the quiddities of the cosmos 
and moral philosophy dealing with human self.
There are two famous saying recorded of Thales of Miletus, the founding father of Greek 
philosophy. The first one is 'all things are full of gods' and the second one is 'water is the 
first principle of everything'^. Even at those times when human rationality was at an 
embryonic stage, people found it extremely hard to understand Thales' adoption of water as 
the ultimate principle of explanation. He claimed that Earth rests on water like a log floating 
in a stream, but when Aristotle asked, what does the water rest on?(Cael.2.13.294a28-34), he 
said that everything came from or it is ,in some way or another, made out of water3 . Aristotle 
objected to Thales' reasoning and thought that Thales was thinking that way as all animals 
and plants need water to live, or because semen is moist (Met.A3.983bl7-27). We have to 
bear in mind that this is the same ancient phallicism based on the worship of the phallus or 
the lingam as a symbol of divine reproductive power, and a source of generation and 
propagation. The adherents of such belief associate phallicism with the discussion of some 
biological theories such as 'natural selection' and 'the survival of the fittest'. Aristotle 
accused Thales and his immediate followers of introducing no efficient cause of motion over 
and above the material cause into their systems4 . The Aristotelian system sees the element as 
the primary, simple ingredient of a composite thing (Met.l014a26ff). According to Aristotle, 
the true elements of the natural world are not these four basic elements, but rather, the four 
main physical opposites: hot, dry, cold and wet. The combination of these opposites gave 
birth to the four elements: earth, water, fire and air. Therefore, Aristotle drew a distinction 
between three things: the tetrad of earth, water, air and fire, which are named 'elements', the 
idea of an element as such, and the primary opposites."
' Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
2 Anthony Kenny ,Ancienl Philosophy, p.4
3Ibid.,p.5
4 Aristot\eJ)eAn.I.411a8;Met.A984al6-27,.
5 Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmolog\\ pp. 120-121
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Aristotle thinks of a snug and finite universe in which fire rose to the top and earthly matter 
settled to the bottom. According to Aristotle, when fire rose to the top is more natural than 
when it came to rest at the top. Likewise, it was no less to earthly matter to rest at the bottom 
than to sink to the bottom'. The Aristotelian system is, and in many occasions, built upon 
syllogism, as we would see in the forthcoming chapters, like in the case of the parts of 
animals, plants and the inanimate objects. If they are proved to be created, all the celestial 
spheres are created as well, as they all share the property of corporeality2 .
If we go back to Thales's claim that water is the arche of all things, we would find that it 
had shortcomings, according to his student and contemporary Anaximander of 
Milerus(c.611-547 BC), because Thales failed to establish the relationship between water 
and fire, in the sense that water cannot be the arche of its opposite. From this perspective, 
Anaximander sees the primal and the infinite apeiron as the main originator of all creations, 
or in other words, an indefinite substance, which he named the boundless as the source of all 
things. Anaximander achieved this conclusion because he sees that the changing face of the 
universe requires the cyclical interaction of things of at least four sorts: the cold and the wet 
condensed to form the earth and the hot and the dry formed the Moon, Sun and stars. The 
heat from the fire in the skies dried the earth and shrank the seas. It is through the gradual 
process of distillation that not only the four elements water, air, fire and earth emerge, but all 
living things as well3 . All over again, we do notice with Anaximander's scheme of thought 
that he sought natural explanation for the origin of the natural world. Therefore, both Thales 
and Anaximander can be considered as 'matter philosophers' because they believed that 
every single thing in our world had its origin in a material substance. The next Milesian 
philosopher was Anaximenes (585 -528 BC) who was so close to Anaximander's definition 
by considering air (vapour or mist), as the main entity of our Cosmos. This because air is a 
warm wet air combining two of the four elements together and it provides a familiar pair of 
processes for changes in its own state which are condensation and evaporation. Therefore, 
because of its rarefied form of breath, or spirit, Anaximenes considered air as the most likely 
candidate for life representation. Parmenides of Elea (c.515 -450 BC) challenged the
1 Normal W. DeWitt, Epicurus: His Perpendicular Universe, p.58.
2 Ibn Rochd, Talkhise Kitab al-Jadal, (Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics),p.43
3 Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
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fundamental standpoints of the Ionian philosophers that all things came out from only one 
single substance. He applied logic to come out with his views in the sense that he sees reality 
as one, eternal and unchanging. Accordingly, we cannot achieve a better understanding of 
reality through our senses as they are deceptive. Therefore, we have to know it through our 
mind; in this case, we came to know reality through reason and not experience. We have to 
depict here that this view is central in Platonic philosophy. It is note worthy to mention 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. 500 BC) who is known in many sources as 'the weeping 
philosopher' because of the mystical obscurity of his thought and his pessimistic views of 
human nature .He argued that life was kept by a tension of opposites, fighting unceasing 
battle in which neither side could win a final victory. Hence, movement and the flux of 
change were unceasing for individuals, but the structure of the universe was constant 1 .
Cratylus ( 5TH Century BC) a follower of Heraclitus went on to say that you cannot step 
twice in the same river as the water would be different water in the second time. This does 
happen because we do see the water reality in its form. That is why, Cratylus came out with 
the conclusion that the belief should be in the absolute, unchanging reality of which the 
world of change and movement is only a quasi-existing phantom and has nothing to do with 
the tangible reality3 . This rational thinking introduced by the pre-Socratic philosophers from 
Thales to Democritus put an end to a very long era known by mythical explanations based on 
blind faith. This intellectual innovation did not reach philosophy only, but all disciplines of 
knowledge. The big example of this enlightenment was manifested by the Greek physician 
Hippocrates of Cos (c.460- 377 BC) who managed to distinguish between magic and 
medicine by saying:
"It is not, in my opinion, any more divine or more sacred than other diseases, but has a 
natural cause, and its supposed divine origin is due to men's inexperience, and to their 
wonder at its peculiar character4. "
From this historical stage, physicians started to observe patients, classify symptoms and 
made predictions about the course of diseases. This enabled them to know the kinds of 
diseases and the possible natural remedy for each disease away from myths, legends and 
arbitrary speculations.
'Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
2 Ancient Athenian philosopher known through Plato's dialogues..
3 Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
4 Ibid.
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1.3 The Pythagorean Theory of Numbers:
Pythagoras of Samos considered things as numbers in their entire nature, and they were the 
first of every nature. He held that the final explanation of the secret of things lie in the 
knowledge of numbers and form, which means that the study of philosophy has to be linked 
to the study of applied mathematics 1 .That is why, Pythagoras assumed that the elements of 
numbers were the elements of all things. In this regard, the whole world is generated from 
numbers, which are the true nature of things. Consequently, the entire universe is just a set of 
harmonious numbers. Pythagoras gave this paramount importance to numbers as first 
principles because of the symmetries existing in them. He assumed that one of the first 
principles, the monad, is God and the good, which is the origin of the one, and the undefined 
dyad is a divinity and the bad. The Pythagoreans went on to say that, there is but one 
number, the mathematical, but things of sense are not separated from this, for they are 
composed of it. We have to mention that in their endeavours to build up the whole cosmos 
out of numbers, they totally discard any role of unit numbers in this construction because 
they do think that the unities have quantity. In the 19th century, some of these Pythagorean 
principles would be borrowed by Bahaism and Babism2 to build their understanding of things 
upon the notion of numbers, and especially the number nineteen, that was glorified and 
regarded as the secret lying behind the existence of everything in the world. 
What is striking here is that if we do admit that all unities have a quantity, so in what way 
the very first quantity was built up to have such a quantity? hi this regard, the Pythagoreans 
did not give us any convincing answer. On the contrary, the qualities of numbers do exist in 
harmony in the heavens and all the other things. The Pythagoreans proved to be accurate in 
many of their explanations of the phenomenon of the cosmos and the qualities and quantities 
of things. However, we are not quite sure that these explanations are about our cosmos and 
these qualities and quantities of things are about the things perceivable with our senses, for 
they made up with numbers, which have no weight and lightness, physical bodies, which 
have weight and lightness. This task becomes even extremely difficult and more 
sophisticated when it comes to virtues and moral values. The Pythagorean theory is of a
1 W. W. Rouse Ball .Pythagoras, p.7
2 These are two religious sects found in Iran by Mizra Hussain known as Baha'Allah(Glory of God) who was 
followed by the Bab. Western colonisation was behind the emergence of these anti-Islamic trends to 
disintegrate the Islamic unity and turn Muslims away from their basic issues. They believe that the Bab created 
everything in the world by his word, they also believe in the manifestation, the incarnation and the eternity of 
the beings and the reward and punishment are spiritual. That is why, there is nothing called heaven and hell. 
Likewise, they deny the truth of jinns and angels, the miracles of prophets and they thought that the religion of 
the Bab is abrogating the Islamic Shari 'a ( law).
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crucial significance in understanding both the origin and nature of our cosmos, at least in a 
time when this issue was so controversial. Pythagoras emphasizes that the first causes of our 
cosmos were immaterial which interacted with other material causes to make up at the end 
the material world. 
1.4. The Sophist Relative View about the Origin of the World: 
The sophists* argued that there is nothing called absolute truth or universal that can be 
valid all the times and in different occasions. This logic is deduced from Protagoras (c.485-
411 BC) who claimed that man is the measure of all things I. This means that everything is 
relative, and consequently, there are no values, as the individual man is the measure of all 
things. In other words, as long as the man who is judging, evaluating and coming out with 
conclusions, truth can never be final and absolute because, for instance, it may happen that 
the same man may came across different findings sooner or later that may change the course 
of his previous discovery or evaluation. Besides, such a man is not the only one in the theatre 
of incidents, as the competition is very fierce from others who may oppose him, refute his 
sayings or even deny his findings. For the same reason, nothing can be evaluated as bad or 
good as long as man is the evaluator. Many scholars think that such relativism is not 
associated with all the sophists and it is restricted to moral and ethical issues and not the 
broader relativism regarding knowledge, truth and reality. Protagoras' relativism is an 
objective one, in that, it is the physical world that changes. That is why, we cannot have an 
objective knowledge of it. Plato agreed with Protagoras to some extent, as long as the 
physical world is concerned, and disagreed with him where there can be no knowledge of the 
physical world, then, there would be the world of essences in which there is knowledge3. We 
have to bear in mind that Protagoras used the term sophism in its later sense of professional 
teacher of virtue, which means that he was continuing the tradition of a long line of 
predecessors4. The other sophist Gorgias of Leontini (c.485-380 BC.) was a very well- paid 
teacher of rhetoric and famous for his saying that no man could know anything, and if he 
managed to do so, he could not describe it, and if he could do so, no one would understand 
him5• Whenever we discuss relativism, the peritropic argument6 is there, such argument 
·Online: www.historyguide.org/ancientJlecture8b.htmI.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007. 
2 Richard Bett ,The Sophists and Relativism, p.139 
3 Block, Irving ,Aristotle and Physical Object, p.93 
4G. B. Kerferd ,The First Greek Sophists, p.9 
sOnline: www.historyguide.org/ancientJlecture8b.htmI.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007. 
6Aristotle, Met. JOOBa2B-34, J012b13-1B 
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stating that all truth is relative to the individual who believe it has to be an absolute truth 
itself, which means true to everybody. If it happens that a person denies it, it must be false 
to him, and consequently, it is both true and false to him. Hence, since relativism indicated 
that no one ever has a mistaken belief, the dissenter's denial of any truth would be a counter- 
instance to it 1 .
The sophists became influential in the intellectual educational life of the Greeks because of 
the apparent failure of the pre-Socratic philosophers, as they had given birth to the tide of 
scepticism about the existence of objective knowledge and truth'.That was the beginning of 
the sophists' challenge to all the values of the fifth century. They tried hard to get rid of all 
the old conventions and the archaic endeavours to achieve a better and comprehensive 
understanding of the universe, gods and even the man himself, as the most complex 
phenomenon of this amazing cosmos. We have to bear in mind that the sophists and 
regardless of their intellectual orientation and their interpretative manners in explaining the 
mysteries of the cosmos, have followed the path of the pre-Socratic philosophers based on 
natural explanations and the degradation of the role of myths and legends in the advancement 
of thought and enlightenment.
* Into such an atmosphere of change, came the travelling teachers, the Sophists. The Sophists were a motley 
bunch - some hailed from the Athenian polis or other city-states, but the majority came from Ionia, in Asia 
Minor. The Sophists were men whose responsibility was to train and educate the sons of Athenian citizens. 
There were no formal school, as we know them today. Instead, these were Peripatetic schools, meaning that the 
instructor would walk with students and talk with them - for a fee, of course. The Sophists taught the skills 
(sophia) of rhetoric and oratory. Both of these arts were essential for the education of the Athenian citizenry. 
After all, it was the sons of the citizens who would eventually find themselves debating important issues in the 
Assembly and the Council of Five Hundred. Rhetoric can be described as the art of composition, while oratory 
was the art of public speaking (Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007).
'j. D. G. Evans, Aristotle on Relativism, p. 194
2 Johnson Steve .Skills. Socrates and the Sophists: Learning from History, p.202
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Even if he was not a sophist himself, Socrates (c.469-399 BC.) came from the ranks of the 
sophists. Socrates argued that humankind is born with knowledge, which is present in the 
human mind at birth. Therefore, the human being does not know too much in his daily 
experiences, but what he is doing is just recollecting the knowledge that was already there. 
This reasoning helps us to understand why Socrates was not used to give his disciples 
answers, but only questions. His duty was just to teach truth, but it is up to his students to 
pull that truth out of their mind, and that is why, Socrates often considered himself as 
midwife in the labour of knowledge. Hence, only through discussions, dialogues and 
conversations can both truth and wisdom come to the surface'.
There is no room for doubt that the theory of atoms is developed from the ancient theories 
about the origin of the world. As the Stoics believed that everything in the world is 
providentially determined by God (Who is nature according to them2 ), they regarded all 
things material, and they tried hard to find out the original kind of matter out of which the 
world is made. They turned to Heraclitus by considering fire as the primordial kind of 
beings, and all beings are made out of it. Other theories are developed to include these 
theories in a single one like Empedocles' theory, which regards earth, fire, water and air as 
the four basic elements of the universe. The third age (500-BC) includes the Socratic 
philosophers and mainly the greatest two sages of ancient wisdom Aristotle and Plato. With 
the latter, we are asking the old pre-Socratic question what the world is made of?
It is of a paramount importance to mention here the Ionian standpoint of the universe that 
descends from Anaximander. The latter's 'principle' is the great cosmic mass that is 
encircling the spherical body of our star-studded heaven. Both the Epicurean and the Stoic 
cosmologies retained the Anaximander reasoning. This alternative conception of the physical 
universe, as a finite sphere began with Parmenides, and a similar view is held by Empedocles 
who applied the Milesian 'epithet' to' the immense sphere' formed by the union of all things 
in the sway of love. 3
'Online: www.historyguide.org/ancient/lecture8b.html.Access Date: 09 Jun.2007.
2 A. A. Long ,Stoic Studies, p.436.
3 Charles H.Kahn Anaximander and the origins of Greek Cosmology, p.234.
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Aristotle supported the Anaximander's principle that had no limit and hence no origin as it 
is ungenerated and imperishable:
"It is believed to be the origin of other things , and to emcompass all things and guide them 
all ( as those say who do not set up other causes besides the boundless, such as mind and 
love) , and to be the divine ; for it is immortal and uncorruptible, as Anaximander says and 
most of natural philosophers'. "
What we can come out from this passage is that, according to Anaximander, the divine 
principle must be not only imperishable, but also ungenerated2 . This means that it has no 
starting point and no origin. This analysis is in sheer contrast with the ageless but generated 
gods of the epics. We have to bear in mind that the philosophers of the sixth and early fifth 
centuries proclaimed a new conception of divinity, which is completely free from both birth 
and death. Definitely, these philosophers followed the path of Anaximander based on the 
belief that such principle guides and governs all things 3 . Furthermore, it is the vital source 
out of which the substance of the world has come and in the same time, the outer limit that 
encloses and defines the body of the cosmos as a whole. It is everlasting, as it is god-like 
power that is controlling the rhythmic life cycle of the world. Therefore, Anaximander 
provided the other philosophers not only with the concept of the well regulated cosmos, but 
also with its regulator, the Cosmic God4 . It is probably for the very first time that we were in 
front of the concept of the natural world, as a unified whole characterized by order and 
equilibrium. It is this concept that gave birth to the first forms of monotheism in ancient 
times5 . We have to emphasize that:
"God of the Greek philosophers is not identical with the world; his Decalogue is the law of 
nature, and his revelation is to be read in the ever-turning cycles of the sun, the moon, the 
planets, and the stellar spheres*. " The answer to this thorny everlasting question led Plato to 
discuss the four basic elements of Empedocles, analysing them through the Pythagorean
'Charles H. Kahn Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, p.238 
: Ibid.
1
2
3 Ibid, 
"bid
5 Ibid.,pp.238-239 
6Ibid.,p.239
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mathematical objects and the atomists' empty space. We have to mention here that Plato's 
view about the eternity of the world combine views of many of his predecessors such as 
Pythagoras who made the physical universe fundamentally mathematical and thought that 
everything was made of numbers. Plato made the geometrical figures the basis of his 
theories. In the Timaeus, he claimed that as fire and earth were solid matters, they need two 
intermediates to be combined. That is why, the Demiurge created air and water to arrange the 
four elements in a proportional way. 
1.5 Democritus' Mechanistic Theory:
Since the dawn of history, man came to the idea of God and gods from the non- 
understandable things that were occurring around him in the world. Democritus confirmed 
this when he related the fear of ancient people from natural phenomena such as thunder and 
lightening to gods. Hence, man created gods to justify that fear. According to Democritus 
and many others such as Leucippus, all things are made of atoms of matter moving in a void. 
By thinking so, Democritus was involved in that time mathematics based upon infinite 
divisibility and points with no magnitude 1 . Therefore, everything that happened in this world 
is due to a mechanical process driven by the velocities and the impacts of atoms because 
mechanistic collisions and overlaps are part of the atom's nature. All the mechanistic 
philosophers that supported or will support Democritus focused their research on the 
invisible mechanisms of that 'huge machine' called nature2 . Many of the Hellenes starting 
from Epicurus and ending by Plato and Aristotle and their followers opposed the explanation 
of natural phenomena in a mechanistic manner. These philosophers rejected such 
explanation, as it failed to answer many questions such as how can the combination of atoms 
circulating in an empty space be responsible for the constant movement of the heavens and 
all living things? Plato and Aristotle tried to replace such theory by introducing divine 
causation and the notion of the purposiveness in the structure and the architecture of the 
world3 . Plato regarded it as based on chance and stated that the collision between atoms is 
not enough to produce all the beauties and the wonders of the world. Likewise, many 
philosophers objected to the idea of man who created God. In the Timaeus, Plato insisted that 
the universe was not eternal but created4, although his creator framed it after an eternal,
'Raymond Godfrey, Democritius and the Impossibility of Collision, p.212
2Cristoph Luthy, The fourfold Democritius on the Stage of Early Modern Science, p.445
3 A.A. Long, .Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism, p.63
4 Plato ,the Timaeus, (28B-29A)
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unchanging model. In his turn, Aristotle's ultimate being is God ( Theos) who is an eternal 
substance. For him, matter is eternal like God and not created. That is why, both of them are 
independent of the world. As mentioned before, Empedocles" theory of the basic elements 
of the world fire, water, air and earth was not taken without amendments and abridgements. 
These elements are said to be made of atoms, which means that the whole world itself is 
made of atoms. Plato objected to this point of view that regards the atoms as the only basis of 
reality. Plato has rejected Empedocles' theory because it is built upon mathematical grounds, 
in the sense that the atoms were made up of an unchanging level of reality. That is why, they 
cannot be the only basic level of reality.
Aristotle, in his turn, emphasized that these four elements earth, fire, water and air are 
continuous, which means that they are not made of atoms. According to Aristotle, any 
change that is occurring in our cosmos is due to the transformation of matter from what it 
was in potential to a new actuality and not through the rearrangement of atoms to make new 
structures. At that time, the Aristotelian explanation of the origin of the world seemed to be 
more rational that Democritus and Plato, for one simple reason, is that their theories 
remained pure speculations because they cannot be put to experiments.
When we are talking about the Aristotelian system about the origin of the world, we have to 
discuss Aristotle's active intellect and the First cause of the universe. However, it is 
worthwhile to mention that when Aristotle was talking about the First cause, he was not 
specifically talking about the origin of the universe, but rather but the universe's motion 1 . 
Aristotle argued that even if we have this account about the origin of the world as seen made 
of water, air , fire or earth or the combination of some or all these(Met.A3.983b20-84a!6), 
our scientific curiosity is not satisfied, as the ingredients of a dish do not put themselves 
together. If these ingredients are put the way they are only because there is an agent operation 
upon them by exercising all the known operations: cutting, mixing, stirring, heating and so 
on2 . Aristotle suggested that sometimes one of these elements does these operations, and he 
suggested fire for this role. The latter is capable to do that because it is the least torpid of all 
elements. It can also be pair of agents, which are more abstract and more picturesque, such 
as Love or Desire or Strife, or the Good and the Bad (Met.A3-4. 984b8-31).
1 HA Davidson proofs for Eternity. Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophv, 
pp. 281-282
2 Anthony Kenny ^.ncient Philosophy, p.2
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The Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias -who was active in the late second 
and early third century AD-, went beyond this Aristotelian logic by considering the first 
cause, as the cause of human thought and the principle of the existence of all other things '. 
Therefore, the Alexandrian view is compatible with the Aristotelian one in regarding the first 
cause, as the cause of the motion of the universe, and surpasses it by seeing it, as the 
responsible for the existence of all beings and other things alike. 
1.6 The Platonist School:
Greek philosophers, and for long centuries, were fascinated by our astonishing universe, its 
structure, its purpose and of course its destiny. They formulated plenty of theories and 
doctrines trying to find some answers of these thorny questions that were repeatedly asked 
by the philosophers of the time and those who preceded them from other civilizations. The 
theory that explains the structure of the universe as a unity composed of heterogeneous 
elements had to do that by assuming that everything was in reality different from the same 
thing. That is why, many of the pre-Socratic philosophers of the sixth and the early fifth 
centuries BC tried hard to find this single substance out of which everything was ultimately 
made such as air for Anaximenes, water for Thales, fire for Heraclitus and a combination of 
the primary elements air, water, fire and earth for Empedocles. Later on, Democrirus and 
Leucippus came out with the idea that revolutionized our understanding of the world, and 
fully contributed to the advent of the Epicurean philosophy". We would shed more light on 
all these theories and doctrines in the forthcoming chapters.
The Epicurean philosophy is based on the atomic theory claiming that everything that exists 
in our world is made of matter and empty space. If the matter is made of invisible and 
indivisible corpuscles called atoms, the empty space is only the void or the vacuum that 
helps to keep the existence of atoms .We would discuss in depth all the aspects of these 
philosophies in the next chapters. We have to bear in mind that many of the problems of 
religion versus philosophy arose in the area of aesthetics and metaphysics and especially 
about the eternity of the world. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of this doctrine, 
we have to cover all views and standpoints from different schools and divergent trends. This 
comprises Platonism, Middle Platonism, Neo-Platonism, and medieval Islamic, Christian and 
Jewish philosophies, the Renaissance thought and theories of cosmology.
1 Alexander (of Aphrodisias) .Scripta Minora.De Anima cum Mantissa, (Commentaria in Aristotelian Graeca, 
Suppl.2, 1), ed. Bruns, I., p.89.
2 Lucretius ,On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R.E Latham p. x (10).
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It is evident that the Platonist school was the dominant philosophical thought in the ancient 
world for more than 800 years. It was the starting point of speculation. This school 
comprises Plato and all his followers such as Speusippus (c. 410-339 BC), Xenocrates (396- 
314 BC) Ptolemy and Philip of Opuntium (Plato's disciple), and what is anarchronically 
called Middle- Platonists like Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130 -68 BC), Numenius of Apamea 
(2 nd Century AD), Arcesilaus(c. 316- 241 BC), Carneades (214-129/8 BC),Clitomachus 
(187-109 BC) and Philo of Larissa( 159/8-84/3 BC) and the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus and 
Eudorus of Alexandria(fl. Ca. 25 BC) and many other outstanding figures. 
We have leamt from Platonic philosophy that the evidences proving the eternity of the world 
are linked to the origin and the architecture of the world itself. From the dawn of human 
thought, this issue was so controversial among all old civilizations: Babylonian, Indian and 
Chinese. Not to mention ancient Greek philosophy that has a big share of this hot debate. 
1.7 Lucretius and the Seeds of Things:
Philosophers were always fascinated by the idea ex-nihilo nihil fit (out of nothing comes 
nothing). Among them, Lucretius who considered gods as the product of men's fear from the 
unexplained natural and supernatural phenomenon that occurs in our world. Lucretius' De 
Rerum Natura is a sort of reflection of certain developments that emerged in the Epicurean 
school after the death of Epicurus'. Lucretius is famous by his dictum nothing can be 
produced from nothing, and in the same time all things are done without the agency of 
gods2 .Lucretius elucidated his theory by many evidences built on plenty of assumptions. If 
we do assume that things might be coming from nothing, then:
"Even' kind of thing might be produced from all things; nothing would require seed. In the 
first place, men might spring from the sea; the scaly tribe, and birds, might spring from the 
earth, herds, and other cattle might burst from the sky; the cultivated fields, as well as the 
deserts might contain every kind of wild animal, without any settled law of production: Nor 
would the same fruits be constant to the same trees, but would be changed; and all trees 
might bear all kinds of fruit. Since, when there should not be generative elements for each 
production, how could a certain parent-producer remain invariable for all individual 
things?3 " The most important point we do come out with from Lucretius perspective is that 
things are made of certain seeds. However, this rule does not apply to everything, as there is
1 P.H. de Lacy ,Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism , p.12
2 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. John Mason Good p. 10 
3Ibid.,p.ll
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something called the first, or the primary matter or the first elements 1 that are responsible 
for the generation of everything without being generated because they are imperishable, and 
consequently eternal. Likewise, everything that comes into existence has to have an element 
that goes with it or responsible for its gradual growth or demise:
"Young men might on a sudden be formed from puny infants, and groves, springing up 
unexpectedly, might dart forth from the earth, of which things it is plain that none happen, 
since all things grow gradually, as is fitting, from unvarying atoms, and as they grow, 
preserve their kind, so that you may understand that all things individually are enlarged and 
nourished from their own specific matter... the earth cannot furnish her cheering fruits 
without certain rains in the year; nor, moreover, can the nature of animals, if kept from food, 
propagate their kind, and sustain life; so that you may rather deem that many elements are 
common to many things, (as we see letters common to many words,) than that any thing can 
exist without its proper elements2. "
1.8 The link between the Agent and the Act:
Many philosophers do assert that the world can be only the act of God regardless of any 
explanations of how this act was generated. However, there are many other philosophers 
who do not believe in such link between the so- called the agent and the act, simply because 
they do believe in the principle stating that God is the Fist Principle. The latter can only 
proceed one. According to them, God as the First Principle is always one, while the world is 
made of different constituents. That is the main reason that compelled them not to believe 
that the world is not the act of God. As they do not believe in such link between the agent 
and the act, they created what we do call the 'mediator' 3 . The existence of this mediator 
means that the world as a whole did not proceed from God:
"What proceeds from Him is one single existent, and this is the first of the created principles, 
namely, abstract intellect, that is a substance subsisting by itself, not possessing any volume, 
knowing itself and knowing its principle, which in the language of the Divine law is called 
'angel'. From it there proceeds a third principle, and from the third a fourth, and through 
this mediation the existent beings come to be many\ "
In modern scientist theories of atomism, pairs and triplets of fundamental quarks combine to create most typical forms of
matter
2Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. John Mason Good, p. 12
3 Averroes, Tahafut al Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol. 1 p. 104
"Ibid.
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From this perspective, the act can proceed from differentiation and multiplication through 
mediation, through which the agent does perform one act, and then the latter does perform 
another act. What is striking here is that all these divisions and multiplications cannot be 
performed in the First Principle, as there is neither differentiation, nor duality and 
multiplicity in the essence of God 1 . Hence, if we do believe in such divisions, multiplicity or 
duality, we then believe in the existence of some existents that are on the same level as God 
acting as first effect, primary matter or first mover, which is quite impossible. There is no 
room for doubt that the majority of ancient philosophers do believe that out of the one only 
one proceeds, and they conclude that the first principle is one. Therefore, the problem was 
only about the source of multiplication. As there was an old common belief that the first 
principles are two, one for the good and one for the bad, it was not very hard for new 
philosophers to assert that all things go back to one ultimate end that really exists in our 
world, and that ultimate end is only one highest principle2 . This is the true sense of the holy 
words, "If there were( in heaven and earth) gods beside God, both would surely have been 
corrupted3 . "
These later philosophers were convinced that this first principle has to be one and unique. 
This notion of the oneness or the uniqueness raised many problems .Anaxagoras and his 
school, does believe that the plurality is only introduced through matter; others do believe 
that such plurality is manifested in the instruments, and others see it through the mediators. 4 
Plato is believed to be the first one who asked about the origin of plurality in the matters and 
the instruments. Plato's logic about the origin of plurality was so difficult to refute especially 
from anyone who asserts that from the one only one can proceed because he has to explain 
how plurality did come from the one5 . We have to bear in mind that such difficulty was 
surmounted with the advert of the emanation theory stating that out of the one all things and 
creations proceed. Al- Ghazali raised many objections against the Peripatetics about this
1 Averroes Jahafut a! Tahafut,(Jhe Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l,p.l04
2 Ibid., pi06
3 The Holy Qur'an, chapter, Al-Anbiya '( The prophets),21, Verse.22
4Averroes , Tahafut al Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l pp.106-107
5Ibid.l07.
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thorny problem by arguing that if the plurality was introduced through mediators: ''''There 
could only arise a plurality of qualitatively undifferentiated agglomerates which could only 
form a quantitative plurality, does not touch them 7 ." The Peripatetics do believe in the 
existence of a 'twofold plurality' that is of simple beings that do not exist in matter, and that 
some of them are the causes of others, but they all ascend to the same unique cause that is the 
first being of their genus. This analysis explains how the plurality of the heavenly spheres 
does arise from the plurality of these principles. Likewise, it explains how the plurality of the 
sublunary world does come only from matter, form, and the heavenly spheres 2 .It is obvious 
that Aristotle and his followers were not faced by the problem of the origin of plurality, even 
if they are some difficulties in their theory about the order of the world in general:
"The heavenly bodies are moved primarily through their movers, which are absolutely 
immaterial, and the forms of these heavenly bodies are acquired from these movers and the 
forms in the sublunary world are acquired from the heavenly bodies and also from each 
other, indifferently, whether they are forms of the elements which are imperishable prime 
matter or forms of bodies composed out of elements and, indeed, the composition in this 
sublunary world arises out of the heavenly bodies . " 
1.9 The Divine Will and the Creation of the World:
We will discuss this point in depth the objections to this theory in the forthcoming 
chapters; we want here just to highlight one of the ancient theories regarding the origin and 
the creation of the universe, regardless of its strength or weakness. Many philosophers do 
hold the view that the origin of the world came from a divine will. These philosophers do 
think that:
" The world has been created by an eternal will, which has decreed its existence in the time 
in which it exists; that its non-existence lasts until the moment it ceases and that its existence 
begins from the moment it begins; that its existence was not willed before and therefore did 
not happen, and that at the exact moment it began it was willed by an eternal will and 
therefore began 4. "
1 Averroes, Tahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol. 1 p. 107 
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.3
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The arguments of this theory are sophistical, as they imply many other controversial issues 
such as the relation between cause and effect, the eternal and the temporal will and the divine 
and the empirical will. Whatever the case, this theory had occupied a big space in the 
explanation of the creation and the origin of the universe for centuries. The reason behind 
that is that it showed, as mentioned previously, the overlap existing between the effect and 
the cause and their need to a necessitating principle to establish such relationship. Likewise, 
it showed that there is no effect without cause, which means that the entire universe with its 
seen and unseen intriguing wonders is an effect that needs a cause. When we do think that 
the world is created, we believe that before its existence, a wilier existed, and that wilier is 
the one and the only cause of its existence. We do deduce from this way of analysing things 
that there is a sort of triangular relationship between the will, the wilier and the thing willed. 
The cause itself is divided into necessary, essential and the effect into accidental and 
conventional 1 . It is worthy noting that we cannot discuss the correlative relationship existing 
between cause and effect before the discussion of many other issues. We have to start by 
asking questions like whether our present world existed as it is now from eternity or it had 
come into existence after it had not existed. This would lead us to investigate whether the 
world is self-sufficient and causeless or its existence depends on a cause that is God, the 
Creator as described by all the Abrahamic religions".
This scenario of the origin of the world is the one who helped philosophers to elaborate the 
emanation theory through the discussion of the oneness and the plurality. By assuming that 
God is the creator of the universe, or by asserting that He is the First Mover, the First 
Principle or even the First Cause, we certainly believe in the oneness of God. At this 
particular stage, the only point of a paramount importance that has to be highlighted is that to 
prove the origin of plurality without falling into contradiction, as we have already asserted 
that the oneness and the uniqueness of God, and the belief in the plurality is a breach of the 
oneness of God. There were many attempts to solve this dilemma and by bridging the gap 
existing between the oneness and plurality. That is why, philosophers introduced many 
solutions like the existence of a determining principle that is acting between the oneness 
represented by God and the plurality manifested in all the other creatures. These attempts 
were not always successful as they left more many missing links and absurdity than solutions
1 Averroes, Tahafutal Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 1 p.5
2 Harry A. Wolfson,, The Twice-revealed Averroes, p.376
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These theories were the seeds of the emanation theory that will be elaborated later on. The 
premises of this theory were simple and clear, as they did not draw a distinction between the 
oneness and the plurality, as it used to be with the precedent philosophers. All the creations 
are manifestations of God that proceeded from Him without the interference of any 
determining principle or mediator. By the introduction of this dictum based on manifestation 
rather than interference and mediation, the precedent belief that the plural cannot proceed 
from the one was on decrease. Regardless of the strength of the emanation theory's premises 
or their weaknesses, they stand for one of the famous theories that have given more rational 
explanation than the other theories. Besides, it is a reliable theory especially for those who 
support the creation of the world. This does not mean that the emanation theory was strong 
enough to be refuted, as it has faced itself many obstacles and left many questions 
unanswered such as when did this emanation take place? And why it did happen at a 
particular time and not another? And why such emanation did happen? Is this theory the only 
way by which the plural can proceed from the one?
It is worthwhile to point out that the divine will and the creation of the world is something 
different from the emanation theory and the manifestations of God. In the former, the dispute 
is about the world whether was created by a divine will or not and in the latter the dispute is 
about whether the plural proceed from the one or not. hi either case, there is an assertion that 
the world is created by God or emanated from Him, and a denial of the interference of any 
external principle in such creation or emanation. However, the real dispute is about the ways 
and the means of this creation or that emanation. 
1.10 The Materialist and the Causeless, Uncreated World
Materialist philosophers argue that the world has no cause and no creator. That is why, it 
can only be eternal in the condition in which it actually is. The materialists do not deny 
completely the existence of cause, as they do believe in the existence of a cause for temporal 
events. What they do deny is the existence of a cause for the world as a whole. The denial of 
the existence of a cause lying behind the making of the world, led the materialists to assert 
that " No body comes into existence, and no body is annihilated, and only forms and 
accidents come into existence, for the bodies are the heavens, which are eternal, and the four 
elements which are the stuff of the sublunary world, and their bodies and matters are eternal
too .'
Averroes .Tahafut Al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l p.250
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The materialists do mean by the causes of the temporal events the souls that come into 
existence. These souls are of living beings: man, animals and plants. The reason why these 
events are temporal because they come to an end in the circular movement .The latter is 
eternal and its source is the eternal soul of the sphere. This analytical standpoint about the 
nature of both the cause and the soul, makes the materialist philosophers believe in the non- 
existence of any cause for the world of whatsoever, and consequently, they deny the 
existence of any creator, or maker of this world 1 .
If we do admit that that everything that has no cause, it has to be of a necessary existence, 
and the body is not one of them as it does not possess the qualities of the necessary existent.- 
we would discuss this point in depth in the forthcoming chapters-. In the same time, the body 
cannot be a necessary existent by itself, simply because it is made of parts that brought its 
cause'. The general rule states that the whole is constituted through the parts, and the latter in 
anything are prior to its whole. Therefore, if it the case, it must be no cause either for the 
parts or for their whole, and they are eternal without the interference of a cause. This logic is 
extremely difficult to refute, and the best way to do it, is in one of the philosophers' 
arguments denying the plurality in the First, which we will discuss in details later on in this 
work. It is the same when a philosopher does believe in the temporal creation of the bodies, 
definitely, he would not believe in the existence of a creator at all 3 .
The demonstration of the termination, a causal series does not mean necessarily that there is 
a cause for the world. The reason behind that is that the materialist themselves do believe, to 
some extent, in the termination of a causal series. We say to some extent, as they do believe 
in the termination of a causal series at the beginning of things when they claim that there is 
no cause for both bodies and forms. Hence, accidents are causes of each other and they do 
terminate in the circular movement .
We will only believe -as Al-Ghazali did- that those who asserted that the bodies are eternal, 
and at the same time, they went on to say that these bodies have a cause are pure atheists. Ibn 
Rochd sees that the materialists reached the dictum of the non- existence of a cause, as the 
world is eternal by relying on their senses. Such reliance led them to think that when the
1 Averroes, Tahafut Al-Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l p.250
2 Ibid., pp.252-253
3Ibid.,p.253
4 Ibid.,p.251
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movements terminate in the heavenly body, the causal series come to an end. Hence, the 
sensation will terminate as well, and this is the same destiny of the intellect. The Ash 'rites do 
reject these sensible causes, in the sense that, they deny that some sensible things can be the 
causes of other sensible things. Alternatively, they claimed that the cause of sensible being is 
another non-sensible being by means of becoming, and such becoming is not experienced or 
perceived 1 . Many philosophers did their best to prove the existence of a necessary existent, 
others tried to prove that an incorporeal being does exist at the top of the hierarchy of beings. 
Ibn Sina is believed to be the first one who did follow the notion of the necessary existent in 
an attempt to prove that an incorporeal being does exist. Ibn Sina claims that his method is 
superior to that of ancient philosophers who managed only to arrive at an immaterial being, 
which is the principle of the universe through derivative things and especially motion and 
time, while his proof enabled him to reach that principle, exactly like the ancient 
philosophers did, through the study of the nature of the existent, as it is an existent2 . Ibn 
Rochd was not satisfied with Ibn Sina's discovery because when we do assert that there is a 
necessary existent by itself, we are agreeing upon the fact that this existent is not made up of 
matter and form:
"If it is supposed to exist as composed of eternal parts which are continuous by nature, as is 
the case with the world and its parts, it may indeed be said of the world with its parts that it 
is a necessary existent, it being of course understood that there is a necessary existent...and 
the method Avicenna followed to establish an existent of this description is not demonstrative 
and does not bv nature lead to it, except in the way we have stated . " 
1.11 Conclusion:
It is obvious that the notion of gods was prevailing in ancient Greek starting from the pre- 
philosophic period based on myths and legends to the phase of rational speculations. There is 
no room for doubt that the notion of gods came as a result of that consisting desire to find out 
the architecture of the cosmos and the power behind its wonderful design. That is why, it is 
of a paramount importance to discuss the architecture of the universe, as a part of the 
discussion of the eternity of the world as a whole. All this started with Orphism, even based 
on mythical explanations, paved the way for debates and controversies about the origin of 
things.
1 Averroes ,Tahafut al-Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol. 1 , p.251
2 Ibid.,p.253
3 Ibid.
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Definitely, the views that underestimate the pre-philosophic materials are not just, as thanks 
to these materials, the first philosophers, if we can call them so at those times, elaborated 
their first theories about the origin of things. We do not mean by that, the content of these 
pre-philosophic materials, but the intention, the desire and the interest of these pre- 
philosophic thinkers who tried hard to decode the enigmas of the cosmos in every possible 
way. They raised the topics of every discussion and suggested solutions to every single 
dilemma the way they saw it convincing and rational, at least according to their mental 
potentials at those times. Moreover, if we do contemplate human achievements in all 
disciplines and throughout history, we would notice that the gradualness from week to 
strong, refutation to support and myth to rationality is vital in every single achievement. This 
atmosphere was not prevailing only among the Hellenes, but also in other religions and 
philosophies like the Hindus who considered the Alaya, as the universal soul and the 
fountain of all things and beings. Likewise, they explained the genesis of the world through a 
series of recycling cosmic creations called Manvantara .
This is exactly the same case here, Greek thought had to pass through these embryonic 
stages to attain intellectual maturity. When the pre-philosophic thinkers thought the cosmos 
which makes gods, they based their studies on this mythical speculation to come out with the 
conclusion that gods who made cosmos and not the opposite. The gradualness in Greek 
thought is obvious, as it started with explanation based on fertile imagination by Herodotus, 
Thucydides, Aeschylus and many more. The main bone of contention at that time was not 
only the origin of things, but also the role of gods in the cosmos. Some totally deny the 
interference of gods in human fate and others saw is as a necessity that we cannot ignore. 
Then, we touched the first seeds of rationality in Hesiod theogony. From that particular stage 
of history, we started talking only about things that can be contemplated or somehow 
justified in some way or another. This new era was represented by Lucretius and his theory 
about the seeds of things, Pythagoras and his numbers, Democritus and his mechanism to 
end up with Platonic and Peripatetic concept of the divine and his relationship with the 
world. Whatever the case, we do find the discussion of the architecture of the universe, as a 
prelude to the discussion of the eternity of the world. If we do admit that this architecture has 
an artist, then, we are assuming that the world is eternal and vice versa. Likewise, the 
assumption that such an artist is responsible for the making of the universe entails the 
discussion of his nature, life and attributes, which all would be important to be discussed, as 
part of the discussion of the eternity of the world.
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ON THE NATURE OF THE ELEMENTS 
COMPRISING THE UNIVERSE: 
2.1 The Elements: Plato, Democritus and Empedocles:
After the introduction of these various opinions about the origin of the universe, the 
question that imposes itself is that how these elements came into being? What are they 
themselves made of? Aristotle went on to say that we cannot assign a figure to any of these 
elements, because if we do that, we would soon discover that a part of an element is not 
made of its nature. If we do take for example fire, we would find out that a part of it is not 
actually a fire 1 .We have to point out here that according to Aristotle, it is not a rule that an 
element should be all made of its nature. We have to point out that many philosophers talked 
about the principle from which the world is made of as a matter, regardless of its nature, 
corporeal or incorporeal, single or multiple. For Plato, for instance, it is the big and the 
small, for the Italian school, the indeterminate, for Empedocles, the fire, the earth, the water 
and the air, for Anaxagoras, the infinite of homeometries. Therefore, these philosophers were 
not attached to the material cause, others adopted the cause of mobility by focusing on the 
principle from which the movement is generated".Empedocles went further by describing in 
his 'cosmic cycle theory' how the world grows to be one from many and grows apart to be 
many from one3 . Whatever the case, philosophers tried hard to find out the basic elements 
that are composing our cosmos and defining their nature. They argued that these elements 
are composed of geometrical forms called atoms and each atom is made of elementary 
triangles of different sizes and shapes and takes place in a receptacle (space). Plato took 
many of his views from Democritus regarding the types of atoms and developed them to 
make his theory more homogeneous and more effective:
"Compare (Plato 's theory) with the best of its rivals, the Democritean. The atoms come 
infinitely many sizes and in every conceivable shape, the vast majority of them being 
irregular a motley multitude, totally destitute of periodicity in their design, incapable of 
fitting any simple combinatorial formula. If we were satisfied that the choice between the
1 Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 304b5
2J Tricot ,La Metaphysique, Vol. 1, p.67
3Denis O'Brien, Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle,p.29
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unordered polymorphic infinity of Democritean atoms and the elegantly patterned order of 
Plato's polyhedra was incapable of empirical adjudication and could only be settled by 
asking how a divine, geometrically minded artificer would have made the choice, would we 
have hesitated about the answer1 . "
Likewise, Plato did not follow blindly Empedocles' theory about the four basic elements of 
the world. He developed it by finding a common atomic ingredient defining the origin of 
these elements, and consequently, explaining the transformation of one element into another. 
However, there are many shortcomings in Plato's theory. The latter, for instance, does not 
allow for transformation of earth into other elements because earth is made of different 
atoms. Besides, the transformation of elements is not compatible with the principle of the 
conservation of matter. What remains constant in every single transformation is:
" The aggregate surface area of the corpuscles. If you press him to say what happens to that 
portion of the matter within the icosahedron which can not be enclosed within the equivalent 
surface area of smaller polyhedra, Plato would say that there is no such matter: after 
creation matter exists only in the form of space encapsulated is empty space encapsulated by 
polyhedra; what is not thus encapsulated in empty space, which becomes matter when 
captured by envelopes of approved stereometric form . "
Aristotle's analysis took another direction by investigating the primary mixture of the four 
basic elements in which none of the mixed elements abandons its essence. He also 
investigated the species of such mixtures since these mixtures are almost infinite .He did not 
find names for them .Likewise, he did not even find names for the ones that can be 
distinguished from each other, except for a few of them such as vapour, smoke, flame and 
the like3 :
"He was forced to find names for many of them, he had to call each by the name of the 
element that predominates in its essence: Thus that in which air predominates, he called 
aerial; that in which fire predominates, he called fiery; that in which earth predominates, he 
called earthy; and that in which water predominates, he called watery. He went on to
1 CF. Vlastos ,Plato 's Universe, pp. 93-94
2 Ibid., p. 90
3 Al-Farabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 111
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distinguish the different names for them by means of differentia inherent in them : Some by 
means of their local motions ,and others by means of their sensible qualities; where two of 
these associate in combination, he combined the names, such as watery-earthy and the 
like1 . "
In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of these named and non-named 
elements, Aristotle investigated the bodies that originate in the combination of the four basic 
elements with each other. The bodies that originate from their combination can be divided in 
two categories: the first one is the homogeneous and the second one is the heterogeneous. 
The latter originate only from the combination of homogeneous bodies in which the essence 
of every one of these homogeneous bodies is preserved. This means that it is the combination 
of being together and in contact, while homogeneous bodies originate only from that 
combination, in which the essence of every one of the parts is not reserved. Homogenous 
bodies themselves are of two types: bodies that only form parts of heterogeneous body and 
those every one of which is generated to form the sum of the generated bodies, and 
consequently, the sum of the whole world2 .
Plato relied on many of these principles to divide the world into two categories: the world 
of forms and that of physics (the cosmos). The former is a world of being, has not becoming, 
does not change and it is apprehended through understanding and not by senses. The latter is 
a world of becoming, everything in it comes into being and passes away and it is grasped by 
sense perception. There are many doctrines, which see these elements as infinite in number, 
divisible and a single unity. In fact, they are a plurality and limited in number.
It is worthwhile to point out that proving the eternalism of the four basic elements 
composing the world is clear evidence that the world itself is eternal. That is why, many 
philosophers concentrated on this task "To be in process a thing must be capable of that 
particular process3. " We deduce from this definition that a thing to be altered, it must be 
capable of being altered, and in order to be in a local, motion, a thing has to be capable of
1 Al-Farabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,p .111
2 Ibid.
3 Aristotle fhysics, 25la, 14-15
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change in place. Thus, before anything is burned, it must be capable of being burned, and if a 
thing starts fire, it has to be capable of starting fire. Hence, there was a time when these 
things did not exist, then, they must have been generated. If it was not the case, they must be 
eternal . Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera championed the view that the primary 
magnitudes are infinite in number, and at the same time, not divisible in magnitude. The 
generation process cannot be achieved through many out of one or one out of many; rather, it 
is the combination and the entanglement of all these bodies. Aristotle asserts that this school 
made the same old mistake by not grasping that the elements are finite in numbers. These 
philosophers contradicted themselves, in the sense that if these elements were indivisible, 
then it would be quite impossible for air, water and earth to be differentiated on the grounds 
of their greatness and smallness. If it is the case, then, they cannot be generated one from the 
other. This could not be the case, simply as the supply of large atoms would fail in the 
continual separating process needed for the occurrence of the mutual generation between 
water, air and earth". 
2.2 The Nature of Generation:
Many philosophers did talk about the nature of this generation such as Empedocles and 
Democritus, but not in a very detailed manner. Theophrastus (ca.371-287 BC) argued that 
philosophers who predicted the generation and the destruction were deceived by four 
particulars, which are the inequality of the earth, the retreat of sea, the dissolution of each of 
the parts of the universe and destruction of terrestrial animals". Whereas, others like 
Empedocles, were mainly concerned with the status of the elements as unchanging and 
eternal beings. Empedocles explained the phenomenon of death and birth of individual 
beings in the light of separation and combination of elemental particles. Empedocles went 
further by claiming that separation and combination are mutually dependent in the sense that 
there is not only genesis, but destruction as well .Ibn Rochd in Fasl-al-Maqal ^Decisive 
Treaty),argued that the cause of disagreement between the Mutakkalimin( the Muslim 
theologians) of the Ash 'rite sect and the ancient wises is due to the difference in nomination. 
They all believed that there are three types of existents, they agreed about the two
'Aristotle fhysics, 251a,20-21 
2 Ibid, pp.291-292lu u --6-^ L *~'*-
3Brodie. John Macdiarmid , Theophrastus on the Eternity of the JVorld,p.239 
4 J. Mansfeld , Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5: A Suggestion, p.20
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propositions and they disagreed about the middle. The first proposition is an existent that 
existed from a cause, made out of matter and it is posterior to time like the air, water, earth, 
animals, plants and so on. All philosophers agreed that these existents are created. The other 
proposition did not exist from a cause, not made out of matter, and it is anterior to time. This 
existent is only God, and they all agreed that He is eternal. The third existent between these 
two propositions is an existent that is anterior to time and caused by something, and this is 
the entire world 1 . That is why, according to Empedocles, perception is due to a consistency 
between the elements of earth, air, fire and water both in the subject and the object2 . Aristotle 
talked about the nature of such generation in the physics and accused the followers of this 
reasoning of talking not about generation, but rather, about only the semblance of generation 
out of one another3 .Their accounts about the nature of generation were not established in a 
very consistent way:
"They speak of each element 'inhering' and 'being separated out', as if generation were 
emergence from a receptacle instead from a material, and did not involve change in 
anything. Even granted that it were so, the consequences remain just as absurd. In the first 
place a body of a certain size is not obsen>ed to grow heavier by compression, but they are 
forced to argue that it does, and if they maintain that water inheres in air, and is separated 
out from it, for when from being air it becomes water, it gains in weight4. "
Regarding the extraction and the extension, Aristotle went on to say that when a body is 
extracted, there is no obvious reason that its extension should be over a greater area than 
before. Moreover, when water is generated from water, it occupies more space, as the finer 
body does take up more space. On the contrary, water when it is in the shape of a liquid does 
turn to steam and vapour vessels that contain the substances do burst because of the lack of 
space5 . Aristotle kept on reminding us of the probable difficulties that we may face in the 
case of the assumption that the bodies cannot expand, as there is no void. Likewise, if we do
1 Ibn Rochd, Fasl al-Maqal, (Decisive Treaty),p.lO 
2D.A. Rees ,Greek View of Nature and Mind, p. 100 
3 Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 305a33 
4 Ibid.,305b5,305blO 
5 Ibid.,305bl5
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believe in the existence of void and the process of extension, it will be also very hard to 
admit that-and out of a necessity- a body has to take up more space if it is separated off'. 
What is important in all this, is that the generation process from one element to another has 
to come to an end. This is the case of course if a finite magnitude can have an infinite 
number of finite magnitudes within it2 .For instance, every time the more is generated from 
the remainder when water is generated from earth through the process of separation, this 
means that something had been taken away from the earth. The same type of production does 
occur every time' the more' is generated from the remainder. If this process keeps on 
operating everlastingly, then, the finite will possess an infinity, and as we do believe in the 
impossibility of such occurrence, the elements in this case could not be everlastingly 
generated from each other3 . 
2.3 The Pluralist and the Monistic Theories:
Aristotle argues that those who do believe in the monistic theory face the difficulty of 
admitting the existence of only one natural motion, but there are many4 .This because the 
specific differentiae of bodies is based only on the differences of shape. This would make an 
infinite number of elements superfluous, for all solids are analysed into pyramids as their 
sole principle. The argument against the infinite number of elements is that every simple 
body has a simple motion of its own, and the number of simple motions is finite5 .
The views of philosophers who do support the monistic theory do conflict with the findings 
of mathematicians and the other natural scientists. They also demonstrated that the popular 
elements are composed of indivisible particles that are different in size. The fact that makes 
the generation of these elements into and from each other quite impossible6 .To reach this 
conclusion we have to assume that the elements are either infinite or finite, and if they are 
finite, what is their number? Aristotle started with the assumption that they are not infinite by 
exposing the views of Anaxagoras, and his supporters who do consider all homeomerous 
substances as elements .
1 Aristotle, On the Heavens, 305bl5
2 Ibid.,305b20
3 Ibid.,305b20 
4 Ibid.,303b9-10
5 Ibd.,303b4-8
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.,302blO
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Aristotle sees that many composite bodies can also be divided into homogeneous parts 
such as flesh, bone, wood, stone, and so on. In this case, what is composite is not an element, 
then, that element is not a homeomerous body, but one that cannot be analysed into 
constituents differing in kind. Aristotle went on to say that the same results can be obtained 
if there are only two or three of such bodies, as the demonstration of Empedocles. Likewise, 
the philosophers failed in forming everything out of homogeneous parts even with an infinite 
number. Aristotle concluded that if the distinction between bodies is made on the basis of 
their proper differentiae, and bodily differentiae are finite in number, it is quite obvious that 
the elements themselves have to be finite'. In the same context, the limitations of bodily 
differentiae demonstrate that the number of elements has to be limited .Hence, every element 
has its own motion, and the motion of every single body is simple, hi the meantime, there is 
not an infinite number of simple motions, simply because the directions of movement are 
restricted to two. hi consequence, the places are limited, and on the ground of this argument, 
the existence of an infinite number of elements is impossible".
After the establishment of the limitation of the number of elements, Aristotle tries to define 
the number of these elements if they are more than one. As we do know, some philosophers 
posit one single element manifested in water, fire or air and sometimes an element that is 
rarer than water and denser than air. Such single element is to be said as infinite in extent and 
is the constituent of all worlds. The existence of one single element, regardless of its nature, 
water, air, fire or that element standing between water and air, or rather, between density and 
rareness, which is responsible for the generation of everything through the processes of 
condensation and rarefaction, is a unconscious supposition of the existence of a substance 
that is more fundamental than the elements. These philosophers see the generation from 
elements as synthesis and back into the elements as analysis3 . This means that the substance 
with finer particles must be prior in nature. Hence, they regard fire as the finest of all bodies, 
and consequently, it is primary in the order of nature. This also applies to either water, air or 
any other substance. Each one can be a primary and not an intermediate. Other philosophers 
made from the greatness and the smallness of bodies the basis of distinction between them
1 Aristotle .On the Heavens, 302b30,303al. 
2Ibid.,303b5,303b7.
3 Ibid., 303b9-20
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other than the primary. On the basis of this criteria, all names of these elements are relative 
in the sense that we cannot nominate one thing as a fire, water or air, but the same body will 
be fire for example relatively to something else 1 . From these divergent views, we deduce that 
the notion of quantity that distinguishes each element, for their magnitudes must have a 
certain ratio to one another, for these ratios may be found in the larger bodies and the smaller 
ones alike. We have to mention here that those who considered fire as that element, escaped 
these problems, but fell in other ones. Some of these philosophers gave the shape of pyramid 
to fire by claiming that the pyramid is the sharpest of figures, and consequently, fire the 
sharpest of bodies. As all bodies are made out of the finest body, and solid figures out of 
pyramids, therefore, as fire is the finest of bodies and , and the pyramid the primary and the 
finest among figures, and the primary figure does belong to the primary body, fire must be
ry
pyramidal . In this regard, those who made the elements divisible, they will find out that a 
part of fire is not actually fire, exactly like the pyramid is not made of pyramids3 . It is not 
necessary the part of something is like its whole or the whole is made of its parts.
Those who built their argument on the size of the elements, and make it the differentiae, 
have to admit that there is an element prior to their element until the infinity. The common 
mistake done by all these philosophical groups is that in believing in the existence of one 
single element, they are allowing one natural motion to be shared by everything. On the 
contrary, every single natural body has its proper motion. Therefore, if we do admit that 
there is only one motion, this means that all bodies are one substance. For all these reasons 
Aristotle objected to the theory stating that there is one single element, but rather, they are 
plurality, not reducible to one, and in the same time, limited in number4.Aristotle 
summarized all his objections to the existence of one unique element responsible for the 
generation of everything in the world by saying that:
"In any case, no one who wishes to look at the matter scientifically can speak as they do. 
For if all bodies are comparable in respect of size, and the magnitudes of homoeomerous 
substances stand in the same ratio to one another as do their elements, (for instance, as the 
magnitude of the whole mass of water is to that of the whole mass of air, so that of the
1 Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 303b30, 303al 
2 Ibid.,303al5,303al7.
3 Ibid., 304b5-6
4 Ibid., 304b5,304blO-20
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element of water is to that of the element of air and so on) ,and if further, air is more widely 
extended than water, and in general the finer body than the coarser, then clearly the element 
of water will be smaller than the element of air...If therefore the smaller magnitude is 
contained in the greater, the element of air must be divisible. The same applies to the 
element fire and fine bodies in general1 . "
As mentioned before, those who support the existence of a single element do believe in one 
natural motion shared by everything. As we know that every natural body possesses a 
principle of motion, and if all bodies are one substance, then, they must have the same 
motion, which is impossible. Moreover, as these elements are generated from each other, 
they cannot be eternal2 .
2.4 The Extension of Elements:
The extension is a common form that characterizes all the four elements for each element is 
extended and is generated from another element, which is extended as well. Therefore, is it 
the extension that makes up the corporeality? In other words, as the extension has three 
different dimensions, are they the first forms that matter has to receive, in a hierarchical 
order, to become first one of the four elements, then, an inorganic composed of the four 
elements, then plants etc..? Alternatively, are they other sort of forms different from the ones 
we know3 ? The Peripatetic hypotheses regarding the bodily substances suggest that the body 
can be extended in all directions .Such an extension is due either to the interval between the 
parts of what is extended and the proximity of their positions or to something else. The 
question that insistently imposes itself here is that can we do consider the body as substance 
for all the attributes when it is extended? Or the extension of the body just means that it is 
the material from which the species of substance are generated and in which the form and the 
attributes succeed, while it remains unchanging? Or the fact that the body is extended means 
that it is a material substance from which the species of substance whose extension is in 
virtue of its having length, width and depth?4
1 Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 304a25-30 
2Ibid.,304bll-15
3 Leon Gauthier, IBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.72
4Alfarabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi, p. 100
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Aristotle left these questions to be answered by his commentators and the philosophers 
who will succeed him. They do think that the first form that must be united with the matter 
which is informe and incorporeal to make up the corporeity, which do not exist, as they are 
in nature and exist only in the shape of an element. By adjunction, a sensible active form: 
heat, coldness, and a sensible and passive form: humidity and drought. This does not mean 
that the extension has three dimensions because each of these dimensions may vary in the 
same body. For example, if we say Plato in a gold ingot, Plotinus, 1 Saint Augustine, Al - 
Ghazali, Descartes in a piece of wax and Ibn Tofayl in a piece of clay, each of these bodies 
can receive the figure of a sphere, a cube or an ovoid. Besides, the whole volume of a body 
can considerably increase via dilatation, for instance, when water becomes air or inversely 
deceases through contraction when air re-becomes water2 . From this perspective, we deduce 
that the three-dimensional extension is not an essential character of the bodies, but an 
accident because an essential character of a being is invariable. If the extension were the 
essence of all bodies, the form of each of the four elements would have been only an 
accident. Moreover, the transmutation of an element into another would not have been no 
longer generation and corruption of substance, but a simple qualitative change3 . The 
divergent points of view of other philosophers reflect the difficulty presented by the 
Aristotelian system.
Al- Ghazali in Maqasid al Falasifa (the Aims of Philosophers), opposed the doctrines 
considering the corporeity or the first form of all bodies as the cohesion or massiveness. He 
regarded that the element of air can be in the form of fire or water, but the superiority of 
coldness, compels it to be in the form of water. Al-Ghazali considered such process 
responsible for the generation and the corruption of all elements. The combination of these 
elements generates all the known bodies: the atmospheric elements such as the air, vapour, 
metals, plants, animals and humans at the end of the scale.
Many Arabs and Muslims alike are mistaken when it comes to the names of some Greek philosophers 
because of the Greek-Arab transliteration of Aflathoun who is Plato and Aflotine who is Plotinus and 
Farfourious who is Porphyry. In many occasions, they confuse Plato with Plotinus because of the big 
similarities between the two transliterated Arabic names.
Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.722
3Ibid., p. 73
4 Al- Ghazali, Makasid al-Falasifah,(The Aims of Philosophers), pp.293-294
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Al Farabi called water, fire, earth and water al-Astoksat (plural of Astokse, and it is that 
things are made of, it is not divided by form into another form'). Al-Farabi argued that the 
generation of the body occurs when the form unites with the matter and the corruption 
happens when the form leaves the matter. That is why, matter is considered as eternal in the 
sense that nothing comes from nothing or turns to nothing; all what happens in nature is that 
the generation and the corruption of bodies is the transformation of matter into any sort of 
form and the abandonment of such form to take another one2 . In the same regard, Ibn Sina 
went on to say that, this first form is neither the cohesion, nor the extension; it is a simple 
predisposition to receive the three- dimensionality.
Ibn Rochd intervened in the debate to find another solution because Ibn Sina's one is not 
well supported. It sees the extension as a direct result of a non-extension without the 
intervention of a form, as a predisposition, is a non-extended thing on one hand and neither a 
predisposition nor the variable three-dimensionality is a form on the other hand. This 
Rochdian point of view was exposed nine centuries ago by Plotinus who established that 
nature stripped the first matter of any form, any quality and any determination. It does 
possess no bigness, no dimension and no volume. The first matter possesses only appearance 
by itself, a phantom of volume. It is just an indetermination by itself. It is more indeterminate 
with Plotinus other than with Aristotle. 3We have to point out here that the Aristotelian and 
the Rochdian standpoints about the notion of the matter and the notion of the extension 
differs form that of modern philosophers. According to all the modern scientists, astronomers 
and physicists, the existence of a real empty space has a three dimensions, continuous, 
homogeneous, infinite and divisible in the infinite. One century before the Aristotelian era, 
the Greek atomists, Leucippus and Democrirus who followed, later on, Epicurus, conceived 
the space of this method except in their explanation of the eternal movement of their atoms 
in the infinite void. Aristotle, all over again, in order to discuss the nature of elements, he had 
to assume their generation, which has to be from what is corporeal or what is incorporeal. 
Besides, the generated thing in order to come into being needs something elsewhere to be so. 
If such generation does occur through the corporeal, it would be through each other or from 
an extraneous body.
1 Ibn Rochd, Tafsieer ma Baeda al-Tabiah,(t\\e Interpretation of Metaphysics),p.499
2 Al-Farabi, Ihsa ' al-Ulum ( Categories of Sciences),p.73
3 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), pp. 73-75
-53-
Chapter 2
On the basis of these two assumptions, Aristotle finds out that those who believe that the 
generation process is done through the incorporeal, they will have to believe in the existence 
of a void separate from the body 1 . That is the main difficulty that they will face. Likewise, 
those who assert that the generation is done through the corporeal, are asserting at the same 
time, that there are two bodies existing in the same place and at the same time, which is quite 
impossible. In this case, there would be no body that could generate these elements, which 
affirms the prior existence of body to the elements2 . In terms of prior existence of a certain 
body or element to the other, we notice that some philosophers assumed that it is water, 
others argued that it is fire or air, but few who gave such priority to earth even if it is known 
for the majority that man himself is made of earth. Hesiod(ca.740-670 BC) himself asserted 
that earth was generated first before all the other bodies, so neither those who believe in 
other principle other than fire nor those who consider the primitive element more dense than 
the air and more subtle than water, are on the right path. What is posterior in the order of 
generation and anterior in nature, and if the composed or the mixed is posterior in the order 
of generation, then, it is the contrary of what we are talking about, water would be anterior to 
air and earth would be anterior to water3 .
If this presupposed body is subject to weightiness, it will be itself one of the elements, and 
it will be unmoved if it has no impulse to any direction. Aristotle does assert that if this 
scenario did happen, this body will move to occupy a place either naturally or unnaturally to 
be one of the elements. If this did not happen, nothing can generate nothing, as the generator 
and the generated have to be together4 .That is the way, Aristotle proved that the elements are 
not generated from the incorporeal or from extraneous bodies, and the only scenario left to 
be supported at this point, is the generation of the elements from each other. 
2.5 Generation and Dissolution of Elements:
As mentioned before, if the elements are generated from each other and in this process, a 
new substance, matter or a body is born. However, which element is the prime responsible 
for this generation? Are all these elements generators, primary and then eternal? Or are they 
some elements only generated and then perishable? As these elements generate themselves in 
the sense that they generate each other because they are primary bodies, their materials are
' Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 305a20-24 .
2 Ibid, 305a20-24 .
3 J. Tricot ,La Metaphysique, vol. l,p.71
4 Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 305a30-33.
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one in species, and taken in their consecutive order. The material of each element is 
identical with the material of the next. They became elements only because each one is 
generated from the other and because there are in them principles and powers that enable 
them to be generated from each other, and above all, they generate the rest of generated 
bodies. We have to mention that the things generated from these elements are generated from 
the combination of these four elements, the mixture of some of them with others and their 
blending together . Al-Ghazali argued that when a change occurs, either the element in 
question keeps on existing or perishes, if it remains, it is eternal and if it is completely 
disappeared after that change, it is completely perishable2 . If we do believe in the process of 
generation as a whole, this means that there is no primary element, as each one is generated 
from the other. From this perspective, all elements are generators and generated at the same 
time in an everlasting natural vicious circle. However, if we do assume that there is a 
primary element responsible for the generation of all the other elements. Then, this element, 
the generator, is eternal and the other elements perishable. If we also believe that generation 
and corruption are alteration, that generation is growing, and corruption is diminishing, still 
the notion of perishability would be unclear and open to plenty of probabilities. We do still 
do not know if these elements are primary or do possess other elements within them or prior 
to them. Definitely, this Peripatetic analysis raises more questions and gives little answers. 
Are these powers and principles sufficient for their generation and the generation of the other 
bodies? Are the positions they occupy in relation to each other in the primary regions of the 
world sufficient for their combination so that the other remaining bodies can come into being 
from them? Or are they all in need of another agent from the outside to impart to them other 
powers and bring them close together so that they would be able to combine, and to provide 
them with the principles of generating a thing other than they? However, Aristotle was so 
clear about the last point when he emphasized that these elements are not sufficient in their 
substances or in any of their states without another agent beside them. Hence, these agent 
principles are only the heavenly bodies . The perishability of these elements passes through 
their generation and their dissolution: "They can be seen in process of dissolution, and this 
process cannot either be of infinite duration, or stop before the whole of the element has 
perished. A second infinity would be required for the reverse process of synthesis, and
'Al-Farabi .Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 105-106
2 Al-Ghazali, Makasid al-Falasifa (The Aims of Philosophers), pp.306-307
3 Al-Farabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 107
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the remnant could not be either indissoluble (proved elsewhere) or capable of, but never 
undergoing, dissolution'. "
Aristotle went further by regarding the process of dissolution depending on the size of the 
body. The smaller the body is the easier can be dissolved. Furthermore, elements cannot be 
generated from anything else incorporeal or corporeal. If the body from which they are 
generated has a motion, it will itself be one of the elements. If not, it cannot exist in space at 
all .Therefore, the motion here is of a paramount importance, for it determines the shape of 
the body. For instance, if the body is designated to make circular movements, it necessarily 
has to have a spherical figure. Hence, and as we have mentioned in the first chapter, the first 
figure, which is the spherical figure is the only one that is compatible with the first body. 
This is the case because it is not the nature of movement that is depending on the nature of 
the body, but the nature of the body that depends on the nature of movement.
From this brief analysis, we do conclude that the existence of the generation and the 
corruption world and the qualitative change is a fact of experience. This can only be 
explained by the first cause: what gives a true and last explanation is never the efficient 
cause, but the final cause, which is the cause of the cause. Consequently, the man is a sort of 
hyphen between the sublunary world, domain of a deterioration movement and the 
supralunary world, domain of the only local circular movement of the inalterable of the 
eternal3 . Al- Kindi in Rasa 'il Falsafia (Philosophical Epistles), supported the paramount 
importance of motion in the processes of generation and corruption. Likewise, he introduced 
the four basic causes interfering in the generation and the corruption and divided them into a 
remote cause like the shouter of the arrow and a close one, which is the arrow itself. 
Concerning the four basic elements, Al-Kindi argued that they do not perish altogether4, but 
they are generated and corrupted just in some of their parts .
'Aristotle ,On the Heavens, 304b23-305al4.
2 Ibid.,305al4-32
3 Leon Gauthier ,Ibn Rochd(Averroes), pp.113-114
4I have to mention here that in many occasions and in different sources, we do come across the term " the last
final". Philosophers and especially the non- Abrahamic ones do use this term to emphasize that there is no
beginning after that specified end. The term final in its own, does not convey the meaning of deterioration and
corruption because it may involve another beginning, as it is the case in religious ideologies. That is why, such
a final is bolstered by the world 'last' to refer to the final of the final that involves with it no beginnings of
whatsoever.
5 Al-Kindi, Rasa 'il al-Kindi al-Falsqfta,(The Philosophical Epistles of Al-Kindi),pp. 109-110
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2.6 Matter and Form; 
2.6.1 The Primary Matter:
The philosophers use this terminology to refer to the indeterminate and imperfect 
material, which means that this primary matter is without substantial and accidental 
determination. That is why, we cannot conceive it by our senses or even by our imagination. 
It is different from all the other inorganic bodies because it has no chemical or physical 
properties. Therefore, this ultimate substrate, which is regarded as the ontological support of 
form cannot be a 'separable being' capable to achieve an independent existence, and in the 
same time, it cannot be a determinate object 1 . This prime matter is a super stuff, which has 
been given many descriptions2 such as 'it is nothing that can become everything' 3 . Such 
ingredient is not anything; it is a pure potentiality 4 :
" We can say that matter , as opposed to substantial determination,, cannot be anything more 
than a mere determinability ...thinking this through , one seems compelled to ay that such 
mere determinability must exclude any determination .In other words , it has to be pure 
indetermination' ."
The primary matter is not a being in itself, but the most important part of any material being. 
As the primary matter has these unique characteristics, it can only be detected or realized 
through its union with a form. Hence, it has no existence of its own because it is completely 
dependant on the form .From this perspective, we can deduce that the primary matter is 
prepared to host a determining principle or a form to fulfil its only and unique function. Its 
passivity enables it to extend to all essential perfections and accidental properties. It is 
worthwhile to point out here that the philosophers who do assume that the universe is one 
and that there is only one sort of matter as its nature, which is the corporeal matter, 
definitely, they are making a terrible mistake. They only directed their attention towards the 
elements of sensible bodies and excluded the incorporeal beings from the equation. Besides, 
in their attempt to explain the causes of generation and corruption and building a material 
system of the universe, they marginalized the principle of movement. 6
1 Jonathan Barnes Malcolm, Schofield and Richard Sorabji Article on Aristotle, pp.8 1-82.
2 Jones Barrington ^ristotle 's Introduction of Matter, p.474.
3E. Zeller ^.ristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, p.247
4 Jones Barrington ^ristotle 's Introduction of Matter, p.474.
5 E. Luyten. .Matter and Potency, pp. 1 06- 1 07. 
6J. Tricot ,La Metaphysique, Vol. 1, p.69.
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The dependence of the primary matter does not mean that it is ready all the time to receive 
all kinds of essential forms, as its receptivity is extremely limited. Such receptivity is based 
on norms and laws governing chemical reactions. Thanks to these chemical reactions, many 
transformations occurred to the primary matter to end up by forming or residing in the living 
substance. The latter could be a vegetable, an animal and if these transformations happened 
in man's own sphere, this primary matter can even takes its place in a human being.
2.6.2 Aristotle's Theory of Substance:
Aristotle divided the substance into two main categories: the first substances and the second 
substances, which are forms eternally residing outside spirits in real individuals. The link 
between these substances is responsible for making up the immutable laws of the cosmos. 
Outside the spirit, the hierarchy of forms make up the harmonious universe; in the spirit, it 
makes up science and the image of the cosmos. Therefore, primary substances, which are the 
basic constituents of the world, are independently existing individuals; paradigm examples of 
which are particular living organisms '.It is worth noting that what we call 'substance 
without qualification', is a substance of one thing and an attribute in another thing. From 
this perspective, any intelligible nature of this description is a substance without a 
qualification. Accordingly, anything else is surely an attribute in relation to what is substance 
without qualification^:
"The other which we call 'substance' in relation to it ,we call 'substance' to the extent that it 
is similar to this substance, then be what is substance without qualification: That is .insofar 
as it makes known what a thing is. Let substance, then, be what substance is without 
qualification is; those others he called in general "attributes in the substance . "
That is why, Aristotle's metaphysical conclusion that form is substance in the primary sense 
goes hand in hand with the notion of substantial form as one of the four causes.4
'Norman O. Dahl ,On substance Being the Same as its Essence in Metaphysics Z6: The Pale Man Argument,
1999, p. 1
2Al-Farabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Trans. Muhsin Mahdi.p.96
3 Ibid.
4 Robert Pasnau, Form , Substance and Mechanism, pp.31-32.
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This division is of a paramount importance because some attributes in the substance are 
essentially in the substance and some are in it just accidentally. Some essential attributes in 
the substance are primary and others are secondary. We have to mention that such a 
substance is not disjoined from an attribute, either in sense -perception or when it is 
intellected. The latter may divorce it from its attributes, and the attributes from each other, 
not because this is how they are, but in order to independently perceive the substance '. 
Aristotle draws the attention to the fact that substance is something other than what is 
extended:
'''Extended does not signify its essence insofar as it is a substance. Our saying extended 
indicates an idea similar to our saying that it is white . Our saying the substance is substance 
without qualification does not mean that it is extended, nor does it mean that it has length 
and width and depth, but other properties of the substance. The idea of the extended and the 
extension does not mean either the material or the form of the bodily substance, indeed, its 
material in itself is a nonbody, and similarity its form2. "
The Aristotelian extension does exist in the composite, as something whose being adheres 
to the latter's form, as it is in virtue of the form that the substance is in act. Therefore, the 
material of the natural substance is not disjoined from its form, which means that substance 
is not composed of any extension. The extension ,with its all directions, is the most prior 
attribute in it. Such an attribute is engendered in it with all its aspects: increases, decreases 
and changes like any other attribute in the natural substance3 . If Anaxagoras does believe in 
the existence of only one substance, which makes any change a sort of alteration, Aristotle 
regards every single substance as a compound of matter and form. That is why, generation, 
and not alteration, acquires a new form, and consequently, the loss of the former one and the 
coming- to -be of a brand- new substance.
1 Al-Farabi .Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi,p.96 .
2Ibid.,p.lOO
3 Ibid.,pp.lOO-101
4 Josep Puig Montada ^.ristotle andAverroes on Coming-to-be and Passing- away,p.5
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Aristotle argues that substances are the same as their essences, but in Met Z4, 10-11 and 15, 
he takes essence to be form, where form is universal, so the evidence is not unequivocal. In 
the meantime, Aristotle went on to say at Met Z 13, that no universal is substance. In the 
light of this analysis, Aristotle seems to be caught in an inconsistency when he claims that 
substance is universal form because it is the same as universal form and in the same time, he 
sees that no universal is substance 1 .
The substances that all philosophers accept as a fact, are the natural substances such as fire, 
earth, the water and the other simple bodies. After that the plants and their parts, the animals 
and parts of animals and at the end of the list we do find the physical universe and the parts 
of the parts of the physical universe. The substances that were admitted by some schools are 
the ideas and the mathematical things. However, the existence of other substances like the 
quiddity and the substratum may be logically established after reasoning. We have to 
mention that such reasoning leads to the assertion that 'the kind' is a substance more than 
species and the universal is more substance than the individuals2 . Regarding the ideas and 
the mathematical things, they are distinct substances of sensible substances. As mentioned 
before, this reasoning leads us to the substances that everybody agrees upon, the sensible 
substances that are all out of matter. In short, what we do call matter is the composite of 
matter and form that is subject to corruption and generation and that is existing in a state 
separate from the absolute matter3 .The distinction between matter and form is the basis of 
the entire Aristotelian system. If form is character, matter is the subject of characters, if it is 
structure or the organization; matter is the content4 .
Aristotle uses artefacts to compare the distinction between matter and form with a statue, 
which is itself made of matter and form .The latter stands for shape and axeity, and the 
former represents bronze and iron. Aristotle called it schema Such a distinction is universal, 
for it is applied almost to all sciences. In logic, the specific difference is the form of the 
specie in which the genre is the matter; in geometry, the definitions are forms in an
1 Norman O. Dahl, ,On substance Being the Same as its Essence in Metaphysics 26: The Pale Man Argument,
1999, p.l
2J. Tricot, La Metaphysique, vol. II, pp. 453-454
3 Ibid., p.455
Villiams Donald. C .Form and Matter. II, p.499
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intelligible matter; in physics 1 , heat and coldness, humidity and drought, heaviness and 
lightness, vegetative souls and sensitive souls, genres and living species are forms; in 
Metaphysics, there are forms totally separable of any matter2 .
Arab philosophers in general and Ibn Rochd in particular were obliged to react against this 
ambiguous terminology. Among the Arabs, the figure of whatsoever, plastic, geometric or 
syllogistic is called chakl; the specie is called ram-'; the form in its broad meaning, as the 
opposite of the matter is called soura. The concept or the general idea is derived from the 
same root as soura: (tasawor) .We have to note here that the Arabs corrected many of the 
Aristotelian terminology .For instance, in logic, Aristotle means with the term ousia (the 
essence) and in ontology he means by it the substance. The Arabs made a clear distinction 
between these terms: the dhat, which is essence and jawhar, which is substance. However, 
these terms can be used in different contexts because of the assimilation between the logical 
point of view and the metaphysical one. 3As mentioned previously, Aristotle and most 
philosophers argue that the first matter is not a body; it is a substance, a body factor, which 
cannot become a real body until it is united with another body factor. For Aristotle, being has 
a unity that coincides with substance, and the latter has not only an ontological priority, but 
also a logical one as well over the other beings4 .
It is the notion of a pure power, but it does work by itself if it does not enter in function 
with the form based upon the generation and corruption notion. The question that insistently 
imposes itself here is whether the whole universe is made of matter and form or are they just
In physics at (192a31-34) Aristotle takes matter to be the substratum of substantial change, something that seems to 
provide him with a more basic subject that the particular living organisms that come to be or pass away in such a change. At 
one point he says: "Now we distinguish matter and privation, and hold that one of these namely the matter accidentally is 
not, while privation in its own nature is not; and the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in no sense 
is. (,Physics, 192a4-6, Revised oxford translation)
* In De Anima at (412blO-12 and 4 Hal 2-14) Aristotle says that form is the essence of a living thing. Since the essence of a 
thing is the cause of its being (Metaphysicsl041b7-9 and!041b27-29), and since the cause of a thing's being is prior to that 
thing (Metaphysics 1003bl6-19), it now looks as if the form of a living organism is a better candidate for substance that is a 
living organism.
2 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.70
3 Ibid.,p.71
4Berti Enrico, Muliplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle, p. 185
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entities among many others? If we go back to the four elements mentioned by almost all the 
Hellenes as the basic elements of our universe, we will observe that the water, for example, 
if submitted to a certain temperature, becomes a sort of air called vapour. This latter, in its 
turn, becomes water all over again under the influence of coldness. In these transmutations of 
elements, the first element disappeared and the second one generated, but the first one is not 
utterly destructed .If it were the case, the second one could not have been generated. This 
means nothing is coming from nothing. Hence, we have to admit the permanence of a 
common substratum in these four elements. This substratum is only the matter because in 
each transmutation, the form of the first element is destructed and the form of the second 
element is generated. This analysis leads us to think about the nature of the first form, which 
is united with the first matter to make up a corporeity 1 .
It is of a paramount importance to mention here that Aristotle considers the homeomerous 
parts such as flesh and blood as the ultimate matter of living organisms. This led him to deny 
that the four elements are part of the matter of living organism .
2.7 Conclusion:
We do conclude from these debates that the cause of disagreement was about the nature and 
the generation of the elements. The focus on the nature of elements would help us to 
understand whether there is a generation in the first time or not. If there is, is it through 
eternal generators? Or is it a generation through the elements themselves? We do mean by 
that, things generating other things in an everlasting vicious circle with the existence of a 
primary matter that would imply the eternity of some generators and the perishability of 
others. In consequence, this would help us to understand the nature and the fate of the world 
as a whole, as these elements are the bricks making our universe. That is why, the eternity of 
these elements means the eternity of the world and their perishability stands for the 
perishabilty of the world. What is striking in these debates is the discussion of the nature of 
generation by including all its probable aspects, which are the change or the alteration (of 
shapes), the extension, the extraction, the condensation, the compression, the separation, the 
actual transmutation, the division, the dissolution and so on. Many of these generative ways-
1 Leon Gauthier .IBNROCHD (AVERROES), p. 72
2Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie. Oksenberg Rorty .Essays on Aristotle 's De Anima, p.7
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if we can call them so-are not very helpful in the understanding of generation itself, as we 
cannot, for instance, consider the change or the alteration of shapes as a way of generation. 
Even if this process gives us a new form and an existent that were not existing before, but 
this newborn thing is not out of the scope of figures and sizes, the fact that does not make of 
it a real generated thing. For the same reason, this process does not make from the generator 
thing a real generator. What we do consider here as a generated thing is any substance or 
matter that is born from another substance or matter, but it is not necessarily that the 
generated and the generator things are bound by shape, size or even the nature and the 
characteristics.
There are many vivid examples of this generation, for instance, the combination of oxygen 
and hydrogen does generate water that apparently has nothing to do with the nature and the 
characteristics of these gases. Definitely, it is not the same when we do talk about water 
changing to vapour or the latter turning back to be water, as it is just water turning back to its 
real nature. The one who believe that such process is generation will be like the one who 
believe that water and the heat generate the rainbow, which is not the case, as the rainbow is 
only the result of the reflection of the solar rays on the little suspended drops of water, so it 
disintegrates the solar rays into its natural colours. Likewise, the combination of the male 
sexual cell with the female one that gives birth to an embryo falls into the same category, as 
these cells do hold all the seeds of that human being that is not different at all in either nature 
or characteristics. Therefore, this kind of generation-as we said if we can call it so- is not 
helpful at all to attain a comprehensive understanding of the nature of elements, as it is 
extremely difficult to associate the generation of the sexual cell with earth for example. 
Therefore, we have to go back to previous processes to find out what had generated man. We 
know that it is important to look gradually at all these stages to reach the former or may be 
the original generator, as sciences were not as developed as they are at the time being. 
However, looking at the advanced stages and describing them as ways of generation is not 
practical. Hence, we do not object to looking at these ways of production and analysing them 
especially at that time when little was known about modern sciences, but what we do object 
to, is the description of these processes as ways of generation. Otherwise, we can include 
ways such as cell proliferation and vegetal propagation to the list of the ways of generation, 
which is not rational, as these processes are only a continuation of an existing form and not a 
pure generation.
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There is another point that should be highlighted here is that these philosophers, either they 
do believe in the generation or the eternity of elements, left many missing links in their 
interpretations of the ways of generation. They mentioned that these ways, or rather, 
principles are needed for the accomplishment of the generation process. What is not clear 
here is whether these principles are also needed if we do reach an eternal generator or not? If 
we say no, then we are respecting the properties of eternity, but we do fall into the co- 
eternity difficulty by making another eternal beside God-if you are a believer, of course, in 
the existence of God and His eternity-. If you say yes, you are breaching those properties of 
eternity, as these generators do need an intermediary to fulfil their functions, and without it, 
there will be no generation. From this point of view, this intermediary is the real generator 
and not the generator we are talking about.
We do believe that in order to reconcile these religious beliefs with what these philosophers 
are saying-as there are seeds of rationality in their interpretations-we have to surmount these 
difficulties raised from ascribing eternity to created originators. These generators, as they are 
created, would definitely need a principle to set the wheel of generation in motion and these 
principles have a sort of physical laws that allow them to function thanks to the will and the 
power of the Almighty God nothing more and nothing less.
We do deduce from this analysis that the principle of differentiae is of a crucial 
significance in the understanding of the eternity or the generation of elements, and 
accordingly, the whole universe. Furthermore, if you do fall into the category of believers in 
the creation of the world by a Creator, definitely, you are a believer in the creation from 
nothing. In consequence, you will not find it difficult to believe in the creation through a 
principle that is functioning through thorough and highly calculated physical and 
mathematical laws that are neither eternal nor independent. Empedocles, Plato, Democritus 
and many other Hellenes mentioned that the elements of the world are four and with 
Aristotle, these elements became five. In the middle ages, physicists were taking about tens 
of basic elements. However, nowadays the scientists prove that the basic elements of the 
world are at least 106 natural ones plus other which are artificial (made by man in 
laboratories).
The reason why these philosophers did restrict these elements of the world to just four or 
five is that because they considered water, air, earth and fire as indivisible, they did not 
understand that these elements could be divided into other constituents.
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For example, if we do take water, they regarded it as an element, as they failed to 
disintegrate it into its real nature that is made of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of 
hydrogen. The atomists, themselves, who believe that the world is made of atoms, failed to 
divide those atoms into their basic constituents, which are the protons, the electrons and the 
neutrons and so on. These constituents are themselves made of quarks and leptons. The latter 
are indivisible at least at the time being according to modern physicists. That is why, they 
may be considered at the time being the constituents of everything in the cosmos, as they 
made up the first drops of matter in the time of the beginning of the cosmos. These quarks 
and leptons are susceptible to decay or what we call 'relative death' in the sense that they 
perish and reborn, and in their death and rebirth, the matter is renewing itself. The fate of 
these quarks and leptons is like the fate of human being, the death of one individual does not 
affect the life or the proliferation of human race, as there will be other individuals still alive 
and ready for the propagation of the race. From this perspective, nothing in this cosmos is 
immune from decay, demise, destruction and death.
Someone would then wonder; if what was said about the Hellenes and non-Hellenes about 
the four basic elements of the world did not survive even the Copernican era, and nowadays 
it seems like a myth that has nothing to do with the facts and truths revealed by modern 
physics, why are they discussed in depth in this thesis? The answer would be that what 
modern physics has achieved did not come by chance or overnight, it is rather, the colossal 
efforts of thousands of thinkers, theologians, philosophers and intellectuals in different 
scientific disciplines. History has proved that human intellectuality was not born as it is now; 
it has passed through many stages of thought and speculations, not just from the Hellenistic 
period until now, but inside the intellectual arena of ancient wisdom as well. It passed from 
myths to reason and from naivety to professionalism. Such gradual progress was very vital to 
the whole understanding of the universe, as it paved the road for discoveries, intellectual 
competitiveness throughout the ages. Undoubtedly, these philosophers with their great 
theories at that time were the founding stone of human intellectuality, the contributors to 
every single success of nowadays thought and the absent participants in the discoveries of 
modern sciences.
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ON THE HELLENISTIC VIEW OF GOD'S EXISTENCE: 
3.1 The Platonic Cosmological Argument:
No one would deny the non-Greek influences on the Platonic and the Aristotelian 
philosophies especially on their theories regarding the conception of God. These influences 
go back to the Indian civilization. Plato was also heavily influenced - as a disciple of 
Socrates- by the Socratic philosophy and the Sophistic schools. However, this does not 
underestimate the charismatic characters of the Hellenes in forming metaphysical and ethical 
speculations. The concept of God in Plato's philosophy has been interpreted in terms of his 
doctrine of ideas and forms. We have to bear in mind that the cosmological argument is a set 
of metaphysical proofs for God's existence. These proofs are traditionally known as the 
argument from causation, the argument from the first cause and sometimes the argument 
from the uncaused cause. Whatever the name is, the main purpose of this argument is to 
argue that such cosmic power must exist and it does not attempt to prove anything about God 
or the first cause. Both Plato and Aristotle posited many arguments about the first cause. In 
the Timaeus, Plato introduces a cosmic creator called the Demiurge, which is the supreme 
divinity in the universe he had created .The Demiurge is the maker of the world and the 
essence of all things. In the Sophist (248e, f), Plato regards the Demiurge as a supreme 
wisdom and intelligence. However, He lacked the supernatural potentials to create out of 
nothing 'ex nihilo'. His ability is restricted to the faculty of the organization of the 'anake'. 
This latter was the only other co-existent element in Plato's cosmogony 1 . In the meantime, 
Plato focused on the analysis of a priori order and structure that existed formerly in the 
world. In the Republic, Plato states, that the idea of good is equal to the God or it is God 
himself. In Theaetrus( 176 f), there is a distinction between the things of God and the things 
of earth and God is the only one capable of attaining metaphysical status. In Politics, God is 
a divine shepherd responsible for the self-moving cause of motion (269 f). We have to bear 
in mind that Plato's God -unlike the Abrahamic religions- did not create the world. He 
created man and put the intelligence in his soul. That is why, He is not a personal divinity, 
but the source of goodness. Plato considers his Demiurge as 'craftsman'. The creator of 
Plato's physical world is not a divine intelligence or a personal ruler, but (as it were) a 
manual labourer:
Cf. Vlastos .Plato's Universe, pp.26-27
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"That the supreme God of Plato 's cosmos should wear the mask of a manual worker is a 
triumph of the philosophical imagination over ingrained social prejudice. But this divine 
mechanic is not a drudge. He is an artist or more precisely, what an artist would have to be 
in Plato 's conception of art, not the inventor of a new form, but the imposer of a pre-existing 
form as yet formless material. Hence, the supreme God of Plato 's cosmos is not the inventor 
of a new form, but the imposer of pre-existing form 1 . "
According to Plato, when the Demiurge created the universe, he also created time. He sees 
time as the number according to which the image of eternity moves .On this regard, cosmos 
is the moving images of eternity and time is the number that measures the change in the 
cosmos. In the Timaeus, Plato considers time as a kind of celestial clockwork. It is a sort of 
motion rather than a measure of motion:
"The Demiurge brought into being the sun, the moon and five other stars for the begetting 
of time. These are called wanderers and they stand guard over the numbers of time...and so 
people are all but ignorant of the fact that time really is the wanderings of all these bodies2 . "
Plato also argued that motion in the world and in the cosmos was imparted motion that 
would have required some kind of 'self originated motion' to set it in motion and maintain 
that motion3 . 
3.2 The Peripatetic-Cireronian Maker of the Universe:
Aristotle held that the cosmos had always existed and has always been matter out of which 
the world has come to its current form. This eternalism came from his concept of the Divine 
as a supreme being that did not take part in creation or the lives of human beings. We do 
understand from the Peripatetic view that God has nothing to do with the creation and the 
demise of the world, his main role is to set its wheel in motion4 . In consequence, the destiny 
of human beings is not under the control of God. According to Aristotle, the notion of 
cosmic God as the supreme arche in the soul superior to logos, episteme, and nous that 
everyone should live according to his requirements and commands as a slave is completely 
erroneous 5 . For Aristotle, God is not a ruler who issues commands6 . In order to avoid this 
analysis, we have to make a distinction between senses ofarkhe:
' Cf. Vlastos .Plato's Universe, pp.26-27
2 Plato ,The Timaeus, pp.38-39
3 ,Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God, in Macmillan Encyclopaedia of Philosophy) 1967),Vol.2, 
p.232. 
Hollister C. Warren, J. Sear McGee and Stokes Gale ,The West Transformed: A History of Western Civilization, p.95
5 Anthony Kenny Aristotle On the Perfect Life, p.98
6 Ibid.
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''God is indeed the supreme arkhe of the soul; but not in the sense in which the analogy of 
slave and master would suggest 1 . " In this regard, Aristotle's God is not a personal God with 
a loving care and interest in His creation. Likewise, he is not a God, to whom all rational 
beings are responsible for every thought, word and act, so the divine truth: 
"Was not to be expressed in the uplifting of pure hearts and hands to Him. Though the whole 
world might be found His temple, He was not to be worshipped as the Holiness of their 
shrines. Though the heavens were telling of His gloty, and the stars were singing together 
for joy at His presence, yet no praise was to ascend to Him, the Lord of heaven and earth, in 
the perfumes of their altars or the poetry and music of their hymns. Thus devotion, being 
banished from the heart, sought a refuge for itself in the wilderness of a speculative 
theological philosophy'. "
In the light of such analysis, could we explain the nature of God as health, which is the hou 
heneka or raison d'etre of medicine? Definitely, we all do agree that wisdom does not 
explain God's coming into being. Besides, there are two kinds of raison d'etre and God 
does not belong -if we can use the term belonging here- to the kind which needs to be 
brought into existence(like health) or provided with benefits- for God has no needs . As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, Aristotle posited an underlying ousia (essence or 
substance) out of which the whole world is made up of. This is the ousia, which the prime 
mover organized and set in motion. What is understandable from the Peripatetic notion of the 
prime mover or the unmoved mover, is that the latter did not physically organize matter, but 
he is -regardless of his nature- the one who organized the universe as a homogeneous entity 
by making matter its building stone, its row material or the object of 'aspiration or desire' 4 . 
Therefore, every single incident that occurred and occurs in our universe is definitely the 
result of at least one cause or a complex set of causes. Each of those causes would be the 
outcome of another cause or a set of causes, which are on their turn the result of other causes. 
That is the way this universal chain is working, regardless of its beginning or its end, only 
this chain may has a beginning if you do believe in the existence of a first mover, which is
'Anthony Kenny ^.ristotle On The Perfect Life, p.98.
2 Renn. Dickson Hampden ,The Fathers of Greek Philosophy, p.48
3 Anthony Kenny Aristotle On the Perfect Life, p.99
*,CosmologicaI Argument for The Existence of God, in Macmillan Encyclopaedia of Philosophy(1967), Vol.2,
p.232.
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eternal and unmoved. The theory that we do come across in different occasions whenever a 
philosopher wants to prove that this world has a cause or a mover, is that of the agent and his 
relationship with the world. The adherents of such theory have to admit that this agent is 
acting from eternity and everlastingness and he is responsible for converting the world from 
a state of non-being to a state of being. This theory was the bone of contention between the 
Aristotelians and the Platonists. Plato does believe that the world has a beginning. That is 
why, his entire arguments were directed towards the existence of a creative agent of the 
world. As Aristotle does believe in the eternity of the world, he had to face all the Platonic 
proofs that support a beginning of the world. In the meantime, Aristotle had to defend 
himself against the accusations raised against him by the Platonists such as his disbelief in 
the existence of a creator of the world. Aristotle, and the Aristotelians later on, did introduce 
many arguments proving that he does believe in the existence of a creator and an agent of the 
world. The focus point of Aristotle is that the celestial spheres maintain their movement 
thanks to the agent of this movement and this is the only way by which the celestial spheres 
achieve perfection 1 . Hence, the responsible for this motion is the agent of the celestial 
spheres'. Besides, Aristotle proves that:
" God is the giver of the unity through which the world is united and the giver of the unity- 
which is the condition of the existence of the composite; that is to say ,He provides the 
existence of the parts through which the composition occurs , because this action of 
combining is their whole world. And the statement that the act has come to be is true, for it 
is movement, and the expression ' eternity' applied to it means only that it has neither a first 
nor a last term3 . "
From this perspective, we do deduce that Aristotle's God is not like the Abrahamic God 
Who is omnipresent and omniscient in every aspect of our daily life or the God of St Thomas 
Who is the God of faith and revelation, or like the God of the Nicene creed, in substance one
1 The interpretation given here is set out at greater length in the Aristotelian ethics 174-8.A veiy similar interpretation is set 
out independently by Brodie. Ethics with Aristotle, 386:' in one sense (i) a person is "ruled" by a valuable objective, in 
another(ii) by the practical wisdom that sets about obtaining it. And in one sense(a), that for the sake of which is the good 
which one aims to achieve, and in another(b) it is the beneficiary of that good. That which rules in sense (ii) rules by issuing 
instructions (one part of the soul to the other, for instance, or a doctor to a patient), and what is niled. In this way is that for 
the sake of which sense (b) .The good which is aimed for is also that for the sake of which, but not in the sense which 
implies that is ruled. It is not ruled by anything, but this not straightforwardly because it is a ruler-as if everything in this 
area of discourse is either ruler or ruled-for it does not rule in sense (ii).yet even so it conforms to the principle (if such it is) 
That everything either rules or is ruled; for it does rule in sense(i).( Anthony , Kenny .Aristotle On The Perfect Life,
p.98)
2 Averroes Jahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol. 1 p. 103
3Ibid.
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and in personality three. This Aristotelian perspective considers God-as mentioned before- 
as a mere unmoved mover who set the world in motion without creating it. Moreover, 
Aristotle goes on to say that the motion of this eternal world was necessary divine effect, but 
in the same time, it was not done by the will of God. We have to mention that Marcus 
Tullius, known as Cicero (ca. 106-43 BC) made one of the earliest known theological 
arguments about the existence of a creator. In De Naturae Deorum (On the Nature of Gods) 
Cicero stated, ''''The divine power is to be found in a principle of reason which pervades the 
whole of nature . " This Ciceronian point of view about the creator came as a result of his 
cultural background of the roman religion, for in Roman mythology, the creator Goddess 
Gaia was borrowed from Greek mythology. The Romans called her Tellus Terra. Cicero, as 
a writer and orator, used all his linguistic abilities and rational thinking to prove the existence 
of a creator to this astonishing cosmos:
"When you see a sundial or a water- clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by 
chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and 
intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their 
artificers2. " 
3.3 The Epicurean Denial of Divine Assistance:
The Epicurean point of view was not that far from the Aristotelian one. Lucretius does 
believe in the existence of gods, but they did not start the universe and they have no concern 
for men. Lucretius's scepticism led him to believe that he could free mankind from the fear 
of gods by demonstrating that all things occur by natural causes without any intervention by 
the gods. Historians of science, however, have been critical of the limitations of this 
Epicurean approach to science, especially as it pertained to astronomical topics, which he 
relegated to the class of 'unclear' objects3 :
"Weather he really believed in the existence of Gods, that is, of being of a similar but 
superior nature to ourselves, it is not easy, from the perusal of his works, to decide. He at 
times speaks of Gods, like Epicurus, as certainly existing, and enjoying a state of tranquil 
felicity, unconcerned about the affairs of the world and unaffected by human good or human 
evil. At other times, he seems to consider them as mere creatures of the imagination, to
Lucretius, On the Nature ofThings,(De Rerum Naturae),p.34
Ibid. 
3 B. E. R. Lloyd .Greek Science after Aristotle, p.26
2 
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which men have attributed, in the operations of nature, those affects of which they cannot 
discover the causes 1 . "
In the meantime, Lucretius does believe in the existence of a natural power that produces, 
develops and sustains everything in the universe. It holds the first and the basic principles of 
all things responsible for the generation and dissolution processes. These generative things 
are the seeds or the primary bodies from which everything is derived:
"For the whole nature of Gods must necessarily, of itself enjoy, immortality in absolute 
repose, separated and far removed, from our affairs; for, exempt from all pain .exempt from 
perils, all sufficient in its own resources, and needing nothing from us, it is neither 
propitiated by services from the good, nor affected with anger against the bad 2 " 
3.4 The Stoic Notion of God:
The Stoic concept of God came from their logic based on the origin of knowledge and the 
criterion of truth. Even though the mind has many activities of its own, these activities are 
restricted to materials supplied by the senses. From this perspective, the Stoics denied the 
metaphysical reality of concepts, for they are mere ideas in the mind. As all knowledge is the 
knowledge of sense-objects, nothing is true except sense impressions. Consequently, the 
criterion of truth lies in sensation itself, in the sense that it is based on reason and not on 
feeling. From this analysis of the criteria of truth, the Stoics built their fundamental 
proposition stating that nothing incorporeal exists, hi this regard, they consider the soul and 
even God as material nothing less and nothing more. This belief in the non-existence of 
anything incorporeal came form the Stoic concept of the world as unique and coming from 
one principle. Therefore, this theory denies the existence of a duality of whatsoever, between 
matter and mind or even between God and the world. The other Stoic belief contributing to 
the emergence of this theory lies in the relationship between soul and body and God and the 
world. The former are regarded as pairs acting and reacting upon each other. The body, for 
instance, produces ideas in the soul, and the latter produces movements in the former. This
* The above passage is considered by Faber, Bentley, Wakefield, and others, to be out of place in the original. 
It occurs again 11.645, whence Isaac Vossius thinks it was transferred to this place by some critics who wished 
to show that Lucretius was at variance with himself in invoking divine assistance, and yet excluding the gods 
from all concern with mortals. If it were so, the critics probably placed it in the margin, from which it crept into 
the text ( Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. John Mason Good, p.6)
1 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things (De rerum Nature), p. 16.
2 Ibid.,pp.5-6.
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process is not possible if both soul and body were of different substance. Hence, the 
corporeal cannot act on the incorporeal and vice-versa. In order that this contact would be 
possible, they must be all corporeal. This pure materialism leads the Stoics to consider the 
primal fire as God who is related to the world as the relationship between soul and body. 
They compared the human soul with fire, which came from the divine fire. As the soul 
penetrates into the body, God, who is the primal fire penetrates into the whole world. 
However, the Stoics did regard God as an absolute reason.
It is worthwhile to mention here that considering God as an absolute reason do not 
incorporate God or make the Stoics idealists, for they still consider God as material. This 
means that the divine fire is a rational element. According to them, since God is reason, the 
entire world is governed through rationality. This means that this world is made for a specific 
purpose based on order, harmony, beauty, design etc, and as reason is a sort of law, the world 
is run and subjugated to that law. Consequently, it is governed by the rigorous necessity of 
cause and effect. 
3.5 Plotinus's Cosmos Maker:
The conception of God, as seen by Plotinus, is defined by the relationship between plurality 
and relation. As it is known every duality implies a relation and every single relation 
establishes a brand-new unity .Since every whole is more than its parts, such a unity violates 
the supreme law of thought stating that a thing is what it is nothing more and nothing less. 
This is the way we may decode the enigmas of the world we are living in and unveiling some 
mysteries of its maker. Therefore, the world is a well-organized and well-ordered system and 
more complicated that the multitude of unities it encloses. According to Plotinus's logic 
states that:
"TTze force binding the plurality into unity, and the plurality of unities into the all- containing 
unit of the universe is the Archetype of unity, the ultimate, primordial Monad, God 
unattainable in His supreme simplicity even for thought. For all thought is relational, 
knitting together in the undefinable unity of a judgement a subject and a predicate. But in 
God's absolute and highest Unity there is no plurality that can be joined, since all joining 
needs a superior joining unit. Thus God must be the One and the Lone , having no attribute , 
no genus, , no species, no universal that He can share with any creatures of the world '. "
'Simon Van Den Bergh, the introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol .1, pp.xxv- 
xx vi
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The broad lines of Plotinus's conception of God can be summarized in three main points: 
God's existence can be expressed through God's essence and not through God's attributes, 
but this means that there is no bridge or passage taking us from the stable stillness of God's 
unity to the changing and varied multiplicity of the world. God's rationality can only 
obtained by regarding His relation to the world, as irrational .If God is not reachable for 
thought, the very affirmation of this will be self-contradictory 1 .
3.6 The Neo-Platonist Views about the Creator of the Cosmos:
The Neo-Platonist philosopher Lamblichus Chalcidensis's(ca.245- 325 AD) concept of God 
was different of that of his Neo-Platonic predecessors who regarded the matter as corrupt and 
putrid and has nothing to do with the eternal divine. He considered the matter as divine like 
all the other elements of the universe. Lamblichus used many terms, that we have previously 
mentioned, to build up his theory about the divine. Among these terms, the monad, which is 
the absolute one or the indivisible entity, its first principle, is intellect or what he called 
'nous'. Thus, Dirlmier, citing EE 1248a -26-9 and NE 1177al6, argued that nous is not
ry
considered as divine, but it is even called 'God' .
After that Lamblichus introduced another super existent one to stand between it and the 
producers of intellect or psyche and he called that the Dyad. The latter was represented by 
Plotinus under three stages: objective being, subjective life and realized intellect. Hence, the 
Platonic creator-God, the Demiurge, is identified with the perfect nous, and the intellectual 
triad is being increased to a hebdomad. As in Plotinus, nous produced nature by meditation 
of the intellect; the intelligible gods are followed by a triad of psychic gods. 
According to Lamblichus, the first of these psychic gods is incommunicable and 
supramundane, while the other two seem to be mundane. Lamblichus wrote of gods, angels, 
demons and heroes, of 12 heavenly gods whose number is increased to thirty -six or three 
hundred and sixty, and of seventy-two other gods proceeding from them, of twenty-one 
chiefs and forty-two nature gods. Besides, there are guardian divinities, of particular 
individuals and nations.
1 Simon Van Den Bergh, the introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, vol.1 p.xxvi
2 Anthony Kenny .Aristotle on the Perfect life, p.96
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The whole of lamblichus theory is governed by a mathematical formalism (Triad, 
hebdomad...) .He applies numbers to all things from the Divine to the creatures. He went 
further by considering numbers as independent existences because they occupy a middle 
position between the limited and the unlimited. If Plotinus spoke about the generation of the 
intellect from the one, and the intellect attempt to go back to the one, Proclus set up a system 
to this process through a three-fold movement, which are remaining (mone), procession 
(Proodos) and return (epistrophe}. This movement makes the intellect remain in the one, 
which means that it has the one as its origin, it proceeds from the one and it has come to be 
as a separate entity. In the meantime, it goes back to the one, which it does not cut itself from 
its source, for it receives the good that is its identity from the one.
Proclus used this threefold motion to highlight everything that is below the one and above 
the material reality. Proclus made a distinction between three moments in the intellect, which 
are the intelligible, the intelligible-intellectual and the intellectual. The intelligible in its turn 
is made up of three triads: the being, the eternity and the living being. The intelligible - 
intellectual moment consists of three triads and the intellectual one is a hebdomad. We 
deduce from here that Proclus tried to give a hierarchical ordering to the various 
metaphysical elements and principles.
From the Proclean triadic logic of unfolding, we deduce that the cosmos is expanding 
from unity to multiplicity. The intellect gives rise to multiplicity, which allows one being to 
be different from another. However, as the intellect is a divine mind possesses a complete 
grasp of its moments in one single act of thought. That is why, the intellect is all the time 
outside the frame of time. It (the intellect) generates other individual intellects, which occupy 
different places in the Proclean cosmos, is like taking the Platonic forms and placing them in 
the self-thinking thought, which is simply Aristotle's unmoved mover. 
3.7 Conclusion:
It is quite obvious that Hellenistic philosophers relied on their proofs that they regarded as 
irrefutable to prove the existence of a creator and sometimes creators. These proofs are the 
ideological one, which states that the cosmos as a homogeneous artefact should have a 
craftsman. The ontological proof sees in the wonders of the cosmos ranging from the 
beauties of the Earth to the enchanting greatness of the skies the name of the Divine. As all 
these creatures are well designed, definitely, there has to be something excellent, which is 
only the creator, as the good implies the best and the excellent.
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The cosmological proof considers the first mover, which is immobile, immaterial and 
eternal as responsible for the existence of the cosmos. Aristotle in his efforts to prove the 
existence of a creator, relied on the eternity of movement and the eternity of time (which is 
the number of movement). He starts first to prove the existence of many movers and in order 
to limit the plurality of these movers, he proved the unicity of these movers and their 
connection to a first dominate mover. We will discuss the Peripatetic concept of movement 
in depth in the forthcoming chapters.
When we do talk about the first cause argument, we have to know that it combines a set of 
proofs and it is argued by different thinkers and covered by divergent philosophies. Each 
trend has a way of speculation and a specific manner of evaluation. However, all these 
arguments have many points in common, in that they do argue that every finite and 
contingent being has a cause, as nothing finite and dependent can cause itself. Likewise, a 
casual chain cannot be of infinite length because there must be a first cause or something, 
which is not an effect.
We have to be careful when considering the outcome of these thorny debates because 
reaching the same conclusion does not mean necessarily that there is an agreement about a 
certain argument. For instance, the Platonic Demiurge is not the Peripatetic prime mover, 
which is not in its turn the Almighty Divine, as known in monotheistic beliefs. As mentioned 
in the first chapter, the postulation of a creator to this cosmos would mean its createdeness. 
That is why, it is so crucial to discuss the proofs supporting or denying God's existence, as 
they are helpful in understanding the nature of the whole universe on the one hand and the 
essence of God, if proved to be existing, on the other hand. No wonder, the existence of a 
creator to our universe is among the old -new debate that involved all the intellectuals from 
all disciplines, it is the key factor that would pave the way for unravelling many of 
supernatural phenomena that are still shrouded in mystery. It is even logical to understand 
every multiplicity in our world if we do understand the oneness, and consequently, it is quite 
helpful to find the underlying cause of that tree of life if we can know its seed. Till 
nowadays, and despite the tremendous human achievements in all disciplines and aspects of 
life, any evidence leading to the refutation or the confirmation of a creator to our cosmos is 
taken into consideration in a world that many modern thinkers want to see as a God free zone 
for other considerations that have nothing to do with scientific honesty.
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ON THE ISLAMIC VIEW OF GOD'S EXISTENCE: 
4.1 Paganism in the Arabian Peninsula:
No one would deny that in al -Jahiliyya (the pre-Islamic period), the Arabs used to worship 
hundred of gods. Each one represents a specific cosmic phenomenon, climatic states, sacred 
places or just names of some celestial spheres. Each tribe had its own deity, even more than 
that, every single Arabic house had its own god. Among the famous gods, we find al- Uzzah 
(the mighty), Manate (the goddess of destiny) al-Lat (goddess), Bubal (The lord of the 
Ka 'bah) and many more. It is well- understood that Quraish (the pagan Arabs) at that time 
kept claiming that they were not worshiping these gods themselves, but they made them just 
to get closer to the one1 , unique God (Allah)2 . What is striking here is that the Meccan Arabs 
created these gods not only for worship, but for the prosperity of their trade as well. Thus, 
polytheism3 for them was of a paramount importance to keep their trade prosperous and 
attract all the other tribes to their homeland Mecca. In the meantime, many people in the 
Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere used to worship stars4, planets, trees5, mountains6, 
persons7, stones, shrines and other specific celestial bodies and spheres such as the Moon 
and the Sun. We have to point out here that those who are in support of the idea that God 
(Allah) was worshipped by the pagan Arabs even before the coming of Islam, want us to 
believe that Islam did come first as a new religion. It came just to reform a chaotic belief in 
God (Allah) that was based on polytheism and intercession8 . This sort of analysis should be 
taken with a tremendous pinch of salt because even if we do admit that God (Allah) was 
present in the minds and hearts of the pagan Arabs, He was not worshipped according to
1 "Say, He is God, the one; God, the Eternal, Absolute, He begets not, and neither is He begotten; And there is 
nothing that can be compared to Him. " ( Qur 'an, Ikhlase : sincerity. 112 ).
2 Allah was also the name of a god among the pagan Arabs even before the emergence of Islam. Allah was 
never presented by any idol of physical nature. The Arabs never created an idol to represent Allah because of 
their belief in polytheism. Allah is not a name but a description that means literally the God exactly like the 
Hebrew word Elohim or the Greek one Theos or the biblical name Jehovah.
3 Even the pagan Arabs, before Muhammad's time, knew their chief god by the name of allah and even, in a 
sense, proclaimed his unity...Among the pagan Arabs this term denoted the chief god of their pantheon, the 
Kaaba, with its three hundred and sixty idols. ( Samuel M.Zwemer ,The Moslem Doctrine of God, p. 24-25)
4 "Among His Sings are the Night and the Day, and the Sun and the Moon. Adore not the Sun and the Moon, 
but adore God, Who created them, if it is Him ye wish to serve." (Qur'an, 41:37).
5 The worshippers of trees believe that the tree is a symbol of everlastingness because of the story of Adam when 
commanded by God not to eat from a forbidden tree, but the Satan's insinuation persuaded him to do so to achieve
immortality.6 Mountains were regarded as an emblem of mightiness( height and bigness..), source of graces( ram, hail,
snow..), and symbol of fears (volcanoes, earthquakes..)
7 Personality cult was also known in the Arabian Peninsula in the form of praising famous religious figures,
and historic heroes.
8 Tor Andrae Jtfohammed: The Man and his Faith, pp. 13-30.
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certain religious rites on one hand and He was associated with other divinities on the other 
hand. This kind of worship is against the teachings of Islam in general and the Islamic 
concept of God in particular. Likewise, we do not agree with those who assert that 
monotheism was in the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula because of non- Arabic terms used in 
the Qur'an . We do agree that the monotheistic believers of Jewish and Christian 
communities were living there side by side with pagan Arabs, but the non- Arabic terms used 
in the Qur'an were there not to serve these communities, but to prove the universality of the 
Qur'an. Besides, the Qur'an is teeming with terms also borrowed from Persian, Aramaic, 
Syriac Greek...As the Qur'an is the last God's speech addressed to human kind, and it has to 
be comprehensive and universal.
4.2 Monotheism in Islam:
The belief in the oneness and uniqueness of God is the fundamental belief of all Muslims 
from different sects and trends of the Islamic monotheistic creed .He is known as Allah2 , and 
He is the Creator of everything. He is not an idol, a spirit or a breath because nothing can be 
compared to Him. He is unrivalled, peerless, and Has a plenty of names, which Muslims use 
to describe His nature. The Islamic God is not a feminine or masculine name and it cannot be 
plural like in other beliefs: god, gods, and goddess. The Islamic belief is based on the 
concept oftawhid (unity of God)3 .This monotheistic belief rejects all doctrines and theories 
considering God as a human or visible. Likewise, it rejects all forms of idol worships even if 
they are just means to get closer to God, as in Islam there is no mediation of whatsoever 
between God and His creatures. Consequently, this monotheistic belief rejects polytheism, 
atheism, dualism, and trinity. God the Almighty is beyond our sight and the human 
intelligence is unable to understand His nature .However, He is so close to us to the point 
that everyone can ask Him what he needs without resorting to any intermediary.
1 Hamilton A.R Gibb, ,Pre- Islamic Monotheism in Arabia, p.270.
2 Many non-Muslims mistakenly believe that the word Allah is an Arab God or a moon God, or some sort of
idol. Allah is the proper name of the one true God known by Muslims and non-Muslims alike throughout the
world.
3"Ifyou ask them who it is that has created the heavens and the Earth and subjected the Sun and the Moon they
will say God. . . If you ask them who it is that sends down water from the sky and thereby quickens the dead
earth, they will reply God.. When they embark they pray to God with all fervour, but when He brings them safe
to land they serve other gods besides Him. " (The Holy Qur'an, Al-Ankabut(The Spider,29. Verses. 61-65)
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4.3 Al-Ghazali's Proofs of God's Unity and the Impossibility of two Necessary 
Existents without a Cause:
The philosophers' arguments about this topic are almost the same, as they see the existence 
of two necessary existents as a proof that the species of necessary existence would be 
attributed to them both. Moreover, the necessary existent 1 has to be independently so through 
itself, which means that it cannot be imagined to be so through another or it has to be so 
through a cause, which means the essence of the necessary existent will be an effect, and 
consequently, its cause determines its necessity of existence, hi order to prove that, 
philosophers used the example of Amr and Zaid, the species 'man' is asserted ofZaid and of 
Amr, the former is not a man through himself. In this case, the latter would not be a man, but 
it is through a cause that makes both of them a man .hi this regard, the plurality of men 
conies from the plurality of matter in which humanity inheres. Such inherence in matter is an 
effect in which does not lie in the essence of humanity.
The deduction that we do come with from all this speculation is that if the necessary 
existent is through itself a necessary existent, it is imperative that it exclusively possesses 
this qualification. On the contrary, if it exists through a cause, it is considered as an effect, 
and consequently, it cannot be a necessary existent . Al-Ghazali objects to this in many 
ways, first, the statement stating that the species of necessary existence has to belong to the 
necessary existent through the necessary existent itself or through a case, is a self- 
contradictory dictum. The expression' necessary existence' is vague and unclear without the 
denial of a cause:
1 "Say: Who is the Lord of the heavens and the Earth! Say: God. Say: Do you then take besides Him guardians 
who do not control any benefit or harm for themselves? Say: Are the blind and the seeing alike? Or can the 
darkness and the light be equal? Or have they set up -with God associates who have created creation like His, 
so what is created became confused to them? Say: God is the Creator of all, and He is the One, the Supreme. " 
(Qur'an 13:16).
"He is the Originator of the heavens and the Earth; He made mates for you from among yourselves, and mates 
of (and for) the cattle, too, multiplying you (humans and animals) thereby; nothing is like Him; and He is the 
Hearing, the seeing. " (Qur'an 42:11).
2 Ibn Rochd, Tahafut al- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 1, pp.91-92
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"To admit two existents without a cause and without the one's being a cause of the other is 
not impossible. And your statement that what has no cause has none, either because of its 
own essence or through some cause, is faulty disjunction, for one does not ask for the cause 
of a thing which is said to have no cause and need no cause for its existence''."
In the same discussion, we have to bear in mind that the dictum claiming that what has no 
cause, has no cause because of its own essence or through the effect of a cause does not 
make any sense at all. Moreover, if philosophers do mean by the expression 'necessary 
existence' a positive qualification of the necessary existence and an existent without a cause 
for its existence at the same time, it is a complete obscurity of meaning:
"But the genuine meaning of this world is the negation of a cause for its existence, and this 
is an absolute negation about which it cannot be said that is due to its existence, or to a 
cause, such that the intended proof might be based on the supposition of this disjunction . To 
regard this as a proof is senseless and has no foundation whatever2 ."
This disjunction cannot be applied even to positive qualities; Al- Ghazali illustrated this 
point by presenting many examples like the one of black colour, which is a colour because of 
its essence or through a case. If it is a colour because of its essence, then, red cannot be 
considered as a colour, and consequently, the species of colouredness can only exist because 
of the essence of black, and if black is a colour because of a cause, which has made it a 
colour, in this case, black would be regarded as being without a colour. In the light of this 
analysis, this disjunction can be only fallible, as we cannot say that black is a colour because 
of its essence, and in the same time, we are unable to claim that this existent is necessary 
because of its essence. This means that this necessary existent cannot exist through anything 
else except its essence, and consequently, it has no cause because of its own essence. This 
way of proving the unity of God is associated with Ibn Sina and it is not found in any of the 
works of ancient philosophers. We have to bear in mind that the premises of this way of 
thinking are common-sense premises.
1 Averroes , The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut al- Tahafut,), vol. 1, pp. 170-171
2 Ibid, p. 171 
3 Ibid.
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What can be possible, it is possible to exist by its essence; its existence from its essence has 
no priority over its non-existence. If one of them has to have a priority over the other one, 
this is due to the presence or the absence of a thing. Ibn Sina in his attempt to prove the 
existence of Wajib al-Wujud (The Necessary Existent) as we would see in the following 
chapters, elaborated the following dictum: the possibility of both the existence and the non- 
existence of a thing does not come from its essence, but if it existed, its existence has to be 
from another . This does not apply to the Necessary Existent, as His existence does not 
depend on any external factor on the one hand , and He is the One Who gave existence to all 
other existents on the other one.
When we do say that this method is Ibn Sina's invention, we do mean by that the way of 
analysis and the method of speculation and not the premises used in it. We cannot deny the 
heavy influences of ancient wisdom on the works of Ibn Sina as a whole, and especially in 
the works regarding the nature, the unity and the knowledge of God. Regarding the second 
proof of philosophers about the two necessary existents, the Ash 'arites went on to say that 
there is a plurality in God. This assertion made them regarding Him as an essence with 
attributes. Al-Ghazali sees the fallibility of this proof in the impossibility of finding two 
different things having many things in common. For instance, philosophers attributed the 
word 'body' to both the transitory body and the body of the heavens and the term' intellect' 
is attributed to the intellect of man and the separate intellects at the same time. Likewise, the 
terminology 'existent' is attributed to eternal and transitory things^.
Al-Ghazali refuted this proof by first introducing the fallibility of philosophers about God's 
unity that can only be possible through the singleness of God's essence and the complete 
denial of any plurality in Him. According to Al-Ghazali, philosophers deny the quantitative 
division of the First Principle in both the real and the fictive world. The one who believes 
that the First Principle is not a body, regardless of his belief of the nature of that body, he is 
definitely thinking that way. Al-Ghazali's second refutation is about philosophers' 
qualitative division of body into matter and form, which is stripped of the First Principle. 
The third one was about the denial of the plurality of attributes in the necessary existent. 3
Ibn Sina, Isharat Wa Tanbihat,( Remarks and Admonitions),p.40 
Averroes ,The incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut al-Tahafut), vol. I,p.l75 
Ibid.p.177.
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4.4. Ibn Sina and the Necessary Existence of God:
We have to mention that Ibn Sina has made massive contributions towards philosophy 
dealing with God's existence and divine essence. As the main focus of physics is the motion 
of things, metaphysics is concerned with the very existence of those things. There is no 
scientific or logical law that states that those things must necessarily exist, however, there is 
a possibility of their existence and an equally real possibility that they might not have 
existed. Unlike all other things and beings, God exists by necessity, and consequently, His 
non- existence is impossible. Existence does belong to both essence and nature of God. In 
other words, the existence of these things and beings that do not come into existence by an 
inner necessity of their natures proves the existence of the Necessary Being called God. It is 
worthwhile to point out here that even an infinite chain of these beings and things that are 
caused to exist by a source, which is external to itself, fail to explain how all of them come to 
exist the way they are existing. That is why, only a first cause that exists necessarily can 
explain the existence of all other things and beings . Therefore, if we do assume that there is 
a necessary being, then, a true proposition expressed the statement 'God necessarily exists'. 
Likewise, if we do suppose that God is not sempiternal, then, that statement would be 
changed into 'God did not exist', 'God does not exist' and 'God will not exist'. Hence, if 
God is eternal in terms of necessity, He must also be sempiternal. This means that 
timelessness and sempitemity are mutually entailing in that necessity entails sempiternity 
and not vice-versa or at least timelessness is identical with sempiternity'. "This is what it 
means that a thing is created, that is, receiving its existence from another3 , writes Ibn Sina, 
"As a result everything, in relation to the first cause, is created...Therefore, every single 
thing, except the primal One, exists after not having existed with respect to itself. "
That is, anything brought into existence by the first cause requires the action of this cause to 
remain in existence. Ibn Sina writes, "That which is caused requires something which 
bestows existence upon it continuously, as long as it continues as existing5. "
' Roy Abraham Varghese ,The Wonder of the World: A Journey/row Modern Science to the Mind of God, pp.
112-113
2 M. Kneale .Eternity and Sempiternity, p.232
3Roy Abraham Varghese ,The Wonder of the World: A Journey from Modern Science to the Mind of God, pp.
112-113.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
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No cause is required to explain the existence of a necessarily existing being. Ibn Sina 
observes, "That whose existence is necessary through itself does not have a cause while that 
whose existence is possible through itself does have a cause 1 ." And there can be only one 
necessary being. "That whose existence is necessary must necessarily be one essence2." is 
the first volley of his elaborate argument to prove the exactitude of his theory. 
The general doctrine of Ibn Sina focuses on the idea that existence is something additional to 
the essence outside the soul and it is at the same time an accident of the essence. We may 
suppose that the existence was a condition for the being of the essence and a condition for 
the essence of the necessary existent. In this case, the necessary existent would be composed 
of the conditioning and the conditioned ,and therefore, it would be of a possible existence. 
Moreover, Ibn Sina emphasizes that what can exist as an addition to its essence, has a cause. 
From this perspective, the existence, for Ibn Sina, is an accident that supervenes on the 
essence and this is the main point Al-Ghazali was referring to in this passage:
"For man before his existence has a quiddity, and existence occurs to it and enters into 
relation with it, and in this way the triangle has a quiddity, namely, it is a figure surrounded 
by three sides, and existence is not a component of this quiddity, and therefore the intellect 
can perceive the quiddity of man and the quiddity of a triangle without knowing whether they 
exist in the exterior world or not3 .''''
From this perspective, any being has to be wajib (necessary) in itself due to its own nature, 
if it is not, then, it has to be not necessary. Therefore, the being that is not necessary in itself 
can, in its turn, be divided into two categories: to be mumtani' (impossibility) or mumkin 
(contingency) and any being that is impossible in itself, cannot achieve realization (al- 
wujud), so it can never be realized (mawjud). Accordingly, such a being has to be contingent 
due to itself and necessary due to the s/zart(condition,) that its cause exists, while it is an 
impossibility because of the condition that its cause does not exist ('illat nist). Therefore, we 
are in front of two factors: one is its being (khwudi) and the other one is manifested in the 
condition of the existence or the non-existence of a cause. We have to point out here that 
when we do consider its being-qua-being (khwudi-i wai) without any other conditions, it is 
not a necessity and not impossibility either. On the contrary, when we do consider that a
1 Roy Abraham, Varghese ,The Wonder of the World: A Journey from Modern Science to the Mind of God, pp.
112-113.
2Ibid.
3Averroes , The Incoherence of the Incoherence^ Tahafut al-Tahafut), vol.I.p. 179.
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determined cause that is the condition for realizing its cause, it become a necessity. If we do 
regard its cause as the condition of the na-hasil (non- realization) of its cause, then, it 
becomes impossibility. The conclusion that we do come out with here is that when we do 
consider number without the resort to any conditions that are connected to it, its nature 
cannot be an impossibility 1 . Ibn Sina went further in the explanation of this point by using 
many examples:
"If one regards the state of the number four which results from two times two, the result 
(hasil) must be necessity, for its non-realization as four is an impossibility .Hence, any 
existing entity, for which existence is not intrinsically necessary (Wujudi Wajib), is 
contingent in itself. Therefore, this entity is a contingent being in itself and a non-contingent 
being (hamumkin) with regard to something else (ghair).Its existence is not yet realized in 
such a manner that it must exist due to that reason(hukm)2 ."
This Ibn Sinian passage emphasized that becoming an existent is a contingency and the 
latter in itself can never be realized, for it has not come from a cause. That is why, it is 
necessary that the contingency be realized through a cause in order to become necessary to 
that cause as an existent. Above all, a cause becomes a cause because of its acting ('ilia) or 
its action so that an effect may result from it. Ibn Sinian reasoning leads us to understand that 
the Necessary Existent cannot be united in itself with any sabab ("cause).This means that as 
its being is necessary in itself without being caused; its being cannot be because of a cause. If 
it were not the case, then, it would not be the Necessary Existent in itself3 .Ibn Sina 
Highlighted this correlative relationship existing between the cause and the existent by 
arguing that:
"TTze Necessary Existent cannot be united with something in a reciprocal union. If it were in 
a reciprocal relation with another entity , and if one were the cause of the other, each would 
then be prior to the other, and the being of each would henceforth be prior to that of the 
other. As its cause, therefore, the being of one would be posterior to that of the other. 
Consequently, its being would then be conditioned by another being which could be realized 
only posterior to its own realization, therefore, its being could never be ."
1 Avicenna , The Metaphysica ofAvicenna (Ibn Sina), trans. Parviz, Morewedge.pp, 47-48
2 Ibid.,p.48
4Ibid.,p.49
-83-
Chapter 4
Ibn Sina concluded that if there are two entities that are not causes of each other, even if 
one of them is related (charanist) to the other, they are then simultaneous (barabar), which 
means that they are neither posterior nor prior to one another, exactly like the case of two 
(twin) brothers. Accordingly, either ad-dhat (the essence) of each of these two entities is 
necessarily in itself or it is not necessary in itself. If it happens that one entity is necessary in 
itself, then, the non-being of the other would not cause any harm to it. That is why, it could 
not be possible that there is such a union between two necessary entities, in the sense that, if 
the non-being of one entity would harm the existence of the other, then, it would not be 
necessary in itself, and consequently, it would be contingent in itself. From this perspective, 
Ibn Sina argued that there is a cause for the existence of any contingent being and such a 
cause is prior to it in essence (dhat). Therefore, if one were a cause ('ilia) and the other 
ma lul (effect), then, both of them would not be necessary. Thus, the Necessary Existent does 
not possess a juz' (element) or a bahra (a part), simply because elements and parts are 
coming from material causes, this is the fact that make the Necessary Existent not united 
essentially with anything 1 .
Ibn Sina was also -like all other philosophers and thinkers- heavily influenced by the great 
pioneers of Greek philosophy Aristotle and Plato. This is obvious in his belief that there was 
a hierarchy of intelligent beings in the universe. That is why, many critics considered him as 
a pantheist, but these accusations are baseless, for Ibn Sina is the one who underscored the 
essential difference between God, the necessary being whose essence is to exist and all the 
other things and beings2 . Despite the belief of Ibn Sina in the world being created by God, he 
admitted -under the impact of Hellenistic philosophy and like many of his contemporaries- 
that both God and matter existed eternally3 . Ibn Rochd rejected the view that the world is 
co-eternal with God, in that, the world is eternally emanated from God .Ibn Rochd went on 
to say that we can describe the world as co-eternal with God only if we do mean that the 
world is eternally moved by God4 . There are many thinkers and critics who do not see any 
contradiction in this equation because creation does necessarily require a beginning in time.
1 Avicenna ,The Metaphysica ofAvicenna (Ibn 5'/no),trans. Parviz, More wedge, pp. 49 -50
2Roy Abraham Varghese, The Wonder of the World: A journey from Modem Science to the Mind of God, pp.
112-113.
3 Ibid.
"Harry A. Wolfson,77*<? Twice-revealedAverroes, p.37.
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Ibn Sina argued that the world in itself is only possible and requires a cause of its 
existence; - we would come back to this point in depth in the forthcoming chapters-. 
Accordingly, God necessarily exists and He is the one Who brought the world into being 
from nothing. This means that such an act could either have a beginning or be both 
beginningless and endless. If the professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo 
(Ontario, Canada) F.F Centore sees in the Ibn simian supposition that the world necessarily 
emanates from God a defect 1 , Ibn Rochd did not support arguments of God's existence taken 
from the impossibility of an infinite regress of efficient causes2 . 
4.5. The Ash'arites-Mu'tazilites Debate Concerning the Divine:
This debate is only the starting point as by the beginning of the twenty century the 
materialists' fierce attacks were, and are still, directed to the branch of philosophy dealing 
with metaphysical topics or what we call divinities3 . If we go back to our debate, we find that 
there were many Islamic trends, which tried hard to understand the nature of the Divine 
because they were inspired by the Greek philosophy, and among these trends we find the 
Mu 'tazilites . In the meanwhile, there were other trends, which focused on the understanding 
of the unique nature and characteristics of God regardless of any outside cultural influence 
like the Ash 'antes. They emphasized that the nature and the characteristics of the Divine can 
never be understood because they are beyond reason, while the Mu 'tazilites's philosophy 
sees that God is one, and His unity makes Him unique. That is why, He is different from all 
existing beings. It is worth noting that even differentiation between God and His creatures is 
not accepted by many religious trends, as this would imply a knowledge of God' essence or 
attributes. This make us conjure up the Plotinus' dictum 'God is other than being', so He did 
not belong to a genus in which He would have something that differentiates between Him 
and the other creatures. This reasoning was reflected by Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (d. -860 
AD) when he was asked what is God, he replied 'He is He' 4. Abbad ibn Sulayman (d. -864 
AD) went further by rejecting all expressions that involve mutual relationship between God 
and man such as the possibilities of man's turning to God and man's causing God to act. 5
'Roy Abraham Varghese ,The Wonder of'the World: A journey from Modern Science to the Mind ofGod, pp.
112-113.
2Herbert A. Davidson froofs of Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic Jewish
Philosophy, p.598
3 Sulayman Donya ,Attajkir al-Falsafi al-Islami,( the Philosophical Islamic Thought), p.7
4 Binyamin Abrahamov fahr al-Din al-Razi on the knowability of God's Essence and Attributes, p.206.
5Ibid.
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Therefore, there are no similarities of whatsoever between God and his creatures. This basic 
belief, led the Mu'tazilites to metaphorically 1 interpret all the Qur'anic Verses stating 
likeness between the Divine and His creatures. If these Qur'anic Verses are understood 
literally, then, we are falling in anthropomorphism, which the Mu 'tazilites are against. 
Accordingly, anthropomorphism is against the oneness and the unity of God. We have to 
bear in mind that the belief in the existence of an eternal existent, which is not necessarily 
God, compelled Muslim orthodox to believe in the reality of eternal attributes in God even if 
they do believe in His absolute unity2 .
As God pervades all nature and human beings, His transcendentalism was a basic tenet for 
the Mu 'tazilites. Anthropomorphism was not the only dispute between the Mu 'tazilites and 
the Ash 'antes3 . There were many other hot issues; the most important of them all is whether 
the Qur'an is created or eternal. For the Ash 'arites, as the Qur'an is the speech of God, it has 
to be eternal, while, the Mu 'tazilites claimed that the Qur'an is created. This dispute was a 
real ordeal in Islamic medieval theology because when you support the creation of the 
Qur'an, you are denying the eternity of God, as the Qur'an is the speech of God Who is 
eternal. According to Muslim orthodox, eternity is a property that is associated with God, 
that is why, eternal things must not ipso facto be God, as their eternity means they are 
eternally created by the only Eternal (God). It is on the same ground that orthodox Islam, 
even if they rejected the belief in the eternity of the world, they tolerate such a belief and 
regarded it as compatible with the absolute oneness of God4 .
1 "Wlien mv sen'ants ask thee concerning me, I am indeed close (to them).I respond to the prayer of even' 
suppliant when he calls on Me. Let them also, with a will, listen to my call, and believe in me. That they may 
walk in the right way (Qur'an 2: 186)."
* "// was We Who created man, and we know what dark suggestions his soul makes to him: For We are 
nearer to him than his jugular vein (Qur'an 50:16)."
*"And call in remembrance the favour of God unto you, and His covenant, which He ratified with you, when 
ye said: "We hear and We obey " and fear God, for God knoweth well the secrets of your hearts ('Qur'an 5: 7)."
2 Harry A. Wolfson, ,The Twice- revealed Averroes, p.377.
3 The Ash 'arites are also known as the Ash 'art Madhhab and al- Ash 'airahf at- Asha- 'irah) in some sources 
and the Ash 'arite school in others. It is a school of early Muslim speculative theology founded by the 
outstanding theologian Abu al-Hasan al- Ash 'ari. This school radically changed the Muslim theology, and 
contributed to its development. They are in sheer contradiction with the Mu 'tazilites who are Greek-inspired 
theologians. They did not rely on rationality; they consider the comprehension of the supernatural phenomenon 
in general and the nature of God in particular beyond human intellectual potentials.
4 Harry A. Wolfson, Jhe Twice- revealed Averroes, p.377.
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4.6 The Rochdian Proofs of the Existence of God: 
4.6.1 Ibn Rochd against the Other Schools of Theology:
Ibn Rochd and Al-Ghazali were faced by two enemies one within the Islamic arena and the 
other from the outside. Al-Ghazali in his work Fadaeh al~Batiniyah(the Infamies of the 
Esoterics), sees that he has to establish the proof and the evidence to upgrade the beliefs 
from the depths of doubt and uncertainty to the highest level of sureness and certitude. This 
step would enable him to face the heresies occurring in the assets of religions, the creeds of 
dualism and the limits of logic brandished by the ancient sages and philosophers. 1 It is true 
that all arguments about God's existence do cover the areas of the concept of 
particularization, design and motion, but we do not agree with some scholars who thought 
that the Muslim and Jewish philosophers focused on arguments taken only from cosmology, 
teleology and there is no trace of any ontological arguments2 . On the contrary, Muslim and 
Jewish philosophers did cover all areas and every single corner of discussions regarding this 
issue. Al-Ghazali, is one of them, argued that all philosophers, with the exception of 
materialists, do admit that the world has a creator and God is that creator, or at least, God is 
that agent of the world. Hence, the entire cosmos is a projection of His act and his work. 
Philosophers' belief in the existence of a creator of the world starts from their standpoint of 
the agent, the act and the relationship between them. The agent is equipped with the power of 
knowledge and choice in addition to the will, in the sense that, He is aware of what he is 
willing. Many philosophers argued that God has no attribute3 of whatsoever, He does not 
will4 and everything was created through the compulsion of necessity. That is why, God, 
according them, can only proceed one thing, and as the world consists of diverse components
1 Al-Ghazali, Fadaeh al-Batiniyah,(the Infamies of the Esoterics),p.4.
2D. Herbert Proofs of Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic Jewish Philosophy, p.598 
3 The Mu'tazilites opponents called them al-Mu'atillah because of their denial of God's attributes. After the 
defeat of the Mu'tazilites at the hands of Asharite and Maturidite theologians, their teachings found no place in 
Muslim thought. The Shi'a Twelvers and the Zaidiya have adopted many of the Mu'tazila theses, and in such 
circles Ali (the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad and the fourth Khalifah) is erroneously held to have 
inspired the teachings of the Mutazilites. The Shi'a Twelvers also call their Imams 'the people of Justice and 
the Unity' _ a title which the Mu'tazila first used of themselves  and have also adopted the Mutazili doctrine 
that the Quran is not eternal but was created. The earlier Shi'a and some Sufis also maintained that new 
circumstances may bring about an alteration in an earlier divine determination. God may 'change His mind'. 
The Mu 'tazilites also, objected to the orthodox doctrine of the divine decree, spoke of free futures and free 
possibilities in human life. In medieval Iraq, the Mu 'tazili theological movement was made a state doctrine in 
832, igniting the Mihna (ordeal). A struggle over the application of Greek logical proofs to the Qu'ran; people 
who would not approve Mu'tazili claims that the Qur'an was created rather than eternal were sometimes 
persecuted. The most famous victims of the Mihna were Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, who was imprisoned and tortured, 
and the judge Ahmad Ibn Nasr al-Khuza'i who was crucified. 
4 In many Arabic sources, the anthropomorphists are referred to as the Mushabihah or the Mujassimah.
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it is quite impossible that it proceeded from Him 1 . Ibn Rochd, as he is always doing 
throughout the entire of his Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), 
introduces the arguments of his components and tries to gradually refute them. He starts by 
presenting Al -Ghazali's argument that the agent must be willing, choosing and knowing 
what he wills to be the agent of what he wills. Then, he went on to say that Al-Ghazali's 
dictum is by no means self- evident, and accordingly, cannot be considered as a definition of 
the maker of the world without evidence. This can be possible if it is justified by deduction 
from the empirical to the divine. The reason why this inference is of a paramount importance 
is that in the empirical world, there are two kinds of agents: the first one is the one called by 
natural philosophers the natural agents such as the warmth that causes heat and the coldness 
that generates cold. The second agents are those that do perform a certain act at one time and 
in the meanwhile, they can perform its opposite at another time2 . These agents are called by 
philosophers 'voluntary and selective agents'. The problem of Al- Ghazali's dictum is that he 
who performs the processes of choosing and willing, he is lacking the things, which he wills. 
This is not possible in the case of God because He cannot lack anything He wills. Likewise, 
who he chooses, definitely he is making a choice for himself of the better of two available 
things. All over again, God does not need a better condition or situation. Furthermore, the 
will is a change and a passive quality, and the wilier after attaining his target, his will would 
cease, and God is not subject to passivity or change:
"God is still farther distant from natural action, for the act of natural thing is a necessary in 
its substance, but it is not a necessity in the substance of the wilier, and belongs to its 
entelechv. In addition natural action does not proceed from knowledge: It has, however, 
been proved that God's act does not proceed from knowledge3 ."
Al-Farabi sees that the world was eternally emanated from the essence of God by the will of 
God4 . Such a belief is not totally compatible with the theories of creation. It is worthwhile to 
mention here that orthodox Muslims were in favour of creationism. That is why, they 
rejected Al-Farabi's reasoning, but without brand it a heretical, as Muslim orthodoxy believe 
that God' will is behind the genesis of the world whether it was emanated or created. Al - 
Ghazali, the champion of Muslim orthodoxy, by asserting that the world was created by the 
will of God; he was rejecting the view stating that it was created or emanated through
! Al-Ghazali ,Tahafut al-FalasifafThe Incoherence of Philosophers), p. 134.
2Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut-al-Tahafut), pp.87-8
3Ibid.
4Harry A. Wolfson ,the Twice-Revealed Averroes,p.377.
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necessity, as the advocation of the last scenario would be an obvious assertion of the co- 
eternity of the world with God. 1 Consequently, such belief is minimizing the power and the 
authority of God over the world. Ibn Rochd sees the manner in which God plays the role of 
an agent or a wilier are not so clear because there is no counterpart to God's will in the 
empirical world. Therefore, anyone who analyses things in this way, he can be only an 
impostor. Even if Ibn Rochd is a very harsh critic, he is always beside the philosophical 
contemplation. That is why, he refuses to call philosophers impostors, as they are truth 
seekers. Even if they err while seeking the truth, they remain in the scope of philosophers 
and not impostors, as the latter, do not seek the truth; they only seek to perplex 2.To sum up 
his argument about the fallacy of Al-Ghazali's conception of divine will and choice, Ibn 
Rochd argued that:
"There is no difference between the one who says that God wills with a will which does not 
resemble the human will, and one who says that God knows through a knowledge which does 
not resemble human knowledge: in the same way as the quality of His knowledge cannot be 
conceived, so the quality of His will cannot be conceived3. "
Ibn Rochd fortified his stance and the coherence of his arguments by exhibiting some 
assumptions regarding the structure and the nature of the world. If the world were existing 
and eternal by itself, it would not be in need of an agent. We do mean here by itself its 
independent existence regardless of its movement that is constituted of produced 
parts4.However, this would also depend on the meaning of eternal .If it is the everlasting 
production that has no beginning and no end. From this perspective, the entire universe is 
God's product. Accordingly, the terminology 'production' is more accurate and suitable than 
the term' eternity'. This distinction between production and eternity is related to that 
between existence and non-existence. Philosophers do define the production as any thing that 
exists after non-existence. This is a very controversial point, as it would lead us to discuss 
what proceeds from the agent when God performs the act of production, and what is 
connected directly with Him. Is that production a pure existence, or rather, a pure non- 
existence or both of them?5 Both Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rochd do agree that it is impossible 
that non-existence was connected with God, since the Agent cannot exert influence on non-
1 Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut-al-Tahafut), vol.1, pp.87-8
2 Ibid.,p.88. 
3Ibid.
4 Ibid., p.96.
5 Ibid.,p.97.
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existence. Hence, it is quite obvious that non-existence is not linked to the agent, and what 
proceeds from God is pure existence, hi this regard, temporal production implies a sheer 
contradiction, in the sense that, it has to be connected with the agent, as it is a condition that 
in order to be produced, it has to be preceded by non-existence, and as mentioned previously, 
non-existence cannot be linked to the agent 1 . Concerning the issue of the agent-as in all other 
issues-Ibn Rochd was against the Ash 'arite logic especially regarding the relation between 
the agent and the world. Ibn Rochd admits such a relation to prove that the act of every 
existent has to be combined with its existent. This is always true if nothing happened to this 
existent, or if it is not subject to an accident, but the Ash 'arites do confuse the others when 
they do think:
"Who assumed an eternal existent, but denied that He acted during his eternal existence , 
but then however, allowed this agent to act eternally in the future, so that the eternal 
existence of the Eternal would become divided into two parts, an eternal past during which 
He does not act and an eternal future during which He acts!'. "
Ibn Rochd criticised most of the theologians 'arguments about the existence of God. In his 
famous work Al-Kashfan Manahij al-Adilla (The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),Ibn 
Rochd directed a bitter criticism to all these theologians and their refutable proofs for the 
existence of God. He tried hard to detect the problems and the fallacies in these arguments. 
In the meantime, he presents his own arguments. The Ash 'arites were among the theologians 
who have received the lion's share of his criticism. He accused them of exercising baseless 
power to control the lives of the Muslim community to achieve political targets. He benefited 
from the mistakes of the other schools of theology in general and the Ash 'arites in particular 
to elaborate his theory of God's existence. Ibn Rochd started his attack against the 
theologians from their ill interpretation of the Qur'anic Verses .He went on to say that the 
Qur'anic Verses that cannot resist the scrutiny of reason are extremely dangerous to accept. 
According to Ibn Rochd, these theologians have interpreted the Holy Scripture in a way that 
made them influence ordinary people and control their minds and lives alike. The truth was 
worse than that because anyone who opposed them or even argued with them, he was 
accused of religious innovation and unbelief. They ostracized "Whoever disagrees with them 
as heretics and unbelievers whose blood and property are free for all3 . " In many occasions,
1 Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut), vol.l,p.9
2Ibid.,p.l01
3 Averroes, The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs,(al-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla), p.133.
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they were exposed to crucifixion and capital punishment in public to sow fear in the other 
people's hearts. Even if there were many sects in Muslim theology at that time, Ibn Rochd 
states that:
"The most famous of these sects in our time are: the sect called the Ash'ante, which is 
believed by most people of our day to be the orthodox, that which is called the Mu'tazilite, 
the group which is known as the batini and the one called the literalist 1'."
We have to point out here that Ibn Rochd dismissed the literalists because they completely 
adhere to the apparent meaning of religion, which is regarded as a total ignorance of 
rationality. Ibn Rochd objected to their method because their: "Method of knowing the 
existence of God Almighty is by way of report not reason'"From this perspective, we do 
understand Ibn Rochd's important means to know the existence of God, which is reason. The 
Qur'an itself is teeming with Verses encouraging man to use reason to decode the enigmas of 
the creation and the secrets of the cosmos. Besides, reason is the most universal and common 
way available to human kind to know God. There are a plenty of occasions where many 
people "Would be required to believe in God by way of report ."This does not mean that this 
kind of people is not capable of understanding, analysing and reasoning on condition that 
these arguments must be delivered in a simple and understandable fashion. Ibn Tofayl, in his 
discussion of God's existence added many points that are worthy to be mentioned like the 
proofs taken from the absence of necessary connection between causes and effects and the 
proofs taken from intuition , The proofs taken from the absence of necessary connection 
between causes and effects were built upon the dictum stating that no material object can set 
itself in motion. Likewise, it is not possible for any form to independently change to another 
one. Therefore, in order that this process can be achieved, there must be an Immaterial Being 
Who is the efficient cause. Ibn Tofayl added that according to logical necessity, the universe 
did not jump into being on its own ex nihilo; it must have a productive factor. The latter
* Ibn Rochd's criticisms were bound to raise dust and undermined his position in the community .His books were burnt in 
public, the teaching of his philosophy was banned in many areas of the Muslim world, and he himself was expelled from his 
native town.
1 Ibn Rochd Jhe Exposition of the Methods of Proofs, p. 133.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.,pl35
4 Sami S. Hawi, Ibn Tofayl: on the Existence of God and His Attributes, p.59.
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could not be a matter, as its fate would be like that of all material objects and it would be 
itself in need of a generative factor. If we do assume that this generative factor is physical, 
then, it would need a third, a forth and so on ad infinitum, which is not rational and since this 
cause is not physical, it cannot be understood by senses or perceived through sensible 
qualities . Regarding the premises taken from intuition, Ibn Tofayl considered them superior 
to other proofs, as they are a means for the knowledge and the apprehension of God. If the 
man does refrain from worldly pleasures, he would experience a subjective transformation 
that would put him face to face with God. In other words, the metaphorical glimpse of God, 
which is acquired through reason in the phenomenal world, would place him in the core of 
reality, which is a direct confrontation with the basic and fundamental source of all beings2 . 
4.6.2 Ibn Rochd's Debate with the Ash'arites: 
4.6.2(a) The Will and the Action:
As mentioned previously, the literalists were dismissed by Ibn Rochd because of their 
suspension of the paramount importance of reason in knowing God. On the contrary, the 
Ash 'arites applied the tool of reason3 to gain any knowledge regarding the Divine and went 
further in relying totally on rationality. Ibn Rochd is on their side in using rational 
arguments, but blamed them for not using religious ones. "They were led to this position via 
arguments that they are not the religious ones that God has drawn attention to and through 
which He called upon all men to believe in Him 4. "
The Ash 'arites argued that the world is created and it must necessarily have a Maker Who 
created it5. However, Ibn Rochd objects to them because they did not specify the mode of the 
existence of the Maker of the world whether He is eternal or created. The Ash 'arites want to 
show that the world is created in time, whereas God is eternal 6 . It is obvious that the 
Ash 'arites could not support the idea that God is created, for this would mean that He is in 
need of a creator. The latter would be created by another one, and the process would 
continue ad infinitum. hi the meantime, the Ash 'arites argue that if God is eternal, then, His
1 Sami S. Hawi ,Ibn Tofayl: on the Existence of God and His Attributes, p .61.
2 Ibid., p.62
3 It is worthwhile to mention that the theological group called Ikhwan as-Safa wa Khillan al -Wafa( Brethren of 
purity) is an eclectic group that appeared in a period when the theological debates were at the climax of 
fierceness. According to them, the truth can be anywhere, that is why, they neither shun sciences, nor rejected 
books. Their philosophy is built upon the stances of all creeds to establish their own creed that combines all 
sciences as "All existing things derive from a single principle, a single cause, a single world, and a single 
soul".( Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa, Beirut: dar Sadir,1957). 
4Averroes , The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs (AJ-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla), p. 135.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
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actions must be eternal .Accordingly, the world that is created by Him, must be eternal as 
well, simply because it is His act. Ibn Rochd argues that the Ash 'arites tried to solve this 
dilemma by claiming that God is eternal, but his actions are created by an eternal will. 
According to Ibn Rochd, this reasoning would not be helpful, as it put them even in a very 
sophisticated position. The Ash 'arites view that God created actions through an eternal will 
is refutable because the relationship between the will and the actions is a conditional one 
"The will is the pre-condition of the action, rather than the action itself. " Ibn Rochd did 
not find it difficult to refute the Ash 'arites' claim by depicting that the will, which is actual, 
exists alongside the act that produces the object. Hence, the action and the will are two 
correlates. Ibn Rochd states that if:
"One of the two correlates existed in actuality, the other would have to exist in actuality as 
well, like father and son, but if one of them existed potentially, the other would also. Should 
the will that is actual be created, then the willed action must necessarily be created (in 
actuality).Furthermore, should the will, which is actual, be eternal, then what is willed, 
which is equally actual, will be eternal2. "
From this Rochdian analysis, the result that we do come out with is that there is a sort of 
overlap between the will and the action, in that, the relation between them is symmetrical. 
This means that any attribute that describes the will for example, has to describe the action as 
well. Therefore, if we do admit that the action is created and the will that produced it has to 
be created, the Ash 'arite theory will be in deep trouble. This because the Ash 'arites do 
believe in the existence of an eternal will, the fact that made them unable to convince us how 
the action can be created from an eternal pre-condition.? Not to mention that the eternal will 
has to be related to what is created before and after its creation. We are talking here about the 
endless time when the product had no form of existence. This adds more difficulties to this 
Ash 'arite logic. According to the Peripatetic perspective, when the object does not exist in 
actuality, it has to exist in potentiality. Consequently, what is created, must have no form of 
existence during an infinite period of time before coming into existence. The Rochdian logic 
started from this point when he sees that the will "Cannot be related to what is willed at the 
time in which it necessitated its coming-to-be, except after a lapse of an endless time, and 
what has no end, does not cease. Thus, what is willed must not become actual, unless an
1 Averroes ,The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs, (A]-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla), p.135.
2 Ibid.
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endless time has elapsed, which is an evident absurdity 1 :'
The Rochdian standpoint is considering the will as something that comes before both the 
action and the willed object produced by it. We have to mention here that this rule is relative, 
and Ibn Rochd emphasized that by introducing the term Azm, the closest meaning to it in 
English is determination or effort, that occurs in the will to produce the action.This happened 
because when the action takes place, a specific active element is required to account for it. 
Thus, if such an extra state does not influence the willing agent at the time of the action, the 
occurrence of the action at that time will stay inexplicable2 . Definitely, the Ash 'arites would 
not accept such an analysis because it is suggesting change to the Divine and compromising 
His eternity. This dilemma did not puzzle the Ash 'arites only, but all schools of theology and 
the craft of dialectics3 as well. Ibn Rochd argues that common people are not in a position to 
understand this reasoning .The Qur'an itself when it refers to God as the creator of the world, 
it does not state whether He created it with an eternal will or a created one. "Indeed when we 
want a thing to be, we just say to it: "Be " and it comes to be4. " Hence, both ordinary people 
and those who are schooled in all disciplines of knowledge have their convincing arguments 
to refuse and refute the Ash 'arite theory of God's existence. 
4.6.2(b)The Creation of Accidents:
To defend their standpoint about the creation of the world, the Ash 'arites, present two main 
arguments, the first one is based on three premises "Which act like first principles from 
which they hoped to deduce the creation of the world. The first(premise) states that 
substances never exist apart from accidents, i.e., they never exist without them, the second 
states that accidents are created, and the third states that what cannot exist, apart from 
accidents is created, i.e., What cannot exist without accidents is created . "
1 Averroes, The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs, (Al-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla), p. 13 7.
2Ibid.
3The ancient Greek philosophers used to use the terminology dialectic to refer to various methods of reasoning, analysing
and for the divergent discussions to find out the truth. More recently, Kant applied this terminology to the criticism of the 
contradictions, which arise from supposing knowledge of objects beyond the limits of experience, for instance the one 
applied to decode the enigmas of the soul. Hegel, in his turn applies this terminology, but to the process of thought by which 
apparent contradictions are regarded as a part of a higher truth.
4The Holy Qur'an ( 16:40)
'Averroes ,The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs,( Al-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla), p.148.
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The difficulty of this first argument lies in the second premise because of its centrality. This 
premise, as we have depicted above, states that the accidents are created. The Ash 'arites, in 
their attempt to prove that all bodies are created, they have to get through this stage by 
proving that all accidents are created. Consequently, they can prove that all bodies that 
cannot exist without accidents are created. This logic did not help the Ash 'arites to prove that 
accidents are created because this means that there would be a sort of inductive leap from the 
visible world to the invisible one and from the tangible world of senses to an abstract world 
in which there are no experiences. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to extend this 
inductive leap from the past to the future. The Rochdian induction is made up on a legacy 
that goes back to the time of Ibn Sina, Al -Farabi and Aristotle of course. As an Aristotelian 
philosopher, Ibn Rochd makes a clear distinction between complete and incomplete 
induction. In the complete induction, all individuals on the basis of which an inference is 
made are enumerated, but this is not the case with the latter 1 .The question that insistently 
imposes itself here is that on what basis the Ash 'arite assumption that all accidents are 
created when all bodies are created is made? Definitely, not on the basis of the world of 
experience, for not all celestial bodies are parts of the world of experience.
In the light of this analysis, it is a very sophisticated task to prove that whether a certain 
heavenly body is created or its accidents that are created "Since neither its creation nor that 
of its accidents is sensed2 . " Likewise, it is extremely difficult to justify that all accidents are 
created or all bodies are created without assuming a principle of the uniformity of nature. 
Ibn Rochd describes the latter as if the nature of the visible world were to be supposed equal 
to the nature of the unseen world3 .Thus, the Ash 'arite's second premise ceases to operate 
because it did not take into account the principle of the uniformity of nature. Even if the 
Ash 'arites wanted to formulate their theory about the second premise, they would not have 
succeeded. First of all, this would make them contradict their occasionalist view of causation 
and their atomistic view of the world, which we will discuss in details later on. Ibn Rochd 
refuted the Ash 'arites premise stating that all accidents are created by presenting the example 
of the space-time. Ibn Rochd argues that time is an accident, but it is very hard to believe that 
it is created. In other words, every single created substance must be preceded by non-being
1 Aristotle gives an illustration that has become proverbial: "Man, the horse, the mule  ' are long-lived (A).Man, the horse 
the mule(c) are gall -less (B). Therefore, (if B is no wider than C) all gall-less animals (B) must be long -lived (A)" Sir 
David Ross .Aristotle, ( London : Methuen and Co ., 1968) p.38
2Averroes, The Exposition of the Methods ofProofs,(M-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla) .p. 140. 
3Ibid.,p. 141.
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in time, because we are unable to get the meaning of the terminology 'proceeding ' through 
other source other than time. We can apply the same rule to the space, for it is extremely 
difficult to claim that the space is created, while every single object exists in a place that has 
preceded it. Many philosophers identify space as a void or the limit of the specialized body. 
If it is the former, then, the present void has to be preceded by another void-as a place that 
accommodates it-, and that void by another one to infinity. If it is the latter, then, this body 
needs a place to be in it, this process requires another body and the series continues to 
infinity. 
4.7. The Occasionlalist View of Causation:
This doctrine emerged much earlier in the Islamic schools of theology and it states that 
matter cannot be a cause of events because all events are caused by a supreme power, which 
is the Almighty God. This theory emerged, as a response to the dualist belief that mind and 
matter are different things and they cannot influence each other. This means that mind 1 is not 
responsible for any physical action and the latter cannot be the cause of any mental process. 
This doctrine emphasizes the total intervention of God in the direction of our actions. Hence, 
the physical world has no direct impact on the individual's destiny. The Ash 'arite 
occasionalist doctrines of causation will be continued and developed by the outstanding 
Islamic figure Al- Ghazali in the eleventh century. Ibn Rochd directed his bitter criticism 
about the creation of the world to 'Abu al-Ma'ali' because he was committed to the Ash 'arite 
occasioanlist view of causality according to which we cannot predict the result of two 
causally connected events. For instance, when a cotton ball meets the fire or when the knife 
cuts the throat of a human being, we cannot predict the burning of the cotton will result or 
that of death of the person will occur necessarily 1 . Ibn Rochd considers this Ash 'arite
' *It is quite obvious that whenever we mention the term philosophy of mind, we do mention occasionalism and dualism. 
The latter is opposed to all forms of materialism, monism, physicalism and phenominalism. The use of two irreducible, 
heterogeneous principles (sometimes in conflict, sometimes complementary) to analyze the knowing process 
(epistemological dualism) or to explain all of reality or some broad aspect of it (metaphysical dualism). Examples of 
epistemological dualism are being and thought, subject and object, and sense datum and thing; examples of metaphysical 
dualism are God and the world, matter and spirit, body and mind, and good and evil. Dualism is distinguished from monism, 
which acknowledges only one principle, and from pluralism, which invokes more than two basic principles. Philosophers 
sometimes employ more than one dualism at the same time; e.g., Aristotle simultaneously invoked those of matter and form, 
body and soul, and immaterial and material substance. (Online Encyclopaedia Britannica: 
www.britannica.com/topic/172621/dualism. Access Date: 15 Jan 07).
1 Al-Ghazali .Tahafut al- Falasifa,(Ihe Incoherence of Philosophers), p.225.
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occasionalist view of causation untenable and he went further by doubting whether this view 
could be taken as a serious philosophical position 1 . The Rochdian real knowledge lies in the 
cause underlying a given process and ignoring efficient causation Abu al- Ma'ali in 
particular and the Ash 'arites in general undermine a very important element vital to the 
acquisition of real and genuine knowledge. Ibn Rochd exposes the irony in the Ash 'arite 
position. He said they start rational when following the course of explanation, but they end 
up by repudiating reason through their reliance on assumptions. Ibn Rochd concludes that the 
Ash 'arite methods and ways to know the creation of the world and God's existence are not 
reliable at all and he advised the common people not to follow them because if they do so 
they will go astray.
4.8. The Atomistic View of the World:
The atomistic philosophy emerged in the history of Islam with the emergence of Islamic 
schools of theology. This atomistic philosophy was brought from the Greek and the Indian 
thought. No wonder this kind of philosophy was the subject of conflict between all religious 
orthodoxy. As mentioned earlier, the Ash 'arite school of philosophy is a shining example of 
this Islamic atomism. All traditional philosophers do agree that the atoms are the main 
building blocks of reality .Accordingly, they make up anything that exists. Other developed 
theories of atomism believe in the momentary atoms that flash in and out of existence. What 
matters here is the belief based on the pure existence of atoms, as they have no physical 
parts, while all the other objects and bodies with parts have no existence such as human 
bodies, celestial spheres, sees and the list is very long. The Mutakallimin (the Muslim 
theologians) believed in the possibility of dividing the bodies finitely and they called the part 
in which ceases the division al-Jawhar al-Fard (The individual substance), which is the 
basic entity that does enter in the generation of all bodies. This reasoning is contradicted with 
the claim of the majority of philosophers emphasizing that such division of bodies is 
infinitely 1 . The teacher of al-Ghazali and many Ash 'ari scholars Imam Al-Juwayni" (1028- 
1085 AD) argued that Muslim philosophers did agree that all bodies are finitely divisible 
until they become afrad (individuals). Some philosophers who were excellent at geometry
1 Al-Ghazali Mi 'yar al- Ilm .(Criterion of Knowledge), p. 140.
1 Mohammed Basil Al-Taee ,Nakd Ibn Rochd H-Madhab Addariyah Inda a!-Mutakallimin,(T:he Criticism of 
Ibn Rochd of Muslim Theologians'Atomism),p.8
2 Al Juwayni is called also Rukn al-Islam (The pillar of Islam), Al-Ghazali Hujjat al-lslam (Sign of Islam) and al-Kindi 
Faylasoufal- Arab (The philosopher of the Arabs) and Ibn Taymiyyah sheikh al- Islam (holding Islamic superior authority).
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compared the part with a dot that is indivisible. They also provided the example of the 
elephant that is bigger than the atom. If there were no target behind the quantities of the 
elephant and the quantities of the atom, none of them would have more quantities than the 
other. Thus, none of them would be bigger than the other. That is the way, they reached the 
following dictum: ^Alil. »>^^ V ^Lui VL.J ^Lu- jj& J yr,- ^\^° -j- ,' L° JS jj : Inna 
holla ma yahsorohu motanahin, yajibu an yakouna motanahi, wama la yatanaha 
layahsorohu motanahi 1 (what is finitely counted has to be finite and what is infinite is not 
counted by a finite).
As influenced by the Greek and Indian theories of atomism 2 , the Ash 'arite view was not 
that far from this traditional perspective. The Ash 'antes do consider the atoms as the only 
perpetual, material things in existence. Thus, everything which is not an atom itself or not 
coming from an atomistic nature, it must have no existence in our world, and consequently, it 
has to be accidental, in that, it will lasts only for a while. This means that all bodies and 
objects, which are not atoms, can never ever be the cause of something else simply because 
their existence is limited in time and space. The Ash 'arite point of view is of a paramount 
importance because it will lead us to unconsciously think that things of no logical necessity, 
or rather, events that are produced by chance are not exposed to natural or physical causes. 
These things and events are the outcome of a permanent intervention of God, which is 
responsible for the occurrence of everything in the world. Ibn Rochd was not the only one 
who rejected the Ash 'arite atomism; it was rejected by the vast majority of Islamic schools 
as well ,and before that, it was rejected by some of the Hellenes themselves like Aristotle 
who does not believe that matter is made out of indivisible bodies. 1
1 Abu al-Ma"ali .Abdel -Malik al-Juwayni ^41-Shamilo fi Asuli al-Dine,( the Comprehensive in the Assets of Faith).p. 158.
2 We have to mention here that atoms with tiny size are called Democritean atoms ( attributed to 
Democritus).,and there are a plenty of Indian and Buddhist theories about atoms .which fully contributed to the 
richness of human thought in general and the development of the Atomistic philosophies in a particular. 
Atomism is referred to in many sources as mereological nihilism or metaphysical nihilism.The atoms that all 
physicists of the early nineteenth century thought were indivisible are in fact made up of even smaller entities, 
which are electrons, neutrons and protons. The latter are also composed of quarks. This leave the gate widely 
open to question whether the matter is infinitely divisible or it is made up by an indivisible entity. 
1 Josep Puig Montada .Aristotle and Averroes on Coming -to be and Passing away, p.4.
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In order to refute atomism, Ibn Rochd resorted to many Greek texts, and especially those of 
Aristotle. By refuting the Ash 'arite atomistic view of the world, Ibn Rochd is refuting 
precisely the position of the prominent theologian Al -Ghazali who is himself an Ash 'ari. 
As an Aristotelian philosopher, Ibn Rochd does believe in the existence of a void to violate 
physical principles. Any specific change in this world of whatsoever occurs not only through 
the rearrangement of atoms to make new structures, but also through the transformation of 
matter from what it was in potential to a new actuality. 
4.9. Ibn Rochd's Principle of Corruptibility:
The claim that the world existed without beginning or it is eternal without a final term, is 
also so controversial, in the sense that, it makes its demise and its corruption unimaginable, 
"It never began to exist in the condition in which it exists, and it will never cease to exist in 
the condition in which it exists '." The philosophers claimed that the world is caused, and its 
cause is without beginning or end .This applies to the effect and to the cause alike. Hence, if 
the cause does not change, the effect cannot change as well. On this basis, philosophers built 
their proofs of the impossibility of the beginning and the ending of the world. On the same 
basis, they regarded the eventual annihilation of the world, as an event that has to occur after 
its existence. Here we are facing another dilemma because the term' after 'implies an 
affirmation of time. This system was built upon another evidence stating that the possibility 
of the existence of the world does not end .That is why, its possible existence may conform 
to the possibility. The last argument can be easily refutable, as it is impossible that the world 
should not have begun, but it is not impossible that the world should last eternally. For 
instance, if God should make the world last eternally, it is not necessary that what begins 
must have an end, even if it is necessary for any act to have a beginning 1 .
The prominent Muslim figure Abu Hudayl al-Allaf who is famous by supporting the Islamic 
creed against the beliefs of Manawiyyah and the Samniyyah (two famous sects in India with 
beliefs different from the pure Islamic ones) after the conquest of India by Muslims joined 
this fierce debate2 . He thought that the world must have an end; he went on to say that the 
infinite circular movements are impossible in the past as they are in the future.
1 Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut al- Tahafut), vol.I,p.69.
1 Ibid., pp.69-70
2
1U1U. \J\J.\JS~ I \J
2see Mohammed Abid al-Jabri JJakd al-Aql al- Arabi( The Criticism of The Arabic Mind), Markaze Dirasat 
al-Wahda al-Arabiyah, Beirut: 1982.
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This logic seems to be untrue because the future ,as a whole, never enters into existence 
simultaneously or successively. However, the whole past is there simultaneously, but not 
successively. As we do not consider the incorruptibility of the world as impossible, we do 
consider its incorruptibility and corruptibility as equally possible. We do know thanks to the 
divine law the scenario that would occur and which of the two possibilities that would be 
realized. However, this should be proved though reason and through methods and means 
stripped of any religious impact. Here we are face to different kinks of eternities and every 
eternity is supported by specific arguments. There are those who assert that the eternity of 
the world is possible only in the past, those who claim that such eternity is only possible in 
the future and a third party see the eternity of the world in both cases. With the exception of 
Abu Hudhail al-Allaf who thought that the eternity of the world is impossible in both 
directions 1 . Philosophers claimed that:
"The possibility of the world had no beginning and that with this possibility a condition of 
extension , which could measure this possibility , was connected in the same way as this 
condition of extension is connected with the possible existent, when it is actualized, and it 
was also evident that this extension had no initial term , the philosophers were convinced 
that time had no initial term, for this extension is nothing but time, and to call it timeless 
eternity is senseless2."
From this perspective, Ibn Rochd deduces that the theologians' dictum stating that 
everything, which existed in the past had a first term, is completely futile because the First 
exists in the past eternally as It exists in the future eternally. The philosophers fell in this 
thorny problem because they have drawn a distinction between the First and Its act. hi order 
to establish such a distinction, the theologian would need evidence that the existence of the 
temporal that occurs in the past is quite different from the existence of the eternal that 
happens in the past. This distinction is of a crucial significance because the temporal that 
occurred in the past is finite in both directions, in the sense, it has a beginning and an end, 
while the eternal that happened in the past has neither a beginning nor an end 1 . Since 
philosophers do not admit that the circular movement has a beginning, they are not obliged 
to admit that it has an end because they do not consider the existence of the circular 
movement in the past as transitory. Any philosopher who is thinking this way, he is
1 Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahaftit al- Tahafut,),vol.I,pp.69-70
2Ibid.
'lbid.,pp.70-71.
-100-
Chapter 4
contradicting himself, and accordingly, he is unconsciously asserting that everything that 
has a beginning has an end 1 . From all these analyses, we can come out with a lot conclusions 
and deductions:
''That anything could have a beginning and no end is not true, unless the possible could be 
changed into the eternal, as everything that has a beginning is possible. And that anything 
could be liable to corruption and at the same time could be capable of eternity is something 
incomprehensible and stands in need of examination2 . "
There is no room for doubt that ancient philosophers had tackled this problem in some way 
or another, Abu Hudail does agree with philosophers that whatever can be generated is 
susceptible to corruption. This can be solved through the rectification of the stance that 
draws a distinction between the past and the future: " Because what is in the past is there in 
its totality, where as the future never enters into existence in its totality (for the future enters 
reality only successively3). " Abu Hudail sees this dictum as deceptive, as past is that entered 
time and when we do say entered time, we do mean that time is beyond it in both directions 
and possesses totality. On the contrary, that which has never entered the past in the way the 
temporal enters the past can be considered in an equivocal way to be in the past, and 
therefore, possesses no totality in itself, even though it parts are totalities . If we do assume 
that it has no initial beginning in the past, it will be time itself as:
"Each temporal beginning is a present, and each present is preceded by a past, and both 
that which exists commensurable with time, and time commensurable with it, must 
necessarily be infinite. Only the parts of time which are limited by time in both directions 
can enter the past, in the same way as only the instant which is ever-changing and only the 
instantaneous motion of a thing in movement in the spatial magnitude in which it moves can 
really enter the existence of the moved . "
We are not claiming that the past of what never ceased to exist in the past ever entered 
existence at an instant because such assumption would mean that its existence had a 
beginning, and consequently, time is limited in both directions. From this perspective, past 
"Stands with that which is simultaneous with time, not in time . "
'Averroes ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al- Tahafut), vol.1, p. 71
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. 
1 Ibid. 
2Ibid.,p.72.
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This analogy helps us to understand that among circular movements, only those that time 
limits enter into represented existence. On the contrary, those that are simultaneous with time 
do not enter past existence. Likewise, since no time limits the eternally existent, it does not 
enter past existence:
When one imagines an eternal entity whose acts are not delayed after its existence-as 
indeed must be the case with any entity whose existence is perfect-then, if it is eternal and 
doe snot enter past time , it follows necessarily that its acts also cannot enter past time, for 
if they did , they would be finite and this eternal existent would be eternally inactive, and 
what is eternally inactive is necessarily impossible 1 . "
Concerning the arguments taken from God's providence or intelligent design to maintain the 
existence of human being and achieve his well-being was an old idea that was frequent in the 
works of many Hellenes. Plato, for instance, demonstrated, in many of his dialogues, that the 
world is organised as an intelligent and melodious cosmos in order that human being can 
fulfil the best life2 . Ibn Rochd, in his work Al kashfan Manahij al-Addilla fi Akaid al-Milla 
(The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs in the Beliefs of the Creed), argued that all 
existents are compatible with the existence of man. Such compatibility is a necessity 
established by a maker with both intention and will and these properties can only be 
associated with God3 . To imagine a world without intelligence where human beings have to 
lead a beautiful and harmonious life thanks to a mechanical necessity is certainly absurd 1 . 
This is the case of the mechanistic theory ,as mentioned before, which explains the natural 
phenomena of the universe only through a necessary physical condition without any resort to 
causes, which are the best for human beings". It is worth noting that the Timaeus does not 
focus only on intelligence to explain the generation of the world, but also on necessity. 
Intelligence uses necessity to achieve its own objectives, in the sense that, intelligence 
always focuses upon what is good and necessity produces randomly its effects. That is why, 
it is of a paramount importance to draw a distinction between causes that work with 
intelligence to produce everything desirable and melodious and causes that are stripped of 
reason and randomly produce their effects.
1 Averroes , The Incoherence of the Incoherence, (Tahafut al- Tahafut), vol.I,p.72.
2 Plato, Timaeus, 90d6
3 Ibn Rochd jU-Kashfan Manahij al-Adilla, (The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),p.80
1 Carlos Steel , The Moral Purpose of the Human Body, p. 107
2 Aristotle, Phaedo, 97c8-dl
3 Carlos Steel, The Moral Purpose of the Human Body, p. 10
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Ibn Rochd's world is an organic one, in the sense that, the organization of its parts did not 
come from a mere coincidence. Definitely, the thorough organization of the world can only 
came from an intentional agent and a creative artisan called the Almighty God. Thus, if any 
basic part were missing from this homogeneous unity, the whole life in our world would be 
affected or even at a high risk of destruction. Ibn Rochd cites many examples to prove that 
many things exist to be conductive to man's existence from the cycles of nature to the 
presence of natural phenomena, animal and plant species necessary for man's well being. 
Since our world is an organic whole that is conductive to human life and as any substantial 
change in its organic constitution leads to the corruption of the whole, then, the world is 
coming from Fa 'ilun qasid wa murid (a willing agent). Accordingly, it is not possible that 
this conduciveness results from coincidence '.This is obvious, according to Ibn Rochd, in the 
succession of the day and the night, the Sun and the Moon, the succession of the seasons and 
everything is destined for the life and the interest of human beings2 .
The second proof concerns dalil al- Ikhtira' (The proof of invention) which proves that all 
existents are invented and this is obvious in everything around us. hi the animal and the plant 
kingdoms:
"O people, a parable is set forth, so listen to it. Surely those whom, you call upon besides 
God cannot create a fly, though they should all gather for it. And if the fly carry off aught 
from them, they cannot take it back from it. Weak are (both) the invoker and the invoked1 ."
We do see inanimate objects that turn to be filled with life and we know that there is an 
agent that bestowed such life on them. Likewise, we do know from the unceasing movement 
of the celestial spheres that they are invented, guided and predestined with providence and 
anything that is predestined and guided is invented by another as a necessity. This means that 
every invented thing has an inventor and the one who does know the truth of the thing can 
never know the truth of the invention, and we do mean by the truth of the thing the cause and 
the purpose of its existence2 . By presenting this analysis, Ibn Rochd is denying the 
naturalists' view that attributes the wonders of our universe to coincidence. He said that as 
rational beings, experience justifies us in attributing this wonderful design to God:
^akhry .History of Islamic Philosophy, p.281
2 Ibn Rochd ^.l-Kash an al-Manahij al-Adilla,(The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),p.80 
1 The Holy Qur'an , Chapter al -Haj ( The Pilgrimage : 22) Verse. 73. 
Ibn Rochd Jll-Kash an -Manahij al-Adilla,(The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),p.l 19
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" Va person were to see a stone somewhere on earth and find it conductive to being sat on, 
in a certain position, and of a certain size too, he would realize that this -stone- must have 
been made in such a form and size by a maker who put it in that place. But when -that 
person- does not see it conductive to being sat upon, he would realize that its being in that 
place with a certain quality is due to coincidence and would not attribute a maker to it 1 . " 
At the end of God's existence discussion, we have to affirm that Ibn Tofayl's proofs taken 
from intuition are very subjective. In order that man can achieve that sublime spiritual state 
leading him to the apprehension of God, he has to be equipped, to some extent, with the 
weapons of piousness, faith and a sort of pre -acceptability of God's existence. Concerning 
the argument stating that everything has a cause, in order to clear and contradiction that may 
occur such as why when do follow all these series of causes, we do stop at God as a final 
cause? Ibn Tofayl presented the argument that way to avoid falling in an ad-infinitum 
argument, and consequently, avoid many absurd questions like what caused God? If we do 
follow Ibn Tofayl's dictum as it is, this would mean that if the conclusion is true, the premise 
is false and if the premise is true, the conclusion is false". Therefore, Ibn Tofayl's dictum has 
to be re-formulated to state that everything has a cause except God to get rid of all probable 
difficulties that may minimize the strength of this argument. 
4.10 Conclusion:
The arguments proving the existence of God Who is the First Agent, the First Cause, and 
the Ultimate Truth are of a crucial significance in the understanding of the entire universe. If 
we do assume, for instance, that the there is no creator -regardless of the nature and our 
understanding of this creator-it would be a very hard task to imagine the existence of our 
world. In the same way, if we do suppose that the creator is non- existent, this would make 
the world non-existent as well. By admitting the existence of a world whose nature is based 
on experience and which is finite and an unseen and another world that is infinite, Ibn Rochd 
is dismissing any proof that can be offered concerning the latter world, based on the 
knowledge of the former one. In other words, those who accept the existence of God as 
Artisan, Creator, Inventor or Originator of the world cannot do so with deductive certainty. 
For the same reason, Ibn Rochd is tolerant with those who disagree with him, since the 
proofs that apply to this world do not necessarily apply to the other'.
'Averroes, The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs, p. 194.
2 Sami S. Hawi , On the Existence of God and His Attributes,p.62.
1 Ibn Rochd , The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs, p.220.
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After examining the divergent arguments of all the theological groups regarding the origin of 
the universe and God's existence, Ibn Rochd came out with a result stating that all these 
arguments are neither conclusive nor authoritative .He proceeds to give us his arguments 
which seems to be irrefutable. Ibn Rochd considers that the arguments that convince people 
of God's existence are universal and simple at the same time and they are two in number: 
The arguments covering Dalil al-Inaya (the design or providence,/, or what Abd al-Jabbar al- 
Hamajani( 935-1025 AD) calls the concept oflutf 1 and the arguments taken from Dalil al- 
Ikhtircf' (invention or creation).
The arguments covering design or providence state that everything exists for a purpose, 
while the arguments taken from the invention or the creation suggest that things are invented 
or created, exactly like the invention of life from matter. Ibn Rochd defends his first 
arguments through the principle of conduciveness and that of the willing agent, while he 
supported his second arguments by relying on the observation of life issuing from material 
bodies and helping us to "Know for a certain that there is here a producer of life and a 
provider of it that is God the Almighty'. "
When we do contemplate the astonishing natural balances, we can only believe that a 
nature that can organize itself in this thorough manner must have a soul. The latter cannot be 
eternal, as it is created by the Eternal because we cannot speak of nature as a designer, as this 
will imply intelligence, craftiness and providence. We have to bear in mind that the process 
of natural selection is restricted to some forms of instinctual behaviours and natural skills 
and it cannot go beyond that. Therefore, what we are seeing here is something totally 
different, we are in an amazing natural and physical factory where everything is calculated 
by seconds, inches and pounds, without decrease or increase. Either the increase or the 
decrease of time, space or weight will jeopardize our life on Earth and annihilate our 
existence altogether. There are thousands of other examples in nature about species, 
especially in the kingdoms of animal and plant, which have to behave, protect, develop or 
even struggle for their lives in ways that nor evolution, neither natural selection can provide 
us with convincing explanations. Besides, the human being who is equipped with the weapon 
of the intellect and rationality remains speechless, so where did these non-intellect living
1 Maha Elkaisy ,Gods and Humans in Islamic Thought: Abd al-Abbad, Ibn Sina, and Al-Ghazali, p.97.
2 Fakhry ,Historj> of Islamic Philosophy, p.281
'ibid., p. 151.
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beings bring such intelligence? So how can nature, which does possess no intellect grants 
the other creatures with these intelligent behaviours? Our answer would be as simple as that, 
nature is ,in its whole entity, an ensouled creature among all other creatures that are designed 
and controlled by divine norms manifested in natural and physical laws. According to Ibn 
Rochd, both philosophers and the masses achieve the knowledge of God through these two 
arguments, but with slight differences based on their natural skills, rational capacities and 
their own ways of assessing things or as it is highlighted in 'History of Islamic Philosophy' 
as:
"The difference between the two ways lies in the details, that is, the common people know 
of the design and invention of what can be known through primitive knowledge that is based 
on sense perception. But the scientists go further to know what can be perceived rationally 
on the basis of proofs...and the scientists do not reveal a greater understanding of these two 
arguments except in the manner of greater detail and more depth in the knowledge of the 
selfsame thing . "
We do deduce from this statement that both philosophers and ordinary people achieve their 
knowledge of God's existence. The former, achieve this understanding through sophisticated 
means and complicated methods, which are beyond the comprehension of the other people, 
whereas the latter achieve such knowledge through the created things. There are many 
philosophers who do not believe in God's existence. Accordingly, they dismiss any argument 
trying to prove that existence. Ibn Rochd was aware of this truth when he mentioned that 
there are some pre-Socratic naturalists-who are known in Islamic philosophy as ad- 
Dahriyun- who do not believe in God and they would reject his two arguments regarding 
God's existence. However, their position would not undermine the validity and the strength 
of these arguments because Ibn Rochd had never claimed that his proofs are demonstrative 
for the existence of God. However, as human beings, we are thinking beings; this logic is the 
utmost that we can reach, as it is completely based on the knowledge of ourselves as rational 
beings and the principles of induction that we use in knowing the world and everything 
surrounding us are relative.
1 Fakhry flistory of Islamic Philosophy, p. 155
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On God-World Relationship: 
5.1. Different Types of Beliefs: 
5.1.1 Polytheism and Monotheism
The distinguishing characteristic of polytheism is the belief in the multiplicity of gods such 
as in Hinduism, Zoroastrian dualism, Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and 
Shintoism. In Hinduism itself, as a major religion, many sects have divergent forms of 
polytheism, but they differ in the way they do perceive such gods. In Henotheism- it has a 
historical roots in ancient Egyptian religion, pagan Hermetism and Hermeticism-, for 
instance, the worship is directed to one among many other gods, for it is more powerful and 
deserves to be praised and worshipped more than the others. In Ayyavazhi, the worship is 
for all gods without any difference or discrimination. In Kali Yukam, All worshippers are 
unified in the Ayya VaiKundar for destroying the kaliyan. In Kathenotheism, the same belief 
is always there, but the only difference is that they worship different gods at different times 
and places. Regarding the Abrahamic religions, we have to mention that the Jewish and the 
Christian monotheism is based on a sort of plurality. In Trinity, the Christians do believe that 
only God the father must be worshipped, whereas, they minimize the divine importance of 
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Ancient Judaism is not far away from the same conception 
by divinely praising Uzair (Ezra).The religious sect called 'Druze' (related to the 11 th 
century Ismaili preacher ad-Darazi) was inspired by this Jewish-Christian concept. The 
Druze movement is a shii sect coming from the Ismaili branch that makes from the divine 
praise of the sixth Fatimid2 Caliph Imam al Hakim bi-Amr Allah (985-1021) its basic tenet. 
We have to bear in mind that Shiism, as a whole, considers the cousin and son-in-law of the 
prophet Ali ibn abi Talib(ca.598-661 AD) as an incarnation of God. On the contrary. The 
Sunni Islam is characterized by the worship of God stripped of all manifestations, 
personifications, incarnations or associations, which make monotheism, stripped of any kind 
of polytheism or plurality of whatsoever. This notion of the relation of God with the world is 
not new, as it goes back to thousands years. Heraclitus dealt with this fundamental 
metaphysical problem in the form of questions about the nature of the relation between the 
absolute and the relative, between the one and the many, between God and the phenomenal
1 The second largest branch of Shii sect, the Ismailis accept Ismail ibn Ja'far (ca.721-755 AD) as their divine 
spiritual Imam. This is opposed to the twelvers (the Ithna'achariyah) the largest Shii sect believing that Mousa 
al-Kadim (ca.745-799 AD) is their spiritual Imam.
2 This is a Shii dynasty ruled by Ismaili Imams (909-1171 AD), the name is derived from Fatima az-Zahrae, 
wife of Ali ibn Abi Talib, son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed.
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world . The general stance of the Islamic God-human relationship based on pure 
monotheism is manifested in the works of three major thinkers: Abd al-Jabbar (d.1025 AD) 
as a representative of the Mu 'tazili Kalam tradition, Ibn Sina in the philosophical tradition 
and Al-Ghazali in the sufic one2 . What matters us in the middle of these troubled polytheistic 
beliefs is the Hellenic one that existed in many forms, in the sense that, the Hellenic 
worshippers used to worship different gods in different places and times. They worshipped 
their outstanding ancestors, their heroes and heroines who turned them into gods and 
goddesses. They also worshipped the nature divinities and the underworld deities such as 
Isis, Astarte, Diana, Hecate, Demeter, Kali, Innana, and many more. The Greek gods always 
do take human forms and personalities and they interfered in the daily human activities. This 
does not mean that polytheism was the only sort of belief prevailing in ancient Greece, in 
that, many philosophers attacked and mocked the way gods are portrayed and the manner 
they were seen. Among them Xenophanes of Colophon (ca.560-478 BC) - the founder of the 
Eleatic school of philosophy- who attacked in his poems polytheism associated with 
anthropomorphism and anthropopathy especially in the poems of Homer (ca. 8 th BC) the 
author of the Iliad and the Odyssey and Hesiod (700BC). Xenophanes asserted, in all his 
poems, the unity of God .By declaring that God is one; Xenophanes was asserting all the 
known divine attributes such as the perfect, the eternal and the immanent intelligent cause. 
That is why, they are some critics, who put him in the list of monotheists or pantheists, but 
what matters us here is that he was not at least a polytheist, which affirms that there were 
other beliefs existing at that time other than polytheism. Many other prominent philosophers 
were of the same view like Parmenides (ca.515 -450 BC) - who used the Xenophanes's 
theory of the unity of God to elaborate his doctrine of the unity of being- Theophrastus 
(ca.372- 287 BC) and many more. Whenever we talk about polytheism, we have to mention 
monotheism either to refute the former or to support it. We all understand that monotheism is 
the belief in the oneness of God, as it is the case in the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam with the reservations we have mentioned previously. Monotheism also 
differs from one religion to another in terms of the way each religion is looking at the nature 
and the attributes of God. However, they all consider God as a supreme, eternal, beneficent, 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, all perfect, all merciful, all just and all loving. What is 
striking here is that in some beliefs God is regarded as a male. This means that he has a
1 Frankel Hermann fleraclitus on God and the Phenomena] World, p.230.
2 Maha Elkaisy ,Gods and Humans in Islamic Thought: Abd al-Jabbar, Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali, p.97
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sexual nature and the latter requires certain physical organs that are associated with males. 
These speculations about the Divine are not rational at all, on the one hand, they are a sort of 
anthropomorphism and they are in clear breach of one of the most important characteristic of 
the God as supreme and unique, on the other hand. Xenophanes seems to be, as we 
mentioned before, the first philosopher of religion. His inclinations to this theological path 
started when he attacked the Homeric anthropomorphism and replaced with a very 
sophisticated monotheism.'This complete refusal of Homeric conceptions of gods compelled 
Xenophanes to upraise against them through monotheistic divine values and attributes:
One god, lord over gods and human kind, 
Like mortals neither in body nor in mind (DK 24 B23)
Xenophanes argued that there could be only one God as the most powerful of all things and 
it could not be more than one God, as in this case no god would have the superiority over the 
other. Accordingly, none of them would have the ability to do what he is willing. These 
divine properties lead us to think that God must always have existed, as He could not come 
into being from something like him because there cannot be anything equal to him 1 . What is 
striking here is that this Xenophanian ancient conclusion about the nature, the oneness and 
the eternity of God is compatible with Abrahamic religions. If we do take, for instance, the 
Islamic concept of God we would find that God describes himself as: "There is nothing 
whatever like unto Him2 ", and in other chapter " If there were, in the heavens and the earth, 
other gods besides Allah, there would have been confusion in both! but glory to Allah, the 
Lord of the Throne: (High is He) above what they attribute to Him!3". Likewise, Xenophanes 
sees that God could not come into being from something unlike Himself, as the greater 
cannot be brought into being by the lesser4 . All these divine properties, made Xenophanes 
assume that God is a living being, but not an organic being like the other living species 
(humans, animals and plants). This means that God is not made of parts: "He sees as a 
whole, He thinks as a whole, and he hears as a whole (DK 21 B24)." The nature and the 
essence of God are beyond physical things, that is why, He has no physical contact with 
anything in the world, but 'Remote and effortless, with his mind alone he governs all there is 
(DK 21 B25)." Despite all these speculations about both God's nature and essence,
1 Anthony Kenny .Ancient Philosophy, p.290.
1 Ibid.
2 The Holy Qur'an: Chapter Ash-Shura (The Counsel), 42, Verse. 11 
3Ibid., chapter Al-Anbiya'(Theprophets),2\. Verse. 22 
4 Aristotle, MXG976bl4-36
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Xenophanes did not accept that God is finite or infinite, changing or changeless 1 . He 
supported some arguments and refuted others without a clear stance. He sometimes proves 
that God is finite and sometimes infinite .Likewise, he directed some of his arguments 
towards the changeability state of God and others to His unchangeability. Xenophanian 
sources, or at least those sources that are available to us, left us very unsure about many of 
his conceptions of God. We do not know whether Xenophanian God is transcendent or He is 
identified in some mysterious way with the entire Eleatic universe2 , "The clear and certain 
truth no man has seen nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say 
about all things (DK 21 -B34). " Xenophanes' concept of the Divine does not mean that he is 
the first monotheist, as he was anticipated much earlier by the Pharaoh of the Eighteenth 
dynasty of ancient Egypt Amenhotep IV, known as Akhenaten 1 . Xenophanes' monotheism 
was not presented as an oracular revelation, but rather, it was the outcome of a rational 
argument. In other words, the prophets who came later on asserted such monotheism through 
the religious revelation, while Xenophanes achieved that as a natural theologian2 . The 
conceptions of the absolute that appeared in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and 
Later on Spinoza and Leibniz do not coincide with the idea of God that is mentioned in 
Hebrew books, the Torah, the prophets of the Psalms and the Gospels.
This idea is well presented by Pascal who said that "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of 
Jacob and not of philosophers and scientists3 ."He meant by the philosophers those who have 
a pagan conception of God, the philosophers who paganised the living God4 . Whatever the 
case, we have to mention that the Abrahamic religions are innocent from the claims stating 
that there is a paradox in thinking that God is knowable to His creation, while He is distinct 
from anything He had created and how is it possible to understand God as outside the world 
and at the same time knowable within it . We do reply that this is one of the properties of 
transcendence, the immanence and the ineffability of the Divine to be known and accessible
1 Anthony Kenny ^indent Philosophy, p.290.
2 Ibid.
' Akhenaten (often alt: Akhnaten, or rarely Akhnatonking (1353-36 BC) of ancient Egypt of the 18th dynasty,
who established a new cult dedicated to the Aton, the sun's disk (hence his assumed name, Akhenaton,
meaning "beneficial to Aton").)(Online Britannica encyclopedia: www.britannica.com. Access Date: 11 May
2008).
2 Anthony Kenny ,Ancient Philosophy, p.290.
3Claude Tresmontant ,la Metaphysique du Christianisme, p.194.
4 Ibid.
5 David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God,p.507.
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to His creatures, as an act of providence, and different from all His creatures, as a property of 
transcendence. 
5.1.2 The Basic Tenets of 
Pantheism, Pauentheism.
Before introducing some definitions of the terminology 'Pantheism', and 'panentheism' we 
have to mention that these terms are modern and did not appear in any of the ancient Greek 
texts. However, it is useful to highlight them to elucidate any misunderstanding that may 
occur in any stage of this debate. We have also to mention that there are many disputes about 
its various significances and who should be considered pantheist and who should not. Some 
consider philosophical Taoism as the most clear example of pantheism .Others also include 
Advaita Vedanta, certain forms of Buddhism and some mystical monotheistic trends.
Pantheism is the religious position claiming that "God is everything and everything is 
God... the world is either identical with God or in some way a self- expression of his 
nature1 . " This led to the view that "Everything that exists constitutes a 'unity' and this all - 
inclusive unity is in some sense divine2 . " There is another definition given by Huw Parri 
Owen( 1926-1996) who went on to say that, "Pantheism ... signifies the belief that every 
existing entity is, only one being, and that all other forms of reality are either modes 
(appearances) of it or identical with it. "In addition to Spinoza, many others are considered 
by many scholars as pantheists such as some of the pre-Socratics, Plato, Plotinus, Schelling, 
Hegel and many more. From this perspective, pantheism does not believe in the existence of 
a personal God. Thus, the Pantheists are in total disagreement with both the theists and the 
atheists. From this particular point starts the difference between pantheism and theism. The 
latter does believe in the existence of a personal God who is ,in some way or another, totally 
separate from the world. Hence, pantheism came in an attempt to solve many of the theistic 
problems about the nature and the transcendence of the Divine. However, many of the 
problems of theism also exist in pantheism especially those related to evil and creation. The 
term pantheism was used in the eighteenth century as "A large, vague term of theological 
abuse4. " Therefore, pantheism is neither theistic, as it does believe in God, but who was not 
transcended from the world, nor atheistic, as it does believe in the existence of God. That is 
why, we can only consider it, as a form of non -theistic monotheism.
1 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, p.74
2 Alasdair Macintyre, Pantheism, In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Paul Edwards, p.34.
3 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, p.65
4 A.M. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 187.
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Many critics compare pantheism to atheism, simply because the belief in God has to be 
accompanied with the belief in a personalistic (as a person) god. Such a god is not a 
condition at all, in the sense that, you may believe in any god who might be an idol, a 
spiritual or even a sort of an idea in your mind. In his non -pantheistic stage, Samuel Tailor 
Coleridge (1772-1834) claimed that, "Everything God, and no God are identical options'. " 
Huw Parri, Owen went on to say that "If God (theos) is identical with the universe (to pan) it 
is merely another name for the universe, It is therefore bereft of any distinctive meaning; so 
that pantheism is equivalent to atheism'." Likewise, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
claimed that, "To call the world 'God 'is not to explain it, it is only to enrich our language 
with a superfluous synonym for the word 'world'2 ."
These accusations addressed to pantheism, as atheism is so old because it goes back to the 
time:
"When Cicero's Velleius describes Speusippus' pantheism as an attempt to 'root out the 
notion of gods from our minds', he is echoing a charge which was commonly made against 
the pantheism of the earlier Greek natural philosophers ... like Anaximander or Heraclitus. 
These tended to be identified as atheists in the popular mind; and indeed Plato himself 
implies a similar view ... the opponents who classify them as atheists are in reality attacking 
them for undermining traditional beliefs about the gods   or, to borrow a phrase from the 
indictment against Socrates, 'for not believing in the gods the city believes in ."
Definitely, panentheism is another philosophical- religious stand stating that there is no 
devil or other malevolent cosmic forces that are in opposition with God. Santiago, Sia in his, 
God in Process Thought, summarises the panentheism of Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) as 
follows:
"Panentheism . . . holds that God includes the world. But it sets itself apart from pantheism 
in that it does not maintain that God and the world are identical. . . . Hartshorne explains 
that God is a whole whose whole-properties are distinct from the properties of the 
constituents. While this is true of every whole, it is more so of God as the supreme whole. . . . 
The part is distinguishable from the whole although within it. The power of the parts is 
something suffered by the whole, not enacted by it. The whole has properties too which are
1 Thomas McFarland ,Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, p.228.
1 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, pp.69-70.
2 Arthur Schopenahuer,. ^4. Few Words on Pantheism, In Essays from the Parerga and Paralipomena. trans. 
T. Bailey Saunders.p.40.
3Christopher Rowe, One and Many in Greek Religion, In Oneness and Variety. Ed. Adolf Portman and Rudolf 
Ritsema, pp..54-55.
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not shared by the parts. Similarly, God as whole possesses attributes, which are not shared 
by his creatures. . . . We perpetually create content not only in ourselves but also in God. 
And this gives significance to our presence in this world1 . "
From this perspective, we do understand that the term 'God' in panentheisn is so broad in 
comparison with that in pantheism. According to the panentheistic belief, everything is 
within God as a part of it. Therefore, the whole universe is the body of God that is consisting 
of many parts, each part has the power to create the same, as God .This notion is different 
from pantheism that regards God, as the only creator and actor in the universe. His presence 
is an overriding presence that cancels the possibility of the existence of anything else. That is 
why, the existence of anything else including the human existence is completely shrouded in 
mystery . There is a sort of overlap between theism -with all its branches-pantheism and 
panentheism. Such overlap is due to the way each religious or philosophical position is 
regarding the Divine nature. We would not find better than the following passage to describe 
such overlap:
"It is not necessary to go to pantheism, with a god that acts as a universal wet blanket, 
smothering the possibilities of everything else's genuine existence. Panentheism gives all that 
one could want: an all-encompassing, growing, perfect God, everywhere present and 
containing everywhere within himself; and the reality of oneself and others, freelv deciding 
within God, responding to God's overtures in the process of co-creation. Theism denies that 
the world (including us) shares in God's being. Panentheism recognizes that everything 
shares God's being (or becoming) but that God's being operates from innumerable relatively 
freely choosing canters or perspectives of existence. God and the world, which is God's 
body, are interdependent'. " 
5.2 Evil Creation and the Principle of Perfection;
If we do admit that God is the maker and the creator of everything on Earth and elsewhere, 
we would definitely admit that God created evil as well, as a part of all these creations. 
Likewise, if we do admit that omnibenevolence is among God' attributes, so how do evils 
exist in our world? We have to admit accordingly, that the evil can only occur in the absence 
of good. Consequently, the evil does not exist in God, as for all God is good, so it must exist 
in human beings, and when we say a human being, we are talking definitely about minds,
' C. Alan Anderson and Deborah G.Whitehouse ,New thought: A practical American Spirituality, p.90.
1 Ibid., p. 89.
2 Ibid.
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souls and bodies. Themistius (ca.317-390 AD) was not far from this reasoning when he 
adopted the Peripatetic view minimizing evil and considered it as a defect in matter and 
human being . No one would deny that the notion of evil is so confusing because when we 
do talk about evil, we are talking about authority and power in the same way when taking 
about good. Ibn Sina in his Kitab ash Shifa ' (Book of Healing), part ofllahiyyat (Divinities), 
does not consider all the imperfections and the defects that occur to the matter as evils. He 
sees, for example, the blindness as evil, as it can only occur in the eye and not somewhere 
else, but this does not apply to the heat even if it causes pains, as it can occur somewhere 
without causing evil and sometimes it is a source of good'.Whatever the case, where did evil 
get this power from? Is it created or is it eternal? Does It exist in the mind, in the body or in 
the soul? Ibn Rochd tried to solve this dilemma through many philosophical questions such 
as what is the common character found in everything we call good? What is the opposite 
character common to all evil things?"
All these questions have been and for long centuries, the bone of contention between 
philosophers, thinkers and theologians. If we do assume ,for the sake of argument, that evil 
gets its power from God ,we would be contradicting ourselves, for in this case evil cannot be 
evil, simply because the good nature of God. If some one says that evil is made up of soul 
and body, it is even more vague and dull, as the evil will have no existence only in the 
combination of both soul and body. Consequently, if body and soul are separated, the evil 
will have no existence, on the contrary, if they join each other, the evil then, is created. If we 
do assume that evil is co-eternal with God, we are denying that God created everything. In 
this case, another question of a paramount importance crosses our mind is that is evil there 
against the divine will or is it a divine wish? Even with the last probability, we can still think 
whether the divine power is associated with the divine wish or not ,in the sense that, God can 
create evil, but He did not wish or He wishes to create evil, but He could not. hi Islamic 
tradition, this dilemma is solved through the concept of tawallud', the closest meaning to 
this Arabic term in English is 'generation'. This concept reveals the casual relationship 
between the internal act of the will and the external action, which followed hard upon it.
1 Guy Guldentops, Themistius on Evil, p. 189
1 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, ( The Book Of Healing ),p.223.
2George F. Hourani ^iverroes on Good and Evil, p. 15.
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Bishr ibn al- Mu'tamir (- d.825 AD) argued that man 'wallada' (generated) this external 
action, that is why, he is responsible for it 1 . Abu- Hudhayl agreed with Ibn al-Mu'tamir that 
man generated his own actions, but he disagreed with him in terms of responsibility, as he 
sees man responsible only for the acts he intends directly and he is not responsible for the 
results of other acts. Hence, this concept does abrogate the atomic occasionalism and 
confirm the secondary causality. The full credit goes to Mu'ammar ibn 'Abbad ((ca.786-809 
AD) who introduced the concept of nature tab' (physis) into Mu 'tazilite physics, according 
to him, accidents act one upon the other through tab 'an (natural necessity) or through an act 
of ikhtiyaran (human volition). Since God created substances, accidents are subject to 
secondary causality, and consequently, God is completely free of any kind of responsibility 
of having created evil 1 . Ibn Rochd, in his turn, sees that God is not responsible, at all, for 
evil, as evil is a concomitant of matter and that God does not know. He went on to say that 
ignoring some things is better than knowing them and this cannot be regarded as a defect or 
imperfection. The fact of making God knows the particular to save Him from responsibility 
of creating evil by claiming that good and evil are only in relation to us, but to God they do 
not exist is a dangerous doctrine2 . All over gain, Themistius was not that far from this 
Rochdian stance when he emphasized that matter is not ugly by itself, but rather, 
accidentally, as it has a share of the privation3 .
We do understand from this reasoning that privation is the source of evil. Themistius, as a 
Peripatetic philosopher, argued that there is a mentioning to privation in Plato's claim that 
matter is not a being. Therefore, there is an obvious link between matter and privation, as 
matter is accidentally non-being and privation is an accidental property of matter that is not 
yet a concrete thing. Albeit, matter is a potential part of a composite substance and so close 
to be a being4 . Many philosophers do believe that the good is prevailing in everything and 
evil is present in a casual way exactly like the punishments which good governors and rulers 
ordain .Even if these punishments are evils, they are performed for the sake of the good, not 
by primary intention5 . Therefore, good things and evil ones do co-exist at least in the nature 
of man who is composed of a rational and an animal soul. According to these philosophers,
1 F.E. Peters .Aristotle and the Arabs, p. 144.
1 Ibid,pp. 144-145.
2 Isaac Husik ^verroes and the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.427.
3 Guy Guldentops Jhemistius on Evil, p. 190.
4 Ibid.
5 Averroes .Tahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1, p. 106.
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divine wisdom allowed that a big quantity of the good should exist, but it had to be mixed 
with a small quantity of evil "'For the existence of much good with a little evil is preferable to 
the non existence of much good because of a little evil 1 ."
Ibn Rochd, as usual, criticized the Ash 'rite position that justice and injustice are there 
because of a prohibition of religion against certain acts. Hence, a man is just only, when he 
does something just according to the law and he is not, if he does what the law enforced as 
unjust. As God is not under such a prohibition of the law, there is nothing just or unjust for 
Him. In other words, there is nothing just or unjust in itself'. Ibn Rochd described such 
analysis as shani 'a (disgraceful), as in this case, there would be nothing that is good in itself 
and nothing that is evil in itself; but in the same time, it is self-evident that justice is good 
and injustice is evil. This would mean, according to Ibn Rochd, that associating other gods 
with God would not be unjust in itself, but only from the perspective of the law2 . Likewise, 
Ibn Rochd opposed the Platonic view, that is not far away from the Ash 'arite one, stating that 
good and evil have no definite nature in themselves, but they are good or evil by 
supposition3 . Ibn Rochd went on to say that Plato, Aristotle and many of their followers 
resort to the assertion that the existence of objective values is a self -evident truth, which 
cannot be accepted as a rational argument. The same can be said about subjectivism, which 
regards the value of the religious rituals as conventional and not intrinsic4 . Aristotle has 
another point of view when he identifies the nature of any thing because of its end and final 
cause5 .The end of such a thing is its function6 and its defining principle7 . Hence, Aristotle 
understands good and evil in terms of his teleology. The natural end of organism and the 
means to this end is good for it and what defeats or impedes this end is evil. For instance, he 
went on to say that animals sleep in order to preserve themselves because nature operates for 
the sake of an end. This is a good, as sleeping is necessary and beneficial for entities, which 
cannot move continuously8 . For human beings, the ultimate good (happiness or what 
Aristotle calls eudemonia) consists in perfection, the full attainment of their natural function,
1 Averroes ,Tahafut al Tahafut, (The incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1, p!06.
1 George F. Hourani ^Iverroes on Good and Evil, p. 17.
2 Ibid.p.l8.
3Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Aristotle fhysics II",2.194a28-9,8.l99b 15-18.
6 Aristotle, EEII.1.1219a8.
1 Aristotle ,MeleorIV.12.390alO-ll.
8 Aristotle ,DeSomno 2.455bl7.
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which Aristotle analyzes as the activity of the soul according to reason that is in accordance 
with the most perfect virtue or excellence 1 . This also provides a norm for politicians "What 
is most choice worthy for each individual is always the highest it is possible for him to 
attain.' "
We have to mention that Aristotle's perfectionism is opposed to the subjective realism of 
Protagoras. According to the latter, good and evil are defined by whatever human beings 
happened to desire. We all unanimously agree with this principle, if we focus on the nature 
of evil itself. The adulterer, for example, sees his act as evil, but the pleasure he is taking out 
from it as good .Likewise, he who harms an enemy, thinks that he is doing well by so and 
does not regard it as an evil. In the same manner, the murderer considers his act as a crime, 
but in the same time, it is good for him either because it is an act of revenge or a means to 
get some financial benefits and you can yourself imagine the length of the list of examples.
This complex ethical system leads us to call the term 'good' into question because it is 
relative, in the sense that, its connotations and symbols change according to circumstances. 
What a person may see as a good thing, as he is involved in an act compelled by certain 
circumstances, is seen as evil by another one who is directly affected by such act. Whatever 
is the definition, evil co-exist with the good, in some way or another, like all other contraries 
in our world: darkness and light, cold and heat, bravery and cowardice, intelligence and 
stupidity and so on. From this perspective, we are talking about sin and sinners as a 
description of evil acts. Regardless of the origin of evil, its power and its connection to the 
Divine, we do understand that there is a sort of overlap between good and evil. As the good 
is the real nature of any human being unless he sins, God created many other things that help 
us to overcome such evil and clean our souls from any devilish acts through religious rites 
such as prayers, sacrifices and initiations. For the same purpose, man invented laws, 
constitutions, judgements and punishments. Ibn Rochd takes into consideration all the views 
of Aristotle and Plato on the one hand and those of the Ash 'rites on the other hand to solve 
this theological problem of evil. As a whole, Ibn Rochd's stance is based upon the 
irresponsibility of the perfect God from evil creation and asserting His creative power over 
everything. It is not like the Ash 'arites who used their definition of value to demonstrate that 
evil is a quality of individuals that consists of disobeying God's commands, and since God 
never does this, He is not evil at all. Therefore, He creates evil in the world without
1 Aristotle, EN /. 7. 1098a 7-17.
2 Aristotle politics VII. 14.1333a29-30; cf.ENX.7.1177b33-4,
-117-
Chapter 5
becoming evil Himself. For Ibn Rochd, if God created evil, the qualification of evil is 
applied to him as well and it has nothing to do with obeying or disobeying commands'. This 
stance makes us conjure up the yazidi2 sect that considers the Satan (source of all evils 
according to the majority of beliefs) the leader of the archangels. According to Yazidis 
Satan's name is ( i_£L u^jjlJa :Taouse Malak), they portrayed his disobedience to God as a 
sign of bravery. That is why, they took from him a guide and a worshipper. From all these 
divergent views and stances, we do come out with the conclusion that God, as a source of 
goodness and benevolence, did not command evil, but it allows it for a divine wisdom. The 
Almighty God wants us to be free, and that freedom is meaningless if it does not entail 
wrongness and lightness. This freedom is only the weapon of choice between obedience and 
disobedience because for man, in the constitution of God, freedom with pain is nobler than 
slavery with happiness 1 .
If we go back to Ibn Rochd, we will find him disagreeing with the Zoroastrian dualism that 
evil is caused by other persons (devils or demons), but he agrees with them that evil is not 
created by God. Ibn Rochd stated that dualism implies taqsir (shortcoming^ in the supreme 
agent. The only rational reasoning to Ibn Rochd is, first of all, to endorse the Platonic 
perspective of God as the absolute good, does not do evil at any time and He is not the cause 
of it. Secondly, He attributes evil to an impersonal force named matter, as the existence of 
ash-Urur (natural evils) is due to the necessity of matter. This is the case because such 
existence is only possible, if the things to whose existence some evil is attached should not 
exist or they should exist in this condition, as more than that is not possible in their 
existence. Ibn Rochd illustrated his standpoint by the example of fire, which is useful, but it 
can occur incidentally bil'arad (incidentally) and destroys many things. However, that 
destruction is not its nature, if it was not brought near to those sensible things2 . When the 
soul produces matter-evil, it does so in all innocence, so the production of matter is due to an 
imperfection proper to the nature of the soul. Hence, as long as matter is there, the soul is 
subject to evil and conditions have to be fulfilled in order that soul becomes evil, in the sense 
that, a certain weakness has to be present in the soul, which needs, in its turn, to be in contact 
with matter3 .
1 George F. Hourani .Averroes on Good and Evil, pp.20-21.
2 Their name is taken from the word 'Yezdan' orEzid who is God according to them
1 Mostapha Mahmoud, Hiwar ma Sadiqi al-Molhid,(A. Dialogue with my Atheist Friend),p.l3.
2 George F. Hourani, Averroes on Good and Evil,p.2\. 
3Jan Opsomer .Proclus against Plotinus on Matter, p. 157.
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5.3 God's Knowledge:
This is the most controversial issue that has to be tackled whenever we talk about the nature 
of the world and its destiny. Philosophers tried to apply the principle stating that every living 
being knows itself; this applies to God as well. As He is alive, He has to know Himself and 
His essence too. Al-Ghazali blamed philosophers for denying divine will and the creation of 
the world and for believing that what proceeds from Him proceeds only in a necessary and 
natural sequence. Al-Ghazali went on to say that philosophers might say why the creator 
created the world through His will at that particular time and not before or after? This 
situation may lack the will and it needs another will ad infinitum 1 . Al-Ghazali replied that the 
world existed through an ancient divine will decided its existence in the time it existed and 
decided its beginning in the time it began and any existence before that existence was not 
willed. Al-Ghazali stated that the world before did not exist, as it was not willed and when 
such a will occurred, it existed " through that ancient will that distinguishes a thing from its 
likeness, and if it were not so, power would be sufficient. That is why, it is the combination 
of both power and will that makes the world exists3 . AL-Ghazali carries on his arguments by 
accusing philosophers of denying that the nature of God' essence is the first effect proceeded 
from it, afterwards, the second effect came after the first one till the hierarchy of existents 
was reached4 . From this perspective, the First Will does not know Itself "Just as neither fire 
from which heat proceeds, nor the Sun from which light proceeds, know themselves or 
anything else5 ?" Al-Ghazali in Tahafut al-Falasifa( The Incoherence of Philosophers) 
attacked the philosophers who claimed that God knows only Himself. He emphasized that 
God is the intellect, the intelligence and the intelligible and all these is one. If it were said 
that it is impossible to unite the intellect, the intelligence and the intelligible, then, the creator 
of the world would not be able to know His work, which is impossible6 . From this analysis, 
Al-Ghazali deduced that the being that knows what proceeds from itself is the only being 
that knows itself and it would be rational to think that it knows other things around itself. 
What is striking here, is that the theory of philosophers states that the First does not know 
other things, and if it were the case, it would be irrational to think that the First knows itself. 
Besides, philosophers put themselves in trouble when they claimed that anyone who does
1 Al-Ghazali Jahafut al-Falasifa, (The Incoherence of Philosophers), p.91.
2 Ibid., p.97 
3 Ibid.,p.l02
4 Averroesjahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. I, p.270.
5 Ibid.
6 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut a-1- Falasifa, (The Incoherence of PhilosophersAp.99.
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not know himself, must be a dead, and we do know very well that we cannot even assume 
that the First is dead. The same applies to their doctrine that everything, which is free from 
matter; it must be an intellect by itself, and accordingly, thinks itself1 . Al-Ghazali concluded 
that this theory is refutable, as it is based on fragile grounds by stating that: 
"There is no difference between you and those who say that everyone who does not act 
through will, power and choice, who neither hears nor sees, is dead, and he who does not 
know other things is dead. And if it is possible that the First is destitute of all these 
attributes, what need has it of knowing itself?2
Al-Ghazali is always anticipating what the philosophers may say to defend their position, 
even if they did not say that like in this passage in which such anticipation is so obvious:
"If they say the proof is that what is existent is divided into what is alive and what is dead, 
and what is alive is prior and superior to what is dead, and the First is prior and superior: 
therefore let it be alive; and every living being knows itself, since it is impossible that the 
living should be amongst its effects and should not itself be alive3. "
Al-Ghazali does consider this virtual analysis as a mere presumption, as it is possible that 
what knows itself can follow that which does not with or without mediators. The rationale 
lying behind this impossibility, according to philosophers, is that in this case, the effect will 
be superior to the cause. Al-Ghazali does affirm that there is no irrationality in the 
superiority of the effect to the cause, as such a superiority is not regarded as a fundamental 
principle. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to falsify the standpoint stating that its 
superiority does not lie in its knowledge, but rather, in the fact that the existence of the world 
is a consequence of its essence. The irrefutable evidence of that is that, while the First neither 
sees nor hears, there are many other beings that have knowledge about other things that do 
hear and see4 .
In order to highlight the relationship between the cause and the effect, Ibn Rochd focused 
on the Last Mover or God. As He has no cause higher than Himself and not knowing the 
lower movers, He knows Himself only. Ibn Rochd did not stop at this particular point; 
otherwise, he would be denying all knowledge in God of things below, and consequently, all 
divine providence. He stated that anything should emanate from a knower qua knower
1 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut a-l- Falasifa, (The Incoherence of Philosophers;,p.99.
2Ibid.
3 Averroes, Tahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. II, p.270.
4Ibid.
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without the latter knowing it and all what we need to recognise providence is an observation 
of nature. Therefore, the upper intelligences do have knowledge of the lower 1 . Ibn Rochd 
exhibits Al-Ghazali's assumption stating that, "If it were said that the existents are divided 
into the seeing and the blind, the knowing and the ignorant2. " Then, we would let the seeing 
be superior, and we would let the First see and have knowledge of things. Al-Ghazali 
believes that philosophers object to this dictum as:
"Its excellence does not consist in seeing and knowing things, but in not being in need of 
sight and knowledge and being the essence from which there proceeds the universe in which 
the knowing and the seeing beings exist3 . "
There is another assumption indicating that, as the First has knowledge of Itself, its essence 
does not excellence. Hence, philosophers do deny that the First knows Itself, simply, as there 
is no evidence that proves this kind of knowledge. The only thing that can be provable is will 
and what proves will is the temporal beginning of the universe4 . On the contrary, Al-Ghazali 
sees that philosophers in their denials and refutations do possess no irrefutable proofs just 
those related to the attributes of the First. Ibn Rochd was not far away from this stance when 
he emphasized that the First Intelligence or God knows the same things as we do know, but 
in a different superior manner. Furthermore, God's knowledge of Himself is identical with 
His knowledge of the universe, but in the same time, His knowledge is not the same as our 
knowledge. That is the way, Ibn Rochd established his theodicy5 .Besides, Ibn Rochd stated 
that those who think that God does not know all the particularities are on the wrong path, as 
they can see the prediction of events through true dreams. These premonitions of particular 
events can be seen by man even before the eternal knowledge destined for everything6 .The 
Aristotelian Arab scholars regard God's knowledge as different from that of human beings, 
simply, as God is the cause, not the effect of the object known 7 . They even went to say that 
Such reasoning of God's knowledge led some scholars to think that, as God is timeless; He 
cannot be omniscient, as He would know only the truths that are tenseless8 .( truths that are 
beyond past, present and future).
1 Isaac Husik Aristotle on the Metaphysics ofAristotle,p.426.
2 Averroes, Tahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1 p.271
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Issac Husik jLverroes on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.426.
Ibn Rochd ,Fasl al-Maqal,(Decisive Treaty),p.9.
7 George. F Hourani ^.verroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy,p. 
8 Stewart R. Sutherland ,God, Time andEternity,p.W4.
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We do reply that being timeless does not mean necessarily that there is no past, present or 
future in God's knowledge; we would explain in depth God's sempiternity in the 
forthcoming chapters. Concerning God's knowledge, many philosophers draw a distinction 
between what is universal and what is particular, in the sense that, God possesses knowledge 
of that which will be and the universals are not among them, but rather, this knowledge is 
about the particulars and individuals. This means that if God knows a future event, 
definitely, He knows that it is not yet a present, and when it is present, He knows that it has 
become present. Accordingly, whenever this event perishes, God knows that it is past and is 
no longer existent 1 . This analysis of God's knowledge would lead us to think that: 
"The cognition (gnosis) in virtue of which he knew that it will be is before the one in virtue 
of which he knows that it no longer exists. Therefore, if time clearly arises (emphainetai 
paruphistamenos) in direct consequence of the phrase 'before and 'after', then will not place 
the creator of time outside the relationship of time2. "
God's knowledge should not be understood this way, as the notion of 'before' and 'after' 
does also exist in the mind of the Divine and also in the intellects of angels and the spirits, 
but this does not mean that God is within the relationship of time. First of all; this is just a 
divine way to make things clear and conceivable to human intellect, as man is unable to 
understand the nature of something that is outside such relationship. Secondly, 'the before', 
'the after' and even 'the now' are just a way to describe the order of things and have no 
implication of time. Therefore, the present, the past and the future are included within the 
everlasting day of God, which are all a present to Him, as God does not remember or expect, 
He only knows. This does not mean that historical time is not real to God, but it is real and 
different from the way we conceive. In any process of passing away, time does not 
disappear, but it passes to God's undying day3 .From this perspective, God's knowledge 
covers everything in both the microcosmic and the macrocosmic worlds. Likewise, His 
knowledge is particular and universal, about individuals and congregations, hi short, we 
cannot find something describing such omniscience better than the following Qur'anic 
Verse: "With Him are the keys of the unseen, the treasures that none knoweth but He. He 
knoweth whatever there is on the earth and in the sea. Not a leaf doth fall but with His 
knowledge:
1 John Philoponus fhiloponus on the Eternity of the World against Aristotle, vol,l,trans.Christian Wilberg, 
p.136.
2 Ibid.
3 Roger Hazelton, Time, Eternity and History, p. 11.
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there is not a grain in the darkness (or depths) of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry (green 
or withered), but is (inscribed) in a record clear (to those who can read] . "
Ibn Rochd took a third position when he mentioned that the temporal becoming of the 
world indicates that it has come into existence through a will or as he called it 'it has been 
willed by a will' 2 .However, we do find that the temporal things may happen through three 
means which are nature, will and chance. The things that do happen through will are the 
products of arts and those that do happen through nature are natural things. In this respect, if 
the temporal things did happen only through will, then, the will would have been a part of 
the definition of the temporal, but this is not the case, as the definition of the temporal 
becoming is 'existence following non-existence' 3 . Ibn Rochd came out with the conclusion 
that, as the world is a natural existent, if it had come temporally into existence, it would have 
come from principles that are appropriate to natural things and not from principles that are 
appropriate to artificial things4 . God's knowledge is linked to the notion of eternity as a 
whole, as it helps us to understand the successive eternity, the Abrahamic religions' eternity 
and the temporal existence of our created world. All other Hellenistic eternities know of this 
world only its simple immutable causes, principles and forms, which is what they are 
themselves. This means that the content of the knowledge of the Neo-Platonic eternal beings 
consists only of eternal objects, while the content of all the other Abrahamic religions' 
God's knowledge consists both of such objects in our existing life and the hereafter5 . 
5.4 Between God's Attributes and God's Essence:
The Mu 'tazilites do agree with some philosophers that we cannot ascribe attributes such as 
power, will, knowledge and so on to God, simply because we come to know all these 
attributes thanks to divine law. The Mu 'tazilites do consider these attributes as: 
" Verbal expressions, but that they refer to one essence ... and that is not permissible to 
accept an attribute additional to its essence in the way we may consider ,as regards 
ourselves, our knowledge , power, and will as attributes of ourselves, additional to our
essence .
From this Mu 'tazilite stance, Muslim theology was divided into two main categories: via 
negativa (negative way or what we call the apophatic theology) and the cataphatic theology.
' The Holy Qur'an ,Chapter Al- An'am(cattle, or livestock), 6 Verse.59.
2 Averroes Jahafut al- Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.I p.271..
3 Ibid.
4Averroes ,Tahafutal- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.I p.271.
5 D.P. Walker ,Eternity and the Afterlife, p.242
6Averroes Jahafut al- Tahafut ,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1 p. 186.
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The apophatic theology is known among Muslims as al-Lahout as-Silbi, and it teaches that, 
as God is ineffable, the attainment of divine knowledge has to be through the Ta'til 
(negation) of God's attributes. This means describing God through apophasis (what God is 
not).That is why, the adherents of such kind of theology are famous by Al-Mu 'atila( AisUJi : 
those who use negation). The cataphatic theology opposes such reasoning, as it teaches the 
attainment of the knowledge of God through cataphasis (what God is), which means through 
positive attributes as mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. This also explains the dispute of 
Muslim theologians over God's essence. A group did assert that God's essence can be 
known and the second one did affirm that it cannot be known. Many Qur'anic Verses, when 
taken literally, prove that God's essence and attributes cannot be known, as He does not like 
anything: "There is nothing whatever like unto Him 1 ". In other Verse: "There is none equal 
to Him ". Al-Ghazali, in al-Qistas al-Mustakim(The Correct Balance),stated that we must 
believe in all the attributes of God cited in the Qur'an with the denial of anthropomorphism 
and the satanic barren dialectics leading to blasphemy and unbelief3 . In his other work 
entitled Al-Ihtisad fi al-I'tikad (The Economy in Belief), divided God's attributes into four 
main categories. As-Sifa an-Nafsiyah ad-Datiya (The self-psychological attribute), which is 
the existence. As-Sifat as-Silbiyah(\he negative attributes) such as the oneness, the eternity, 
the everlastingness and the opposition to accidents. Sifat al-Ma 'ani (the attributes of 
meanings) like power, will knowledge, speech, hearing, sight and life, and finally As-Sifat 
al-Ma 'nawiyah (moral attributes) such as He is the omnipotent, the wilier, the omniscient, 
all-Hearing, all-Seeing and the Living4 . In addition to this problem, there is another one, 
which is not less serious that its precedent, in the sense that, by ascribing these attributes to 
God, we are causing plurality to the First Principle. There are two cases concerning these 
attributes and both of them do cause plurality in the First Principle. The first one is 
manifested in the attributes that do happen to us in the course of our development. In this 
case, they are additional to our essence, as they would be considered as new facts. In the 
second case, the attributes are simultaneous with our essence and this state of simultaneity is 
also an addition to our essence. This analysis is so clear and obvious, as it states that 
whenever one thing is added to another, and they are characterized by not being identical, 
they are making up two, even if they are simultaneous. Consequently, this is a clear plurality
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter As -Shura ( The Counsel), 42, Verse. 12.
2 Ibid., chapter Al-Ikhlas( The Sincerity),! 12, Verse. 5
3 Al-Ghazali, al-Qistas al-Mustakim,( The Correct Balance) pp.64-65.
4 Ibid, Al-Iktisadfi al-I'tikad^he Economy in Belief),p.31
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in the First Principle Who is the necessary existent 1 . That is the starting point of 
philosophers to achieve their denial of attributes. Ibn Rochd sees the problem of the 
philosophers who does not agree with the plurality of attributes in the fact that the does 
believe in the existence of both essence and attributes that are additional to that essence. We 
have to bear in mind that the attributes can be reduced to one essence. If we do take, for 
example, the attributes of will, knowledge and power, we would find out that they have the 
same meaning and describe the same unique essence2 . Gahm ibn Safwan (- d.745/6 AD) is 
believed to be among the first theologians who dealt with the topic of 'God is not a thing' 
(shay'). Gahm ibn Safwan was on the same line with Plotinus that God is not a being. 
Accordingly, He is transcendent, which means other than creation and above all attributes. 
Hence, if we deny the fact that God is a being, it is impossible to apply attributes that are 
entities existing in God. Moreover, what is not a being is not composite like created things 
and cannot be divided into parts. Dirar ibn Amr (- d.815 AD) believed that God's essence 
can only be known through a divine act, as in the resurrection day, God would create a sixth 
sense by which people would be able to know God's essence.
This view was rejected by speculative theologians such as Mu 'tazilites, Kharajites and 
Mu 'rji '/Yes3 . This view led the head of the Basrian Mu 'tazili School Abu Hudayl al-Allaf ( - 
d. ca. 850 AD) to conclude that God's incorporeality made His attributes identical to His 
essence, which means that even these attributes do belong to the divine essence; they do not 
tell anything about it. Therefore, God's essence cannot be known, defined or perceived by 
our intellect. The only thing that we are capable to know about God is His signs left in the 
universe. We have to bear in mind that Muslim theologians, and Abu Hudayl is one of them, 
established a link between knowledge and sight, in the sense that, if you see God in the 
hereafter means that you managed to know Him". Likewise, if we do separate God' essence 
from His existence, we are just like asking whether God has existed for a longer time since 
He created Adam than He had before, which falls in the same absurdity6 . 
Ibn Rochd solves this problem in a very convincing way when he affirms that:
' Averroes , Tahafut al Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1 p. 186.
2 Ibid.
3 Binyamin Abrahamov, Fahr al-Din al-Razi on the Knowability of God's Essence and Attributes, p.205.
4A relation to the city of Basra in Iraq.
5Binyamin Abrahamov , Fahr al-Din al-Razi on the Knowability of God's Essence and Attributes, p.205.
6 M. kneale, Eternity and Sempiternity, p.235.
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"The essence becomes a condition for the existence of the attributes and the attributes a 
condition for the perfection of the essence, and that their combination would be a necessary 
existent that is one single existent in which there is neither cause nor effect1 . "
It is worthwhile to mention that such a problem can be surmounted, if we assert the 
existence of an essentially necessary existent .This would indicate that the necessary existent 
has to be one all the time and it is not composed of the condition and the conditioned, and 
accordingly, of the cause and the effect. The reason why such a composition is not possible 
is that it has to be through two means, which are necessity or possibility. In case of necessity, 
such a necessity has to be through another agent or mediator and not through itself ,and as 
we know, it is extremely hard to suppose the existence of an eternal compound by itself. In 
the case of possibility, there would be a dire need for a cause that put together the cause and 
the effect. The general idea that we would come out with here, is that, it is quite impossible 
that a compound exists by itself and possessing eternal attributes, as such a composition 
would be, as mentioned before, a condition of its existence. Furthermore, it is not possible 
that the parts of the compound can be agents for the composition, simply because such a 
composition would have to be a condition for their existence". 
Ibn Rochd went further in the explanation of this dilemma by arguing that: 
" When the parts of any natural compound are disjoined, their original name can be only 
applied to them equivocally, for example, the term ' hand 'used for the hand which is a part 
of the living man and the hand which has been cut off; and every compound is for Aristotle 
transitory and a fortiori cannot be without a cause . "
The system of Ibn Sina is different of that of Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rochd and Aristotle, in the 
sense that, Ibn Sina's division of the necessary existent led to the assertion of the existence 
of an eternal compound. When we do suppose that the possible ends in a necessary cause 
that has to have a cause or not and in the former case has to end in a necessary existent that 
has no cause:
"This reasoning leads through the impossibility of an infinite regress to a necessary 
existence which has no efficient cause-not, however, to an existent which has no cause at all,
1 M. kneale, Eternity and Sempiternity, p.235.
2 Averroes , Tahafut al Tahafut ,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l ,p.!87.
3 Ibid
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for this existent might have a formal or a material cause, unless it is assumed that everything 
which has matter and form , or in short, every compound, must have an external cause'. "
The demonstration based on the principle of the necessary existent does not contain a proof 
to clarify this difficulty and corroborate this reasoning. This is the same dilemma like the one 
faced by the Ash 'arites, when they went on to say that every temporal occurrence is in dire 
need for a cause does not help them to reach an eternal First Principle that is not composite, 
but rather, they only attain a First Principle that is connected with temporality. Besides, the 
existence of these pairs of things such as knower and knowledge, will and wilier, power, and 
the possession of power are necessary, as they are one and they lead to the unity of their 
concepts'. There are other philosophers who did not complicate such attributes like Ibn 
Tofayl who summarized them to immateriality, non -contingency, self causality and the 
logical guarantee for the existence of other entities . 3 
5.5 Between the Empirical and the Invisible: 
5.5.1 Divine Incorporeality
This is an old debate started when philosophers start to draw a distinction between the 
corporeal and the incorporeal. The pre-Socrates natural philosophers assumed that there is 
nothing but corporeal existence, while Anaxagoras, the Megarians and Plato argued that, the 
incorporeal does exist also, beside what is corporeal4 . There is no room for doubt that we can 
prove some facts and reach some truths that are based on sense -perception or subject to 
scientific experiences or practical observations. However, it extremely difficult to unravel 
those things, which are, out of the scope of our vision and sometimes beyond our perception 
without the backing of religious revelations. Therefore, to what extent can we be more 
rational and logical, if we do discard these religious revelations and rely on our reasoning? 
Ibn Rochd emphasized that Al-Ghazal's theory about the essence of God is more convincing 
than that of the other philosophers. However, when it is put under test, it seems to be facing 
many difficulties. Regarding eternity of God, theologians compared the world with the 
products of arts designated by God's will and knowledge with human power. Such 
comparison is reducing Divine eternity to a just a human one, and accordingly, it is making 
God corporeal. Even if theologians are faced by this self-contradiction, they kept defending 
their stance by claiming that God is eternal because all the bodies, without the least
1 Averroes .Tahafut al Tahafut ,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.I,p.l87.
2 Ibid., pp.187-188
3 Sami .S Hawi ,Ibn Tofayl: on the Existence of God and His Attributes,p.64.
4 Eduard Zeller ,Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 1, trans.B.F.C Costelloe and J.H Muirhead.
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exception, are temporal. In this case, theologians are compelled, because of this self - 
contradiction, to admit that the world is the product of an immaterial being 1 . There is also 
another point that is worthwhile to be mentioned here, is that when the theologians do assert 
that God wills and knows, He must be alive, they did not specify exactly what kind of life, is 
that life, which is a condition for the existence of living beings (man, animals and plants)? Or 
is it a Divine life that we do know nothing about it? Or is it a life that is a condition for the 
existence of knowledge, power, will and all the other attributes? The Holy Qur'an gives us 
an account of the divine nature, as God knows the curiosity of man and his dire need to know 
everything that occurs around him. In chapter Al-Ikhlas (the unity, the sincerity or the 
oneness of God), He says Say:
"He is God, the One and Only; God, the Eternal, Absolute, He begetteth not, nor is He 
begotten; and there is none like unto Him2 ". The very detailed account of the nature of 
God's essence does exist in the chapter of An -Nur (the light) "God is the Light of the 
heavens and the Earth. The Parable of His Light is as if there were a Niche and within it a 
Lamp: the Lamp enclosed in Glass he glass as it were a brilliant star: Lit from a blessed 
Tree, an Olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though 
fire scarce touched it: Light upon Light! God doth guide whom He will to His Light: God 
doth set forth Parables for men: and God doth know all things . "
We have to bear in mind that, this is not a tangible and clear comparison, as its purpose is 
just to make the nature of God's essence understandable to human mind and conceivable by 
its impotent intellect, as man is unable by nature to know the true nature of God's essence. 
This incapacity is not due only to man's intellectual impotence, but also to the will of God 
manifested in the purposes of His sublime wisdom. Likewise, in chapter of Ar-Rahman(The 
Beneficent or The Mercy giving), there is a an explicit indication that the nature of God's 
essence can never be conceivable later or sooner, as it is not made of matter or bound by 
space-time system:
"All that is on earth will perish: But will abide (for ever) the Face of thy Lord, -full of 
Majesty, Bounty and Honour, Then which of the favours of your Lord will ye deny? Of Him 
seeks (its need) every creature in the heavens and on Earth: every day in (new) Splendour
1 Averroes ,Tahafut a! Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.II, p.256.
2 The Holy Qur'an, Chapter Al-Ikhlas (The Sincerity) 112
3 Ibid., chapter An-Nur: (The Light) 24. Verse. 35
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doth He (shine)!, Then which of the favours of your Lord will ve deny? , Soon shall we settle 
your affairs, O both ye worlds!. Then which of the favours of your Lord will ye deny? 1 ." 
Therefore, God is neither corporeal, nor incorporeal; He is also neither material nor 
immaterial. He is as He describes Himself:
"(He is) the Creator of the heavens and the earth: He has made for you pairs from among 
yourselves, and pairs among cattle: by this means does He multiply you: there is nothing 
whatever like unto Him, and He is the One that hears and sees (all things}2." 
Alternatively, we can conclude as our predecessors that God is neither a substance, nor a 
body, nor an accident. He cannot be found in a specific direction and He does not station 
Himself on the throne. 3 In other word, God is neither in a place, nor in any given direction, 
He is neither inside the world nor outside it and He is not connected to the world or separated 
from it4 . 
5.5.2 The Nature of the Divine's Life:
The same problem occurs when theologians ascribe the faculty of sense perception, 
without sense -organs, to God and deny completely His motion in space5 . All over again, 
and as we have mentioned above, the perception, knowledge, power and all their attributes 
are identical with life, and we do know already the dilemma raised from the discussion of 
God and His sublime life. Ibn Rochd went further by emphasizing that: 
" The meaning of will' in man and in animal is a desire which rouses movement and which 
happens in animal and man to perfect a deficiency in their essence, and it is impossible that 
there should be in the Creator a desire because of an imperfection in His essence, which 
could be a cause of movement and action either in Himself or in something different from 
Himself . "
When it comes to the essence of God, Ibn Rochd is asking questions more than giving 
answers such as how can we imagine an Eternal Who is the cause of an act occurring without 
an increase of the desire at the time of the occurrence of the act? Therefore, how could a
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Ar-Rahman( The Beneficient),55.Verses.26-32
2 Ibid., chapter Ash- Shura ( The Counsel) 42, verse: 11
3 Binyamin Abrahamov ,Fahr ad-Din al-Razi on the Knowability of God's Essence and Attributes,p. 207.
4 Ibid.,p.208.
5 Averroes ,Tahafut al- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.1 p.256.
6 Ibid.p.257.
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desire or a will, which were before, during and after the occurrence of the act in the same 
state and without the least change? All these thorny problems emerged on the assumption 
that the Creator is corporeal. If we do admit that the desire is also among the causes of 
movement, which is only found in animate bodies, we are asserting that the First Principle, 
the Creator is a body. In brief, philosophers went on to say that there are only three 
attributes, which are most appropriate to God: Knower (He has Knowledge), excellence and 
power, but unlike man, His power is not inferior to His will 1 . Undoubtedly, the dispute over 
the corporeal or the incorporeal of the Creator does entail many difficulties either in the case 
of assertion or in that of denial. Among these difficulties, some of God's attributes 
themselves, especially those related to perception and sensation. What is certain here is that 
we shall not understand the life of the Divine as a condition of existence, as it is the case 
with ours as human beings. It is rather, both eternal (aionios) and sempiternal (aydios)2, in 
the sense that, God's eternity entails His sempiternity. In other words, there is one- way 
entailment, which means that every eternal object is sempiternal but not vice versa3 .
5.5.3 Bodily and Spiritual Resurrection:
The other controversial issue is that of the notion of resurrection, first, is it possible? If it is 
so, is it a physical resurrection or a spiritual one? We have to point out that this problem is 
not found among older philosophers. However, Pythagoras mentioned spiritual resurrection 
through his doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Bodily resurrection was mentioned 
almost in all religions thousands of years ago, but we can deduce from the teachings of the 
Psalms, and all the other books attributed to the Israelites, that bodily resurrection was first 
mentioned by Israel after Moses. Likewise, the New Testament asserted bodily resurrection, 
but it was an attribution by Jesus Christ to the theory of the Sabaeans4 . It is also an issue 
among the free thinkers called by the Talmud the Epicureans5 . This doctrine is of a 
paramount importance, as it is helpful in understanding the existence of human being and 
highlighting the nature of his destiny:
1 Averroes ,Tahafutal- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.l,p.257.
2 M. Kneale, Eternity and Sempiternity,-p.225. 
3Ibid.,.226
4 Averroes, Tahafut at- Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.I, p.359.
5 Ernest Renan ,Averroes et L 'Averroisme, p.457.
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" It is conductive to an order amongst men on which man 's being, as man depends and 
through which he can attain the greatest happiness proper to him, for it is a necessity for the 
existence of the moral and speculative virtues and for the practical sciences in men'. "
We do deduce from this passage that philosophers argue that man is unable to live in this 
world without practical sciences. Likewise, he cannot live either in this world or in the 
hereafter without the speculative virtues. However, the practical sciences and the speculative 
virtues do take their strength from knowledge and the worship of God. The latter can only be 
achieved through religious norms such as offerings, prayers, supplications and so on2 .
All Abrahamic religions do agree that there is another existence after our non-existence, 
but they disagree about the nature of that existence as they agree about God's knowledge and 
attributes and they disagree about the nature of this knowledge and these attributes. That is 
why, according to philosophers, religious norms are important and obligatory, as they help to 
achieve a universal wisdom known to all human beings3 .Religions in general do establish 
communication with the masses that do form the majority of people. That is why, they do 
acquire such importance, as philosophy is only directed to the elites who can attain wisdom 
by means of their intellectual potentials and mental capacities, "// is the truest of all sayings 
that every prophet is a sage, but not every sage is a prophet; the learned, however, are those 
of whom it is said that they are the heirs of the prophets4 . "
This would lead us to discuss the agreement between religion and philosophy, whish is not 
our concern here, as we will discuss it in the forthcoming chapters. Anyway, regarding 
resurrection, Al-Ghazali declares that what arises from the dead is simulacra of earthy bodies 
and not the bodies themselves because what has perished can only return as an image of what
*The Sabaeans (Arabic: usL>  ^),rhe Minaean, the Qatabanian, and the Hadramawtian are the four known South Arabic 
dialects of ancient times. The earliest South Arabic inscriptions, dating from the 8th century BC, are in the Minaean dialect. 
Sabaean is the dialect of the majority of South Arabic inscriptions; the latest inscriptions are from the 6th century AD .Any 
of a group of minor scripts originating in the Arabian Peninsula in about 1000 BC, possibly related to the writing system 
used in the Sinaitic inscriptions. These scripts, most of which were used only in the Arabian Peninsula, are of note because 
of their great age and because of the lack of any clear link between them and the North Semitic alphabet, which dates from 
about 1100 BC and is probably ancestral to all subsequent alphabetic scripts except the South Semitic group. The South 
Semitic alphabets generally have 28 letters, all representing consonants, and were usually written from right to left. Online 
Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/topic/514 903/sabaean. Access Date: 23 Apr., 2008).
'Averroes .Tahafut al- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1, p.359.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.,p.361
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has perished and not like an identical being with what has perished. Hence, the theological 
doctrine of resurrection stating that the soul is an accident and the bodies that would be 
resurrected are completely identical with those that have perished, is not convincing at all: 
"For what perished and became a new can only be specifically, not numerically, one, and 
this argument is especially valid against those theologians who hold that an accident does 
not last two moments '. "
The dispute is not only about the doctrine of resurrection itself and we do mean by that the 
resurrected bodies and the perished ones, but about the types of this resurrection as well. 
When we draw a distinction between these two types of bodies, we are definitely asserting 
that there exists a bodily resurrection. On the contrary, many theologians deny this corporeal 
resurrection, as they do believe in a spiritual one. The Islamic concept of the resurrection is 
clear and obvious, as it states that the resurrection is corporeal like in chapter of Al -Waqi 'a 
(The event or the Inevitable):
"And they used to say, "What! When we die and become dust and bones, shall we then 
indeed be raised up again?- "(We) and our fathers of old?" Say: "Yea, those of old and 
those of later times, "All will certainly be gathered together for the meeting appointed for a 
Day well-known. "Then will ye truly, - O ye that go wrong, and treat (Truth) as Falsehood 2 " 
Likewise, in the Chapter of Yasin, there many verses discussing the issue of resurrection: 
"Verily We shall give life to the dead, and We record that which they send before and that 
which they leave behind, and of all things have We taken account in a clear Book (of 
evidence)3. " In the same chapter, there is a description of the last day, the resurrection 
agonies that were denied by many people, and the description of their big surprise when they 
will be resurrected as they did not believe in it in their worldly life:
"Further, they say, "When will this promise (come to pass), if what ye say is true?" They 
will not (have to) wait for aught but a single Blast: it will seize them while they are yet 
disputing among themselves! No (chance) will they then have, by will, to dispose (of their 
affairs), nor to return to their own people! The trumpet shall be sounded, when behold! 
From the sepulchres (men) will rush forth to their Lord! They will say: "Ah! Woe unto us! 
Who hath raised us up from our beds of repose?"... (A voice will say :) "This is what ((God))
'Averroes ,Tahafutal- Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.I, p. 362
2 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Al-Waqi'a (The Inevitable, or the Event), 56, Verses: 47-51.
3 Ibid., chapter Yasin, 36 Verses. 12
-132-
Chapter 5
Most Gracious had promised. And true was the word of the apostles!" It will be no more 
than a single Blast, when lo! they will all be brought up before Us! 1 ."
It is worthwhile to mention here that the notion of resurrection is among the causes that had 
discouraged many people from embracing Islam in the time of its emergence. Those people 
found the notion of resurrection very hard to believe, as it was the first time they heard about 
it, as they were idle -worshippers. There is a whole chapter in the Holy Qur'an called (The 
resurrection), as it is the case of many Qur'anic Verses teeming with that challenging tone to 
those who do not believe in it:
" / do call to witness the Resurrection Day; and I do call to witness the self-reproaching 
spirit: (Eschew Evil). Does man think that We cannot assemble his bones? Nay, We are able 
to put together in perfect1 . "
The Islamic theology3 is abundant in discussions and debates raised by the doctrine of 
resurrection. In the Qur'an and almost in every single chapter, we do find a direct or indirect 
indication to resurrection. That is why, Muslim theologians do take the doctrine of 
resurrection seriously and not like a fable . Ibn Rochd showed, in many occasions and in 
different works, his antipathies against some Muslim and non-Muslim theologians alike. 
According to Ibn Rochd, the first who talked about resurrection were the prophets of Israel 
after Moses, and after that the Gospel of Christians and the Sabaeans who had, according to 
Ibn Hazm, the most ancient religion of the world. Ibn Rochd considered the doctrine of 
resurrection elaborated by many religious thinkers as a way to urge people to do good deeds 
and discard bad ones:
"/ do not blame Al- Ghazali and the other Mutakallimin* for saying that the soul is 
immortal, but to pretend that the soul is only an accident, and that man will take the same 
body that had decayed. No he will take another one similar to the previous, for what is once
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Yasin, Verses. 48-53
2 Ibid., chapter Al Kiyyama (The Resurrection),75, Verses. 1-4.
3 In Islam, speculative theology. The term is derived from the phrase kalam Allah (Arabic: "word of God"), which refers to 
the Qur'an, the sacred scripture of Islam. Those who practice kalam are known as mutakallimun. In its early stage, kalam 
was merely a defence of Islam against Christians, Manichaeans, and believers in other religions. As interest in philosophy 
grew among Muslim thinkers (Online Encyclopaedia Britannica: www.britannica.com/eb/article9044375/kalam. Access 
Date: 02 Feb., 2007.
4 Ernest Renan ^verroes et L 'Averroisme, p.457.
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corrupt cannot go back into life. These two bodies do make up only one in terms of type, but 
they are two in terms of number".
This is also the Aristotelian view, in the last lines of 'The Generation and the Corruption', 
Aristotle stated that the corrupted being can never become identical again with itself, but it 
can go back to the specific variety to which it belongs. Aristotle illustrated his stance by 
means of this example: when the air comes out of the water and water comes out of the air, 
each of these substances does not go back to the individual where they used to be, but to the 
type where they used to be2 . 
5.5.4 Reward and Punishment:
Definitely, we cannot believe in something called reward and punishment, if we do not 
believe in the first place in resurrection regardless of its nature corporeal or spiritual. 
Resurrection was not an issue among ancient philosophers and so it is the notion of reward 
and punishment, as there is a sort of overlap between the two issues. If you do believe that 
the life of man ends with his death and there is no existence after existence, it is very 
unlikely that the punishment -reward equation would cross your mind. There is another link 
of crucial significance between resurrection and the punishment -reward equation is that the 
purpose of existing. Why does man exist in this life? Is his existence arbitrary? Is there any 
purpose3 behind it? If it is so, why does his destiny go towards demise? Is his demise a 
declaration of the end of his purpose? Many ancient thinkers and philosophers had some 
belief in the existence of another world where souls would be fairly judged. If Callicles4 
considered this process a mere fiction, Socrates made it in a reasoned account. He follows 
the account of the three judges of the underworld who sit in the meadow at the parting of the 
ways, the soul appears, bearing all the marks of evil or good brought with it from its previous 
earthy life, totally stripped of all the trappings of power, wealth and social standing under 
which it was concealed 5 . This is exactly the notion of the day of judgement that we do find in 
the Abrahamic religions. In the Republic, we have also the story of Er, the son of Arminius, 
an elaborate eschatology, which tells the judgement after death, which means retribution for
1 Ernest Renan ^verroes et L 'Averroisme, p.458.
2 Ibid.
3" / have only created Jinns and men. that they may worship Me."(The Holy Qu'ran, chapter Adh-Dhariyat (the winnowing
winds): 51:56
4 Callicles is an Athenian citizen who is a student of the sophist Gorgias .He appeared as a character in Plato's dialogues.
5 Patrick Duncan. Immortality of the Soul in the Platonic Dialogues ,p.309.
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good or evil and the return of the soul ,after its allotted period of purgation, to another life on 
earth(614.b).All these questions above can be answered- to some extent- by Abrahamic 
religions better than through philosophical speculation. If we do want to understand the 
Islamic reward-punishment system, we have to go through the notion of resurrection. 
Muslims do not agree at all with the spiritual resurrection, as it is against the pure Islamic 
teachings and opposed to Qur'anic instructions. The Holy Qur'an is teeming with religious 
Verses dealing with corporeal resurrection especially when talking about the reward and the 
tortures of the hereafter. However, there are some indications that souls themselves will be 
rewarded and punished, but we can only understand the contents of the Qur'anic Verses 
dealing with the punishment and the reward of souls through interpretations and metaphors. 
This is due to the richness of Arabic vocabulary, its flexibility and its susceptibility to 
divergent interpretations. Sometimes the term' soul' refers to man himself and sometimes to 
'Nafs' ,which is another type of soul that had existed ,according to Islamic teaching, even 
before the creation of man. This kind of souls has negative connotations in comparison with 
the soul (Ruh) that is always connected with positive dimensions. What is said about 
resurrection can also be said about the reward and punishment for the correlative relationship 
that does exist between the two. All over again, the Qur'anic teaching highlighted the notion 
of reward and punishment in hundreds of Verses:
''''Then, on that Day, not a soul will be wronged in the least, and ye shall but be repaid the 
needs of your past deeds, Verily the Companions of the Garden shall that Day have joy in all 
that they do; they and their associates will be in groves of (cool) shade, reclining on Thrones 
(of dignity); (Every) fruit (enjoyment) will be there for them; they shall have whatever they 
call for; "Peace!" - a word (of salutation) from a Lord Most Merciful''."
The same meaning is found in chapter of Al- Insan (The man):
"But God Will deliver them from the evil of that Day, and Will shed over them a Light of 
Beauty and (blissful) Joy. And because they were patient and constant, He will reward them 
with a Garden and (garments of) silk. Reclining in the (Garden) on raised thrones, they will 
see there neither the sun's (excessive heat) nor (the moon's) excessive cold. And the shades 
of the (Garden) will come low over them, and the bunches (offruit), there, will hang low in
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Al- Insan (The man), 76, Verses. 11-15
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humility. And amongst them will be passed round vessels of silver and goblets of crystal1 . " 
In chapter Al-Waqi 'a (The event or the inevitable), there is a very detailed description of the 
position of those who would be awarded and the reward depends on the size of noble deeds 
done in worldly life:
"Then (there will be) the Companions of the Right Hand; - What will be the Companions of 
the Right Hand? And the Companions of the Left Hand,- what will be the Companions of the 
Left Hand? And those Foremost (in Faith) will be Foremost (in the Hereafter). These will be 
those Nearest to God. In Gardens of Bliss: A number of people from those of old, And a few 
from those of later, times. (They will be) on Thrones encrusted (with gold and precious 
stones), Reclining on them, facing each other. Round about them will (serve) youths of 
perpetual (freshness), With goblets, (shining) beakers, and cups (filled) out of clear-flowing 
fountains: No after-ache will they receive therefrom, nor will they suffer intoxication: And 
with fruits, any that they may select: And the flesh of fowls, any that they may desire. And 
(there will be) Companions with beautiful, big, and lustrous eyes,- Like unto Pearls well- 
guarded. A Reward for the deeds of their past (life). Not frivolity will they hear therein, nor 
any taint of ill, - Only the saying, "Peace! Peace'"
Likewise, those who will be cursed, the size of their curse depend on the evil deeds they 
have done in their lifetime:
"The Companions of the Left Hand, - what will be the Companions of the Left Hand? (They 
will be) in the midst of a Fierce Blast of Fire and in Boiling Water, and in the shades of 
Black Smoke: Nothing (will there be) to refresh, nor to please: For that they were wont to be 
indulged, before that, in wealth (and luxury), and persisted obstinately in wickedness 
supreme...taste of the Tree ofZaqqum3 . "Then will ye fill your insides therewith, "And drink 
Boiling Water on top of it: "Indeed ve shall drink like diseased camels raging with thirst!" 
Such will be their entertainment on the Day of Requital! . "
The purpose of man in life is related to the secrets that lie behind his existence, according to 
monotheistic beliefs in general and the Islamic one in particular, man was created only to 
praise and glorify God. Such worship is performed through very minute divine norms and 
thorough instructions that have to be practised in the form of worships such as prayer, 
almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage and many other related to his behaviours and manners. All
'The Holy Qur'an, chapter Yasin 36, Verses. 54-58
2 Ibid., chapter al-Waqi 'a (The Event), Verses.9-26
3 A Tree of fire grows in the bottom of hell
4 The Holy Qur'an, chapter al-Waqi'a (The Event),Verses.41-46 and 52-56
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these practices have to be done in his worldly life that is considered as a test where he will be 
examined and a passage to the other world where he will live forever either in complete 
happiness or in absolute misery. This purpose called in Islam Al -Amanah (The Trust) is the 
one that leads the Muslim to believe in the doomsday as an end to human race and the entire 
world. In addition to the belief in the resurrection, the transition to the other world and the 
last judgement that has to be based on reward and punishment depending on every 
individual's acting in accordance with the instructions and norms as stated by the Trust. 
There is no room for doubt that the Abrahamic theologians and philosophers alike did benefit 
from these religious revelations in their debate with their non-religious counterparts. The 
issues of resurrection and the punishment - reward system helped them to unravel some 
enigmas of our intriguing existence. We do know that the universe comprises many 
complicated dilemmas and intriguing wonders built upon sophisticated equations, but we did 
not know until recently that we are -the human beings-the most sophisticated part of it. 
Besides, these religious revelations, helped theologians and philosophers to enrich the 
debates about the eternity and the creationism of the world, as they combined what is 
acquired from ancient wisdom and what is learnt from religious teachings. The discussion of 
the resurrection doctrine and the award - punishment equation is of crucial significance, as it 
asserts the immortality of souls and the existence of another life called the hereafter or the 
afterlife. The Abrahamic stance based on the createdness of the world is regarded as untidy 
and inelegant 1 because of the dilemma of the afterlife. There were many attempts to reform 
the religious afterlife by Christianizing some parts of the Neo-Platonic scheme built upon an 
eternal, cyclical created world, with souls endlessly circulating from heaven to earth, to hell 
and back again and probably ending in universal salvation. Such reform started by the 
elimination of the aeternitates a parte post by asserting the pre-existence of the soul in 
dealing with heaven and the extension of the aevum backwards to infinity in the case of hell 
through the denial of its etemity(giving it an end as well as a beginning)2 . We have to 
mention here that the pre-existence and the universal salvation doctrines are supported by 
arguments based on time and eternity. The Neo-Platonic3 theologians and philosophers do
1 D.P. Walker .Eternity and the Afterlife, p.246.
2Ibid.
3 There were also several variations on the Neo-Platonic scheme: Two friends of Henry More, Lady Conway and Francis
Mercurius Van Helmont, proposed an eternal cyclical universe combined with a cabalistic (relation to kaballah) circulation
of souls (Proclus .Elements of Theology, p.304).Only one person solved the problem by denying the eternity of both heaven
and hell: William Whiston, the great English Arian (D.P, Walker .Eternity and the Afterlife, p.246).
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see, as mentioned before, the aeternitas a parts post as absurd ,as in this case, if human souls 
are immortal, then, they must have existed, at least as ideas in the mind of God, ab aeterno. 
Moreover, the sins and the miseries of hell, which have begun in time, and have no eternal 
roots in God, must end in time'.
Definitely, the demise of the world with all its implications starting from the dooms day 
passing through the resurrection day, the judgement day and the punishment and reward 
equation have a strong link with the Creator. The relationship of God with His servants is 
like that of a doctor with his patient. When a doctor prescribes a medicine to his patient, he 
would not be affected by the patient's response to his recommendations, as the doctor is only 
a guide. If the patient follows the doctor's medical advices, he may recover if not he may 
perish and both survival and death are equal to the doctor2 . The Almighty God created a 
cause for happiness and another for misery; neither the servants' disobedience will harm him 
nor their obedience will benefit him. He is beyond the limits of harm and benefit.
5.6 Conclusion:
We have discussed the God-world relationship in this chapter by introducing all the types of 
beliefs just to mention that relationship that is and always existed between the Creator and 
His creations regardless of the nature, the essence of that creator and the kind of worship that 
is followed by every believer. That is why, we have highlighted, for example, polytheism, 
pantheism and panentheism. It is to mention this sophisticated God-man relationship on the 
one hand and to expose the divergent means of perceiving God and assessing His power and 
control over man since the dawn of history on the other hand. It is man' fear from the unseen 
and from the unexpected and his worries about his life and his destiny that makes him in a 
constant attempt to unravel anything shrouded in mystery and decode the enigmas of his 
existence. Man was always overwhelmed by this discovery of his self and the nature of 
things around him as a colossal step to find out what lies beyond. These types of beliefs are 
of a paramount importance in understanding the nature of the creator, as they all do believe 
in the existence of a maker of our universe either he is one and unique as in the monotheistic 
beliefs or he is one beside many others like in the polytheistic beliefs. Whatever the case.
1 D.P. Walker, Eternity and the Afterlife, p.248
2 Al-Ghazali, Majmu 'at Rasa 'Hal-Imam A/-Ghazali.(The Compendium of the Epistles of Al-Ghazali),p.362.
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they all have a common point asserting that this cosmos has a creator and it cannot be 
eternal. If we do contemplate the Islamic concept of the nature of existence, we would 
notice that it is divided into two categories: the temporal existence and the eternal one; the 
former is manifested in all creations including souls, celestial spheres and invisible things 
and the latter is represented only by God and His attributes. Therefore, everything in our 
infinite universe is His act and His creation, but it is created by Him on a temporal basis, as it 
would collapse and demise at a certain time in the near or the remote future. We are not here 
very interested in the ways and the manners by which the cosmos came into existence, what 
matters us more, is whether this cosmos is created or eternal as it is the case throughout the 
whole thesis. The reason why we have exhibited Al-Ghazali's reasoning based upon the 
creation of the cosmos through both God' will and knowledge, as anything willed has to be 
known by the wilier is just to prove that the cosmos has a creator and an artisan. Such 
evidence would lead us to the assertion that such a creator has to be eternal by His will, His 
knowledge and His attributes. In this regard, nothing can come to existence without God's 
will and God's knowledge, which means that everything has a temporal existence. 
Accordingly, everything is going towards demise and the everlastingness is restricted to God 
only, as He is the only eternal being if we could of course call Him a' Being'. As mentioned 
before, the discussion of both God's knowledge and will is of a crucial significance because 
by proving that God knows Himself and everything around Him and as we asserted that He 
is eternal, His Knowledge, His will, and consequently, all His attributes have to be eternal as 
well.
All these assertions would pave the way for the affirmation that the entire universe with its 
empirical and visible creations is eternal. We do also discussed the claims raised over the 
corporality or the materiality of God because if we do admit such claims regardless of the 
nature of this materiality or corporality, we are admitting ,in some way or another, that God 
is not eternal, hi this case, even if you do assert that God is the Creator of the world, it would 
not make such world eternal, simply because it is extremely hard to affirm that a creator who 
is not eternal is able to create something eternal. It is not easy to refute this naked truth even 
if we did try to bridge the gaps and the missing links existing between God, the Creator and 
the world, His creation by introducing, or rather, imagining the interference of intermediaries
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and mediators in the temporal or the eternal creation of the world. From all these troubled 
discussions and controversial debates, we have to admit the closeness that does exist between 
all these stances and between all these systems of beliefs.
We can only come out with the conclusion that there is a fine line between eternity and 
temporality 1 , between materiality and non- materiality, between existence and non-existence 
and between the demise and the everlastingness. Therefore, any small addition can create a 
difference, anything is subject to irrefutability or falsifiability except what concerns God's 
essence and anything related to it, as it is the core of every comprehensive study of the 
enigmas of our existence, our destiny (corruption, demise) and our relationship with the 
whole cosmos as a dependent entity. We do find in the discussion of resurrection and the 
reward and punishment doctrines many important keys to open the gates of the unknown and 
uncover things shrouded in mystery to make a way in the labyrinths of life and death, the 
meshes of the demise and eternity and the maze of existence and non-existence. These two 
doctrines are not just important, but very essential to the comprehensive understanding of the 
nature of the world because they are all related to God, the Creator and the Maker of the 
entire universe. We cannot for example, imagine a resurrection made by nature or a 
punishment inflicted on man by the vacuum or a reward granted by evolution, as the process 
of resurrection does require the interference of a sublime intelligence. Even if we do imagine 
that such a process can be done by nature or evolution in some phases, it is quite impossible 
that nature can inflict punishment on man or grant him with a reward. Hence, we can only 
believe that the punishment -reward system is the act of a Creator Who was not made of 
matter, moved by energy or imprisoned in the space -time equation. Such a sublime power 
has to be the first before creation, the last after eternity, not bound by the laws of limit and 
the norms of boundaries. All these discussions would be insufficient without tackling the 
problem of evil, as it is the other side of this eternalism-crteationism intricate equation.
1 Aevum is always defined as an intermediate state between time and eternity, less objection can be taken against the tenn in 
this sense, for it was just in this sense that it arose in Christian thought, which felt the need to distinguish between the 
supratemporal in a creaturely sense and eternity in the sense of the Being of God.
-140-
Chapter 5
If we assert that evil is created by God, this would be an affront to His benevolent nature 
and undermine His omnipotence and authority over His creation. Likewise, we cannot affirm 
that evil is created by another supreme cosmic power, as this would make associates with 
God, which is a complete breach of His uniqueness and oneness. Moreover, justice and 
injustice would be meaningless in the presence of divergent powers imposing different laws 
and norms. This dilemma cannot be solved by claiming that evil is not created, rather, it is 
eternal as it is the case of God, as this would make something else eternal beside God, which 
is against the properties and the conditionality of the notion of eternity itself. We do agree, to 
some extent, with Plato that God is the measure of all things, but in the same time, He is the 
source of good and not of evil. This does not minimize God's omnipotence as the maker of 
everything, for He is the source of good, but He allowed the existence of evil for a wisdom 
we are not acquainted with. Our solution to this religious-philosophical dilemma is that evil 
has something to do with matter, but not like the Aristotelian matter or what the Muslim 
theologians call Al- Huyula, which is co-eternal with God. Matter is created by God, but 
without having a malevolent authority over man on condition that he (the man) obeys the 
laws and abides by norms. If we do take, for example, death, which is an evil, is the opposite 
of life, which is in its turn, an epitome of eternity. In this case, the existence of death as an 
evil and opposite of life is very important, as its absence would mean eternity and then the 
hereafter, the last judgment and the establishment of the ultimate truth would be unjustifiable 
and purposeless. The same can be applied to all other matter-related evils such as sickness, 
physical abnormalities, senility and so on. Some thinkers would say why then God Who is 
good and omnipotent did not create a world free of evil? Here becomes the equation of the 
reward-punishment to answer this question because without the presence of the evil, the 
moral tests in this earthy ephemeral life would be meaningless. Here, as mentioned before, 
comes the role of the Al-Amana (The Trust), The Almighty God says:
"Truly, We did offer Al-Amanah (the Trust or moral responsibility or honesty and all the 
duties which God has ordained) to the heavens and the Earth, and the mountains, but they 
declined to bear it and were afraid of it (i.e. afraid of God's Torment). But man bore it. 
Verily, he was unjust (to himself) and ignorant (of its results) 1 "
The Holy Qur'an, Chapter al-Ahzab( The Parties, or the Allies: 33), Verse. 72
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This means that before existence, man accepted to take such Trust, which is only the belief 
in God through obeying His commandments to achieve happiness and the reward or 
disobeying His commandments entailing the curse, damnation and punishment. Some would 
say what kind of Trust have I accepted to take in the eternity when I was still a non-existent? 
Islamic teaching has the answer to that, as it divided the human life into four main 
categories. The first one, is life in the eternity (life before life) when man was still a 
'Nafs '(Spirit):
"When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam - from their loins - their 
descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): "Am I not your Lord 
(who cherishes and sustains you)?"- They said: "Yea! We do testify!" (This), lest ye should 
say on the Day of Judgment: "Of this we were never mindful1 . "
The second life is the one that every one lives in this world, the third one is that of 
Barzakh (life between death and resurrection) and the fourth one, the eternal life of the 
hereafter. That is why, man is praised and his standing among other creatures is very high 
because of this 'divine contract', called the Trust. Even better than angels, as the latter were 
obliged to obedience and created without passions and better than animals, which were 
created without Intellect, so they are not subject to any obligations or duties. Man have taken 
both of them the passions of angels and the rationale of animals. If he managed to take 
control of his passions, his rank is higher than that of angels and if he is controlled by these 
passions, he is degraded to the rank of animals.
From this particular point came the rationale behind classifying human Nafs to three main 
categories: an-Nafs al-Ammara bi as-Soue (the commanding Nafs) that is engaged in all 
kinds of worldly pleasures. An-Nafs al-Lawwama (the blaming Nafs), which is committing 
sins, but in the meantime, always repentant and contrite and an-Nafs al-Motmaenna (the 
peaceful or the assured Nafs) that is the highest rank ofNofous( plural of Nafs) stripped of all 
these evils. Al-Ghazali, in his book Mizane al-Amal( The Balance of Deed), talked about 
this ranking of human beings, as they can attain human perfection when they perceive the 
rationalities without illusions and sensuous deceptions that they do share with animals. The 
soul innately desires such rationalities, but its occupation with the pleasures of the body
'The Holy Qur'an, Chapter, Al-A 'raf, ( the Heights, or the Elevated Places: 7), Verse. 172.
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prevents it from achieving this rational spiritual objective 1 . For these reasons and others, we 
can never solve the problematic of evil existence without discussing the existence of another 
life and all its implications. The importance of the discussion of evil existence within the 
discussion of the eternity of the world is of crucial significance. It we do assert that evil was 
always existed, this means that it is eternal, and as evil is part of our world, the whole world 
then must be eternal because we cannot assume that a part of the world is eternal and the 
other parts created. This reasoning proves why many thinkers do not accept the dictum 
stating that if God created the world and He is eternal, then, the whole world must be eternal. 
We would reply to this by emphasizing that he who does support this dictum, he then 
believes in the co-eternity, which means sharing authority and the total absence of a unique 
superiority, and we all know the consequences that we may be generated in ignoring such 
total and complete authority. Likewise, all other beliefs focusing on God-world relationship 
or denying altogether such relationship such as atheism, pantheism, panentheism, deism, 
pandeism, Gnosticism and henotheism do not explain adequately the intriguing wonders of 
the universe and failed to define the faith of human race as the most sophisticated 
phenomenon in our astonishing cosmos.
We have to mention here that many archaic forms of atheism appeared since the beginning 
of divine messages to humanity. People used to deny the existence of a creator, denounce 
one religion, support other and sometimes reject them all. The reason behind such rejection 
was their disbelief in the notion of resurrection or their religious shock after the death of the 
prophets whom they believed supernatural, metaphysical and sometimes immortal. There 
were times when people could reject the whole credo including God's existence, but they 
have never been called atheists or described by any term bearing the same meaning. The only 
term that was frequent is apostasy. According to the ideology of that age, the renunciation of 
a religion means the rejection of its prophet, and consequently, the Divine Who charged him 
with that message. Nowadays, atheism has more to do with the scepticism raised over the 
existence of evil and the emergence of scientific theories and philosophical doctrines such as 
humanism, rationalism and naturalism. These doctrines did not manage to bridge the gap 
existing in human understanding of unseen world and to challenge the power and the 
authority of revelation as a tool of attaining sublime knowledge and a vehicle to dive into the 
maze of our intriguing existence.
Al-Ghazali. Mizane al-Amal,( The Balance of Deed),p.l5.
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ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD: ARGUMENTS TAKEN FRON TIME,
MOVEMENT. POSSIBILITY AND VUCCUM:
6.1 Aristotle's Doctrine of the Co-eternity of Matter and God:
Aristotle does hold that matter is eternal, for it was not the result of a divine creation or 
emanation. However, it is God who caused it and made it change from one state to another. 
This means that matter always existed and it inspired its eternity from its uncreated nature. 
Hence, it is like God neither created, nor emanated from divine essence, but caused by it. We 
have to bear in mind that even if Aristotle does believe in the co-eternity and the 
independency of both God and matter, he does assert that the former and not vice-versa 
caused the latter. Aristotle holds that substratum is the responsible for the existence of 
everything. Aristotle was arguing this way to avoid any probable contradiction in his system 
and to prove the eternity of matter. If we do assume that matter came into existence from 
another matter, we are confirming its creation and consequently, we would be against its 
eternity. Aristotle defends his theory through many arguments, in physics " We can always 
observe something underlying from which the generated object comes, plants and animals, 
for example, coming from seeds'." Besides, in metaphysics, Aristotle considers the 
impossibility that "Generation should take place from nothing" is self-evidenr. This 
Peripatetic reasoning is not always true; with the Abrahamic religions emphasizing that the 
creation is both free and immediate and does not presuppose a pre- existing matter, the 
creation does not meet any co-eternal principle opposed to God as the only creator of the 
particular beings in their multiplicity and their diversity3 .
Aristotle's concept of God is associated with the existence of a Prime Mover and First 
Principle of all things. This prime mover has to be necessary being who has to have 
intelligence. Since the latter is an activity and activity is life and such a life must be eternal. 
This process of life-activity that requires such intelligence can only be ruled and organised 
by an eternal mind. From this perspective, we do understand why Aristotle is putting matter 
and God on the same level regarding the eternity and the capability of causing and 
generating other things and beings. We would discuss this point in depth in the forthcoming 
chapters. Definitely, when we do talk the Aristotelian matter, we are talking about the world 
as a whole as a material existent. That is why, many philosophers argued that the world is
1 Aristotle, Physics I, 7, 190b, 3-5.
2 Aristotle Metaphysics ///,4,999b,8.
3Claude Tresmontant ,La Metaphysique du Christianisnie, p. 194
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co-eternal with God. Al-Ghazali explained, in the Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of 
Philosophers), that these philosophers considered the world as God's effect and it is posterior 
to time. Such co-eternity of God and the world is exactly like the relation between cause and 
effect, light and Sun. Even if God precedes the world, it is as the precedence of cause over 
the effect. Such precedence is of essence and rank and not of time 1 , philosophers claimed 
that God's precedence over the world does not exclude the world from being with God in the 
same temporal existence, but God preceded it as the individual's movement with the shadow 
movement following him, the hand's movement with the ring's movement and the hand's 
movement in water with the water's movement. Al- Ghazali attacked these views about the 
nature of such co-eternity by explaining that even if these examples of movements seems to 
be simultaneous, we always say that the shadow moves with the movement of the individual 
and water moves with the movement of the hand in water. This means that both movements 
must be either eternal or created, so it is impossible that one movement is eternal and the 
other created . We have to mention that Al-Ghazali's harsh critic was not addressed to the 
Hellenistic philosophers, but rather, to their Muslim adherents and especially Al-Farabi and 
Ibn Sina. Al-Ghazali's teachings of philosophers who were opposing him were through the 
exposition of their contradicted views and erroneous theories. He accused them of blindly 
following Greek philosophers without drawing a clear distinction between what is right and 
what is wrong .Al-Ghazali tried be just when he stated that it is impossible to refute any 
philosophical theory without thoroughly studying and analysing it3 . 
6.2 Argument from Movement:
There are many questions that need to be solved to prove the eternity of the movement 
such as was there ever a time when movement came into being? Is movement doomed to 
pass away? Will time return when nothing will be stirred into activity? Is movement 
ungenerated and indestructible?4 All those interested in the mysteries of the cosmos 
acknowledge that there is a movement because without it, there would be no sign for the 
generation and destruction processes. Such a movement is always there either for those who 
believe in the existence of an infinite number of worlds or those who support the theory of 
the existence of one single universe. There are two ways in which there is a time when 
nothing at all comes to pass. One set forth by Anaxagoras who states that all things are
' Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa,(Jhe Incoherence of Philosophers)^
2 Ibid., p.110
3 Ibid.,p.31
4 'Aristotle .Physics, 251al 1
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together for an infinite time until mind imports movement and distinction into them. The 
other is derived from the teaching of Empedocles who went on to say that rest alternates with 
movement .The latter is always there when love unifies the manifold diversity of things or 
when strife disrupts the unity:
Since unity takes its rise from plurality, 
And plurality, from a diffused unity,
Things come and go and are without stability, 
But since their rotation continues forever,
They form a cycle with eternal steadiness 1 .
Aristotle also joined this debate by giving a detailed account of many axioms concerning 
bodies that follow from their motion and from the principles that move them. The moving 
bodies are moved by other bodies that are:
"Together and in contact with them, and these in turn by others together and in contact with 
them, and the latter in turn by others together and in contact with them; the bodies that move 
each other are contiguous in their positions or in contact, succeeding each other; and this 
succession is infinite in number . "
Certainly, there are modes and ways in which the natural body moves another body. The last 
of the bodies that moves the moving things that come after it, must also be moving, but only 
with local motion. There cannot be beyond this body another one that moves it. Hence, there 
is here, a finite body that is moving all the natural bodies. Aristotle came out with the 
conclusion that the body that moves in a circular motion has a mover3 . After this analysis of 
the modes and the ways of movement, Aristotle became convinced that, "Which gives 
circular motion to the bodies at the limits is a certain being that cannot be a nature or a 
natural thing, or a body or in a body, or ever in a material at air. "
This finding compelled Aristotle to use another investigation and another theory, which is 
totally different from the natural investigation theory. In Physics, Aristotle pointed that there 
would be a period of time, when a first mover would be active and a thing acted upon would 
react, but there would be another period of time, in which nothing of this kind takes place 
just a continuing rest. This means that anything, which was at rest, but it is in movement,
'Aristotle, Physics, 251a30
2 Al-Farabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 102
3Ibid.
4 Ibid., 104
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must have witnessed a change before its supposed first change. In this regard, Aristotle 
proceeds as follows: if an absolute beginning of motion should be assumed, the object to 
undergo the first motion, must either have come into existence and began to move or have 
existed in an eternal state of rest before beginning to move 1 . From this particular point 
started the Aristotelian syllogistic argument stating that the activity of the Prime Mover is to 
think itself .Knowledge has to be that which is the best and that which is the best is God2 . 
Aristotle explains this syllogistic point by the statement, "If it is best, it thinks itself, and the 
thinking is a thinking of thinking3 . "
Before reaching this conclusion, Aristotle started by emphasizing that the object must have 
come into existence and began to move is self-contradictory, for an object cannot move 
before it comes into existence. Besides, the act of coming into existence is itself a movement 
that requires another movement before it. Regarding the arguments stating that the object 
have existed in an eternal state of rest before beginning to move, Aristotle argues that it is 
unsatisfactory for two main reasons: firstly, if the world began at a state of rest, the coming 
into existence of that state of rest would itself have been a motion. Secondly, if the world 
changed from a state of rest into a state of motion, the cause of that change to motion would 
itself have been a motion4 . Ibn Tofayl entered this debate by arguing that if we do suppose 
that the world is eternal, its motion would be eternal, which means it had neither begun nor 
started from rest. Accordingly, as all bodies in the world are finite, they cannot produce the 
eternal motion of the world that is an infinite effect. That is why, Ibn Tofayl believes in the 
eternity of the world, and in the meantime, such belief does not compel him to change his 
mind about the God's existence as an irrefutable fact".
Aristotle failed to explain why the act of coming into existence could not have been the 
required first movement. Similarly, he did not state clearly, in which scenario the starting of 
movement and the coming into existence is not self-contradictory. However, he concluded 
that for these reasons motion has to be necessarily eternal.
1 Aristotle .Physics VIII, 1,25la, 8-20
2Richard Norman, Aristotle 's Philosopher-God, p.63
3 Aristotle Metaphysics, 1074b34
4 Ibid physics, VI11, \ ,251 a,8-20
5 Sami S. Hawi, Ibn Tofayl: On the Existence of'God and His Attributes ,p.61.
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The Aristotelian system of analysing the nature and the mechanics of movement is based 
upon some universal hypotheses that focus on natural beings. These hypotheses are a set of 
universal propositions, premises and rules that cover all these natural beings. These 
hypotheses, of course, are not self -evident first premises. They are just universal 
propositions that can turn to be evident by means of demonstrations made up of self-evident 
first premises. Aristotle applies the dialectical faculty in his investigation. This means that 
whenever he achieves useful knowledge about any particular natural being, he uses it in the 
explanation and the investigation of all other natural beings 1 .
No wonder, the first of all these propositions are the universal rules dealing with the 
principles of the being of nature and the purpose of all bodily substances. Aristotle sees that 
each of these bodily substances have two principles: "A principle in virtue of which it is 
potentially, which is called the material, and a principal in virtue of which it is in act, which 
he called the form2 "
From this Aristotelian standpoint, we do deduce that the principle that exists potentially, 
which is the material, is not sufficient to make what is potential come to be in act. Hence, it 
must necessarily be a third principle that can move it from potentiality to actuality. This 
principle is called by Aristotle 'the agent principle'. Aristotle concluded that everything that 
moves and changes, has to necessarily be moving toward an end and a finite purpose3 . From 
this perspective:
"Everything that is a bodilv substance is either for a purpose and an end, or is a concomitant 
of, and adheres to, a thing that is for a certain purpose and end. Therefore it became evident 
to him that bodily substances have all the principles ;all the principles of their beings are of 
four kinds, no more and no less; and those four are the material ,the whatness, which is the 
form, the agent and the end ."
1 Alfarabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Trans. Muhsin Mahdi,pp.98-99.
2 Ibid.,99.
3 Ibid.
IT
'Ibid.
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In tackling the doctrine of the eternity of the world in general and that of movement in 
particular, Al-Ghazali addressed many embarrassing questions to philosophers who are 
backing such a doctrine. These questions do take the shape of a challenge, as Al- Ghazali is 
not expecting convincing answers because of the sophisticated nature of this challenge. 
These questions are like 'what would your response be to those who say-as the Ash 'arites-: 
The world was produced (which means created in time) thanks to an eternal will, which had 
decided the world had to appear in this moment and not another?' 'What is your objection to 
this thesis and what is irrational about it? 1 '.
It is of a paramount importance to mention here that there are many elements within the 
doctrine of the eternity of the world supporting the doctrine of creation. The eternity of the 
world doctrine is extremely controversial, for it leads to discuss the rotations of celestial 
spheres .The numbers of these rotations are infinite and their unities cannot be numerated 
even if there are finite numerical links between them. For instance, the sphere of the Sun 
makes one turn a year and the sphere of Saturn in thirty years. The number of rums done by 
Saturn is one thirtieth of the number of turns done by the Sun and the number of rums done 
by Jupiter is one twelfth of the number of turns done by Sun, as it makes a turn every twelve 
years. Hence, the number of turns of Saturn would be infinite if the world was pre-eternal".
All these turns are non-existent: those, which have gone are no longer existent and those, 
which are coming up are still non-existent. Therefore, in both cases, there is nothing existent. 
Ibn Rochd went on to say that the number ceases to be existent after it had existed is only 
true, if it has a beginning and an end outside the spirit or in the spirit. Thus, the number, 
which has neither a beginning nor an end, is not true regardless of its oddness or evenness, 
its commencement, its end, its belonging to the past or the future. According to Ibn Rochd, 
these are the characteristics of the non-existents, which made philosophers consider the turns 
that took place in the past or those that will occur in the future as non-existents 1 .
1 Leon Gauthier .IBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.205.
2 Ibid.,p. 206. 
'Ibid., p. 207.
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We do deduce from this analysis that there is an eternal principle motor, which its 
existence has neither a beginning nor an end. In addition to that, its action has necessarily to 
be accompanied by its existence without any delay. Therefore, any anterior action cannot be 
a condition of the existence of the following one because neither the former nor the latter are 
an agent by essence. If one of these actions took place before the other one, this would only 
happen by accident. This does not apply only to successive and continuous moving things, 
but also to things that we do think that the precedent is the cause of the following, for 
example, the man who generates another man like him 1 .
The man, who produced such a man designated by the mean of another man, has to be 
eventually a first eternal agent that its existence had neither a beginning nor its action can 
produce a man coming form another man. Moreover, the ad infinitum production of a man 
coming from another man is an accidental production, while the anteriority and the 
posteriority are by essence. When the Motakallimin (Muslim theologians) do believe that 
what is coming by accident is coming by essence, they are refusing its existence. According 
to philosophers, this kind of the infinite has no beginning and no end. Consequently, we 
cannot say that this kind of the infinite had ended, it is entered in the existence or in the past 
time, for everything that ended had begun and what have not begun had not ended".
This is also evident when we do see the commencement and the end belonging to the 
category of relationship. Accordingly, he who says that the turns of the sphere have no end in 
the future, he has not to give them a beginning, for the one who has a beginning, has an end, 
and the one who has no end, has no beginning. In other words, the one who has a first has a 
last and the one who has no first, has no last and the one who has no last, none of his 
components is really ended. Likewise, none of his components has a real commencement. 1 
What is striking about the whole Peripatetic system of movement is that it is investigating 
whether the world is homogeneous or heterogeneous. Consequently, the system investigates 
whether these moving or moved bodies are the first constituents of the world, or in other
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.209
2Ibid.
'lbid.,pp.209-210
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words, the primary parts of the world. This leads us to assume, if one of these primary parts 
are missing, the whole system that the world is based on would vanish, be demolished or 
turned to be not the world we do know1 . Even if Aristotle did not specify exactly which of 
these bodies are the first to constitute the whole world, but he was quite sure that such bodies 
do exist. However, he mentioned their nature and summarized them in five primary simple 
bodies:
"One of them is the outermost body that moves in a circular motion. The remaining four 
have common material but are different in their forms. The fifth differs from these four in 
both its material and its form, and is the cause of the existence of these four, of their 
constitution, of the continuity of their being, of their positions and of their ranks: These four 
are the elements from which all bodies below that outmost body come into being, and these 
elements are also generated from ach other and not generated from a body simpler than they 
or from any body at all. Besides, the mentioning of these primary bodies, lead us to think 
about bodies posterior to them which may help us to achieve better understanding of the 
nature and the origin of the primary bodies2 ".
The Aristotelian system sees these four bodies as elements generating each other because 
they are the primary natural substances and the rest of the generated bodies are generated 
from them. 
6.3 Argument from the Nature of Time:
First of all, and before shedding more light on the nature of time, we have to mention 
Aristotle's definition of time as a kind of number and that number is motion in respect of 
before and after3 because we judge more and less by number and more and less motion by 
time 1 . The first question that may jump into our mind when talking about time is whether 
time is eternal or produced because the concept of talking about time before time is self- 
contradictory. Anyway, this concept of movement leads us to interject questions such as 
when there was nothing going on, can there be time? And if there was no time, can there be
'Al-Farabi .Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p.103 
2 Ibid. 104.
3Julia E. Annas, Aristotle, Number and Time,p.91 
1 Aristotle ,Physics, 219b3-5
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any terms like 'after' and 'before'? In this regard, we have first to investigate the nature of 
time and all what is concomitant with it on the one hand and to motion and natural beings on 
the other one. Likewise, we have to investigate whether natural beings or motion in order to 
exist, they have to exist in time and whether time is a consequent attribute not required for 
the existence of any being at all 1 .
If Democritus proved ,in his way, that time is ungenerated to refute the view claiming 
that all things are generated, Plato was for the generation of time, as he considers time and 
heavens as contemporaries coming from the same origin and with the same age. As time can 
never be conceived without present, which is the starting-point of the future and the end- 
point of the past, there must always be time. Therefore, as time, which is an aspect of 
movement is eternal, movement must be eternal as well2 . Plato in particular and the Greeks 
in general, are accused of employing the principles of time and eternity to theoretically split 
the universe in two. Definitely, eternity and time are not the same and each of them cannot 
be reduced to the other by means of rigorous dialectic. Plato sees the past and the future 
tenses as not applicable to eternity or to what he calls(aionios), we can only use the term ' 
that it is' to express the timelessness(the limitation of existence in time) of Plato's forms and 
mathematical objects.
Aristotle used the same terminology to describe the nature of the Sun and the stars .In other 
words, time is not a duplicate of eternity and it has a dynamic kinship with the eternal. This 
is the case of time because it has its share of the nature of eternity through the imitative 
participation process that is common to all empirical events and objects. Hence, the question 
about time is a question about the world's relation to God. For Plato, God is the originator of 
the eternal forms in which all temporal facts participate, he is the maker and the father of all 
things and time is a creature-like all the other God's creatures- that is made by a will not by 
its own and bearing the marks of likeness to its creator 1 . If many philosophers linked eternity 
to timelessness and necessity, another non- temporal view of eternity goes back to Plato and 
Aristotle associated eternity with immutability or the total absence of change. This means
} A\-Farabi .Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,?. 102.
2 Ibid. p. 146.
3 M. Kneale .Eternity and Sempiternity,p.225. 
1 Roger Hazelton ,Eternity and History, p.7.
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that whatever is changeless is necessarily non-temporal, and accordingly, eternal, which is 
not the case of time, as it is subject to changeability 1 . We have to bear in mind that for the 
Abrahammic religions, 'creation is different from the Platonic one, which is a mythical - 
mathematical fashioning of the world through the agency of the Demiurge2 . Therefore, the 
Platonic position stating that time is the moving image of eternity created many unanswered 
questions, as eternity is not a simple state of timelessness or changelessness. Plato 
emphasizes in the Sophist:
"Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present in 
the absolute Being? Can we imagine Being to be devoid of life and mind and to remain 
venerable, holy, mindless, unmovingfixture?3 "
On the other side, Plato always explains and understands time by means of eternity and not 
all the way around, thus, eternity cannot be considered only unending prolongation of time. 
Moreover, the Platonic view states that eternity may become temporal, but time does not 
become eternal, as the relation of time to eternity is not merely paradoxical, it is analogical 
as well. After proving- to some extent- the fallacy of these two meanings of eternity, what it 
is left to us is a third meaning emphasizing that eternity is that mode of reality, which 
includes time by transcending it. Thus, time is not a synonym of eternity, but it may be, in 
some occasions, a symbol of it4 .
For a better understanding of the Ghazalian chronological posteriority and anteriority of the 
temporal existence, we do suppose that the creator is anterior to both the world and time, not 
with His essence, but temporally. Then, before the existence of the world and time, there was 
a time in which the world was non- existent, since the non-existence preceded the existence. 
Consequently, God had preceded such non-existence for a long space of time, which had an 
extremity at the level of the end and had not that extremity at the level of the beginning. 
Therefore, before time, there was an infinite time, which is contradictory, and makes the 
theory of the creation of time even more vague and ambiguous 1 . Al-Ghazali in Mi'yar al- 
///M(The Criterion of knowledge), gives the same dimensions to eternity proceeded from 
essence and that from time. Eternity that is proceeded from time is that which has no
1 E.J. Khamara .Eternity and Omniscience, p.204.
2 Roger Hazelton .Eternity and History, pp.7-8.
3 Ibid., p.8
4 Ibid.
1 Al-Ghazali Jahafut al-Falasifah,( The Incoherence of Philosophers),p. 110.
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beginning to its existence and that which is proceeded from essence, is which its essence 
has no principle or a cause. According to philosophers, the world is created in relation to the 
first and eternal in relation to the second'. There are also two other argumentations of a 
paramount importance in clarifying the notion of time. First, the assumption of philosophers 
affirming the existence of 'a first moment' is ambiguous and unclear assumption. That is 
why, Al-Ghazali, and in order to prove the necessity of a first moment created along side 
with the world, he uses the argument of ad hominen to make these philosophers 
contradicting themselves. Regarding the infinity, space and time are identical (similar in all 
details), which means that beyond the exterior surface of the supreme sphere there was 
nothing neither fullness nor vacuum or extension. Therefore, philosophers have to admit the 
existence of a first moment of time before which there was neither a full time nor a void time 
(a before without before or an anteriority without anteriority). God created the world after it 
was not, this does not mean after a time where it was not, but means God without the world, 
then, God with a world2 .
Philosophers may say that time is not comparable to space, and since the parts of space 
were co-existent, the positions in space are reversible ad libitum and dependent on the 
position chosen by the object. On the contrary, as the parts of time are successive, the present 
is stable not depending on an arbitrary shift of the object, the anterior or the past cannot 
become the posterior or the nature. Al -Ghazali answered this objection by depicting that, 
without cease, the present is shifting: the past was a future and the future will become a past; 
thus, time and space are assimilable. The before and the after are like the high and the low: 
what distinguishes time from space diminishes in the vision of reason and becomes a pure 
rational co-existence exactly like the case of space~. The Abrahamic religions in general, see 
the incarnation and the manifestation of eternity in time and the constant struggle between 
eternity and time is, in fact, a struggle between life and death, between substance and shadow 
and reality and reflection. The Abrahamic religious teaching is based upon the notion that 
what is seen is temporal and what is invisible is eternal and both time and eternity are 
associated with the Divine as properties and creatures. In discussing the notion of time and 
its nature another point has to be highlighted here is that of the term sempitemity(aydios)
1 Al-Ghazali, Mi 'yar a/-flm,(The Criterion of Knowledge),p.334. 
2Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa,( The Incoherence of Philosophers),p. 
3 Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (AVERROES ), p.227. 
'Roger Hazelton, Eternity and History ,p.9.
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that was used by many philosophers and theologians alike. They discussed whether an 
eternal object has to be also sempiternal 1 . Aristotle argued that the heavens are sempiternal 
and Epicurus ,and many of his followers, asserted that the primordial atoms are everlasting2 . 
If Aristotle argued that eternity and sempiternity are compatible, Plato emphasized their 
incompatibility, as eternity excludes succession (the before and the after), whereas this 
succession is involved in sempiternity. Epicurus and Lucretius thought that 'the before' and 
'the after 'express a single notion3 .
6.4 Argument from Possibility:
The existence of other worlds along with our existing world and the possibility that other 
worlds other than our own could exist, were among the intriguing questions asked by all 
natural philosophers from the Hellenistic Greece, through medieval ages, the Copernican 
revolution to modern philosophical doctrines. The multiple worlds front is represented by 
the atomists like Lucretius, Epicurus, and Aristotle is the pioneer of the one world front. The 
terminology here is of a paramount important because the world meant to be synonymous 
with cosmos, which is the totality of the universe. Aristotle's cosmology, unlike the atomistic 
one that allowed the existence of more that one world, is very strict and precise regarding the 
existence of one and unique world. The Aristotelian system is based upon the natural places 
of the movement of elements, which did not allow the existence of more than one world. In 
their debate about the multiplicity of worlds, the atomists started with the idea that the 
universe is changing and infinite and nothing comes into being from nothing. This is well - 
depicted in these Lucretius's poetic verses:
"add to this that nothing in the universe
Is born unique and grows unique alone,
But all belong to a species, very many,
Of the same kind. Consider animals:
You will find this rule applies to the wild beasts
That roam the mountains, to the human race,
To the dumb shoals offish, to all things that fly
! M. Kneale .Eternity and Sempiternity, p.223. 
2 Ibid.,p.224.
1 Ibid.,p.225.
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Therefore likewise one must accept that sky 
And earth and sun, moon, sea and all else that exists 
Are not unique but in number numberless. 
No less a deep-set boundary stone of life '".
In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of Lucretius poetic cosmic principle, we 
have to establish a good balance between the philological meaning, the poetic meaning and 
philosophical one. This balance is well portrayed in Fowler's commentaries on Lucretius 
poems. In his comments on Summa (154-156), Fowler mentioned that Lucretius uses this 
terminology in divergent senses. Sometimes Summa is 'the sum of things' in this world and 
sometimes it is the sum of things in the whole universe. This shift in meaning is not 
arbitrary, but of a paramount importance, as it serves a dialectic purpose: 
"As Lucretius leads us from the comforting thought at the beginning of Book 2 that life goes 
on as material is recycled in our world, to the end of Book 2, where "this consolation is 
removed, and we have to see that only the summa summarum as to pan, the whole infinite 
universe, is really immortal" (155). The commentary is full of insights like this, as Fowler 
shows us how carefully Lucretius chose his words and to what effect he used them". "
In the theological hypothesis, the creation of time and the world was possible. Therefore, 
the possibility is an attribute that supposes an object, but there is no possibility in the Divine, 
for everything in Him is a necessary immutable act. The object of the eternal possibility can 
only be the matter and if we do prove that the matter is eternal, then, the whole universe is 
eternal as well. To clear the confusion between the two meanings of possibility, Al -Ghazali 
drew a distinction between the logical point of view, in which the opposite of the term 
possible is impossible and the ontological standpoint, in which the opposite of the term 
possible is real, or rather, the absolute real, which means the necessary 1 . In Tafafut al- 
Falasifa( The Incoherence of Philosophers), Al-Ghazali exposed the views of philosophers 
of the possibility of the existence of the world. Philosophers argued that the existence of the 
world was possible before its existence, as it is impossible that the world was impossible and 
then, became possible. This possibility has no beginning because it is still there, and
1 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Ronald Melville, Don and Peta fowler, p.66. 
2Don Fowler, Lucretius on Atomic Motion. A Commentary on De Rerum Natura, Book Two, Bryn
Mawr Classical Review, p.513.
'Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of Philosophers, p.97.
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consequently, the world is still possible to exist. Al-Ghazali replied to these claims by 
stating that when we say the world is possible to exist, means that it is not impossible to 
exist. If it is possible to exist eternally, then, it is not impossible to exist eternally. In this 
case, we cannot say the world is possible to exist eternally, and accordingly, we cannot say it 
is still possible to exist. If we do deny that the world is not still possible to exist, then, we can 
assert that this possibility has a beginning. In consequence, if we can assert that such a 
possibility has a beginning, then, the world was not possible before that. Al-Ghazali 
concluded that the assertion that the world was not possible before leads to the possibility 
that God was not capable of its creation. Furthermore, the estimation of the world is bigger 
than it is, and the creation of a body above the world is possible, and another above that body 
is also possible ad infinirum. There is no end to the possibility of the increase, albeit the 
existence of infinite fullness is not possible. Likewise, an infinite existence is not possible, 1 
Al-Ghazali went further by falsifying the view of philosophers arguing that, as the world did 
not exist before its existence, its status changed from impotence to capability and the world 
itself from impossibility to possibility. According to Al-Ghazali, this view is not logical and 
the only rational explanation is that the world existed through a divine will".
Ibn Rochd, and as usual, proves that he is realistic by attacking the Mutakallimin( Muslim 
Theologians)-that are defended by Al -Ghazali-and describing them as nominalists. He 
accused them of destructing many metaphysical idols that Peripateticism was built upon. 
However, they considerably contributed, through the intermediary of conceptualism and 
nominalism, to the advent of science and modern philosophy. Ibn Sina holds that prior to 
anything coming into actual existence; its existence must have been possible. The discussion 
of the eternity of the world in the future, is connected to that of its pre- eternity, paves the 
way for the same old- new arguments about the impossibility of the Divine Cause of the 
world to remain inactive after the disappearance of the universe, and accordingly, the 
possibility of time to remain empty. The second and the third evidences have no secondary 
importance, as they are subsidiary evidences backing the first one, which is the main 
evidence 1 . In this fierce dispute about the eternity of the world, we have seen the two
1 Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),p. 118.
2 Ibid.,pp.90-91.
1 LeonGauthier ,IBNROCHD (AVERROES),p.235.
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adversaries exhibiting their ingenuity and their considerable profundity in their analyses. 
This enabled them to occupy an outstanding position in the history of universal philosophy.
6.5 Argument from the Vacuum:
Obviously, we do understand vacuum-whatsoever it is- as the space which is devoid of 
matter, and whenever we talk about the emptiness, the void or the vacuum, the very first 
thing that may cross our minds is atomism and its outstanding pioneers. Among these 
pioneers Epicurus and Lucretius' who do believe in the existence of atoms. The latter are 
responsible for the existence of the whole cosmos. The atomists do believe that everything in 
the universe is made of indivisible atoms and the remainder is void. Therefore, the nature of 
the world is boundless and its constituents are infinite in quantity:
''''Nothing comes into existence from non-existence, for if that were possible, anything could 
be created out of anything, without requiring seeds. And if things which disappear became 
non-existent, everything in the universe would have surely vanished by now. But the universe 
has always been as it is now, and always will be, since there is nothing it can change into. 
Nor is there anything outside the universe which could infiltrate it and produce change2. "
This doctrine leads us to deduce that nothing can be made of nothing. Likewise, nothing 
can be destroyed into nothing. Consequently, when the destruction does happen; it definitely 
led to what the atoms are made of. We do mean by that the atoms real nature whatsoever it 
is, particles, corpuscles or something that is still shrouded in mystery. The atomists do 
believe in the existence of atoms because they are also believing in the existence of empty 
space, which is only the void or the vacuum, simply because the cosmos, as a whole, is made 
of atoms, which are solid matter and the space, which is the void. Thus, the atoms need that 
void to keep them in a constant movement, and in the same time, they have no place, where 
they can take rest:
1 Lucretius's poem on the nature of the universe combines a scientific and philosophical treatise with some of the greatest 
poetry ever written. With intense moral fervour Lucretius demonstrates to humanity that in death there is nothing to fear 
since the soul is mortal, and the world is governed by the mechanical laws of nature and not by Gods; and that by believing 
this men can live in peace of mind and happiness. Lucretius bases his argument on the atomic theory expounded by the 
Greek philosopher Epicurus, and the poem explores sensation, sex, Cosmology and Meteorology, and Geology with moving 
sympathy for man's place in the world (,Lucretius, ,On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Ronald Melville,Don and Peta 
Fowler. An extract from the book introduction).
2 Lecritius fetter to Herodotus, trans. C. Bailey,p.39.
-158-
Chapter 6
"If you think that the atoms can stop and by stopping generate new motions in things, you 
are wandering far from the path of truth. Since the atoms are moving freely through the void, 
they must all be kept in motion either by their own weight or on occasion by the impact of 
another atom ...as a further indication that all particles of matte are on the move, remember 
that the universe is bottomless: There is no place, where the atoms could come to rest. As I 
have already shown by various arguments and proved conclusively, space is without end or 
limit and spreads out immeasurably in all directions alike 1 ."
Even if the atoms are the building blocks of everything including human beings, there are 
many phenomena that are caused by the different combinations of these atoms. The doctrine 
of the indivisibility of atoms is proved by the continuity of their existence:
"If there were not some level beyond which matter could not be divided any further, then 
everything would have dissolved into nothing long ago. These atoms are always flying off the 
surface of objects and forming fresh compounds and they can not themselves be destroyed, 
although the compounds they make they can be broken up (e.g., at death).The atoms go on 
for ever making new 'bodies' of matter'. "
In general context, the matter does not stick together as a unity of a solid mass because the 
generative bodies of matter are responsible for the birth of various things. The bodies that are 
waning or fading in a certain world; they are in fact enlarging the other world they are 
joining. They do bring decay in one side, life and growth in the other one through this 
interchange process. In other words, one world increases at the expense of the demise of 
another one in a mutual relationship, "The generations of living things pass in swift 
succession and like runners hand on the torch of life . " Hence, the indivisibility or the non- 
destructivity of atoms is not possible without the existence of an empty space, which is vital 
for these two processes, "Empty space must also exist to give the atoms room to move at 
all2. " Later on and precisely in the De Caelo, Aristotle, like Plato, rejected the assumption of 
the existence of many worlds when he was discussing the plurality of immovable movers3 .
'Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans.Latham, p.40.
2Ibid. p.(X:5)
'lbid.,p.39.
2 Ibid., p. (X: 5)
3 Harry A. Wolfson . The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes, p.236.
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The movement of atoms and the existence of a boundless void are governed by a plenty of 
rules. As we have seen previously, atoms need empty space to travel though. However, the 
heat and the bright light emitted by the Sun do not need such a void to travel through. That is 
why, they are forced to move slower than the other atoms to clear their way through waves 
of air. Furthermore, the atoms that are composing the solar radiance do not travel 
individually in an isolating manner, but linked to each other '.As there is no void, the bodies 
move circularly at the circumference surrounding all the other bodies. What is inside every 
single body, is bodies that are continuous and in contact, simply because there is no void at 
all in the interval between them2 .
''''Thus their pace is retarded by one dragging back another as well as by external obstacles. 
But when separate atoms are travelling in solitary solidity through empty space, they 
encounter no obstruction from without and move as single units being composed of their own 
parts, on the course in which they have embarked. Obviously therefore they must far outstrip 
the sunlight in speed of movement... . "
We have to mention that these symmetrical principles were revolutionary, for they came to 
refute the common belief -that was prevailing at that time- stating that the whole universe 
was created by deities. Lucretius, and in many occasions, tried to highlight the existence of 
void through many clear and tangible examples like the one in the following passage:
"This process, as I might point out, is illustrated by an image of it that is continually taking 
place before our very eyes. Observe what happens when sunbeams are admitted into a 
building and shed lights on its shadowy places. You will see a multitude of tiny particles 
mingling in a multitude of ways in the empty space within the actual light of the beam, as 
though contending in everlasting conflict, rushing into battle rank upon rank with never a 
moment's pause in a rapid sequence of unions and disunions. From this you may picture 
what it is for the atoms to be perpetually tossed about in the illimitable void...their dancing 
is an actual indication of underlying movements of matter that are hidden from sight. There 
you will see many particles under the impact of invisible blows changing their course and 
driven back upon their tracks, this way and that, in all directions 1 . "
1 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Latham, p.41. 
2Alfarabi philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 103 
3Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Latham, p.41. 
'lbid.,pp.40-41.
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Aristotle criticized the atomist stance that the void is the primary cause of motion: "Yet it is 
illogical that bodies should move upwards on account of the void if the void does not do so 
itself ." Therefore, the atomistic theory does attribute motion to the void, Aristotle objected 
to that, as his fundamental tenet ,is that, the first cause of motion is that which moves itself2 .
All these cosmological principles do corroborate the atomistic standpoint stating that our 
world is definitely not the only one in this world. For the Aristotelian system, the nature of 
the world is not as sophisticated as it is seen by the atomists, for it is comprised of four 
elements. Each element has a specific movement, even if we suppose that there are many 
worlds, they have to be made of the same nature, which is the four basic elements. This 
means that we are still talking about the same world and not a different one. Hence, we are 
projecting the characteristics of the uniqueness and the oneness of our world on other worlds 
that we completely ignore.
"Therefore the parts of earth in another world are such as to move to the centre here and fire 
there towards the extremity of our world. Yet this is impossible: for if this happens ,earth in 
its own world must move upwards, while fire must move to the centre, and similarly earth 
from this world must move from the centre naturally in moving to the centre in that world, 
because of the way in which the worlds are mutually positioned. For either we ought not to 
lav down that the simplest bodies in the many worlds have the same nature, or in saying that 
thev do we must make the centre single, as well as the extremity; yet if this is so, there cannot 
be more than one world1 . "
On his commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens , natural medieval philosopher Nicole 
Oresme or Nicolas d'Oresme(ca. 1323- 1382 AD)- even before the Copernican revolution in 
which atomism was not so popular to be backed - remained on Aristotle's side, but in the 
same time, he reached a different conclusion by claiming that it could be more than one 
world. This crucial conclusion was reached when Nicolas d'Oresme came across the 
Aristotelian argument stating that there cannot be more than one world because of the way in 
which the elements move in relation to each other:
'W.K.C Guthrie, Introduction of Aristotle's ,On the Heavens, pp. xxii-xxiii
2Ibid.,p.xxiii
'Aristotle ,On the Heavens, book I 276bl 1
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"But up and down are used otherwise with respect to heavy and light objects, as when we 
say the heavy bodies tend downward and the light tend upward. Therefore, I say that up and 
down in this second usage indicate nothing more than the natural law concerning heavy and 
light bodies, which is that all the heavy bodies so far as possible are located in the middle of 
the light bodies setting up for them any other motionless or natural place '. " The advent of 
the renaissance, compelled philosophers to draw a distinction between the terms world and 
cosmos .Such distinction had not existed before. From the Hellenistic period to the medieval 
one, world and cosmos were regarded as two synonymous.
6.6 The Aristotelian System Repudiates the Existence of Vacuum: 
6.6.1 Nature Abhors a Vacuum Doctrine:
Aristotle, and his followers, do not believe in the existence of vacuum, as for material 
objects can only come into existence in place. This view was supported by the Aristotelian 
Arabs, and among them, Ibn Hazm who argued that the substance is only a body, every 
substance is a body and every body is a substance and there is no vacuum in nature, as the 
entire world is a ball without any space for emptiness. The //azw/a«-Aristotelian view came 
as a response to the Mutakallimin (Muslim theologians) who thought that the world is like an 
onion and the orbits in which turn the stars and the planets are like the skins of that onion2 . 
This conclusion started by investigating whether or not for motion to exist, the moving thing 
requires void. The conclusion reached was that void is not required by the moving thing or 
for the existence of motion. Consequently, no void is required for the existence of a natural 
thing regardless of its nature, substance or attributes'. Therefore, no place in the space can be 
completely empty. In other words, in order that these material objects achieve a physical 
existence, have to occupy a space. It is worthwhile to mention here that this Aristotelian 
stance is against creationism, as it made from the empty space, which is according to him, no 
matter, a condition for the existence of all things from the tiny to the giant. If we do believe 
that material objects can come into existence from a place, which was previously occupied 
by a vacuum, we believe that something can come from nothing. According to the 
creationists, God created the dimensions at the same time he created the matter, so there was 
no vacuum before there was matter. According to Peripatetic philosophers, the vacuum has
'Nicole Oresme ,The Possibility of a Plurality of Worlds, trans. Albert D. Menut. pp. 550-551. 
2Ibn Rochd, Al-Kashf an Manahij al-Adilla,( The Exposition of the Methods of Proofs),p.38. 
1 Al-Farabi .Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Trans. Muhsin Mahdi, p.101.
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no existence, simply because the matter is eternal. Accordingly, if we do believe in the 
existence of vacuum, we are denying the eternity of matter. We have to bear in mind that the 
terminology 'vacuum' is so puzzling because if the vacuum is not the emptiness, how can be 
called a vacuum? 'All over again, we have to draw a distinction between the classical 
vacuum represented by classical physics and modern vacuum defined by modern physicists. 
The former is achieved -or at least perceived- when all matter and heat radiation have been 
removed from a region of space, while the latter is defined as any region of space empty of 
all matter, heat radiation and pattern of electromagnetic fields. Therefore, the vacuum is the 
experimentally attainable void2 . The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century rejected 
Aristotle's doctrine that nature abhors vacuum. However, the advent of brand- new theories 
in modern physics prove the exactitude of many of Aristotle's speculations -but not all of 
them of course- and helped to elaborate many of the renaissance theories about matter in 
particular and the cosmos in general. 
6.6.2 Aristotle Filled the Vacuum with the Aether:
hi De Caelo, Aristotle develops his famous theory of the Aether by claiming that the 
universe does not consist of four concentric elements, which are earth, water air and fire. 
There must be a fifth element or what he calls 'Proton soma or Aether'. According to 
Aristotle, this Aether ,as a self-mover, is the Supreme Being3 and it is the fifth body from 
which the heavens are made .Such element makes up a set of spheres surrounding the other 
four elements .It is prior and more divine than the other four elements. The latter are called 
sublunary because of their position below the Moon .That is why, they are imperishable. It is 
actually Aristotle's theory of motion, which led him to make such distinction, in the sense 
that, he considered the motion of heavens as circular, which is natural to them, while that of 
the four basic elements as done by nature upwards and downwards in a straight line 1 . 
Therefore, this material of the heavens named the Aether is completely different from all the 
other material out of which are made all the other bodies we do know. It is not generated and 
it cannot be destroyed and moves with the purest form of movement.'
1 Timothy H. Boyer ,The Classical Vacuum, Scientific American Magazine, Aug 1985, p.70.
2Ibid .
3 W.K.C. Guthrie, Introduction of Aristotle's On the Heavens,p. xxiii
1 John philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Trans. Christian Wilberg,p.23.
~ Josep Puig Montada Aristotle and Averroes on Coming-to be and Passing -away,p.4.
-163-
Chapter 6
As mentioned previously, vacuum was invented as a part of the atomic theory by Leucippus 
and his student Democritus in the fifth century BC. The pioneers of this theory needed the 
void to provide us with a rational explanation of the architecture of our startling world. They 
build their theory on many tangible and simple examples taken out from our daily 
observations and experiences. If matter is unbroken and continuous, were would a knife for 
example find room to begin the process of slicing into a piece of wood? And how would 
milk find room to dissolve into water? All these enigmas can be solved easily and 
convincingly, if we admit the existence of a void between atoms to accommodate the edge of 
the knife or to allow milk atoms to intermingle with water atoms' .We can imagine here the 
inexhaustible list of examples. This theory is rejected by philosophers who had different 
view of the architecture of the world on one hand and because the atoms are invisible on the 
other hand. We have to mention here that Aristotle's theory based on the rotating of this fifth 
element the 'Aether' will not survive the theory of Copernicus stating that it is the Earth 
which rotates around the Sun and not the Sun which orbits the Earth. However, in 1616, 
Cesare (1550-1631 AD) Cremonini (1550-1631 AD) was sill defending Aristotle's theory of 
the Aether against Philoponus' stance2 .
We have to bear in mind that the church, which was at that time, the icon of Christian 
religion par excellence; will not allow the Copernicus' theory of the rotation of the Earth 
around the Sun. Ironically, the belief of the church was not against the Aristotelian theory of 
the Aether, even if many of Aristotle's views were against the Abrahamic religions. The 
reason behind this discrepancy is that this time the Peripatetic system of the rotation of 
cosmic things was compatible with the church basic beliefs. After the death of Copernicus, 
the Aristotelian theory of the Aether was prevailing until the first third of the seventeenth 
century. The most powerful opponent of this atomic theory built on the belief in the 
existence of vacuum was Aristotle who considered the existence of vacuum physically 
unacceptable. He filled the vacuum with the Aether because it is the stuff of the stars and 
heavens and also permeated the four basic worldly elements (water, air, earth, and fire) 1 . 
We have to mention that Aristotle's theory takes its powerfulness from the fact that even
'Hans Christian von Baeyer, Vacuum Matters, vol.13 No.03, March 1992.
2Jhon Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, trans. Christian Wilberg, p.21.
1 Hans Christian von Baeyer, Vacuum Matters, vol.13 No.03, March 1992.
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when these elements turned out not to be elemental, the Aether keeps on surviving, as it 
survived for centuries. By the seventeenth century, Aristotle's objections to the Aether were 
deflated, as scientists managed to obtain a vacuum or something close to it, with the help of 
the newly invented vacuum pump. There scientific experiments were not perfect of course, 
but they provided us with the belief that vacuum can be made. However, the Aether remains 
powerful as long as no totally empty space was achieved 1 .
The Aether would be revived all over again to be an essential component of the nineteenth 
century physics because of the advent of the wave theory of light, as we all know, light was 
found to be consisted of waves. This time, the question that insistently imposes itself here is 
that what are these waves made of? Waves can be sounded in air, water waves in oceans, but 
we have never imagined waves of void. We do know- at least at the time being- that sound 
cannot travel through empty space, but we do admit that light can travel through an apparent 
empty space. However, such emptiness cannot be completely empty, but filled with Aether." 
It is worth noting that the Aether we are talking about here has more definite physical 
properties than the Aristotelian one. This is well depicted when we do talk, for instance, 
about light speed:
"It was known that sound waves move faster in a denser medium, such as water, than in a 
thinner one like air. Since the speed of light is so tremendously high 186,000 miles per 
second the a ether had to be exceedingly firm, even solid. And yet planets move through it 
without encountering any detectable resistance. It was strange stuff indeed, this ether, at the 
same time denser than steel and more tenuous than air, but the physicists of a century ago 
could see no way to do without it."
hi 1887 ingenious experiment was conducted to prove the existence of the Aether by the 
two American physicists Albert Michelson and Edward Morley. If Earth was moving 
through stationary Aether, it should be feeling an Aether wind and when light was bucking 
this head wind, it should move more slowly than when it was cutting across the wind. Our 
two physicists made a device called interferometer that is able to measure this tiny effect. 
They came out with nothing; the speed of light was constant so the Aether's foundations 
were shaken. Eighteen years later, Albert Einstein (1879-1955) refuted the old- new claim of 
the existence of the Aether. In his theory of relativity, he declared that the theory of the
1 Hans Christian von Baeyer , Vacuum Matters, Discover Magazine, vol. 13 No.03, March 1992.
2 Ibid. 
1 Ibid.
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Aether is superfluous because not all waves need a medium to carry them. It may happen to 
some waves, but it is not the case for light 1 .
6.7. Peripaticism and Islamic Reasoning:
The Peripatetic Muslim philosophers, in general and Ibn Sina in particular, did face many 
of the Mutakallimin 's argumentations by introducing many unsolved problems. Before the 
moment in which the Mutakallimin supposed that God had created the world, did He have 
the power to create another world identical to the first one, but which would have begun, for 
instance, hundred years earlier? Likewise, did He have the power to create another world, 
which would have begun hundred years before the second one and two hundred years before 
the first one? These philosophers concluded yes, following very homogeneous scholastic 
argumentations based on the logical articulations of the question. Therefore, they came up 
with the conclusion that there were before the so-called' the created first moment' possible 
periods, which have been between them, for example 100, 200, 300, etc., until the infinite. 
This period that measures all these worlds, cannot be a non-being because the non-being is 
unable of measuring: This quantity capable of measuring ontologically precedes all produced 
things. It is exactly the same when we think that the measurement precedes the measured and 
this is what we call the eternal infinite time'.
Ibn Rochd argues that Ibn Sina's argumentation involves at least this postulate that the 
anterior possibilities of the world in the hypothesis of a creation of the world and time, 
would be of the same nature as the possibilities that do exist in this world. Al Ghazali 
interferes in the debate by establishing a comparison between time and distance and 
concluded that there are outside the world many possibilities in ad infinitum spaces, full or 
empty, between them there are plenty of determinate, qualitative links, which reinforces the 
existence of an infinite space that is denied by philosophers. Ironically, their infinite time is 
submitted to the same reasoning 1 . We have to point out here that if the comparison between 
time and space is valid for the Mutakallimin, it is not the case for philosophers who proved 
that the world would be neither bigger nor smaller. Thus, the comparison between time and 
space is then illegitimate because the possibility of a space outside the world is of an
'Hans Christian von Baeyer, Vacuum Matters, vol.13 No.03, March 1992.
2 Leon Gauthier, IBN ROCHD (A VERROES) p. 229.
'Ibid.
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imaginative nature, while the possibility of the necessity of a time before any moment 
belongs to the intellectual order 1 . The first evidence based on the idea of movement, which 
is a synonym of change. The movement is eternal in the past, simply because we cannot 
conceive a first movement, as God the author of movement, is Himself eternal and the effect 
has to follow the cause without delay, for the latter would not have a sufficient reason. 
Hence, this first proof is built upon' the principle of the sufficient reason'. However, as this 
proof applies this principle to establish the impossibility of a delay, we can see already in 
this first proof, the second one based on time. In this first proof, Al -Ghazali replied by 
taking the opposite direction of the first premise. We reluctantly have to admit that there is a 
first movement because the eternity of the world involved an infinite number of turns 
accomplished by each of the diverse celestial spheres and these infinite numbers had defined 
links between them and none of them would be even or odd. This is a triple mathematic 
absurdity, which makes us only assume that God produced the world at a given moment2 .
The question that is persisting here is that why the creation had taken place at such a 
moment. Al -Ghazali responded to this question that there is no sufficient reason. God and 
even man when making some choices, does not need always a sufficient reason. From this 
perspective, Al- Ghazali exposed his theory of a liberty of disinterest. When Ibn Rochd 
disagreed with Al Ghazali about the status of the world, this means that the former is 
confirming and the latter refuting the universal value of the sufficient reason principle. 
Philosophers turned against Al-Ghazali the objection of infinite number by applying it to 
time in which God abstained from the creation of the world. Al- Ghazali replied here that 
time itself was created with the world. By achieving this task, Al-Ghazali initiated the second 
proof',which does form with the first one a very striking analogy. The first one established 
straightforward that if God is eternal, the world is necessarily eternal, for the world is His art. 
The second evidence indirectly established the eternity of the world by depicting that we 
cannot suppose a first moment because God is eternal and so it is time. Similarly, he showed 
that time is the measurement of movement and as the world is a set of movements, it must be 
eternal2 . First, we have to object to Ibn Rochd's claim in the last evidence when passing from
1 Ibn Rochd Jahafut al- Tahafut, p.87.
2 Ibid., p.230.
'Ibid.,pp.230-231.
2 Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.231.
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the eternity of God to that of time 1 . He confused time with eternity: the eternity is immobile, 
indivisible and not capable of measurement, while, time is mobile, divisible and capable of 
measurement. That is why, it is the cause of the world. Ibn Rochd is always replying that it is 
only about the possibility of an infinite time. In the first evidence, why among this infinity of 
possible, identical and successive moments, God had chosen one, which is of preference to 
others? ] . We do deduce from here that these two evidences are supporting each other, and in 
many occasions, they do form clear and irrefutable evidence. Regarding the second evidence, 
Al-Ghazali, by an argument ad hominem objected to the argumentation by which 
philosophers want to establish the limitation of the world into the space, for they want to 
establish its limitation into time as well. Consequently, this would make the world in a need 
of a first moment. Ibn Rochd replied by refusing this assimilation to the space, which does 
form a whole and time, which does not.
Ibn Rochd criticized the two adversaries of regarding the subject of the infinite. We obviously conceive what Ibn Rochd 
means by something infinite: It is something that has no components, and consequently; does not form a whole. But our 
philosopher does not confuse the mathematical point of view with the metaphysical one. In Mathematics, the whole and its 
components are things of the same order, ideal or abstract. The whole is purely and simply the sum of the components. In 
Metaphysics; as the main focus is not only to represent things, but to conceive them as they are as well, and the 
requirements to rigorous measurements through mathematical schemes completely constructed by human intelligence, the 
notion of the infinite is different: The order of subordination of the whole and the components in both cases is reversed. For 
it is a must to distinguish between two kinds of the whole and the components: When the components are real, indivisible, 
the whole is fictional and divisible, for example, the soldiers and the army; when the whole is real, the components are 
fictional, for example, the soul and its faculties, or from a modern point of view, the conscious life and the states that we can 
distinguish. Therefore; when Ibn Rochd conceive an infinite thing as "a thing that has not got components, can not form a 
whole", he is exclusively place in the mathematical point of view, and not in the metaphysical one. This is due to his 
conception of time as not a mathematical abstraction, but an independent reality of movements that accompany it. Even if 
Ibn Rochd and El-Ghazali are in disagreement about all points, they fall here in total agreement by confusing the 
mathematical and the metaphysical point of views. They claimed that the two infinite numbers cannot have definite links 
'between them. Today, this is among the fundamental principle of mathematical sciences that the infinite quantities can 
have definite links between them. We have to point out that for Aristotle and his Greek and Muslim disciple, the 
infinite, in metaphysics, in the order of the essence, the quality, means incomplete, imperfect, it is also an 
epithet that they never apply to God or its attributes. For Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, the infinite is synonym of 
perfect (Leon ,Gauthier JBN ROCHD (AVERROES), pp. 231-232).
Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD " (A VERROES), p.231.
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6.8 The Eternal Determining Principle:
There are many other proofs related to the ones we have mentioned previously either 
supporting or refuting the eternity of the world such as the impossibility that 'the temporal 
proceeds from the Eternal '.In order to refute this dictum , we have to elaborate assumptions 
and formulate hypotheses about the divergent scenarios of the making of the world.
" If we assume, the Eternal existing without, for instance ,the world proceeding from Him, 
then at a certain moment, the world beginning to proceed from Him -that it did not proceed 
before, because there was no determining principle for its existence, but its existence was 
purely possibility''."
This means that we are here before two probabilities: when the world starts in time, a new 
determinant arises or does not arise. If it does not arise, the world will stay on the same 
position, the position of pure possibility as it was before. If a new determinant arises, the 
question that insistently imposes itself is why it does arise at that particular moment and not 
before, and consequently, are we before an infinite regress or a principle that determines 
eternity?2
Ibn Rochd replied to this argument of the determining principle by exhibiting all the 
available types of the term 'possible. The latter is used in an equivocal manner of the 
possible that occurs more often than not, of the possible that occurs less often than not, and 
of the possible with equal chances of occurrence. All these kinds of the possible do not have 
the same need for a new determining principle. Besides, and unlike the possible that has 
equal chances of occurring and not occurring that has its determining principle outside, the 
possible that occurs more often than not is believed to have its determining principle in itself. 
Furthermore, we have to understand that the necessity for a determining principle is not the 
same in all cases .The possible resides sometimes in the agent, this is seen in the possibility 
of acting and sometimes in the patient and this is manifested in the possibility of receiving 1 . 
As mentioned before, these two types of possibility do not have the same need for the 
determining principle:
1 Averroes .Tahafut Al-Tahafiit. (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol. I, p.
2 Ibid. 
1 Ibid., p.2
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"For it is well known that the possible in the patient needs a new determinant from the 
outside; this can be perceived by the senses in artificial things and in many natural things 
too...therefore it is believed of many natural things that they move themselves, and it is bv no 
means self-evident that everything that it is moved has a mover and that there is nothing that 
moves itself . "
We have to add that in any case, the possible in the agent can be actualized without any 
external principle. This occurs because the transition in the agent from a state of inactivity to 
a state of activity is considered a change that does need a principle. Ibn Rochd cited some 
examples in which the change that occurs at the level of the possible in the agent does not 
require any external principle such as the transition in the geometer from non-geometrizing 
to geometrizing or in the teacher from non-teaching to teaching. We have to mention that all 
changes that are considered as needing a principle of change can sometimes be "Changes in 
substance, sometimes in quality, or in quantity, or in place2. "
6.9. Aristotle's Doctrine of Natural Motions:
This doctrine is based upon the movement of objects spheres and celestial bodies. Aristotle 
states that everything that is in motion must be moved by something else. Self-motion is 
impossible because motion is defined as the actualization(energeia) of the movable qua 
movable 1 , Aristotle deduced from this definition that the potentially moved object pre-exists 
the motion in time".Hence, it is very hard to believe in an uncaused motion or an infinite 
series of moved movers. Therefore, a cause that can be considered as original is a cause that 
generates a movement without being moved. Ibn Sina in his work Uyun al-Hikma (The Eyes 
of Wisdom), sees that every mover has either a power in itself or it is moved by something 
external by means of friction. All the movers and the moved end up with unmoved mover, as 
it is impossible to imagine succession of bodies moving themselves infinitely. Regarding the 
nature of these movements, Aristotle sees that there are two kinds of motion: one natural and 
the other unnatural. This motion can be moved by the thing's own nature, an external mover
'Averroes .Tahafiit al-Tahafut. (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.I, p.2.
2Ibid.
'Aristotle fhvsics, 251a9f
: Ibid.,251alO-23
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(energizer) that boosts the nature of the moved and reaches the target to which the moved is 
aiming at or by an external force that prevents the object from following its natural course. 
From This trichotomy of movement, we deduce that the motion of stars cannot be natural, 
for the natural motion can be upward or downward. Likewise, it cannot be enforced because 
there is no force more powerful than the stars themselves, which may move them contrary to 
their nature. Hence, their motion can only be voluntary. Therefore, they are living sentient 
and intelligent beings. Consequently, no enforced motion can be eternal. All these types of 
movements do form the Aristotelian theory of the motion '.We have to point out here that 
this theory helps us to understand the Aristotelian doctrines of matter and form and 
potentiality and act. It is quite clear here that Aristotle does not support the possibility of 
self-motion. Moreover, this theory proves to us his strong belief in the aliveness of the 
heavenly substance and refuting his former explanations about the spheres movement built 
on a pure mechanistic basis.
6.10. Types of Movement and Kinds of Beings:
The existence of a cosmic unmoved mover is the main concern of the last two books of 
Aristotle's physics. This Aristotelian concern did come from the argument that everything 
that is in motion is moved by something else. Aristotle elaborated a reductio ad absurdum of 
the idea of self-movement stating that the self- moving object, in order to be in motion, has 
to have parts. Its motion has not to be just in one of its parts, but it has to be as a whole and 
this self-moving object has to originate its own motion'. Aristotle deduced that if any part of 
the body is at rest, the whole of it is at rest, but if the whole body is being at rest, as one part 
of it, is being at rest, then, the motion of the whole body depends on the motion of the part. 
This means that it does not originate its own motion. Therefore, what was supposed to be 
moved by itself is not moved by itself (Ph.8.241b 34-242a49).
If we do observe non-living things, we would come out with the result that some are 
partially at rest and others are not only unmoved, but without power of self-movement. In
'Aristotle .On the Heavens I, 268bla-270al2
1 Anthony Kenny .Ancient Philosophy, vol.II, p.296.
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spite of that, these things are capable of being moved and are given a start at some time. In 
this respect, we do argue that if self- movement, which is not in being, cannot be generated 
and then all things are either in or not in movement 1 . We do agree-to some extent- that these 
considerations are evident in case of the living being:
"There are times when there is no transition within ourselves, but only complete repose and 
when nothing external moves us; but presently we find ourselves in the midst of an activity 
which we have ourselves set on foot2. "
This does not apply to the non-living beings because they always need an external mover, 
but what is striking about this Peripatetic concept of movement is that of the animal's 
movement. As we know, the animal moves itself as we do exactly, but if there is a time when 
an animal is in a wholly unmoved state, it is possible for movement to be generated in non- 
living being by its own power without the interference of an external mover. From these 
comparisons between the motion of human beings, animals and non-living things, Aristotle 
applied his theory to the universe as a whole. He considers the animal as one fragment of this 
universe and what happens to it, may occur to the whole cosmos: "What happen in a 
'microcosm' can happen in the' megacosm ' and what happen in the cosmos can happen in 
the infinite . "
This Aristotelian notion of movement does not give convincing answers to solve the core of 
this kinetic problem. Why the unmoved comes to be moved? Why the external mover is 
sometimes present and other times absent? How the same thing can be sometimes put in 
motion and other times not? Why are some beings always in quiescent state and others 
always in motion? However, he found some solutions to the last question by dividing human 
being into different categories. Each category is defined according to its activity, mode of 
life and its psychological state. There are some beings who are transient and others inert 
.Some beings are always in process, whereas others in a state of repose. Some beings are 
always independent of movement and others subject to movement'.
'Aristotle. Physics. (252b 18-25)
2Ibid
'ibid
2Ibid.(253b23-26)
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6.11. The First Mover as a Self-moved;
There are two ways in which an agent acts upon a thing .This agent can be itself acted upon 
by another or it is the one, which exercises the impact. Such an impact can be done directly 
or through intermediate agents. This means that everything that is in process must be acted 
upon by an agent. The latter is -in its turn- acted upon by another .Thus, a moved mover 
requires a first unmoved mover, whereas the latter does not require the former. Accordingly, 
the first moved must be a self-moved. This means that if an object is not directly acted upon 
by a self-mover, the series of its movers may reach a self-mover 1 . Aristotle assumes a 
plurality of immovable movers as many as the number of the spheres, but all these 
immovable movers are, like the first immovable mover, transcendent beings, existing apart 
from the spheres that are moved by them2 . This concept of the first mover led Aristotle to 
formulate many other principles. There are things that can be moved, but in the same time, 
they cannot put other things in motion. There are other things, which are moved only by 
themselves and not by anything else. Aristotle praises Anaxagoras for having made intellect 
an immaterial form, the prime mover and for this reason:
" It does not suffer any action from anything, for the cause of passivity is matter and in this 
respect the passive potencies are in the same position as the active, for it is the passive 
potencies possessing matters which accept definite things . "
In other words, Aristotle does believe in the existence of a prime mover which is responsible 
for making things change from something to something else and from one state to another 
because the matter is not created or even emanated, but eternal. Besides, there is a third kind 
of being, which is an unmoved mover and it was presented by Anaxagoras as the 'mind'. He 
considers it as 'impassive' and 'unmixed' 2 .This notion of the first mover widely opens the 
gates to many unanswered questions. If we do admit that, a certain object is a mover, is it 
then necessarily unmoved? As the unmoved mover is dominating, is it comprised of the 
characteristics of all other movers? And if everything that is moved has a mover, then, 
everything capable of moving anything, would not be capable of being moved? From these 
divergent arguments and thorny questions, it appears that we are coming out with more 
absurdity than clarity, more questions than answers and more gaps than bridges. Let us admit 
for the sake of controversy that there is a self-mover with all these features. How does this
'Aristotle .Physics, 252b 18-25
2Harry A. Wolfson ,The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes, p.234.
1 Averroes Jahafut al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon Den Bergh, p.358.
2 Aristotle ,Physics,257a,24-26
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self-mover do that? Aristotle tried to solve this dilemma by going on to say that the self- 
mover, in order to be so, must have two aspects: one to initiate the process and the other to 
undergo it. The eternity of this process does not require that an agent be acted upon. The 
only thing that matters is the existence of some unmoved and self-moved movers'.We have 
to point out here that, according to Aristotle, if we do believe in the plurality of worlds, we 
have to believe in the existence of an infinite number of first immovable movers. Therefore, 
by rejecting this theory and replacing it with the one world theory, philosophers busied 
themselves with answering the question whether, in the latter theory, did exist only one first 
principle'. The first mover as being indivisible, it is regarded as beyond time and 
quantification. For Ibn Rochd, its unique nature allows it to escape from an infinite regress of 
causes. Ibn Rochd drew a distinction between the first mover and the first moved through the 
accidental necessary-nature of their relationship3 . Both Ibn Rochd and Ibn Sina called these 
immovable movers' Intelligences', but Ibn Sina went further by seeing these Intelligences as 
a series of successive emanations, in that, there is a causal relation between them. Each 
Intelligence is the cause of another one emanating from it until we reach God that is at the 
top of these series as an uncaused cause 1 . Ibn Rochd was somewhere between Aristotle and 
Ibn Sina as he was not with the view that the Intelligence emanates, so he did not make a 
distinction between Intelligences in the sense of cause, but in the sense of nobility bil-sharaf 
(nobility). This is what it was emphasized by Al-Ghazali in Maqaid al-Falasifa, when he 
made a distinction between the two parts of the passive intellect on the basis of nobleness2 . 
This view is closer, to some extent, to that of Aristotle who made that distinction on the basis 
of excellence, but at the same time, in the sense of 'cause' 3 .
6.12. The Immobility and Eternity of the First Mover:
In order that the movement must be eternal and continuous, it has to have a unity. Such a 
feature can only be acquired through a unitary mover and a unitary subject4 .By the eternity 
of any movement, we do simply mean that such a movement is neither generated nor
'Aristotle . Physics, 257a, 31-35
"Harry A. Wolfson . The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes,p.23(> .
3 Alfred L. Ivry .Epitome de Fisica (Filosofia de la Naturale:a).p.64&
%id.p.244
2 Al-Ghazali, Makasid al-Falasifa. ( The Aims of Philosophers),p.290.
- Ibid.,pp.244-245.
4 Aristotle ,Phvsics,259b,\l-\8
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destructive. The movers must be eternal, for the features they possess. They are of necessary 
relation to the eventfulness of the cosmos. Furthermore, they are indefinite in numbers and 
are not simultaneous beings. Even if we do admit that there are some unmoved movers and 
self-movers, which perish, this does not mean that there are not eternal .The perishable 
unmoved movers and self-movers are replaced by others Even if when an unmoved being 
moves another one and the latter -in its turn -moves another, there is a sort of a permanent 
continuity1 . From this everlasting vicious circle, we have only to deduce that there is a 
plurality of eternal movers and which all go back to one unique, immovable self-mover. 
Aristotle went further in his analysis by claiming that anything unmoved, which accidentally 
moves itself, cannot generate continuous movement. Since there must be a continuous 
movement, the first mover must be immovable even accidentally. Only perishable things are 
accidentally moved by themselves, but being accidentally moved by something else belongs 
to celestial bodies2 .
Plato focused on the nature of the self- mover, as it is of a paramount importance because if 
we do assume that the self-mover ceases to move, it would be against its nature, hi other 
words, the self -mover had to abandon its nature by ceasing to move. Is that Platonic 
reasoning strong enough to demonstrate that self-moving things are eternally in motion? The 
answer to this question is simply no because if we do suppose that a self- mover had to cease 
to move itself, then, it could resume moving again if it galvanised into motion by itself or by 
something else. Here we are in front of two probabilities, if it is set in motion by itself, this 
had to happen through the agency of some part of itself that was already in motion, which 
means that this self-mover did not cease to move itself. If it is moved by something else, we 
cannot consider it as a self -mover. Only we can call a thing a self- mover if it can move 
continually itself '. There is further evidence that the first mover is eternal, in that, the 
processes of generation, destruction and transformation would never occur without the 
impact of an eternal mover, which is eternally unmoved. We have to point out here that these 
processes are not actually changes that happened to things and altered their quiescent state or 
change their natural course. Therefore, they are not eternal because every single change has a 
definite start and a definite stop. Accordingly, it is limited, as it cannot continue indefinitely.
1 Aristotle, Physics,259a,35-40.
2Ibid.
1 Richard Bett Jmmortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus, p.5
-175-
Chapter 6
Ibn Rochd illustrated this standpoint by many vivid examples when he imagined two circular 
movements at the same finite time. Likewise, he also imagined a limited part of theses 
movements at the same finite time. The outcome of this imagination will be that the 
proportion between the parts and the wholes of these two circular movements will be 
definitely the same. However, there is no proportion between two movements in their 
totality, as they are both potential, for instance, they have neither a beginning nor an end, but 
there exists a proportion between the parts, as they are both actual. In this case, the 
proportion between the wholes is not necessary the same in comparison with the proportion 
of the parts' .
For Ibn Rochd, since motion is associated with life, the movers do not only move the 
heavenly bodies, but they give them their forms, thus, they are agents. In this regard, the 
forms of the heavenly bodies are what they conceive of the other movers above them. 
Therefore, these movers are pure intellects, and their function is knowing and conceiving, 
such function made them immaterial and immovable .
The ancient philosophers do believe that the totality of movements of the Sun and Saturn 
had no beginning and no end. This means that there could be no proportion between them 
because this would have implied the finitude of both these totalities".In order to refute the 
theory of Al-Ghazalian philosophers or the adversaries, as Ibn Rochd call them, he 
introduced all their arguments about the proportion and his at the same time:
"Our adversaries believe that, when a proportion of more or less exists behveen parts, this 
proportion holds god also for the totalities. But this is only binding when the totalities are 
finite. For where there is no end, there is neither 'more' nor 'less ' 3 . "
The fact of admitting that there is a proportion of more or less generates another vague 
consequence, which is that one infinite, cannot be the same as the other. However, such a 
proportion of 'more' and' less 'can be unclear when we do assume two actually infinite
'Averroes Jahafut Al Ta/mfut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.II,pp.9-10.
'Isaac Husik .Averroes On the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.426
- Averroes Jahafut Al Tahafitt,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. II,p.lO.
3Ibid.
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things because a proportion exists between them. There is another dilemma that was raised 
by ancient philosophers when they went on to say that:
" If the movements in the past are infinite, then no movement in the actual present can take 
place, unless an infinite number of preceding movements is terminated '. "
This dictum became more rational when the anterior movement is the condition for the 
occurrence of the posterior one. This is quite obvious when one single movement indicates 
an infinite number of causes. We have to point out here that no philosopher, including the 
materialists, does believe in the existence of infinite number of causes, as such belief will 
indicate the existence of an effect without cause, and consequently, a motion without mover2 .
The discussion of the existence of infinite number of movements leads us to talk about the 
existence of an eternal prime mover. The latter cannot be posterior to his being, if it is the 
case, his act would be possible and not necessary, and accordingly, it cannot be a first 
principle. The agent who has no beginning for his existence and for his acts, he does perform 
without instrument. Definitely, he has no first instrument to perform his acts without 
beginning'.Ibn Rochd went on to say that, as theologians confused the accidental with the 
essential, the result was the complete denial of this eternal agent. Aristotle solved this 
problem when he asserts that "//" motion were produced by motion, or element by element, 
motion and element could not exist. "
There is no room for doubt that this is a kind of infinite in which philosophers do admit that 
there is no beginning and no end. Accordingly, no one can claim that something in these 
infinite things has ended or has begun, and as a result of this belief, anything that has ended 
has to have a beginning and what has no beginning, does not have an end. A good and 
comprehensive understanding is achievable if we do know that there is a mutual relationship 
between the beginning and the end 3 .That is what Al-Ghazali was aiming at when he went on 
to say that the movement have to be infinite and eternal with the passive intellects, as they 
have to be moved by a moving power. It is quite impossible that the bodies possess the
1 Averroes,Tahafut al -Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence),vol.II,p. 10.
2 Ibid.
'Ibid., pp. 10-11.
2Ibid.p.ll
3Ibid.
-177-
Chapter 6
power of moving themselves infinitely. Therefore, every body is divisible and movable 
infinitely, in this case, the part would be like the whole without any superiority, which is 
impossible or it is movable towards an aim and the other part towards another aim. 
Therefore, the total of movement would be infinite 1 . From this perspective, if we do affirm 
that there is no end of the celestial spheres, we cannot assert that there is a beginning for 
them. For the same reason, if we do believe that these celestial spheres have an end, we are 
confirming that they have a beginning. This is the same relationship that exists between the 
first and the last, for instance, what has a first term, has a last term as well. Similarly, what 
has no first term, it must have no last term. Besides, anything that has no beginning for any 
of its parts, it must have no end for any of them as well:
" When, therefore, the theologians ask the philosophers if the movements which precede the 
present one are ended, their answer is negative, for their assumption that they have no 
beginning implies their endlessness. The opinion of the theologians that the philosophers 
admit their and is erroneous, for they do not admit an end for what has no beginning1 . " 
Ibn Rochd concluded' the first discussion' of his 'The Incoherence of the Incoherence' by 
suggesting a good and suitable answer to all these difficulties and among them the question: 
Where in the past was the starting point of his acts? The answer would be the starting point 
of his acts was exactly at the starting point of his existence as none of them has a start2 .
hi the middle of all these discussions, we do deduce that the theological arguments of the 
temporal creation of the world represented by Al-Ghazali are sufficient to achieve very 
stringent evidence. The same are all the other premises represented by him in his book 
Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of Philosophers) in the name of Muslim philosophers 
and especially Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi, Ar-Razi and the Hellenic ones and especially Plato, 
Aristotle and Plotinus. As we know, Aristotle was the disciple of Plato and he never ceased 
to be so, that is why, the Platonic philosophy was his starting point. The Platonic analysis 
focuses on motion to define eternity, as he sees that what is always in motion, must always 
exist, and has to be eternal. Consequently, only that moves itself never cease moving and 
what is moved by something else, there is a probability of cessation of its movement, and 
accordingly, a cessation of life3 . However, there are many convergences as there are many
1 Al-Ghazali, Makasid al-Falasifa, (The Aims of Philosophers),p.279.
' Averroes . Tahafut al- Tahafut,(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 1 ,pp. 11-12.
2Ibid., p. 12.
3Rkhard Bert Jmmortality and Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus, p.4 .
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analogies between the two great minds. Plato does not consider self-motion as impossible 
and regards the prime mover of all is a self-mover. This latter is identified with the soul as 
the primary cause, but we have to admit that Aristotle criticizes the pre-cosmic chaos of 
Plato's Timaeus in many passages like this one:
''''The motion must have been either enforced or natural. But if it is natural, careful 
consideration will show that there must have been a cosmos. For the self- caused motion of 
the first heaven must be natural... 1 "
In this passage, we deduce that Aristotle believes in the self-caused motion as a foremost 
and highest god, immutable and owing no superior. This does not mean just a supernatural 
force, "but movement is also due to the original creative force and to that which removes the 
hindrance.... as was explained... when we tried none of these things moves itself. "
Therefore, Aristotle does believe that the outermost heaven as the primary being and it is 
the self-caused revolution of this primary being that is responsible for the motion of 
everything in the universe. Aristotle did not deny that this outermost heaven could be 
associated with a superior unmoved mover2.The heavenly system is described by Aristotle as 
'the foremost and the highest divinity' and in unceasing motion because there is nothing 
powerful that can move it .
This leads Aristotle to discuss the notion of god and his activity as immortality, which 
means eternal life, in consequence, god has to be associated with eternal motion. Aristotle 
applied this argument to 'the first body' as the necessity of movement of this first body is 
seen to follow from its divinity 4.This first body is said to be god, as there is a necessity for a 
transcendent mover that it has an eternal life, consists of pure intellectual activity and 
entirely unmoved .
1 W.K.C. Guthrie, Introduction of Aristotle's ,On the Heavens, p. xxi 
'Ibid.
2tIbid.,p. xx 
3Ibid.,xxi 
4 Ibid.,p. xxii 
5Ibid., p. xx
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6.13 Conclusion:
It is quite surprising how Democritus managed to find the underlying cause of the heart of 
nature when he considered reality as a combination of atoms and void. Likewise, the 
Peripatetic reasoning added many ambiguities and mysteries by claiming that no space can 
be completely empty. What is striking more, is no one at that time realized that the stars, the 
atoms and the vacuum are just a part of a single harmonious cosmos. If we do look at the 
atomistic view of the architecture of the world, we will find out that it is the most consistent 
one in comparison with the other views. However, we have to take their stance with some 
reservations; we know very well that the atomists see the atoms as the main constituents of 
the world, as they are indivisible, according to them of course. They do not only believe in 
the postulation of the void, but they also see it as essential and vital for the occurrence of any 
event. Even if this is not true in modern physics, as atoms are divisible to other constituents, 
which are the real bricks of the world, the atomists were within this logic. Regarding the 
void, all over again, the atomists were turning around what is rational to some extent, as the 
void is still controversial in modern physics, for the nature of non- matter is even more 
sophisticated than matter. Scientists do regard the vacuum in space as a matter that is made 
of constituents exactly like matter. This means that this vacuum itself needs to be 
disintegrated into its real constituents, as matter can be disintegrated into its real nature 
manifested in atoms. Such dream would enable us to find out other worlds that are 
completely unknown to us. That is why, we do find the theory of the multiplicity of worlds 
quite rational, as we are still in the threshold of discoveries regarding matter and vacuum as 
opposites or as completing each other to achieve the harmony and the melodiousness of our 
cosmos.
The Islamic concept of the atoms and its constituents does support the existence of other 
worlds other than our and we do find such assertion at the beginning of each Qur'anic 
chapter: "Praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds ' ". We have nothing to 
add to the Aristotelian Aether, as it did not survive even the Copernican cosmic theory, 
which was elaborated in the seventeenth century and it has no place in modern physics. The 
eternity of time and motion is another story, in the sense that, -and till nowadays-what is 
applied to motion is applied to time, as we cannot separate them or treat them separately, for 
the correlative relationship existing between them. The difficulty that arises here is that time
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Al-Fatiha (The Beginning or the Opening : 1) Verse. 1
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and motion are not like matter that we can disintegrate its basic constituents or investigate 
its real nature. Neither the Platonic assumption that time came into existence along with 
heavens and the destruction of the heavens would imply the destruction of time, nor the 
Aristotelian eternity of time and motion are helpful enough to decode the enigmas of such 
two existents called respectively 'time' and 'space. Likewise, the Aristotelian theory of 
motion is not consistent, as it is refuted by many philosophers who could not give the 
alternative in the form of a convincing and coherent theory. In addition to the proofs we have 
presented about the fallacy of the nature of the self-movers and the unmoved movers, we can 
sum up this discussion by introducing a very simple evidence about the notion of the self- 
mover. It is like a dictum stating that the self-mover can never be so, if it has not the ability 
of both moving and ceasing without the intermediary of an outsider mover. We know very 
well that philosophers do agree that a self-mover has to move itself eternally without cease, 
but if it ceases to move and resumes its movement, again, it cannot be a self-mover. We do 
not agree with this reasoning, as among the properties of any self-mover is to stop and 
resume its movement. In other words, if the self-mover carries out the two processes of 
movement and cessation without the interference of any cosmic power, that is the genuine 
and the reliable definition that can be given to any self-mover body. As mentioned above, 
motion is only the half story of the problem and the other side of it lies in time, which is the 
other metaphysical dilemma shrouded in mystery. If we are unable to understand the notion 
of time, at least we have to make many distinctions that seem to be, to some extent, available 
to us.
The distinction between God's time, which is timelessness, and man's time that is based on 
complete relativity would lead us nowhere, as this is the final conclusion and not the starting 
point. More attention has to be directed to the relativity of time in the world we are supposed 
to know such as the mechanisms of time in our planet and those in other celestial spheres. 
Such attention would help us to unveil some of the mysteries of the relativity of time. This 
would help us to know the life-spam of different beings living either together with us in this 
universe or in other one that is still shrouded in complete mystery. We would not then be 
surprised if we do hear in the Islamic prophetic tradition that a day in the life of an angel 
equals seventy thousand years in the life of man. This is clear evidence that would make the 
angel an eternal being, according to our belief, even if he is not. The religious traditions, and 
especially the Islamic one, are teeming with this relativity of time. Among them, the 
Qur'anic kasas (true stories) like that of a man called Ozayer (Ezra), there also some hints to
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this kasas in Hebraic revelation: " Or like the one who passed by a town and it had tumbled 
over its roofs. He said: "Oh! How will God ever bring it to life after its death?" So God 
caused him to die for a hundred years, then raised him up (again). He said: "How long did 
you remain (dead)?" He (the man) said: "(Perhaps) I remained (dead) a day or part of a 
day". He said: "Nay, you have remained (dead) for a hundred years, look at your food and 
your drink, they show no change; and look at your donkey! And thus We have made of you a 
sign for the people 1 . "
We do find this relativity between the supposed life in the different planets of our solar 
system in our galaxy and other systems in different galaxies. Likewise, we find it in the 
distinction between life and death. Islamic tradition teaches that once the individual emits his 
last breath, many hidden truths will be exposed and among them the real nature of time: "On 
the day when they see it (resurrection), it will be as if they had but tarried for an evening or 
a morning ''. " In some occasions, The Almighty God simplified the notion of time in the 
hereafter to human mind "To Him ( God) ascend the angels and the Spirit in a day the 
measure of which is fifty thousand years2. " In other occasions, He reminded us (the human 
beings) of our weakness and our dire need for a celestial system to organise our earthly life 
in terms of time: " He it is Who made the sun a shining brightness, and the moon a light, 
and ordained for it stages that you might know the computation of years and the reckoning. 
God created not this but with truth. He makes the signs manifest for a people who know1. " 
Here life itself is a barrier preventing us from understanding many phenomena that occur in 
our life. We would understand many of them when we emit our last breath. No wonder, 
many theologians consider life as a trap that man has to release himself from. Likewise, 
philosophers who make no distinction between life and death are compelled to think so 
because of the sophisticated nature of life and the mysterious labyrinths of death. According 
to Islamic teachings, a dead person has the power more that a living one, in the sense that, 
after his death, he would be able to know the destiny of all the members of his family. He 
could not enjoy such power in his life, as there was still a union between body and soul on 
the one hand and he was still in his earthy trial on the other hand. Even if we do not know 
exactly the nature and the limit of such power, but we know that has something to do with 
the notion of time that collapses entirely after death.
'The Holy Qur'an , chapter Al-Baqarat. The Cow. 1), Verse.259. 
1 Ibid, chapter Al-Nazi'at( Those who yearn. 79), Verse.46 
2Ibid., chapter Al-Ma 'rij (The Ways of Ascent. 70), Verse.4 . 
3Ibid, chapter Yonous( Jonas. 10), Verse .5
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ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL: 
7.1. The Hellenistic-Islamic Concept of the Soul: 
7.1.1 The Nature of the Soul:
The nature, the fabric and functions of the soul were and are still controversial and raise 
unsolved disputes between thinkers, philosophers and theologians in our living memory, as 
soul is much older than philosophy. Some see it just a mere body different from ours in 
structure and they called rarefied body (Pneuma) or blood in some form'.Others regard it as 
breath and it cannot be corporeal. While others consider it as a matter made of atoms like any 
other matter nothing less and nothing more. With Aristotle, the soul is the recognition of the 
difference between the living and the dead, but in the middle of this recognition, he did not 
find the soul to be like a being that is conceived to enter and leave 1 . It is the active intellect 
and it is thought to be 'what it is only when separated', and this alone is immortal and 
eternal. 2 Aristotle was advised to put the study of the soul among the priority of priorities as 
it is, as it were, the start of all things that live3 .There is no room for doubt that anyone 
fascinated by the ancient wisdom, should be familiar with the Homeric poems teeming with 
the notion of soul. It is something that human beings risk in the battle and lose in death. After 
death, it endures as a shade in the underworld4.
There some philosophers who went further in their explanations like Socrates who claimed 
that the soul has a sort of existence even after the death of the person. This leads us to think 
that disembodied souls are as ensouled bodies do enjoy the life of thought and intelligence. 
Beside this Socratian view of the nature of the soul, there are the Epicureans who thought 
that the soul is an arrangement of indivisible bodies called the atoms, some of which made 
up the flesh, blood and bones and others are responsible for the existence of vital powers of 
the body5 . They went on to say that, the soul is completely destroyed at the moment of death, 
the Stoics who believed in its survival and the Peripatetics who were concerned with the 
immortality of the mind6 . Unlike the Epicurean materialistic view of the soul, Plato may 
have a dualistic view, in the sense that, he is with Socrates that the soul can exist without the
1 Plotinus ,On the Nature of the Soul, p. 131.
' Frederick. J. E. Woodbridge .Aristotle's Vision of Nature, p.l 10.
2 Aristotle (De an.3.5.430a22-23).
3 Frederick J. E. Woodbridge .Aristotle's Vision of Nature, p. 111.
4 Snell ,The Discovery of the Mind. p. 19.
5 A. A. Long ,Soul and Body in Stoicism , p.34.
'Merrill Orne Young ,Did Some Middle Platonists Deny the Immortality of the Soul, p.59.
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body, as he regards it as an incorporeal substance, and consequently, immortal '. In the 
Phaedo-was also known to ancient readers as 'On the soul' and in' the Republic', which was 
also known by its ancient title ' On justice'- Plato sees the soul as a possessor of cognitive 
and intellectual features. Platonic view of the world is compatible with that of the soul, in the 
sense that, as he believes in the successive eternity of the world, he believes in the successive 
eternity of human souls2 . Plato represented his arguments about the immortality of the soul 
in a very simple rule stating that the soul is that, which is its own source of motion and that, 
which is its own source of motion is immortal, therefore, soul is immortal 1 . Many scholars 
asserted that Plato's immortality of the soul does concern only part of the soul and not all of 
it like in the Republic X, Plato went on to say that we cannot judge the true nature of the soul 
as long as it is associated with that degraded state when living side by side with the body. 
Hence, we have to contemplate the soul when it is isolated from all miseries, blemishes and 
vices of the body2 . In this regard, in the Republic, a distinction was made between the 
logistikon, a soul that is exhausting the plenitude of psychic activity in pursuing and loving 
phronesis( the passions and emotions confined to the body).From this perspective, the moral 
conflict can only be understood as a dispute between body and soul3 . Hence, the study of the 
nature of the soul leads us to understand the everlasting course of the world, which is 
cyclical and souls endlessly descend into earthly bodies and on death re-ascend to the 
intelligible world. However, souls destiny is not always the same as other souls descend still 
further to Hades where they can be justly punished and some souls remain there forever4 . In 
the Phaedo, we are told about such a destiny:
"Those souls, which seem to be incurable because of the greatness of their crimes, having 
committed many great acts of sacrilege, or many wicked murders, or any other such things, 
these their fitting destiny throws into Tartarus, whence they never come out5. "
No wonder as Plato never ceased to be Socrates' bright disciple. Aristotle developed a 
conception of the soul close to that of Plato's in the Phaedo as he was against the view that 
the soul is an attunement of the body by claiming that it is imprisoned in a carcass or in,
1 A. A. Long, Soul and Body in Stoicism, p.34.
2Proclus .The Elements of Theology, E.R, Dodds, pp. 50-55, 226-29.
'Richard Bett .Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus, p. 1.
2 T.M.Robinson, Soul and Immortality in Republic X", p. 147. 
3 Ibid.,p.l49.
4 D.P. Walker, Eternity and the Afterlife, p.243.
5 Ibid.
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what the Orphic language of the mystics call, a tomb 1 . The soul is capable of happier life 
once separated from it. That is why, the dead are more blessed and happier than the living. 
Therefore, it is good, for all men and women not to be born, and if this does happen, once 
they were born, it is better for them to die quickly, as death is the return to one's real home2 . 
Ibn Sina, in his turn, in kitab an-Najat( Book of Safety),asserted that the soul does not perish 
with the demise of the body and it is not subject to corruption. He argued that everything that 
is corrupted with the corruption of something else is related to it either through a co- 
existence, posterior or anterior to it in existence with essence and not with time. If they were 
equal in existence, both of them would be substances and the corruption of one of them does 
not mean necessarily the corruption of the other and if such relation were based upon the 
posteriority in existence, then, the body would be a cause of the soul 1 . All these reasonings 
are about the soul when it is separated from its body, but there are many mystic views stating 
that the soul can achieve its essence even during the life of the body. Among these Sufis 
(mystics) Ibn Arabi who went on to say that the individual has to go through the experience 
of ''the fana Y passing away) if he wants to achieve the goal of union with God. hi such a 
case, "The soul is stripped of all its desires, affections and interests, so that in ceasing to will 
for itself it becomes an object of the Divine Will, that is the beloved of God2. " hi such 
spiritual case, the individual will see only one and because of that, he will not see himself, 
and, as he does not see himself because of his occupation with the unification, he is Fani 
(passed away) in himself3 . Al-Hallaj (c.858- 922 AD), the famous Persian Sufi (mystic), 
thought that in every mystic experience, soul has to start with Zuhd (asceticism) and 
terminates with Tawahhud4 (unification, or rather, unicity). In his book of Tawasin(The 
Sufic Path Series), expressed such feeling that can be attained from the union between soul 
and God: / am He whom, and He whom I love is 1 **We are two spirits dwelling in one body
Ifthou seest me, thou seest Him And if ** thou seest Him, thou seest us both 5. 
The mystics are thinking that way, as they believe that the body is the temporary dwelling of 
the soul, which is considered as a bird. Such view is expressed by the other Persian mystic 
Jallal ad-Din al-Rumi :
1 Patrick Duncan Jmmortality of the Soul in the Platonic Dialogues and Aristotle, p.305. 
2Anthony Kenny ^indent Philosophy, Vol. I, pp.66-67. 
'Ibn Sina Jiitab an-Najat,(Book of Safety),?. 153
2 Frazee Charles A., Ibn al-Arabi and Spanish Mysticism of the Sixteenth Century, p.230. 
3Al-Ghazali, Ihyae Ulum al-Din,( The Revival of the Sciences of Religion),pp.l58-159. 
"Muhammad Ghallab, At-Tanassuk al-Islami( The Islamic Hermeticism),p.l28. 
5Nicholson Reynold A., The Idea of Personality in Sufism, p. 18.
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lama bird of God's garden
I do not belong to this dusty world
For a day or two they have locked me up in the cage of my body1 .
It is quite banal to think that the soul is just what distinguishes a living human body from a 
corpse; rather, it is more sophisticated than that as it is responsible for the activities, 
responses and the operations of a person's life. In the Homeric poems, only human beings 
are thought to have souls. Likewise, we only recall and talk about soul when someone's life 
is at risk. After that period, the terms 'ensouled' (empsuchos) and 'alive' were applied not 
just to human being, but also to other living being (animals and plants) and non- living 
beings (heavens and celestial bodies). This precisely what happened when Thales of Milletus 
predicted a solar eclipse relying on the capability of the magnets to move iron. The point 
Thales was making is that since the magnets has this power to initiate movement by 
attracting the iron, it must be ensouled. The pre-Socratic theories are teeming with the notion 
of the soul, which they regard as a fine kind of body made of flesh and blood exactly like our 
bodies. Whatever the case, soul has moral and intellectual virtues, hi order to possess any 
kind of virtues, you have to possess all 'the partial virtues' (tas kata meros aretas).This 
means that: 'The virtues of the parts of the soul, just as the partial virtues of the body are the 
virtues of the various parts of the body. So it must include the virtues of the intellectual part 
of the soul, including the supreme and the theoretical part. "
hi this regard, the relationship between body and soul is not like the relation of medical 
skill to health, but like health itself. This is exactly the same relationship that exists between 
the first class happiness consisting of the exercise of Sophia and the alternative second -class 
happiness that consists of wisdom and moral virtues. Such a relationship is based upon 
activity, productivity and not on superflousness . This concept of the soul goes hand in hand 
with the two dominant Hellenistic schools: the Epicurean and the Stoic sharing the view that 
the soul is 'corporeal', which means it is a body and not a sort of smoke or breath, as it is the 
belief in other philosophies3 . However, the Epicurean school, as the atomist does, believe 
that such a body is made of atoms. The notion of soul was always present whenever we talk 
about inner feelings and psychological troubles alike such as love, hatred, happiness and
1 Cyprian Rice, The Persian Sufis,p.67.
1 Anthony Kenny .Aristotle On the Perfect Life, p.94.
2 Ibid., p.92
3 Annas Julia, fpicurus' Philosophy of Mind, pp. 39-41.
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sadness. Besides, many human virtues and moral qualities like courage, altruism and 
knighthood were associated with the soul. If we go back to the structure and the nature of the 
soul, we would find Abu- Barakat (c. 1080-1165 AD) refusing to recognize a single active 
intellect as the cause of the existence of souls in the sublunary world. He went further by 
claiming that a single cause cannot suffice even for the existence of human souls, so what 
about the souls of the other creatures? Besides, the causes of the existence of human souls 
have to be sought not among the incorporeal intelligences, but rather, in another echelon of 
the hierarchy of existence 1 . This barakatian reasoning leads us to talk about the differences 
between human souls defined by Abu -Barakat in 'the substances' and 'the quidditties', that 
is every human soul, or rather, every class of human souls has its individual cause from 
which it proceeds. This reasoning proves that human souls do receive their existence from a 
plurality of causes. Abu-Barakat argued that bodies cannot produce the different classes of 
human soul, since bodies are not 'the efficient cause of anything' and these causes cannot be 
accidents that exist through bodies, as a cause has to be of a more perfect existence than its 
effect". This is what explains that, ""Anything having its existence through a body... cannot be 
the cause producing an incorporeal substance . " Ibn Sina also did believe in the possibility 
that human souls have bodies or accidents in bodies as the cause of their existence. However, 
he argued that the souls of the spheres could not be the cause of the existence of the human 
soul. That is why, its cause can only be an incorporeal intelligence and particularly the active 
Intellect4 . The objection of Abu- Barakat started from this particular point, as he did not 
agree that 'the holy substances that have no link with bodies', are the immediate cause of the 
existence of human souls, that is the incorporeal intelligences, including the substance called 
'the active intellect' 5 .
Abu -Barakat explained his objection in many passages like the following one:
" For in every instance, an effect is similar to its cause, and everything belonging 
essentially to the effect comes from the cause'. Incorporeal intelligences, which do not 
operate through bodies, for the intelligences to be taken as the immediate cause of the
'Herbert Alan Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes On the Intellect, p.156.
2 Ibid.
3Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.,p.l57.
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existence of human souls. The cause of each class of human soul must accordingly be one 
of 'the celestial souls', that is a soul of a celestial sphere, or the soul of a star inbedded in 
one of the spheres l . "
Abu-Barakat inclines to the view that the human soul is an incorporeal substance. According 
to Ibn Sina, this can be true only if the indivisible incorporeal thoughts are present in the 
human soul and anything in which something indivisible is present is equally indivisible. 
Abu-Barakat pointed out that there are kind of knowledge that cannot be present in the body. 
However, they are present in human soul, he argues that:
"If a certain thing is present in another and the second in a third, then the first is also 
present in the third. Hence, if the human soul resided in the body, anything in the soul would 
likewise be in the body; any percept in the human soul would be present in the body as 
well1."
Abu-Barakat concluded that since those precepts cannot be present in human body, the soul 
also could not exist in the body. He went on to say that, the soul does not exist within a spirit 
that envelops the human body. Both Abu barakat and Ibn Sina concluded that the soul is an 
incorporeal substance and that it does act through the body2 . This was also the view of John 
Philoponus who considered the soul as immaterial substance whose existence predated its 
bodily entrance3 . On the other side, Ibn Rochd objected, as mentioned in the doctrine of 
resurrection, to the view that the soul is only an accident and man will take the same body 
when resurrected. Ibn Rochd does agree with Aristotle that the corroded body can never be 
identical with itself4 . 
7.1.2 The Fate of the Soul:
The fate of the soul is so sophisticated and controversial and paves the way for discussing 
not just its immortality, but also the nature of such immortality .The soul's destiny can only 
be highlighted through its relationship with the body. We all do agree that soul and body live 
along through the life of the human being. When the latter dies, his soul may continue to live 
Independently, in some way or another, in our world or in another one, which is utterly
1 Herbert Alan Davidson, Alfambi, Avicenna andAverroes On the Intellect, p. 157.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid, p. 158
3 Philoponus, On Aristotle On the Intellect, tran. William, Charlton p.353.
4 Ernest Renan .Averroes etL'Averroism, p.458.
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unknown to us. If we do admit that such a soul keeps on living without our decomposed 
body, this means that we are not wholly destroyed after death and we still exist, but in 
different form and manner. As we know the destiny of our body, which is death, we do aim 
to know the destiny of our soul, which may has not the same destiny as our body. The 
protrepticus contains the Platonic view that the union of the soul with the body is a sort of 
punishment for evil done in an earlier life 1 . From this Hellenistic point of view, we deduce 
that they were making a clear distinction between what is physical and what is mental or 
psychological. The physical pain may be a response to a mental or a psychological one .As 
the body stands for what is physical and soul for what is psychological, we can understand 
that relationship between soul and body. Besides, we do understand how the body can 
respond to the suffering of the soul.
7.2. The Individuality and the Transmigration of Souls (Metempsychosis):
Pythagoras was among the first philosophers who believed in the possibility of survival 
after death, but he did not agree with those who claim that at death, the soul enters a different 
and shadowy world. On the contrary, he did believe that it comes back to the world where 
we all lived in and it did so as the soul of a different body1 .Here, and all over again, we 
would be pushed to highlight the Pythagorean tenet based on the immortality of human soul. 
As Pythagoras regarded the spirit or (the breath) of human beings as a divine air, he had only 
to claim that it is naturally immortal. Its existence naturally outlives the relatively temporary 
functions of the human body. That is why, the Pythagoreans do believe in the transmigration 
of souls into other bodies at death with either animals or plants taking part along with human 
beings in a grand cycle of reincarnation. Pythagoras himself claimed that he had inherited his 
soul from a distinguished line of spiritual ancestors and he remembered fighting some 
centuries earlier, as a hero at the siege of Troy. Therefore, souls could transmigrate this way, 
according to Pythagoras, not only between one human being and another, but also across all 
species. He claimed also that once he stopped a man whipping a puppy because he 
recognized in its whimper the voice of a dead friend2 Proclus rejected Plotinus 'possibility 
that the soul leads a double life lapsing from eternity into time and changeability on her
1 Anthony Kenny ,Ancient Philosophy, vol. I, p.67. 
'Ibid.
2 Ibid.,p.229
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worthy elements, but her noble activities remain in the spiritual world 'unfallen' 1 . If we do 
admit that the soul existed before the body, the question that imposes itself insistently here is 
that whether the soul keeps its individuality after leaving its body or it is multiplied. 
Therefore, if the soul did not exist before the body, it must be existed along with it. In the 
light of these assumptions, the doctrine of the transmigration of souls that was prevailing in 
ancient India and ancient Greece becomes refutable. This doctrine that was depicted in the 
'Bhagavad-Gita ''(Hindu Scripture) came from the Hindus belief in the reincarnation. As the 
soul resides in a new body after the living being's death, makes her possess the forms of the 
unchangeability and eternalism. It is worthwhile to mention that this view was also supported 
by some of the Hellenes and especially Plato and Plotinus. The successive eternity of the 
world depends on the still eternity of the intelligible world as described by Plato in the 
Timaeus, " An everlasting image moving according to number, an image of the eternity, 
which stays still in unity2. "
This image has to move in a circular movement to be the closet image of eternity, as it has 
no beginning and no end. Hence, not only the transmigrating souls endlessly revolve, but the 
successive ages of history repeat themselves in an endless cycle as well. In the middle of this 
successive eternity, things have a beginning and end, but in the meantime, it is not a 
condition that the created world in general and the human souls in particular should have 
either a beginning or an end. If this scenario did occur, then, the circle would be broken, 
could not be repeated and consequently, the successive duration would not be of course a 
true copy of the ideal, still eternity3 . Hence, we do understand what Plato was aiming at, 
when he went on to say that it is not easy for a thing to be immortal if composed of many 
elements, in that, the soul's indivisibility is a suasion of its likelihood to be different in kind 
from destructible physical objects4 . We have to bear in mind that Plato's tripartition of the
1 A.E. Taylor, The Philosophy ofPmclus,p.604
1 It is called also Gitopanisad and it is commonly referred as The Gita. An episode recorded in the great Sanskrit poem of 
the Hindus, the Mahabharata. It occupies chapters 23 to 40 of book 6 of the Mahabharata and is composed in the form of a 
dialogue between Prince Arjuna and Krishna, an incarnation or avatar of the god Vishnu. Composed perhaps in the 1 st or 
2nd century CE, it is commonly known as the GiMwww.britannica.com/topic/63871/bhagavadgita. Access Date:04. Jun,07)
2 Plato, Timaeus, 37D, Cornford, Francis Macdonlad flato 's Cosmology, pp. 102ff.
3 D.P. Walker .Eternity and the Afterlife, p.243. 
4T..M.Robinson, ,Soul and Immortality in Republic X, p. 149.
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soul is associated with the body and not when the soul is in its discarnate state 1 . Pythagoras 
did not give irrefutable proofs about the transmigration of souls; he only claimed that it 
works in his own case through the identification of his belongings to a previous incarnation2 . 
Alcmaeon of Croton (mid fifth century BC),one of his contemporaries, seems to be the first 
who tried to prove the immortality of soul by philosophical argument. He claimed that the 
soul has to be eternal, as it is in a perpetual motion like the other divine bodies of the 
heavens . Empedocles elaborated version of the Pythagorean transmigration of soul doctrine 
as a part of his cyclical conception of history:
"As a result of a primeval fall, sinners such as murderers and perjurers survive as 
wandering spirits for thrice ten thousand years, incarnate in many different forms, 
exchanging one hard life for another. Since the bodies of animals are thus the dwelling 
places of punished souls2. "
Therefore, the slaughtering of an animal is regarded by Empedocles as an attack against 
one's mother or son. That is why, he advised his followers to abstain from eating living 
beings. These Pythagorean philosophers did not stop at this point, they went further by 
considering the transmigration of souls possible not only into animals, but into plants as well. 
Hence, even the vegetarians have to be careful what they consume and they have to avoid 
especially beans and laurels (DK 31 Bl 15).After emitting your last breath, if you became an 
animal, it is better to be a lion and if a plant, it is better to be a laurel. Empedocles, like 
Pythagoras, claimed that he lived such experience of the transmigration not only as a human 
but also as a plant and an animal :
I was once in the past a boy, once a girl, once a tree, 
Once too a bird, and a silent fish in the sea. (DK 31 B117)
We have to bear in mind that all the earliest thinkers have a materialistic view of the soul: 
Anaximenes and Anaximander thought that the soul consisted in air, while Parmenides and 
Heraclitus argued that it consisted in fire. Later on, many questions were raised like how 
does a material element, which is fine and fluid, perform the soul's characteristic functions 
of feeling and thought? .
1 T..M.Robinson, Soul and Immortality in RepublicX, p.150
2 Anthony Kenny .Ancient Philosophy, vol.II, p.231.
'Aristotle, DA.1.2.405a29-lb
2 Anthony Kenny .Ancient Philosophy, vol.11, p.231.
3 Ibid.
1 Ibid., p.232,
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7.3. Plotinus' Theory of Emanation:
As we all know the Neo-Platonic emanation theory is one of the three chief theories of 
existence. It states that all beings issue from the divine substance or essence. Even if this 
theory has been propounded in many forms, its focus is the relationship between God and the 
creatures, the one and the many and the universal and the particular. However, for Plotinus, 
this theory is more specific than that, for he regarded the physical world as derivative from 
the ultimate source one. This derivation is achieved through the intermediary stages of the 
intellect and the soul. Such a derivation is of a crucial significance because it emphasizes that 
the intellect and the soul in particular are responsible for the existence of our material, 
physical world. Hence, Plotinus followed the path of Plato and Aristotle in regarding the 
world as a pure derivative of the Divine and, as the latter is eternal, the former has to be 
eternal as well, hi this regard, Plotinus considers the matter as a co-eternal principle with the 
Divine, but in the same time, it is not co-absolute with it. Simply because the Divine can 
exist without the matter, but the latter cannot have any form of existence without the former. 
As mentioned above, God is the source of emanation through which everything descends, so 
the world derives from it. However, the soul is the direct cause of the world in the same way 
as the divine intellect is the cause of the soul. Therefore, the relationship that exists between 
the world and the soul is similar to that one existing between the divine intellect and the soul. 
The creator or the maker is the good, which transcends the intellect. The latter generated the 
soul that gave birth to the whole cosmos. This process of generation is present in almost all 
Hellenistic philosophies.
We have to bear in mind that, as the relationship between God and wisdom as explained at 
EE 1249bl3 refers to the theoretikon (to a part of the soul), the referred God here has to be 
an immanent one 1 : "If this God were exterior and transcendent, wisdom would be the 
supreme mental faculty, and wisdom is not appropriate for the contemplation of God2 .'" 
Therefore, the superior and the inferior mentioned at EE- 1249bl3 are respectively nous and 
phronesis . It is true that Aristotle calls the human mind 'divine', but he never calls it 'God' 
because God is superior to the human understanding(1248a29) on the one hand and God is 
always in a state of actuality, but the human understanding needs a principle to set it in 
motion(1248a 17-21) on the other hand3 .
1 Anthony Kenny, Aristotle On the Perfect Life, p.96.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p.97.
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7.4. The Hierarchy of Soul;
Soul in Islam is among the big divine secrets that are exposed to none of his creatures 
regardless of their rank and closeness to the Divine:
"And they ask you (Talking to Mohammed) concerning the Ruh (the Spirit); Say: "The Ruh 
(the Spirit): it is one of the things, the knowledge of which is only with my Lord. And of 
knowledge, you (mankind) have been given only a little1 .'1 ''
Al-Ghazali describes it ,in his Ma 'rij al-Quds, as a mild vapour proceeding from the heart to 
ascent to the brain and then to the whole body through the blood vessels. This vapour, which 
is the vehicle of life, works as a lamp and life that proceeds from it as a light. Its influence on 
the body is like the enlightenment of the lantern to the whole parts of the house. It is the 
source of knowledge, revelation and intuition and it is from the genus of angels different 
from the corporeal world 1 . Muslim scholars do think that the human soul is governed by 
hierarchy, in the sense that, there are types of souls classified according to age and 
intellectuality. There are the infant soul, the young soul and the mature one. Muslim scholars 
do consider the latter the only one, which can achieve immortality because of its full 
intellectual development and its psychological characteristics. These qualities enable this 
kind of souls to overcome death, and consequently, it can achieve its complete existence in 
the absence of the body. This point is well- highlighted by Ibn Rochd who emphasized that 
the soul could act and live independent of its body:
"The sight of the elderly is weak, not because the visual faculty has been weekend, but 
because the eye, that he uses as an instrument, has been weakened .If the elderly had the 
eyes of the young man, he would have been able to see like the young man. Besides; sleep 
provides us with a clear evidence of the substratum of the soul permanence2'."
This standpoint about the immortality of the soul is not absolute because there are some 
other scholars who regard the soul as immortal by nature regardless of its intellectual level, 
age or the body it is living in or with. Either we do adopt the first view or the second one; 
there are many unanswered questions about this immortality. Are some souls immortal and
'The Holy Qur'an, Al-Isra '(Night travel. 17), Verse.85
1 Al-Ghazali ,Ma 'rij al Quds,( The Ascent to the Divine),p.l2.
2Ernest Renan ^verroes et I'Averroisme, p. 154.
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others mortal? If all the souls achieve immortality in a particular stage of the body life, does 
this mean that they used to be mortal in the past? If they are mortal, what is their destiny? 
And, as there is a sort of hierarchy concerning the types of soul, is there the same hierarchy 
regarding the level of knowledge that each soul requires? Undoubtedly, this hierarchical 
classification is asking more questions than answering them. As mentioned before, human 
beings are not the only ensouled creatures, animals and plants do share this quality with him, 
as they pass through nourishment, growth and decay. These are the characteristics of any 
ensouled creature. In this regard, the souls are divided into three categories: the human soul 
(al-'Aql: The Intellect), the vegetative soul and the animal one. Hence, there is a sort of 
overlap between the rational soul and the irrational one. Therefore, the way in which 
medicine rules over the patient corresponds exactly to the manner in which the rational part 
of the soul rules over the irrational part of it 1 . It is not like other philosophers who do think 
that the rational part of the soul consists of superior and inferior or Aristotle who did classify 
human being to superior and inferior, which are just the rational and the irrational parts of 
the soul. However, the rational part of the soul is itself twofold2 :
"The rational soul in man abounds in marvels, both of knowledge and power. By means of it 
he masters arts and sciences, can pass in a flash from earth to heaven and back again, can 
map out the skies and measures the distances between the stars. By it also he can draw the 
fish from the sea and the birds from air, and can subdue to his service animals like the 
elephant, the camel and the horse. His five senses are like five doors opening on external 
world; but, more wonderful than this; his heart has a window which opens on the unseen 
world of spirits . "
We do deduce some points of a paramount importance from this passage: the soul here is 
only another synonym of brain and heart together. In that, it is the centre of intellectuality 
and the reservoir of emotions and feelings. This is obvious in the state of sleep, as all the 
gates of senses are closed; the individual conceives all the impressions from the invisible 
world. Furthermore, he can sometimes go further by receiving or conceiving some 
foreshadowings of the future4 . Al-Ghazali in his book Ma'rij al -Quds (Ascent to the 
Divine) gives a detailed explanation of the classification of souls by putting the soul of
'Anthony Kenny .Aristotle On the Perfect Life, p.94
2 Ibid., p.97
3Al-Ghazali .Kimya ' As-Saada ,(The Alchemy of Happiness) ,trans. Claud Field, p.22.
4Ibid.
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plants in the third category, as it is the first perfection of a natural mechanistic body that is 
subject to nourishment, growth and generation. The second category is that of the soul of 
animals, as it is the second perfection of a natural mechanistic body that perceive the 
particularities and move by will. The first category is that of human soul, as it is the first 
perfection of a natural mechanistic body that acts through rational choice and deductive 
thinking 1 . Al-Ghazali went further in his classification by including the souls of angels to all 
these categories. He argued that, unlike human beings, the souls of angels and their bodies 
are similar and you cannot find two angelic souls in the same category, every angel is a 
category himself and he is that entire category 1 . This does not mean that all souls are similar 
in these conceptions because every single soul has its own qualities and characteristics. 
Consequently, each one is responsible for specific daily activities of life. These activities are 
defined by Aristotle as growth and reproduction for the vegetative soul, sensation for the 
animal soul and rationality for the human one. As sensation is the quality that distinguishes 
animals from plants, rationality is the one, which distinguishes human beings from animals.
We have to bear in mind that despite the difference in qualities and functions between these 
kinds of soul, the nature of the soul remains the same. Hence, it is essential to make a clear 
distinction ,especially in Arabic, between soul as (Ruh) and soul as (Nafs) or as it is called in 
Christianity Nephesh. Such a distinction enables us to understand the relationship between 
soul (Ruh) and body on the one hand and between soul (Nafs) and body on the other one. In 
the monotheistic beliefs, as a whole, soul (Nafs) has always negative connotations, while 
soul (Ruh) is always associated with what is good, docile and obedient. In many occasions, 
such a distinction is made on the basis of life and death. When the human being passes away, 
for instance, the soul (Ruh) is taken away from his body, so it is here responsible for life. In 
other psychological or mental daily activities like sleeping, the soul (Nafs) is taken away 
from the body for a limited period of time. Hence, this sort of soul stands for the distinction 
between what is real and tangible and what is fictitious and absurd. Many scholars Muslim 
and non -Muslim alike built such a distinction between the two souls upon this ground. 
Therefore, they make breathing the difference; it keeps on existing with the sleeper and stops 
with the dead2 . It is worthwhile to point out that, not only reasoning that differentiates
1 Al-Ghazali JMa 'rij al-Quds, (Ascent to the Divine), pp. 16-17.
1 Ibid., p.92.
2 Jane Smith ,The Understanding of Nafs and Ruh in Contemporary Muslim Considerations of the Nature of Sleep and
Death,pp. 151-162.
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human soul from other created things, but also the reason of power, in the sense that, the 
soul rules the entire members of the body. The souls that have a special degree of power, 
master their own body and the bodies of others as well. For instance, if these souls wish a 
sick man to recover, he recovers or a healthy person to fall ill, they do it and if they want the 
presence of an absent person, he comes to them. The effects produced by these powerful 
souls -regardless of their nature good or bad- are termed miracles or sorceries'. From this 
perspective, these souls of special qualities are different from other souls in three important 
points: firstly, what others may see in dreams, they see it in daylight, secondly, while the will 
of others only affect their own bodies, these souls have the power to move bodies extraneous 
to themselves. Thirdly, the knowledge acquired by others through laborious learning, comes 
to these souls by the vehicle of intuition'.We can say that from this particular difference, 
revelation , prophecy and all future foreshadowings come to exist.
hi Greek philosophy, the only term used for soul is Psyche, and it is used in all aspects, 
whereas, in Islam, scholars are always making distinction between these two kinds of soul. 
They used them in different contexts with different meaning and connotations. Whenever 
soul (Nafs) is mentioned in the Holy Qur'an, it is mentioned as a bad, disobedient and with 
inclinations to evil, "The soul is indeed prone to evil". ", "At length his soul( the son of 
Adam) made it easy for him to kill his brother, so he killed him; so he became one of the 
losers3 . " On the contrary, the soul (Ruh) is described as holy divine and with inclinations to 
good:
"And Mary, the daughter of Amran, who guarded her chastity, so We breathed into him of 
Our Soul and she accepted the truth of the words of her Lord and His Books, and she was of 
the obedient ones4 .'''
From this perspective, soul (Nafs) is only a soul (Ruh), but it is deviated from its proper 
moral values and psychological virtues, went astray and became corrupted. According to this 
reasoning, Ruh is more sublime than Nafs, but the latter existed before Ruh. This view is 
similar to that of many philosophers who advocated the Aristotelian eternity based on the 
notion of necessity. These philosophers preferred to use the term sempiternal, rather than, 
survival of the human mind. In this way, they corroborated the pre-existence and the post- 
existence of human mind. They claimed that even if we do not remember that we have
1 Al-Ghazali, Kimva 'a al-Saada,( The Alchemy of Happiness) trans. Claud Field, p.24.
1 Ibid.
2 The Holy Qu'ran , chapter Yusuf ( Joseph. 12 ). Verse.53.
3 Ibid., Chapter, Al-Ma 'edah (the Food: 5) Verse.30.
4 Ibid., Chapter, at-Tahrim ( The Prohibition. 66), Verse. 12.
-196-
Chapter 7
existed before the body, we do feel our mind to be eternal 1 . Regarding the doctrine of the 
transmigration of the souls, Muslim philosophers in general and Ibn Rochd in particular do 
oppose such a doctrine, for its irrationality and ambiguity. Likewise, Ibn Rochd does not 
corroborate the view stating that the soul can be divided as it is the case with Socrates and 
Plato2 .hi the meanwhile, he agreed with Aristotle's entelechies doctrine asserting that the 
soul is a recipient of only one body. Hence, both soul and body do live in harmony as one 
single entity. This concept is compatible with the Rochdian view regarding the soul as 
emanated from the divine realm. This proves why our thoughts in our sleep are so dull 
unclear to the point that they dull the mirror of heart, but after death, these unclear thoughts 
vanish and things are exposed as a naked reality .The Holy Qur'an is supporting such 
analysis: " We have Stripped the veil from offthee and thy sight today is keen1. "
7.5 Shortcomings of Plotinus' Emanation Theory;
7.5.1 The Existence of Evil Dilemma:
In spite of that, most Hellenistic philosophers do hold the emanation theory; they do not 
look at it from the same angle. That is why, the Islamic principles would be in opposition 
with the Peripatetic and the Proclean concept of the emanation theory. In the meanwhile, 
most Muslim philosophers and theologians do agree with the Plotinian one. If Plotinus calls 
the one as the ultimate being, Ibn Sina's, for instance, calls it Wajib al -Wujud (Necessary 
Existent).
If we do say that Muslim philosophers do support the emanation theory, this does not mean 
that their philosophies about the emanation are compatible with the Plotinus one in every 
single respect. It is not only the case of Islam, but also that of the other Abrahamic religions: 
Christianity and Judaism. As discussed in chapter five, all these religions do agree, to some 
extent, that the world and its divergent aspects derive from the perfect and the absolute 
divine essence. However, how this can be possible when we do look at the existence of evil, 
which is in sheer opposition with the good nature of the divine? Shall we then consider the 
evil as emanating from the divine essence? If we do so, it would be a sort of contradiction in 
this theory, and if we exclude it, the situation would be even more sophisticated, for this 
theory would be incapable of proving the origins and the roots of evil as explained in chapter 
5.
!M. Kneale .Eternity and Sempiternity, p.236. 
2 Ernest Renan ^verroes etL 'Averroisme, p.455. 
'The Holy Qur'an. chapter ga/50.Verse.22.
-197-
Chapter 7
Whatever the case, the emanation 1 theory remains unique, strong and reliable, to some 
extent, in understanding some of the origins of the universe. It is worthwhile to point out 
here that, this theory is different from the cosmogonic theory of Christianity and Judaism. 
The latter sees the human existence as a result of a single creative act of moral agent, in that, 
God is in a very close personal relationship with His creatures, while the emanation theory is 
denying personality of the Divine and the creatures alike.
7.5.2 Ibn Sina's Scale of Emanations:
If we do admit that Wajib al- Wujud (The Necessary Existent) is one, and consequently, is 
the ultimate being, the question that insistently imposes itself here is how the universe, which 
is a plural, can derive from one? Ibn Sina tried to solve this dilemma by considering Wajib 
al- Wujud (The Necessary Existent) as the one that emanated only one entity through an act 
of pure reflection on itself. The Necessary Existent can only generate one, because if it 
emanates more that one, it would violate the divine unicity. This unique entity is called Al - 
Aql al- Awwal(The first Intelligence), Al-Ma'lul al- Awwal (The first Cause). The first thing 
that God created is Al-Aql. He said to it 'come forward' and it went forward. Then, He said 
'go back' and it went back 1 . 'Come forward' means that you are perfected by Me and 'go 
back' means the whole world is perfected by you. God says: "By My might and majesty I 
have certainly not created a creature dearer to Me more excellent that you. By means of you 
1 take, and by means of you I give2. " On the contrary of the Necessary Existent, the first 
intelligence produces many such as the second intelligence and heavenly bodies, for the 
plurality lying in its essence. As the first intelligence is immaterial, it is considered to be of a 
pure nature, and accordingly, a pure intelligence. Therefore, what is the relationship between 
the first intellect and the first cause? According to Ibn Sina, the first intellect reflects upon 
itself to give birth to the first cause. Thus, the first intellect has two qualities of a paramount 
importance: the possibility and the necessity, for it relates to itself and to the Divine alike. In 
this regard, the first intelligence possesses the quality of oneness and plurality. From this 
perspective, the soul is emanating from it. Therefore, Ibn Sina's view is for the emanation of
1 We have to mention here that there is a sort of superficial similarity between the emanation theory and the evolution one. 
The latter considers the scale of existence as a process starting from the indeterminate lower towards the indeterminate 
higher, but the former regards it as from the highest to the lower. 
'This prophetic tradition is classified as weak one (Not found in or not supported by the authentic Islamic sources).
2 Al-Ghazali, Ma 'rij al-Quds,( The Ascent to the Divine),p.l3.
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material bodies from immaterial substances like in the case of the active intellect. This 
view is against the Aristotelian reasoning claiming that substances with the same form 
caused the generation of all beings of the universe. As the first intelligence is the first cause, 
it has the power to generate three divergent things: the form of the first intelligence (the 
soul), the matter of the first intelligence (the body) and the second intelligence. The latter is 
responsible for generating three things as well: the third intelligence, which is the sphere of 
the sphere of the fixed stars and the body of the second sphere. Ibn Sina explained this 
process 1 of emanation by going to claim that this process goes on in succession until the 
ninth heaven and the tenth intellect is generated (Isharat, III, 1960, 214). Ibn Sina calls the 
last heavenly intellect 'the active intellect' that is responsible for the generation of our souls 
(an-Najat, 256)2 .
We have to mention here that the active intellect is considered as the last incorporeal 
intellect in these series of emanations. Accordingly, it cannot emanate any heavenly body, 
but it can emanate the substratum -matter and forms of the sublunary world. Ibn Sina went 
even further by suggesting that the active intellect emanated the prime matter or what he 
calls the substratum-matter with four forms of simple bodies (fire, air, water and earth).The 
prime matter is subjugated to many movements of the heavenly bodies before emanating 
from the active Intellect. As a result of these movements, these four forms (Fire, water, earth 
and fire) are attributed to the prime matter. Al-Ghazali in his Mi 'yar al-Ilm (The Criterion of 
Knowledge), suggested, like Ibn Sina, a solution to the problem of the plurality emanating 
from the one. He argued that the one among the Mutakallimin( Muslim Theologians) is not 
divisible neither through a power nor through an action and it is a one in number. It is like 
the gathering of the scent and the taste of the apple, for instance, in one subject. In this case, 
we do see all these things as one but in the subject and not in the number. Then, the union in 
quality is called Mushabahah (likeness), in quantity Musawat (equality), in genre Mujanasah 
(homogeneous), in kind Mushakalah (accumulation) and in parts Mutabakah (stratification). 
They are one in genre, one in kind, one in number and one in equality3 .
1 Avicenna's four forms of simple bodies (fire, water, air rand earth) are analogous to Aristotle's four fundamental material 
elements. But unlike Aristotle, Avicenna holds that these simple bodies which are imprinted on huyula (the prime matter ) 
while they emanate from above are caused by the active intellect. Moreover, for Ibn Sina, the materials for all these four 
simple bodies are common, but they differ from each other with respect to their form. Hence, one body, for example, earth, 
differs from another, for example, water not through its matter, but through its form (Compendium, 27).
2 Morewedge, Parviz 'The Metaphysica of AvicennaiVon sina)'p.!43
3 Al-Ghazali, Mi'yaral-Ilm,(The Criterion of Knowledge),p.343.
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7.5.3 Ibn Sina's Numerical Plurality of Souls:
Al- Ghazali went on to say that, all philosophers have two evidences to prove the 
immortality of the soul. The first one is covering the assumption of the mortality of the soul, 
if this did happen, it can only be in one of three ways: the soul perishes either simultaneously 
with the body or through an opposite, which is found in it or through the power of God. We 
do deduce from this analysis that the soul cannot perish through the corruption of the body 
because it is separated from it .Likewise, it cannot have an opposite, for a separate substance 
has no opposite. Besides, it is completely untrue that the power of God can attach itself to 
non-being .Al- Ghazali is objecting to the concept of these philosophers by stating that: 
"We, the theologians, do not admit that the soul is external to the body; besides, it is the 
special theory of Avicenna that the souls are numerically differentiated through the 
differentiation of the bodies, for that there should be one single soul in every respect and in 
all people brings about many impossibilities, for instance that when Zaid knows something, 
Amr should know it too, and when Amr does not know something Zaid should not know it 
either; and manv other impossibilities follow from this assumption'. "
From this statement, we do deduce that Al -Ghazali is against Ibn Sina's argument that the 
souls are numerically differentiated through the differentiation of the bodies, which means 
that they are attached to the bodies and must necessarily perish with their decay3 .Most 
philosophers are advocating Al-Ghazali's view, which is against Ibn Sina's theory. They 
claimed that wherever there is a relation of attachment and love between two things, for 
instance, the relation between the lover and the beloved or the relation between iron and the 
magnet, the destruction of one, does not necessarily cause the destruction of the other4 . Al- 
Ghazali concluded that the soul does not perish with the body, and at the same time, it does 
not live forever5 . Al-Ghazili supports his view through some Qur'anic Verses:
"Do not reckon those killed for the sake of God to be dead, but alive with their Lord, 
provided for, and delighting in what God gave them of His bounty .", "Do not say about 
those who are killed for the sake of God dead, rather they are alive 7. " This notion of 
immortality is also mentioned in the prophetic tradition stating that the souls of martyrs are
1 Averroes Jahaful al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 1, trans. Simon Den Bergh, pp. 356-357.
: Ibid p.357
- Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 AI-GhazaIi . Ma 'rij al Quds, (Ascent to the Divine),p.95.
6The Holy Qu'ran, chapter, Aljmran: The Family oflmran: 3) Verse. 160.
'ibid., chapter, Al-Baqarah( The Cow. 1 ), Verse. 154
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are in the crops of green birds going about feeding in the gardens of heaven and lodge in 
suspended lanterns under the throne 1 . Al-Ghazali concluded that the soul has neither a 
quantity nor a measure. It is not apprehended by means of the sense nor can a body 
apprehend it". If we go back to Ibn Sina's theory, we would find that many philosophers 
opposed it because they were asking what would happen to the individuation and numerical 
plurality of souls when they are separated from their matters, because the numerical plurality 
of individuals arises only through matter 1 :
"He who claims the survival and the numerical plurality of souls should say that they are in 
a subtle matter, namely the animal warmth which emanates from the heavenly bodies, and 
this is a warmth which is not fire and in which there is not a principle of fire; in this warmth 
there are the souls which create the sublunary bodies and those which inhere in these 
bodies2. "
Ibn Sina sees that creatures, or rather, entities that have no fixed order in space or nature, for 
instance, the angels and devils may constitute a simultaneous numerical infinity. This is not 
the case with the souls, as they cannot be pre-existed because before their entrance into 
bodies they would have to be either one or many. They could not be many because of the 
immaterial essence of the soul and we do know that in the immaterial essence there is no 
principium individuationis for a plurality. They cannot also be one because the one soul 
would have to be subject to division between bodies and the immaterial essence cannot be 
divided. Despite all these immaterial qualities, the souls can exist when they are separated 
from their bodies. This is quite possible, as they are distinct through the bodies in which they 
have been dwelling, through the times in which they were created, and through the 
distinctions of their forms, according to the different conditions of the bodies, they have been 
residing3 . We have to mention here that none of the philosophers is against the theory stating 
that in the elements, there is heavenly warmth and it is the substratum for the potencies, 
which produce animals and plants. However, philosophers are in a disagreement about the 
name of this heavenly warmth. Some philosophers call it 'natural heavenly potency', others 
chose the name of 'the forming power' or 'the Demiurge' who is 'the wise maker' of the 
living beings and he is the one who has created it4 .
1 Mohammed Ali as-Saboni .Mukhtasar Tafseer Ibn katheer( The Concise Interpretation of Ibn Katheer),p.l43.
2 Al-Ghazali .Ma 'rij al- £>!«&,( Ascent to the Divine),p.21
1 Averroes .Tahafut al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.I, trans. Simon Den Bergh, p.357.
2Ibid.
3 Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. II, trans. Simon Den Bergh, pp. 13-14.
4 Ibid.
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7.5.4 Aristotle's Theory of Hylomorphism and 
The Functionalist View of the Soul
The earlier philosophers held different opinions about the nature and the role of the soul. 
The Platonists thought that the universals existed as forms and Ideas, which are responsible 
for all knowledge .The natural philosophers went on to say that no universal substances 
existed in the real world and the only real things are the individuals' .Whatever the case, they 
all made from the soul a source of movement and knowledge. They regarded the soul or the 
souls of the stars as the primary cause of their motion. The rationale behind the consideration 
of the soul as a source of movement is that, what was itself in motion could move other 
things. Consequently, as the soul moves other things, it is thought that its only and primarily 
function is movement2 . We have to mention here that the soul is not entirely ignored as a 
cause of motion, what it is denied is only associating it with movement.
It is worth noting that the universe -as a homogenous entity comprising all beings- has a 
soul. Such a soul is moving itself, which means it is a fount and a source of movement. 
Therefore, if we do admit that the soul of the universe is everlasting, the universe must 
always be being moved by it. Thus, the soul of the universe is a source of movement, and in 
the meantime, unable to be that source of movement because it is a self-moved and a source 
of movement. Then, if we presume that the soul of the universe is not a source of movement, 
the universe itself should previously or subsequently not exist. Therefore, as the soul 
possesses these qualities, it is ungenerated, and imperishable. Accordingly, the heavens must 
be eternal, as they are ungenerated 3 .
This theory states that the relationship between soul and body is exactly the same 
relationship between matter and form. Aristotle's concept of the soul is biological: psuche is 
that in virtue of which a body is a living body: " Soul is the substance, in the sense of form, 
of natural body potentially having life4. " As we have seen previously, by 'substance' (ousia), 
Aristotle does not mean a Cartesian substance, which means an independently existing thing. 
According to Aristotle, psuche is not a thing because he calls it a substance 'in the sense of 
form'. From this perspective, human soul is a form of considerable complexity for it
1 Thomas Aquinas , Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries ^Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, p.5.
2 Ibid.,p.l6
3Aristole On the Heavens, 270a, 12-22
"Aristotle, DA 2, ].412a20.
-202-
Chapter 7
comprises all the capacities to think, to be nourished and to take in sensory information 
about our surroundings. Thanks to these actions, we do manage to explain the teleological 
human activities and the systems of our bodily parts 1 . In other words, our explanations are 
based on the aims of our actions and not the mechanical functions of our bodily parts. 
Aristotle also uses the distinction between matter and form to explain the passions and the 
actions of the soul. If we do take, for example, the feeling of anger, a scientist would define 
it as the boiling of blood in the vicinity of the heart, but a philosopher would define it as a 
desire for retaliation 1 . We do deduce from the two definitions that one focuses on the matter 
and the other on the form.
The reason why we are introducing functionalism here, is that many critics do think that the 
Peripatetic standpoint about the soul is compatible with many modern theories. The latter 
state that the design of objects is determined by their functions, rather than, aesthetic 
considerations. Regarding the human psuche, the functionalist interpretation holds that it is 
the form of a living body in the sense of a functional organization of bodily components2 .
It is worthwhile to mention here that Aristotle's homonymy principle states that an organ, 
which is not alive, is no longer bearing that property. For example, we cannot call a body a 
body when it is no longer alive and we cannot consider an eye as an eye, if it loses the 
faculty of sight. Thus, the physiological difference between organs determines their physical 
difference. Aristotle put this principle as follows:
"There is no such thing as face or flesh without soul in it; it is only homonymously that they 
will be called face or flesh if the life has gone out of them, just as if they had been made of 
stone or wood . "
The existence of ensouled organic bodies is beyond question for Aristotle; this means that 
these organic bodies are incapable of exercising their functions in the absence of souls. 
Consequently, they have no real existence. "...Each is in reality the thing capable of 
performing its function, such as an eye when it sees, while the one not capable of performing 
its functions homonymously (that thing), such as one dead or one made of stone4. "
1 Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty .Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, p.58. 
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Aristotle, (GA734b24) 
4 Ibid.,(Mete.390alO-\).
-203-
Chapter 7
7.6. Drawbacks of Aristotle's Homonymy Principle; 
7. 6.1 Matter of Living Organism:
Peripatetic philosophers faced many systematic problems when they tried to specify the 
matter component of a living body. These philosophers argued that the form of the matter 
component body is its soul. This means that the matter of any component must have that 
form, and at the same time, it must not have it necessarily. The matter of an animal, for 
example, is its body, but this is not compatible with the homonymy principle, as it is not 
possible to pick out the matter without the form, for if what we pick out is not alive, then, 
what we pick out is not a body. Hence, the homonymy principle is not in good tune with the 
fulfilment of the contingent specification requirement 1 as John Ackrill (1921-2007) says: 
"The body we are told to pick out as the material 'constituent' of the animal depends for its 
very identity on its being alive, in-formed by psuche2. "
If we go back, all over again, to the four basic inanimate elements earth, air, fire and 
water, of which living things are composed, we would realise that these elements do satisfy 
the contingent specification requirement, as they are existing independent of composing a 
living body. However, they are too far to be the matter of a living hylomorphic compound, 
for they are not even endowed with a potential life, "Until there is a living thing... there is 
no 'body potential alive'; and once there is, its body is necessarily actually alive3. "
7. 6. 2 Functional and Compositional Matter:
Undoubtedly, the homonymy principle focuses on the paramount importance of function in 
the definition of a living being and its organic systems, but this leads us to wonder whether 
there was a time before the beginning of life at which a non-living body was potentially 
alive. Likewise, can we pick out something, especially of a living animal that is functioning 
in certain characteristic ways although it will finally cease to be so and which continues to 
exist? If this happens even if for a short period of time, can we consider what we have picked 
out as a body? -. Furthermore, Aristotle provides us with the example of the eye at
1 Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty JZssays on Aristotle's De Anima, p.68.
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., p.69. 
4 Ibid.
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(DA 412 21-3) and that of the finger at (Met.l035b24)to make us to treat the whole body as 
we have treated its organs, simply because Aristotle sees the natural bodies as the organs of 
the soul(DA 415bl8-19). As Aristotle is committed to the homonymy principle and its 
application to living organisms, it is controversial to argue that Aristotle takes each living 
organism to have some matter, which is only accidentally ensouled. The last problem with 
Aristotle's homonymy principle lies in the Aristotelian treatment of all the parts of animals - 
including homoiomerous parts such as flesh and blood-as defined by their functions. This is 
the fact that makes them in need of a soul to perform these functions. From this perspective, 
if the anhomoiomerous parts such as eyes, limbs and hearts are composed of functionally 
defined homoiomerous parts, then, organic bodies cannot be made up by any matter, which 
is only accidentally ensouled. For this reason, many commentators do not believe that any of 
the animal's matter can survive the loss of soul'.As the living body is composed of flesh and 
blood, cannot share any of its matter with its corpse. This is so clear in this Aristotle's 
statement:
"If the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. For this is the being (ousia) of an eye 
according to its account (logos).But the eye is the matter of sight, which (sight) taking leave 
it is no longer an eye, except homonymously ,like the one made of stone or painted. And it is 
necessary to take what is said of the part- to apply to whole living body, for as part is to part 
so perception as a whole is to the whole perceptive body as such. But it is not that-body- 
having lost its soulfto aprobeblekos ten psuchen) which is potentially such as to live, but the 
one having -soul-; and the seed and the fruit are potentially such a body- the seed and the 
fruit are potentially bodies potentially such as to live-2. "
In other words, Aristotle tries to draw a distinction between the homoiomerous and the 
anhomoiomerous parts of animals. The former do not perish in the same time with the animal 
itself, but they decompose separately, or at least they survive for a while, but the latter perish 
simultaneously with the body. Aristotle's account is well -depicted when he states that: 
"The function of it -flesh- is less clear than that of the tongue. Similarly also with fire, but- 
its function is probably even less clear naturally than the function of flesh. And similarly also
'Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty £ssays on Aristotle's De Anima, p.79. 
2(DA 412bl8-27)
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with plants and inanimate things such as bronze and silver. For all these are - they are-what 
they are-by some potentiality to act or to be affected, just like flesh and sinew. But the 
accounts (logoi) of these are not precise. So it is not easy to discern when they exist 
(huparchei) and when they do not, unless a thing is very far gone and the shapes alone 
remain, as when the bodies of very old corpses suddenly turn to ashes in their coffins'. "
Aristotle's commitment to the distinction between functional and compositional flesh is 
also supported through the generation and corruption processes. He claimed that flesh, bone 
and each of the parts like these are twofold (ditton) "... For both the matter and the form are 
called flesh or bone2. " In this context, Aristotle is talking about two things: the form and 
the matter and each of which is called 'flesh' and not only about one thing capable of being 
considered in two different ways. This is well- highlighted when Aristotle ascribes different 
properties-and implicitly different criteria of identity- to the form and the matter3 and from 
his claim that this phenomenon is clearer when we draw a distinction between the 
anhomoiomerous parts and the homoiomerous ones. In the case of the anhomoiomerous 
parts, the matter is different from the form4 .
7.7 Conclusion:
There is no room for doubt that the notion of the soul is the most controversial topic ever, 
as it implies all what we have discussed before about the eternity of the world. By 
unravelling the secrets of the soul's nature, we can achieve a comprehensive understanding 
of the architecture of the whole universe. That is why, it is of a paramount importance to 
prove either the eternity or the creationism of the soul, as without finding the underlying 
cause of the soul's nature, it is extremely difficult to prove the nature of the entire universe. 
Soul and universe are correlatives, in the sense that, there is not just a sort of mutual 
relationship between the two, but also an overlap, as what can be applied to the soul is 
applied to the universe and vice- versa. Definition of immortality itself is another dilemma 
we are facing when discussing the immortality of the soul. Some philosophers do mean by
1 (Mete. 390a 14-24)
2 (GC 321b22-32)
3Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ,Essays on Aristotle'sDe Anima,p.8\.
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immortality of the soul, the survival of the soul after the separation from its body, others its 
coming back to a new corporeal life in the form of a re-birth or even to as a matter or what is 
called in Hinduism the avatar. A third party sees such immortality as a complete eternity that 
is achieved after the discamation of the soul. If we do contemplate all these doctrines and 
theories, we would notice the size of this fierce dispute. Theologians and philosophers alike 
tried their best to build a very coherent and homogeneous set of arguments to persuade their 
adversaries, but at the end, everyone sticks firmly to his standpoint without amendments or 
abridgments even though many of these philosophers and theologians were contemporaries 
to each other. This explains why history kept all these records, sometimes in depth details, of 
philosophical and theological works about the nature of the universe, simply because it is, as 
it was, extremely difficult to refute some theories or falsify certain doctrines. All what a 
philosopher or a theologian can do, is to support a theory against another one. Therefore, all 
what it is about is the degree of support or refutation.
If we do look at Plato' theory stating that there is only one eternal soul that is divided in 
bodies and goes back to its original unity after its separation from these bodies, we would 
notice that it is considered as absurd, if we face it with the necessity of thought criteria 1 . As 
soul has no quantity, it cannot be subject to division and distribution. The same applies to 
eternal will and temporal creation, the emanation theory and the existence of evil, the 
functionalist and the compositional matter. Definitely, Plato's view of the nature and the 
destiny of the soul based on separation and division and the supposed return to the origin is 
compatible, to some extent, with what we do believe in terms of the separation and the 
return. Regarding the division of the soul, as it is mentioned by Al-Ghazali, is not rational, as 
the soul does not possess a quantity. Besides, the return of the soul to the origin as stated by 
Plato is unclear, as we do believe that the soul has not a specific origin. Plato was thinking 
this way, as he does believe in the existence of one eternal soul. The assertion that there is 
one eternal soul open widely the gates to many interpretations and divergent explanations 
such as is that eternal soul only the soul of the Creator Himself (Demiurge as called by 
Plato)? Is it separated from Him? Or is it co-eternal with Him? The most rational explanation 
is that there is only one Eternal Principle Who is the Almighty God .Hence, we cannot talk
'Averroes ,Tahafut al-Tahq/ut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol.1, p. 15.
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about something else eternal beside His eternity whatsoever it is, soul or primary matter. 
The existence of two eternities is self- contradictory, as we can only consider an eternal 
power as eternal, if it is the only power characterized by such quality. The existence of two 
eternal powers is a sheer breach of the main criterion of eternity. To conclude this 
discussion, we have to mention that the soul, regardless of its kind, nature and destiny is 
considered among God's creatures. It is not only the second part of every individual's life, 
but the third one beside the body and 'Nafs'. As its place is on Earth in the time of human 
being's life and heaven -where it should be- after his death, it can only be created either in 
the time when God created human race or before it. The separation of the soul from the body 
it dwelled in its lifetime and the return to its origin does not mean necessarily that it is 
eternal. If we do believe that there is something eternal, it would be 'Nafs' other than Soul 
(Ruh), as the former is prior to both the latter and the body, and if we want to put them in a 
chronological order, Nafs will come first, followed by Ruh, then, body. The distinction 
between Nafs and Ruh came from their functions, as the former possesses the faculties of 
intelligence and distinction and the latter is responsible for breath and movement. This 
explains the mysterious activity of sleep in which Nafs is seized and not Ruh. It is 
worthwhile to point out here that this triangular combination between Nafs, Soul, and body 
does exist only in Islamic conceptions. Such triangular combination does stand for the moral 
conflict existing in the inner self of every human being to achieve the worldly rest and the 
hereafter happiness. The human being comes out from this supernatural war either a 
triumphant or defeated: "And the soul and its perfection! So He reveals to it its way of evil 
and its way of good; He is indeed successful who causes it to grow, and he indeed fails who 
buries it1 . "
The human being, since a foetus in the womb of his mother, is imprisoned in the placenta of 
spirit in three obscurities: the obscurity of Nafs (soul), the obscurity of Tab' (custom), and 
the obscurity of Hawa (passion)2 . Ibn Hazm in his work al-Akhlaq wa al -Siyyar 
(Mannerism and Behaviours),describes these obscurities of the soul and its inclinations. The 
human self has a priority over the inanimate and the animals' souls regarding the faculty of
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter as-Shams : the Sun.91, Verses.7-10
2 Ibn Kayyim al- Jawziyah. Tank al- Hijratayn Wa Bab As-Saadatayn (The Path of two Migrations and the Gate of two 
Happinesses,), p. 24.
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virtue, which he (the man) shares with the angels. When the man for instance, does not put 
his bravery in its right position, the lion or the tiger can be more brave than he can and if he 
is proud of carrying weights, the donkey is powerful than him. If he is boasting that he is so 
fast, the hare is faster than he is and if he is satisfied with his melodious voice, the birds are 
better than he is. There is no superiority in this case, as man is surpassed by animals, but 
whose distinction is strong, his knowledge broad and his deeds benevolent, is the one who 
can be surpassed only by angels and the virtuous men 1 .
The supporters of the eternity of the soul built their stance upon the fact that the soul does 
not perish with the body. Is it immaterial? Is it without quantity? Is it a generator? It is well- 
known, through human experience that everything, which is not subject to practical 
observation and scientific experience, is beyond human reason. This widely open the gates to 
divergent interpretations, which are, in the most of time, very difficult to refute even if they 
are built upon fragile grounds, as we have not the adequate knowledge to elaborate strong 
theories or falsify old ones. This inadequacy makes the influence of religious revelation 
operates efficiently. This does not mean that we are turning our back to science or any other 
rational explanation for two main reasons: first, religion and science are two faces of the 
same coin, in the sense that, they are just vehicles of knowledge. Secondly, we did not resort 
to religious revelations until we have lost faith in scientific explanations. Furthermore, there 
is no collision of whatsoever between religious revelation and scientific truths. The 
irrefutable evidence proving the exactitude of our words, is the scientific brand-new theories 
about all the astonishing wonders of our cosmos that are in tune, in most cases, with the 
ancient religious revelation. Not to mention that religious revelation itself is teeming with 
scientific facts to give the full credibility to the credo on the one hand and fortify the belief 
of its adherents on the other hand.
*#####********#*##**##*#****#*##***#*#**#****##************#***
Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi ^1-Akhalq wa al-Siyyar,( Mannerism and Behaviours),p.4.
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CHAPTER 8:
ON PHILOPONUS AGAINST PROCLUS
AND ARISTOTLE ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD:
8.1. Philoponus against Proclus:
8.1.1 The World between Religionism and Paganism:
Before shedding more light on Philoponus' works, we have to mention that this grammarian 1 
was known to medieval Arabic-speaking world better than he is known to the Occident. 
Many of Philoponus' works were known to the Occident as only fragments, while medieval 
Arabic -speaking scholars had access to the integral text2 . Philoponus' works, and until the 
sixteenth century, heavily influenced the medieval writers through Arab intermediaries3 . 
Philoponus' reputation has been gained from his commentaries on Aristotle's works and the 
rejection of many of his fundamental doctrines4 . Philoponus did not attack only Aristotle, but 
Proclus as well before him, but many critics and scholars do find the contra Aristotelem less 
interesting than the earlier contra Proclum. However, for Simplicius the contra Aristotelem 
is the most important work to the point that he informs us that he had not read the contra 
Proclum .Whatever the case; both his works were directed towards the pagan belief in the 
eternity of the world, but the contra Aristotelem does focus on the outmoded belief in a 
geocentric universe5 . Philoponous tried hard to convince his adversaries that Christianity is 
right in its belief that the universe had a beginning by turning the arguments of the pagans 
against them. Philoponus argued that if the world is eternal and had no beginning, then it 
would have passed through a finite number of years, and even if this assumption is quite 
impossible,it is accepted by Aristotle and adopted by the pagan Neo-Platonists. Accordingly, 
Philoponus refuted such an assumption by claiming that:
"If the past years up to the present were infinite, their number would soon be greater than 
infinity, and if some planets had revolved infinitely often, the revolutions of others would be 
many times infinity . "
The Islamic thought represented by school of Baghdad, which will be known to the Christian 
philosophical school in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, and its prominent pioneers Ibn 
Sina and Al- Farabi has many works regarding this controversial issue. If we do take, for 
instance, Al- Farabi, he attacked Philoponus' concept of the eternity and the creation of the
1 The Grammarian is the pseudo of Philoponus in all Arabic sources.
2Joel L. Kraemer, A lost passage from Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem in Arabic translation,p.318.
3Richard Sorabji fhiloponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science,?. 1052.
4 Jhon Philoponus, On Aristotle's "On Coming-to-Be and Perishing", Carl Pearson, p.303.
5 Jhon Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, trans. Christian Wilberg, p.20.
6 Ibid.
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world in a four major works. Al Farabi does think that Philoponus is completely wrong to 
attribute the eternity of the physical world to Aristotle. Al- Farabi reached this judgement 
about Philoponus' works as his interpretation of Aristotle is derived from the spurious 
'Theology of Aristotle'. This is an Arabic distorted version of texts by Alexander, Plotinus 
and Proclus to present God as the Creator out of nothing; this means that He had given the 
universe a beginning 1 . 
8.1.2 The Ungeneration and Imperishability of the World:
This is the most controversial point that has been raised by every single philosopher from 
the pre-Socratic philosophers; passing through the Neo- Platonists, the medievalists to 
modem ones. Socrates says on the eve of Timaeus' discourse "Everything that has come to 
be there is a passing out of existence2." He claimed that he was not speaking for himself, but 
the Muses that were speaking. If this doctrine of the Muses is true, anything for which there 
is no passing out of existence is generated. Hence, as there is no passing out of existence for 
the world, it is generated, which means that it is uncreated and then everlasting.
Many Hellenistic philosophers do agree somehow with this Socratic view that the universe 
is indissoluble and everlasting. They put every single effort to cogently prove that through a 
plenty of theories and principles. Among these philosophers Proclus, who supported the 
Platonic and the Peripatetic standpoint about the eternalism of our world. He went on to say, 
"If the creator alone bound the world together, he alone may unbind it...it is in every way 
indissoluble except for the one who bound it together." Therefore, the creator would not 
unbind the world because it is himself who says, "It is the act of an evil being to wish to 
unbind what has been put together and is in good state3." Hence, we are before two 
probabilities, either the creator did not put the world together well. This means that he is not 
an excellent creator or he put it together well and will not unbind it, unless he becomes an 
evildoer. This is not possible because of the good nature of the divine essence4 . If we do 
believe that the universe is imperishable; we unconsciously believe that it is ungenerated. 
Plato was accused by the Hellenes of using 'ambiguous' and 'unusual 'terms in describing 
the world. He considered the world as generated and in the meantime, he assigned that it is 
ageless and imperishable. Such a beginning is in relation to one of the six beginnings, which 
are matter, form, instrument, efficient cause, paradigmatic cause and final cause. In all these,
'John Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, trans. Christian Wilberg, p.20.
2 Ibid., p. 13
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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he meant a temporal beginning .Porphyry( ca.234-305 AD) states that the world is described 
as generated by Plato because it is notionally 'composite' even though it was not put together 
with respect to time 1 . Proclus went on to say the world is thought to be generated by Plato 
because it has its being in coming to be and because it is generated with respect to 
causation2 .Plato claimed that the world is 'dissoluble' and 'mortal by nature. In the 
meantime the world is ageless and free of disease, albeit it is not so by nature. Furthermore, 
there is nothing outside the world that could destroy it. However, it is perishable because of 
the finite nature of its own power. We have to depict that Proclus was entirely for this 
standpoint .Likewise, there are many Hellenes and non-Hellenes alike who exploited the 
sophisticated nature of Plato's wording to explain his theories about the eternity of the world 
in the way they see it compatible with their own beliefs. We have to bear in mind that not 
only Plato's wording, which was open to divergent interpretations, but that of many of the 
Hellenes such as Lucretius whose wording never gave a thought to the doctrine of creation 
through a divine norm when he established his fundamental principle 'nothing ever comes 
from nothing by divine power' 3 . Likewise, Democritus held to the eternity of atoms, but not 
to the eternity of the present order of things and the Epicureans despite the indestructibility 
of their atoms, believed that the Earth is mortal. Not to mention the Stoics who denied the 
eternity of the world, as the present world is only one showing, as it were, of a reel of motion 
pictures, that reel may be shown many times, it can be even an endless reel, but this present 
showing has an end 4 .
8.1.3 The Universe and the Law of Contraries:
Proclus assumes that everything that perishes, it is perishable as a result of an external factor 
attacking it from the outside world. If it perishes, it has to be perishing to something else. 
This means that if there is no such perishing power outside our universe, the latter must be 
imperishable and ungenerated. Everything that is generated must be coming from something 
else. In this case, we are talking about the existence of something else other than the 
universe5 . What is striking about the Proclean universe is that when we assume that there is
1 John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8, p. 14
2 Ibid., p. 15.
3 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things,(De rerum natura),p. 150.
4 Gordon H. Clark ,Plotinus on the Eternity of the World, p. 132.
5 John Philoponus ,Plriloponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8, p. 116.
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an outsider (power) that is superior, mighty and may has the ability to destroy our universe, 
we are admitting the existence of something, which is beyond our knowledge of the 
existence. In other words, it would be something-different from our universe in every single 
aspect- that we cannot apply the laws of existence to it .This means that such a thing would 
be made of other dimensions and submitted to different norms from the ones we are familiar 
with in our intriguing universe we know-to some extent-that they are existing. Proclus carries 
on his arguments by stating that, if there is another world other than our universe, definitely, 
it would be utterly different from ours as he said:
"Contraries derive from one another ,and change into one another... and if on the other 
hand, these are contraries, governed by the law of contraries .then the universe too changes 
into the contrary form which it come to be . "
Aristotle states, "All things that come to be come to be out of, and all things that pass away 
pass into their contraries or (xac) Intermediates (between their contraries). And the 
intermediates (arise) from the contraries. For example, the colours come out of white and 
black .And so all of the things, which come to be by nature, are contraries or things, which 
come to be out of contraries . "
Definitely, Aristotle is not thinking of contraries in a linguistic vision, but rather, a 
metaphysical one, in that, the relation between colours black and white and not a relation 
between the linguistic predicates' black and white' 3 . When we do discuss generation and 
corruption, we are discussing alteration, locomotion4 and changes that occur not only in 
quality, but also in locomotion and quantity as well5 .Therefore, these contraries change from 
privation to possession and much more from possession to privation. The change from 
privation to possession is quite impossible because there are some privations that cannot 
change into possessions. As the world, is imperishable, it does not change into a contrary and 
it has not come to be6 . Thus, when they are two contraries, it is impossible that there is a path 
from the first to the second. On the contrary, there is one from the second to the first. 
Therefore, regardless of the nature of the disorderly and the ordered, either the disorderly is 
the privation of the ordered or they are contraries, the arguments supporting the ungeneration
1 John Philoponus fhiloponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8, p. 117.
2 Aristotle .Physics, 15, \S8b2l-26.cpMetaphysicsl 1055bl6-17. De Coe/o/3, 270al4ff, Generation and Corruption^ 7, 
323b28-324a9
3 Aristotle J)e Interpretation, 717b20
4 Bogen James , Change and Contrariety in Aristotle, p. 1.
5 Aristotle fhysics K, 226a25ff.
6 John Philoponus fhiloponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8,p. 117.
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of the world are stronger than those backing its imperishability 1 . The dictum stating that 
everything that perishes faces this destiny, as an outcome of something else attacking it from 
outside is refutable, as the world is susceptible to the perishability by nature even if it is the 
only existent and there is nothing outside of it. If we do go by this dictum, we will be 
asserting that everything that comes into existence does so upon the debris of another thing. 
Besides, we are affirming that nothing exists outside the world, which means that nothing 
contributed or interfered in its existence. From this perspective, we do deduce that not 
everything that comes into existence depends on its existence on a contrary. By the law of 
analogy, this applies to the whole universe, as one entity made of things, if it does come to 
be, it is not a necessity that it has to come from a contrary. Proclus tried hard to solve these 
difficulties, as it is possible for possession to return to privation by claiming that:
"If the world has indeed, as Plato holds, come to be out of the disorderly, it will inevitably 
follow, both in the natural course of events and by the will of God, that it changes back into 
the disorderly , that is to say, into its own privation, from which it has come to be . "
Proclus tried to defend Plato's hypothesis stating that everything that is perceptible has two 
qualities, it does come to be and it is perishable against Aristotle's one that says although the 
heaven and the entire world are perceptible, they do not have Plato's perception qualities 
manifested in coming into being and the perishability2 . However, we have to bear in mind 
that this argument can only be useful if we do admit that the whole world, and all celestial 
bodies, do come to be. Proclus attacked the Aristotelian claim that no finite body has infinite 
power because if the world is finite, it does not have infinite power. Accordingly, the world 
that has no infinite power does not have external existence, which means that the world has 
not an everlasting existence. Aristotle himself states that the everlasting existence is a 
property of eternity3 ."
We have to bear in mid that this argument can only be useful if we do admit that the whole 
world and all celestial bodies do come to be. Proclus attacked the Aristotelian claim that no 
finite body has infinite power because if the world were finite, it would not have infinite 
power. Accordingly, the world that has no infinite power does not have external existence,
1 John Philoponus fhiloponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8,p. 117.
'Ibid., p. 118.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.,p.ll9.
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which means that the world has not an everlasting existence. Aristotle himself states that the 
everlasting existence is a property of eternity 1 . The Peripatetic stances themselves prove that 
the world does not belong to eternal things; even if Aristotle argues that the world is eternal. 
We can call this a self- contradiction or theories that were still in an embryonic stage at that 
time. Whatever the case, and ironically, Aristotle who is supposed to be supporting the 
eternity of the world, he is providing us with many useful arguments supporting its demise 
and its perishability. Proclus concluded that the world does not exist from its own nature, but 
rather, from a source, which is outside of it:
"Nor is what is true of that which always is also true of that which is always coming to be (it 
is not the case that) infinite power belongs to the latter on account of its always coming to be 
as it does to the former on account of its always being. But it does (belong) to its maker, and 
on that account it too is always coming to be, forever gaining (the property of) being thanks 
to (dia) that which always is by the terms of its own existence, and not having the 'always' in 
its own right. And so the definition of that which comes to be would also fit the world1 . "
We do deduce from the Proclean analysis that everything that comes to be, has to perish, 
but this does not apply completely to our universe:
"This whole (universe) remains in (a state of) becoming (and) comes to be (but) does not 
perish because of the being it has drawn off from that which is. Therefore, because in its own 
right that which comes to be qualifies for the definition, he also refers to it as perishing, 
since by its own it is such . "
We do come to know with Proclus that as the universe is infinite, it does not possess infinite 
power. Consequently, what initiates infinite movement, does so by infinite power. That is 
why, the motionless cause of infinite movement for the universe has to have infinite power 
itself. This would be obvious if we do separate the universe from that cause, then, it would 
not keep moving ad infinitum, but rather, it would cease its movement and vice versa.
1 John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8, p.l 19.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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The Proclean world will remain imperishable as long as there is nothing outside of it to 
destroy it. Likewise, Proclus assumes that if the world comes into existence, as a whole made 
out of wholes, a perfect thing made out of perfect things, and it is combining all these things 
within itself, it would not perish because there is nothing outside that can attack it. By 
combining all these things, the world has not left any causes of its destruction outside of it. 
Therefore, nothing can destroy the world, and at the same time, the world cannot perish by 
itself. Accordingly, what cannot perish, as there is nothing able to destroy it, is imperishable 
by nature. The second Proclean supposition is that if the world, as a body, is of naturally 
finite power, and if finite power were perishable, all over again, the world would be 
imperishable by nature 1 .
Proclus put his entire system about the destiny of the world including all his arguments in 
the following passage:
" One and the same thing will be both naturally perishable because it is of finite power and 
naturally imperishable because it has nothing else outside of itself to attack and destroy it. 
So if it is impossible for both sides of a contradiction to be true at the same time, and if it is 
true that the world is of finite power, then it will be naturally perishable. But it is naturally 
perishable; it will be false that it is naturally imperishable .But it would be naturally 
imperishable if everything that perishes perished as a result of something else attacking it 
from outside. If, then it is not naturally imperishable, and if there is nothing apart from it 
that could destroy it, since it contains everything within itself,then, although perishable, it 
will not be destroyed by something else attacking it from outside2. "
In the same respect, Proclus does not agree with Plato about the fact that everything 
ordered emerged from the disorderly and the latter is the privation of the ordered. This is the 
fact that makes the ordered, which is the world, imperishable even if it has come into 
existence. However, Plato does not deny that, in the natural order of things, the ordered can 
change to the disorderly. The Platonic logic turns around the fact that since you come into 
existence, you are not indissoluble. Likewise, the world is imperishable, as it acquires the 
qualities of indissolubility and immortality through God' will even if it is dissoluble by 
nature.
'John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Proclus'on the Eternity of the World 6-8, p. 121. 
2 Ibid.
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From this perspective, Plato does not only assert that the world is imperishable, but he 
affirms that it has to be imperishable as well: " He does not claim that it is the unlimited 
power of the world's nature that is the cause of its imperishability , but that is the will of the 
creator . " Proclus denies the emergence of the ordered from the disorderly and even if such 
an emergence did happen, it is thanks to God' will, while Plato denies the interference of 
God' will in the emergence of the ordered from the disorderly2 .
There is no room for doubt that this Proclean analysis of the destiny of the world helps us 
to come out with many conclusions: everything that is perishable is so because of a defect 
within itself and nothing does possess a power within itself that can threat its existence. The 
Platonic view about the destiny of the world that it has come to be is in support of the 
religious standpoint concerning the creation of the world. However, it is not in support of its 
perishability, as Plato does believe in its immortality. For the same reason, we have the 
Proclean support when he states that the emergence of the orderly from the disorderly is 
done by both the course of events and the will of God. Therefore, we have more arguments 
supporting the perishability of the world from those who do support its imperishability such 
as Proclus and Plato, hi the same time, we have their support about its coming into being and 
the assertion that there is something called the will of God that interferes in the natural 
course of events in some way or another. Plato asserts that the world is imperishable and he 
argues, in the meantime, that such imperishability is not the cause of a natural course of 
events, but rather, it is the will of God:
''''If it were that absolutely necessary for something corporeal to last forever, it could not be 
imperishable unless the power of the creator provided it with everlasting continuance, since, 
as far as the law or nature goes, no body has everlasting existence (to aei einai) ."
Finally, we have to add that the disorderly and the ordered are not contraries by Plato's 
testimony itself when he says that the ordered is nothing but the world and we do know that 
the world is a substance. As the latter does not have its genesis from a contrary, definitely, 
the ordered and the disorderly are not opposed as contraries, but rather, as form and 
privation.4
1 John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Proclus on the Eternity of the World 6-8.p. 127. 
2 Ibid.,pp.l26-127
3 Ibid., p. 127.
4 Ibid.
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8.2 Philopouns against Aristotle:
8.2.1 Philoponus against the Aristotelian Theory of the Aether:
There is no room for doubt that the contra Aristotelem was so famous to the point that it 
is a good resource for reference and debates in Islamic world and heavily influenced almost 
all Muslim scholars especially Ibn Rochd, Al -Farabi , Ibn Sina and Al- Kindi. Likewise, it 
had influenced the Latin West outstanding scholars such as Bonaventure (1221-1274) and 
Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274). In the same way, it had left its traces in the works of 
Jewish thinkers like Gersonides' 1 Milhamot Adonai( wars of God) and Hasdai Cresca's 
Hashem' (DVJH vjivp : The Lord). Philoponus was not the first one who fiercely attacked 
Aristotle's fifth element. According to Simplicius, some early Peripatetics like Xenarchus(l s( 
century BC) devoted a whole work to show his complete disagreement with the Aristotelian 
theory of the Aether in a debate about natural movement and place3 .
Philoponus used many of the theories, elaborated by his predecessors, to defend his 
Christian belief based on the denial of the eternity of the world .That is why, he was accused 
by Simplicius of stealing many arguments from Xenarchus. Whatever the case, among the 
theories Philoponus used to refute the Aristotelian theory of the Aether, is the theory of 
epicycles elaborated by both Hipparchus (ca. 190 120BC) and Ptolemy. Philoponus claimed 
that, as this theory made the celestial motions both eccentric and complex and as the fifth 
elements' rotation is simple, the Aristotelian theory is already facing serious difficulties. 
Simplicius was somewhere between the Platonic and the Peripatetic views, as he is with 
Plato who mentioned in the Timaeus, that there are only four elements and with Aristotle, 
with some reservations, that there exists a fifth element, but it is only made of the purest 
parts of the four known elements .
It is worthwhile to point out that although Plato's Timaeus mentions that the heavens have 
a beginning, the other Neo-Platonists, except Philoponus, have their own speculations even if 
they are not too far from their master. We have to understand that Philoponus' theories,
' Gersonides is the Latinised name of Levi ben Gershon (1288-1344 AD)
2 There are plenty of names given to God in Jewish tradition: Adonai (the Lord), Elohim (the \awmaker),Shaddai (the
Guardian of the doors of Israel), Yahweh (nin 1 : term used in Hebrew bible), Jehovah [ni rv), tetragrammaton
(TETpafpdfj^arov ) which is a Greek term used in Hebrew bible.
3 Siorvanes Lucas ,Philopomis on Aristotle,p. 109
4 John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World. Book 1. trans.by Christian Wilberg, p.22.
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objections and refutations were always within the scope of religion in general and 
Christianity in particular. As he was always trying to establish a sort of compatibility 
between the religious messages and the Platonic -Peripatetic conceptions, he was accused of 
misunderstanding them and of his failure to establish such reconciliation. Undoubtedly; 
Philoponus was fascinated by the debates and the arguments of both his contemporaries and 
his predecessors, but at the same time, as a philosopher holding a monotheistic Christian 
belief, he considered the Platonic-Peripatetic views as an explicit denial of the divinity of the 
heavens, and consequently, atheistical speculations of the universe as a whole.
Philoponus started his fierce attacks against Aristotle by criticizing his concept of the 
relation between the nature and the movement in elementary bodies. Philoponus does agree 
with Aristotle that cosmological movements are caused by nature, which is a principle of 
motion. In the meantime, he went on to say that it is not necessary to suppose the existence 
of a fifth element that is added to the other four basic primary bodies. Furthermore, the 
circular motion is not prior to rectilinear motion as Aristotle claimed, but it is considered as 
one of the natural motions of fire and air. Accordingly, the postulation of a fifth celestial 
element 'the Aether' is not out of necessity 1 .
Philoponus objected to Aristotle's thesis that in case of simple physical bodies, which are 
the elementary bodies: earth, water, air, fire and Aether, nature is a principle of a single 
motion2 . If different natures do generate different movements, the same movements have to 
be generated by the same movements. This is not always true if we do take water and earth, 
for instance, they move with the same movement, and in the meantime, their natures are 
completely different. Moreover, if the case of bodies that are different in nature such as 
water and earth, can move with the same movement is true, then, the same rule can be 
applied to the bodies that move with different movements can be of the same nature by 
means of contraposition .
What is striking about Philoponus second arguments is that the heavens and the sublunary 
bodies are of the same nature. However, they move with a different movement. This example
1 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book I, trans. Christian Wilberg, p.23
2Aristotle J)e Caelo 1.2, 268bl4-16
3 John Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book I, trans. Christian Wilberg, p.23
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invalidates, to some extent, his second argument'.Aristotle established a sort of correlation 
between simple bodies manifested in both the elements and simple motions and composite 
bodies and composite motions. He also drew a distinction between upward and downward 
motions , but he fails, according to Philoponus, to draw such a distinction between the 
eastward and the westward motions. Aristotle also did not give any importance to the 
differences in speed of the divergent celestial bodies. Furthermore, Aristotle's assumption 
that the movement of the celestial bodies is circular is not compatible with the astronomical 
theories of eccentrics and epicycles.
Philoponus summarized his objections to the Peripatetic concept of the movement of the 
celestial bodies by stating that the circular and the rectilinear cosmological motion cannot be 
compared, as the former does speak about the movement of a whole and the latter does speak 
about the movement of the parts3 .
Aristotle, like Proclus, and unlike Plato, relies on the law of contraries to assert that the 
heavens have to be only eternal, which means ungenerated and imperishable, as all things are 
generated out of a contrary and perish into a contrary. This is not, according to Aristotle, the 
destiny of the heavens, for they have no contrary, as there is no contrary to circular motion. 
Philoponus accused Aristotle of form and privation opposites (antikeimena) and in some 
cases contraries (enantia), without making a differentiation between cases in which the cold 
body becomes hot and vice versa or how a shapeless body can be turned into a piece of art4 . 
Philoponus moves to talk about the process of generation itself, as Aristotle and Proclus 
focused all the time on this point to prove that the world is eternal, as it is ungenerated.
1 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book I, trans. Christian Wilberg,p.23
2 The Greek astronomical theories attempted to explain the phenomenon of the complex movements of the planets by a 
theory, both mathematical and physical, that heaven consisted of a set of transparent spheres (the heavens) which carried the 
heavenly bodies around on distinct courses. So far Aristotle agreed .But it was later added that the spheres revolved at a 
different speeds around points which did not coincide with the centre of the universe(hence eccentrics).The stars and 
planets were much smaller rotating sphere (the epicycle), if apparent irregularity of a Planet's motion required this(de 
Caelol.2,268b26-269a2).
3John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, p.45. 
4Ibid., Book IV, p.79,
-220-
Chapter 8
At least it was not like the Platonic 1 view stating that even though the world is generated, 
it is eternal. The Philoponus' process of generation is quite different, in the sense that, not all 
things, which are generated, do require a pre-existing substrate, as the creation ex nihilo 
means that the necessary condition for the generation of anything is generated as well. That 
is why, the form is created together with the substrate2 , hi the whole discussion, Aristotle 
was accused by Philoponus, and many others, of sophistry. Aristotle, and in his attempts to 
prove that the world is ungenerated and imperishable, he focused on the heavens. Once he 
proved that the heavens are ungenerated and imperishable, he applied that to the whole 
world. Aristotle had in his mind that the heavens are the only part of the world that move 
with a circular movement:
"How, then, did he permit himself to speak of the entire world in place of this part of the 
world (for what is made evident about certain parts of the world, whether a state or anything 
else, need not necessarily be rue of the entire world), and not distinguish between the two, 
and this either unintentionally, or intentionally as someone who employs sophistry? For, to 
shift one's ground from the particular to the universal and from one particular to another is 
one of the topics of sophistry1 ."
For the same reason, Aristotle tried to prove the eternity of the heavens by proving their 
unchangeability. This logic is not always true because in the sublunary world, we can find 
many things that have the property of changeability, but they are not eternal. Heavens, as 
they are the most important part of our universe, they will remain unchangeable for as long 
as the universe itself does exist. However, as the celestial spheres do form a limited body, 
they can be only destructible .
1 In Neo-Platonic metaphysics, the universe is arranged hierarchically, with supreme deity, the One, at the top, and then the 
Divine intellect, the world soul, the material world, and at the bottom prime matter. Each lower level 'proceeds' from the 
one, because it owes its beginningless existence ultimately to the One. What Philoponus is said to overlook is that things 
can be differentiated by having distinct differentiating characteristics (differentiae).They can be differentiated instead by 
being more or less subordinateffazta huphesin) in the order in which they proceed from the One. Matter differentiated in the 
second way will not be turned into a composite of matter plus differentiae. ( Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the 
Eternity of the World, Book IV. Trans. Christian wilberg, p. 86).
2John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book IV,trans. Christian wilberg, 
p.87.
3 Ibid., p.88.
4 Ibid.,pp.88-89.
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No one would deny that the uncreatedness of the world is related especially to the nature of 
heavens and the essence of God. As-Sijistani says:
"If all men allot the highest place to the divine cause, and therefore raise their hands to 
heaven when they pray on the assumption that the abode of God is in that place, still this is 
not proof that all men believe the heavens to be imperishable and ungenerated. For we find 
the ancients and the people of our time who clearly assert that they believe the entire world 
to be generated raise their eyes to heaven when they pray no less than those(others) 1'."
8.2.2 Philoponus against Aristotle's Eternal Time and Motion:
For Aristotle, time is a reckoning of movement with regard to antecedent and subsequent 
eternity . Philoponus, in his sixth book, attacked this argument by criticising Aristotle's 
definition of motion to conclude that both time and motion have to have a beginning and 
they will cease to exist in the future. We have to point out that many of the Hellenes 
associated eternity with the notion of time, and among them Plato and Plotinus, who 
considered both time and eternity as kinds of life3 . Regarding movement, Aristotle defines 
motion as the actualisation (energeia) of the movable qua4, and infers from this definition 
that the potentially moved object pre -exists the motion in time5 and then, motion is the 
actualization of what potentially is6 .
Ibn Sina in his Mubahathat (Discussions), combined time and motion in many of his 
definitions. He argued that there is a big difference between defining time as the numeration 
of movements and defining it as related to every movement. Likewise, there is a distinction 
between claiming that the essence of time is related to movement and claiming that the 
essence of movement is related to time. This is the doubt raised by philoponus who tried to 
dispel it through many of his works7 .
1 Abu Sulayman As-Sijistani ,Muntakhab Siwan a!Hikma, trails. D.M.Dunlop, p.237.
2 Aristotle ,Physics2I9b2
3 Ibid.
4 Aristotle,Physics,.8.1. 251a9f
5 Ibid., 251 al0-23
6L. A. Kosman, Aristotle 's Definition of Motion, p.40
7Ibn Sina , Mubahathat,( Discussions), p. 170
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The objection of Philoponus to this Peripatetic definition is that it cannot be applied to all 
kinds of movements. For instance, in the case of eternal motion, "No potentially moved 
object pre-exists the motion . " As motion is analysed in the light of two relatives, which are 
the mover and the moved object, Aristotle claims that if the two have not always been in 
motion. Then, there must have been a prior motion that caused one of them or both of them 
to establish that relationship between the mover and the moved object to make the motion 
process possible. The same rule applies to the prior motion and the chain is continuing 
infinitely. That is why, it is extremely impossible to suppose that there is first movement2 . 
The standpoint of Philoponus is quite different from the Peripatetic one, as he denied that 
relationship between these two relatives because once they come into being nothing is 
related to something else. Besides, the things related do not necessarily pre-exist the relation. 
It seems that Aristotle was contradicting himself when he went on to say that everything 
comes to be by virtue of motion and he added that it is impossible to assume a first motion. 
Philoponus replied to this Peripatetic analysis by asserting that God's creation-including 
motion itself- was out of nothing3 . The Grammarian kept on attacking Aristotle by arguing 
that there are some generated things that do not pre-exist their natural movement in time4 . 
Regarding the Peripatetic assumption that the relationship acquires that one or both relatives 
(mover and the moved object) have to be in motion, the Grammarian explained that
"Aristotle took for granted, that the relatives must exist first and then acquire the 
relationship between them, so that it is not possible for something no sooner to be than to be 
in a relationship, and concluded in this way that in all cases either both or one of the things 
must be moved in order to acquire the relationship between them'. "
The Grammarian faced the Neo-Platonists with three alternatives, which are unacceptable: 
the first one-as mentioned above-is that this definition does apply to all kind of movements. 
The second one is that even if we do assume that this definition does apply, the supposed 
eternal motion would not be eternal, as some potentially moved object pre-exists that motion.
' John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans. Christian Wilberg, p. 122.
2Aristotle physics, 8.1, 251 b5-10
3 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans. Christian Wilberg, p. 131.
4Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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The third one is that if this eternal motion does exist, the prior existence of the potentially 
moved object does not come from the definition of motion, as Aristotle tried to prove. 
Philoponus tried hard to prove that the third hypothesis is the correct one by means of 
falsifying Aristotle's arguments of the eternity of motion. In order to achieve that, 
Philoponus re-define the notion of Aristotle of potentiality' (dunamis) as 'internal force. 
Such re-definition helped Philoponus to suppose that motion can only occur in the presence 
of a dunamis, which immediately results in motion if it was not prevented from doing so by 
an external force (bia). Such analysis assisted the Grammarian to demonstrate that the notion 
of dunamis is applied to cases of simultaneous generation and motion of elementary bodies. 
Accordingly, it is not true that the potentially moved pre-exists the motion in time. If we do 
admit that this is true, then, any motion would be natural for any body. Hence, Aristotle' 
definition of motion does not help him to prove the eternity of motion 1 .
Philoponus opposed Aristotle's arguments that comprised the complete exegesis of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and he also added Themistuis' paraphrase in order to terrify, 
according to Philoponus, any ignoramus by this voluminous work 2.Philoponus expressed his 
own objections to Aristotle's arguments of the eternity of motion and time by saying that:
"When Aristotle defined motion as the actuality of the movable qua, he covered by this 
definition (horismos) all motion in general, yet he assumes that some motions are eternal 
whereas others possess a beginning and an end. Now what are his grounds for assuming as 
a consequence of the definition of the motion that the things that are going to be moved 
necessarily pre-exist in time the non-eternal motion, which possesses only the capacity 
(Dunamis) of motion without the actualisation (energeia/T
The Grammarian argued that the only basis on which we can prove that motion is eternal, is 
that the principle' nothing comes to be from nothing' to be true, but according to Philoponus, 
this principle is not true. In order to prove the falsification of this principle, he started by 
conceding that this might be true in the case of nature, but it is far away from any sort of 
credibility whenever we do discuss the notion of God. This law cannot be applied to God, as
John Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans.by Christian Wilberg, p.123.
- Ibid.
'Ibid.
-224-
Chapter 8
He is not nature; He is opposed to it, as He is the Creator from nothing. The clear evidence 
of such creation from nothing is that He created both matter and form at the same time 
without process in time 1 . We have to add here that even if nature can produce things out of 
what already exists, as it has its own reality and actualisation (energeia) in a substrate. 
Moreover, nature cannot be or act without a substrate2 . Therefore, it is quite irrational to 
apply the creation out of existing things to God, as He does possess the property of 
separating His reality and actualisation from all the other beings:
" And yet God not only produces the form (eide)ofthe things directly generated by him, but 
is believed to originate and to create even matter itself .For only what is primarily is 
ungenerated and without a cause. So if God gives existence (huphistesin), even to matter, 
and if matter does not need any other matter for existence (for it is the primary substrate of 
all natural beings), then it is not true that everything which is generated is generated of what 
it exists3 ."
Here our main concern is not whether God created matter continuously or in a single act, 
but whether this matter does need any other matter, as it is the first substrate (to proton 
hupokeimenon) of bodies. What we can deduce from this axiom is that if things generated by 
nature out of other existing things, it does not necessarily means that things which are 
directly generated by God, are generated out of existing things. The only obvious reason 
behind this is that nature needs both time and a process (of generation) to perform the act of 
creation. Besides, nature produces the physical objects that God gives existence (huphistesin) 
to the things generated directly by Him without any need to that time and that process of 
generation. God's production is achieved without the gradual forming and shaping of 
objects, as His will is sufficient to substance and to things (eis ten ton pragmaton 
ousiosin)4This would lead us to talk about Aristotle's dualistic conception of nature:the 
necessary and the teleological element in nature. Aristotle introduces the immanent teleology 
conception. This means that nature itself strives towards an end, in De Caelo A4, and de GC 
Aristotle identifies nature as God, the fact that destroys the opposition of immanence and 
transcendence. Nature, and in order to create needs materials, and not any materials, but
'John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity ofthe World, Book VI, trans.by Christian Wilberg, p. 128. 
2 Ibid., p. 129.
3 Ibid. 
4Ibid.
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those with specific qualities and inherent necessities',in the sense that, nature does need all 
the available materials, but they are used according to its necessity exactly like someone who 
wants to build a house needs bricks and the one who wants to make a knife , needs iron:
"This conception would imply that certain materials having their own laws are presupposed 
by nature, and so are not nature itself; nowhere, however, does Aristotle indicate what these 
materials are, and indeed this whole conception is in opposition to his fundamental thesis 
that matter in itself, without having as yet received any form-and end are fundamentally 
identical for Aristotle-is absolutely undetermined 2.'"
In the same discussion, Aristotle went on to say that time has to be eternal 3and Plato 
established an obvious link between time and eternity4 through the indication that the 
temporal world is likeness or image of the eternal. Plato held that a description of this 
likeness can itself be likely and he did not treat the physical world and time as akin to the 
timeless model. 5 Here the Aristotelian concept of infinity that is under attack, as Aristotle 
argued that time was infinite, and at the same time, denied infinity to place, 6 all over again, 
Philoponus, as a creationist, was faced by many proofs that have to be refuted. Time must 
always be there as long as there are' before' and 'after' in every single event7 . Philoponus 
replied to this argument by demonstrating that the locutions 'before' and 'after' do not 
necessarily imply the presence of time. For instance, the intellects of angles and the spirits 
think discursively, in the sense that, there are the terms 'before' and 'after' in their thoughts. 
However, these terms are not related to time if we do think that time is the number of motion 
of bodies. In the same context, God exists above time, but at the same time, He has 
knowledge of 'the before' and 'the after' of events. This explains the temporal reasoning of 
man because of the limitations of his intellect, in the sense that, the human intellect cannot 
think about atemporal things without reference to time, while God contemplates temporal 
things atemporally .
1 Averroes ,Tahafut al-Tahafut, (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans.Simon Van Den Bergh, p.24.
2 Ibid.
3Aristotle .Physics, 8.1, 251blO-28
4 J.B Skemp ,The Theory of Motion in Plato 's Later Dialogues, p. 67', G.Vlastos ,The Disorderly Motion in the
Timaeus,p.72>
5 W. Von Leyden, Time . Number and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle, p.36.
6 Jhon Dillon, Philoponus on Aristotle Physics 3, p.201.
7 Aristotle ,Physics,.25\b\Of
1 John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI.p. 133.
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Regarding movement, Philoponus argued against Aristotle that place has to be three- 
dimensional. Philoponus' corollary on void is an attempt to prove against Aristotle that 
motion is possible even if there is a void and that motion needs void. This is the reason, 
according to Philoponus, why the speed of bodies has to be determined by both external 
resistance and internal impetus 1 . Accordingly, we cannot separate either the eternity of time 
from that of motion or the eternity of motion from that of time, as they are correlatives. This 
sort of overlap between time and motion is well -explained by the Grammarian:
"Whoever says that motion is generated does not say anything else than that it did not exist 
before, but does exist after. And whoever says that it is destroyed does not say anything else 
than that it did exist before, but does not exist after. Therefore; if 'the before and 'the after' 
are parts of time, there will be time both before and after the motion .But whenever there is a 
time, there always is a motion as well2. "
The Grammarian continues the explanation of the arguments supporting his stance by 
claiming that even before the supposedly first motion (or movement), there was always a 
motion, and after the supposedly last motion, there will be again a motion. That is why, 
motion has only to be eternal. He argued also that the notion of time is of a paramount 
importance, as it does possess the third reality-he said the fourth reality later on- after the 
other third realities, which are the body as the first reality, according to him, the physical 
kinetic potentials as the second one and the motion as the third one3 .
The point of crucial significance that we do deduce from this discussion, is that not 
everything that we do think about as after or before holds a reference to time. If we do go by 
what Plato said about time that it came to be with the heavens, and if all the physical bodies 
are destroyed, time would be also destroyed, it would be still impossible to destroy the 
intellect. This would mean that: "If the actualisation of the intellect is progressive, and time 
did not exist, it is still necessary that the intellect thinks one thought first and the other one 
second4.'" This would lead us to assume that if God had created the heavens, He will be also 
responsible for their movement. If we want to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the 
Divine 'before' and 'after',at least from the Aristotelian point of view, we have to 
contemplate the movements of the celestial spheres.
'A. Ide Harry .Place, Void and Eternity, p.90
2 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World ,Book VI,p.4.
3 Ibid.
4Ibid.,p.l35.
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If we do imagine that the celestial bodies are in conjunction in the same division of the 
zodiac, then, each of them will go back to the same point they started from, but in different 
time. For instance, the moon, and in order to turn in its orbit and completing its turn, arrives 
at the same point in which all the other planets had been before. God the Arranger and the 
Organiser of this celestial system knows and knew that the moon has completed its rotation 
before and the other celestial bodies have not. Accordingly, God knew and knows that one of 
the celestial bodies completed its rotation and the other will after. This is clear evidence that 
term before and after do exist in the Divine thoughts as well .Consequently, time also exist in 
His thought even if He is regarded as superior to time. Furthermore, God' knowledge of 
movements of the planets goes to the point of His will, in that, when the moon reached the 
same point from which it started, and the other celestial bodies still not, God wanted that to 
be with the moon at that particular time and not with the other celestial bodies at the same 
particular time. From this perspective, the claim that God does not know things of which He 
is the immediate Creator is not rational because the terms after and before are not only parts 
of his thoughts, but also do exist in the acts of His will 1 .
Definitely, many of these examples represented by Aristotle are not compatible with 
modern physics especially when Aristotle argues that God wanted the Sun to be still, but He 
did not want to do so with the other celestial bodies2 . However, these examples illustrated 
what Aristotle wanted to mean by the presence of 'the before' and 'the after' in Divine 
thoughts and acts of will. The acts of divine will themselves be classified according to 
numeration such as this event would be classified first, that one second and the other one 
third and so on, according to their importance priority or just as a sequence of events. In all 
these cases, we do also mean time. Philoponus did also refute the Aristotelian claim that 
time is eternal supported by the majority of physicists3 . Ibn Sina stated in his book 
Mubahathat (Discussions), that they are some philosophers who claim that time has an 
existence as time as a whole is a set of times. Every time is accidental and its existence 
entails the existence of another time, which means that every time is created from the other, 
which is a delirium of the Mutakallimin (Muslim theologians) according to Ibn Sina 1 .
'John Philoponus fhiloponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World. Book VI, trans.by Christian Wilberg,.p. 136.
2 Ibid.
3Aristotle .Physics, 8.1, 251 b 14-19
1 Ibn Sina ,Mubahathat,(Discuss\ons),p. 168 .
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By arguing that the truth can never be found by democratic means, and if we do suppose 
that it is the case; Aristotle's theory of the Aether and the eternity of the world would be 
rejected 1 . All over again, the Grammarian rejected this Aristotelian argument and by 
showing his fascination by Plato's logic:
"Although the physicists ,except Plato-perhaps five or ten men -agree with each other in 
saying that time is ungenerated, it is inappropriate to prefer these men to Plato simply 
because of this . For the truth must not be judged by the number of men having made 
assertions; for this way, at any rate, Aristotle , who alone introduces the fifth substance of 
body, will receive the inferior vote because all or; at least most physicists say that the four 
elements .either all, or some of them are the principles of the world ."
We do notice here that Aristotle is contradicting himself, to some extent, as he asserted that 
the world is ungenerated, while most of the other physicists were of the view that the world 
was generated. Therefore, if we do apply his argument based on the unanimity of the 
physicists, he has to be with them in the generation of the world. The Grammarian went 
further in his refutation of the Aristotelian argument and the complete support of the Platonic 
system by arguing that if we do trust those who are consistent with themselves, rather than, 
those who are not, we have to take Plato as example, as he is very consistent in his entire 
analysis. Plato says the time came into existence with the heavens at the same time, while the 
others say that the world is generated, and in the meanwhile, time is ungenerated, even if 
both time and the world have the same reality and they cannot be separable. Hence, the 
consistency is in favour of Plato, as other philosophers and physicists have shown an obvious 
inconsistency .
The Grammarian concluded this discussion by wondering how Aristotle can claim that a 
large number of physicists went astray regarding their theories about many treaties, but at the 
same time, he praised their testimonies about the ungeneration of time. Moreover, there are 
many ancient physicists whose testimonies were trustworthy about many treaties, have raised 
many objections about time being ungenerated '.
1 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans. by Christian Wilberg, p. 137.
2 Ibid., p. 138.
3Ibid.
'ibid.
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Aristotle's third argument focused on the term 'Now', or in other words, the present, in the 
sense that, time cannot be conceived without that point between the past and the future. The 
present is very important in the understanding of the notion of time, as it is always time at its 
sides. As long as this present exists, there will be always time before and after it. That is 
why, time has to be eternal 1 .Aristotle, in many passages, expressed his doubts about what is 
called time. According to him, the past no longer exists, the future is not yet and the present 
is only an intermediary between the two2 .
Philoponus accused Aristotle of petitio principii which means that the assumption stating 
that the 'now' is a mean of time. Aristotle went on to say that if 'the now' is a mean of time 
possessing the beginning of the future and the end of the past, time must have existed 
always.Consequently, if this rule is applied to time, it can be applied to motion as well 
because of the correlative relationship that does exist between the two3 .
The Grammarian directed his fierce attack to Aristotle by demonstrating that the now 
argument does add nothing to the discussion of the eternity of time and motion:
" Astonishment comes over me at the philosopher not realising that he had proved nothing 
but had begged the question. For the question was whether time was one of the things which 
existed always ;in order to prove this proposition he used the axiom that 'the now' is a mean 
of time. However, this is the same as to assume that time is eternal, just as for someone who 
asked whether a line stretched to the maximum distance as that its limits are not visible was 
limited or unlimited, were to assume that every point on the line in question was a mean of 
that line 1 "
This passage shows us an example of what Aristotle wanted to demonstrate. It is a premise 
of syllogism, in the sense that the assumption that there is a line on either side of every point 
on the line in question would mean nothing just that the line is unlimited. It is exactly as the 
proposition that time is eternal as it exists on either side of the now'. Thus; the one who put
1 Aristotle, Physics, 8.1, 251M9-28. 
2 . Ibid., 10.217b32
3 John 'Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans.by Christian Wilberg, p. 139
'ibid.
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this assumption has to assume the question itself that time possess neither a beginning nor 
an end '. After the refutation of the Peripatetic claims that time and motion are eternal, 
Philoponus established that both time and motion can only be generated, hi order to finish 
his debate with Aristotle and his supporters, Philoponus formulate his hypothesis based upon 
three main points: the first point states that everything that is subject to generation must have 
something out of which it was generated. The second point talks about the impossibility of 
traversing or increasing the infinite by demonstrating that, as the universe is a corporeal 
object, contains only finite power. That is why, it is generated and could not have existed 
from all eternity2 .The third one suggests that the generation of anything would be impossible 
if an infinite number of things were needed before the process of generation.
As we do believe in the process of generation, then, the past process of successive 
generation has to be finite. This undoubtedly means that the movement of the heavens, as it 
is the cause of the generation and the destruction processes, is impossible to be eternal. 
Philoponus demonstrated the impossibility of the infiniteness of the planets' revolutions, as 
this would imply the multiplication of the infinite3 .
Philoponus assumes three axioms to refute the ungeneration of the motion: the first axiom, 
as we have mentioned previously, states that in order to achieve the generation process, each 
of the generating things needs something that pre-exists. He illustrated his point by 
presenting some example such as the example of the ship' that it has to be pre-existed by 
'wood'. The second one proves the impossibility of the existence of an infinite number in 
actuality (energeiai) or traversing (diexelthein) the infinite 1 . This means that it is quite 
impossible that something can be greater than the infinite, and in the meantime, the infinite 
cannot be increased. The third one rums around the proposition that if the generation of a 
thing implies the pre-existence of an infinite set of things, then, the generation of that thing 
would be quite impossible. Aristotle himself asserted that if the elements are generated one
1 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, Trans. by Christian Wilberg, p. 139
2 Herbert A. Davidson Jhon Philoponus as a source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs ofCreation,p35S
3John, Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans.by Christian Wilberg, p. 143.
'Ibid.',p.l44.
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out of the other, it is impossible that they will be infinite in number 1 . We have to mention 
here that those who support the creation and the demise of the world, they do not believe in 
the end of the world as a negative destruction. They do consider the destruction of the world 
as a change occurring at its structure. This destruction is not a change to nothingness, but 
rather, it is a sort of transition from one world to another one more sublime ruled and 
controlled by divine norms. In Al -Farabi's lost treatise Al -Mawjudat al-Mutaghayyira (On 
Changeable Beings), Al Farabi defended Aristotle against Philoponus and attributed to 
Philoponus an explanation of creation ex nihilo. According to this explanation, the 
generation of the world did not lie in a pre-existent matter, the fact that is regarded by many 
scholars, as contradicting the doctrine of the creation ex nihilo". The reason behind such a 
contradiction, according to them, is that when we advocate the creation process, we are 
asserting that such process has to be achieved from something. When we do believe in the 
creation, which was done from nothing, it is like a breach of the property of the creation 
process based on a starting point that was done from something.
8.3 conclusion:
After the analysis of all the points raised by Proclus and Aristotle from one side and Plato 
and Philoponus from the other side, we do conclude that even if Plato does agree with the 
generation of the world, he is with its eternity. While, Proclus and Aristotle were with the 
ungeneration and the imperihability of the world, and Philoponus of course-as he stands for a 
monotheistic Credo- is for its creation and its perishability. Whatever the case; we have to 
bear in mind that there are many arguments formulated by Aristotle and Proclus in order to 
prove the eternity of the world, but they can be used to prove the opposite. If we do admit 
that all things that do exist in this world, they come into existence by means of 
transformation. Likewise; if we do assert that all things that were generated, if we do believe 
of course in the generation process, were generated by two main means:
John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans. Christian Wilberg, p. 144. 
! Herbert A. Davidson .Jlion Philoponus as a source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs ofCreation,p360.
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The substrate and the opposites, we have to admit that there is something called 
'destruction', 'chaos' or a complete or casual state of 'disorder' .In this case, what is the 
definition of the term destruction? Is it the process from which we do move from the chaos 
to the order or is it simply the generation of other things? In such a case, we are moving from 
a state of non -existence to a state of existence. If we do believe that the destruction is a 
complete collapse of an existing order, we are believing that the substance perishes as well, 
as it is one of the constituents of all things. However, if we do believe like Aristotle that no 
substance perishes, 1 we are making up set of eternal things such as the substance, the 
substrate and the opposites that are sharing the properties of divinity and eternity with God.
The generation and destruction processes are a real dilemma that cannot be solved by the 
Proclean conceptions, the Peripatetic logic or the Platonic system, as they are simpler than 
their sophisticated arguments. This does not mean that we are all the way with the 
Philoponus' concept of the destiny of the world, but at least, he is more convincing than the 
others. We do not say that because we do hold the same religious instructions and we do 
believe in the same norms and laws, but because Philoponus managed, to some extent, to 
refute the other theories and falsify their assumptions by means of logic, rationality and 
coherent cogency.
It is obvious that if we do want to decode the enigmas of the destiny of our world, we have 
to find the underlying cause of these correlative relationships between God and nature, time 
and motion, heavens and soul and so on. The way of natural productions is quite different 
from God' one in that nature does produce from what already exists, which means that the 
natural generation is achieved through other generating things. While God's generation is 
from nothing, as He does not need primary matter or generating things to perform the 
process of generation. The Grammarian showed such correlative relationship between God 
and nature by saying that:
1 John Philoponus .Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, Book VI, trans by Christian Wilberg, p.143.
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"Even if nature does not make prime matter (ten proten hulen) , God makes it no out of 
matter. In consequence, whenever God wants , he destroys matter into not-being, from which 
it came to be, just as form does not change into another form but turns back into complete 
not-beingfrom which it came to be as welt" 
Every single argument that we use, and every single theory that we do elaborate either to 
prove the generation or the ungeneration of time, has to be applied to motion as well because 
of their correlative relationship and in order to be consistent in our cogency. We cannot, for 
instance, prove that time is eternal and motion not or vice versa. Therefore, even if we do not 
agree with all the Platonic conceptions about time and motion, we do believe that his system 
is consistent, as he applied to time what he applied to heavens when he went on to say that 
time came into existence with the heavens. If one of them is destructed, the other one has to 
be destructed as well. 
In brief, we are, like Philoponus, to some extent, in favour of the generation and destruction 
of time and motion, as they are part of nature. This bolstered the view of the generation of 
things out of matter that was not made out of matter and which will be turned into no matter 
by the power and the will of God. This is the only scenario that we do find rational, logical 
and consistent. Regarding the Aristotelian claim, that it is God 'will that wanted the Sun to 
be still and the other celestial bodies not is compatible, to some extent, with the Islamic 
conceptions. We say that such incompatibility is not in the inaccuracy of knowledge-which is 
not compatible at all- but with the interference of God' will in the rotation of celestial bodies, 
or at least, God created those physical laws that were, are and will keep controlling them the 
way they are. However, these Islamic conceptions are against his claims that 'the now' is a 
mean of time and an implication of 'the before' and 'the after' to make both time and motion 
eternal. This means that Grammarian's logic is in complete agreement with the Islamic 
conceptions. It sates that the term 'before' and 'after' do exist in divine thoughts and this is 
obviously seen in the movements of planets when each one has to terminate its rotation 
around its orbit before the other one in a very melodious and harmonious way (as it is the 
case for the whole cosmos as one entity of course). In chapter Yasin, of the Holy Qur'an God 
the Almighty says: 
I John Philoponus ,Philoponus against Aristotle on the Eternity o/the World, Book VI, trans. by Christian 
Wilberg, p.l43. 
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"Glory to God, Who created in pairs all things that the Earth produces, as well as their own 
(human) kind and (other) things of which they have no knowledge. And a Sign for them is the 
Night: We withdraw therefrom the Day, and behold they are plunged in darkness; and the 
sun runs his course for a period determined for him: That is the decree of (Him), the Exalted 
in Might, the All-Knowing. And the Moon, - We have measured for her mansions (to 
traverse) till she returns like the old (and withered) lower part of a date-stalk. It is not 
permitted to the Sun to catch up the Moon, nor can the Night outstrip the Day: Each (just) 
swims along in (its own) orbit (according to Law) 1 . "
hi the same context, the Aristotelian logic stating that what is asserted by the majority is 
true is not rational, likewise, his system of applying laws found about the part to the whole 
that constitutes that part is by no means an acceptable analysis. If this is the case, the world 
must be perishable, as we all know that the human race is perishable, as it is a part of the 
whole, which is the entire world. If it is the case, that the assertion of the majority makes 
from a supposed truth a naked one, then, and all over again, the world has to be destructible, 
as the followers of the Abrahamic religions who do believe in the destruction of the world 
are definitely a majority in our world.
Definitely, we cannot deny that we are fascinated by many of the Peripatetic ways of 
analysis, elaborated theories and well-established doctrines, but this does not mean that we 
do agree with them all. The evidence of the strength of such theories is that they resisted 
centuries until the Copernican era and many of them are still in discussion especially those 
related to ethics and politics .
**************************************************************
1 The Holy Qur'an : chapter Yasin.36, Verses. 36-40
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ON the Impact of Muslim Theology on Western Scholasticism: 
9.1 The impact of Hellenic Philosophers on Muslim Theology:
No one would deny that Greek philosophers heavily influenced Islamic thought and its 
outstanding pioneers. In the discussion of all theological thorny issues, and especially the 
dilemma of the eternity of the world, Muslim theologians were heavily influenced by Greek 
philosophy. If we do take, for instance, the famous theological sect the Ash 'rites, we would 
find that they were consistently under the impact of ancient wisdom with all its aspects. The 
Ash 'rites, with the leadership of Al-Ghazali as mentioned previously, deny the potentiality in 
nature, or in other words, the denial of no becoming things out of potencies. This means that 
there is no room for necessity or possibility as things they are or they are not. The Ash 'arites 
were also influenced by the Greek Sceptics from whom they took the sceptical theory 
denying the rational relation between cause and effect'.The Ash'arites have copied this 
theory and applied it in divergent theological contexts . Regarding the nature and the eternity 
of the soul, Ibn Sina copied Plotinus' claim that matter in its continual changing, cannot 
explain the identity of the soul:
"One should contemplate the nature of everything in its purity, since what is added is ever 
an obstacle to its knowledge. Contemplate therefore the soul in its abstraction or rather let 
him who makes this abstraction contemplate himself in this state and he will know that he is 
immortal when he will see in himself the purity of the intellect, for he will see his intellect 
contemplate nothing sensible , nothing mortal, but apprehending the eternal through the 
eternal1 ."
Arabic philosophers combined Platonism and Aristotelianism to formulate their theories 
about the soul as eternal, ungenerated and incorruptible by adopting some principles and 
rejecting others. Al-Ghazali, in his continuous attempts to refute the proofs for the 
substantiality and the spirituality of the soul, he did not emphasize that the soul is material, 
but many Ash 'arites adopted the stoic materialism. No wonder, the ten arguments of 
philosophers about the spirituality of the soul derive from old Greek arguments2 , hi the other 
side, Ibn Rochd tried all the time to be near to the Aristotelian conception by adopting the
Ibn Rochd, The Introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, trans . Simon Van Den Bergh, Vol
p.xxix.
Ibid.,p. xxxiii. 
2Ibid., p. xxxi.
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eschatology of the Late Greek authors. Likewise, he adopted the theory of the Jinn, the 
equivalent of the Greek Daimones, and he rejected, what most philosophers rejected, the 
resurrection of the flesh 1 . We have to mention that Platonism did not survive in Islam the 
way Aristotelianism did. The Platonic dialogues were translated into Arabic, at the same 
time as the Aristotelian corpus, but none of the Platonic translations survived, and all what 
the Arabs have about the Platonic tradition are resumes, like Gale's paraphrase of the 
Timaeus, the compendium of the Leges preserved by Al-Farabi. Therefore, the Islamic- 
Platonic tradition was built thanks to this limited materials, and from the abundant 
doxographical and gnomological sources available to the Arabs. The Platonic influences 
appeared at an earlier stage among Muslim philosophers when Al-kindi and Thabit Ibn 
Qurrah wrote their treaties built on Platonic material. Likewise, Al-Farabi and his student 
Yahya ben Adi(893-974 AD) busied themselves with Platonica. In 'Ihsa al- 
Ulum '(Catalogues of Sciences),Al-Farabi struggled with the idea of 'transformation 
grammar' using evidence from Persian, Soghdian, Greek, Syriac, and Arabic in an effort to 
discover the multilinguistic structures'. Abu Sulayman as-Sijistani (ca.932-1000 AD) made a 
collection of Platonic Dicta and Ibn Miskawayh who made extensive use of Platonic 
material.
The irrefutable proof of Muslim philosophers' interest in the Platonic tradition is that it 
remained alive until the time of Ibn Rochd. Since the time of Al-Farabi, it is the Platonic 
ethic and political theory that deeply impressed Muslim thinkers and the Metaphysics was 
overwhelmed by Neo-Platonic emanationism. Abu baker al-Razi was the name most 
associated with the Platonic physics, this is well- depicted in his physical theory about the 
five eternal principles: creator, soul, matter, time or eternity (dahr) and space, or void 
(khala'). In this theory, there is no mentioning to the Aristotelian aspects 1 . This is the 
Farabian physical theory, based on Platonic principles, that makes of time an absolute entity 
independent of bodies, and consequently, makes the universe not eternal, not like the 
Aristotelian system supporting the eternity of the universe. Ibn Sina, like Ibn Rochd, was not 
a mere a commentator, or a reformer of the Aristotelian metaphysics. In Kitab as- Shifa, bab 
al- Ilahivvat (Book of Healing, section of Divinities), he proved his metaphysical acumen
' Ibn Rochd, The Introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of The Incoherence, Vol 1, p. xxxiv.
  Muhsin Mahdi M -Farabi 's Book of letters,(Kilab al-Huruf), ,p.221.
'F.E. Peters .Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in 7s/om,pp.l69-170.
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and the originality of his works'. Likewise, in his theory of space and time, Al-Farabi gives 
the full credit to Plato. He shows his acquaintance with the Greek doxographical material. 
Al-Farabi in his famous work Kitab aljam' bayna al -Hakamayn (the Book Combining the 
two Sages' Opinion), known in English sources as (The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle), 
praised both Plato and Aristotle. He sees them as creativists in philosophy, establishers of its 
principles and roots, accomplishers of its branches and sources of its simplicity and 
sophistication . Al-Masudi and Said Al-Andalusi connected the eternal principles with 
Pythagorean doctrines, while Al -Razi attributed this doctrine to the Pre-Socratics, and 
particularly to Democritus3 .Like Ibn Sina, Abu- Barakat4(ca. 1080-1165 AD) stands within 
and without the Aristotelian tradition, hi the preface of his encyclopaedic Kitab al- 
Mu 'tabar5(The Considerable Book), he expressed his intentions to follow the outline of the 
Aristotelian system6 .
Concerning the theory of universals claiming that universals, which are not in particular 
space and have no individuality, cannot be material as everything material is individual and 
is in space, Al-Ghazali built his arguments against this theory relying on Stoic principles to 
give birth to his nominalistic theory7 . Such theory summarizes the whole reasoning held by 
the Ash 'rites. The Mu 'tazilites also integrated some of the physical sciences of the Greeks 
into their theology, but the borrowed materials were not always compatible with the 
theological positions they intended to support. The Isma 'His 1 , in their turn, took from the 
Greeks and especially from Aristotle the orderly treatment of the physical sciences, and 
Plotinus' emanation theory2 . A parallel to the already published epitome of Aristotle's 
philosophy attributed to Al-Farabian epitome of Aristotelian ethics maintained in Greek in 
Stobaeus' Eclogae was also available in the Arab tradition through the ethical compendium 
of Ibn Miskawayh (932 -1030 AD) Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (Cultivation of Morals)3 , hi Al- 
Khawarizmi's work entitled faslfi al-Mantiq (Chapter on Logic) a paramount importance
'Amos Bertolacci .The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitab al-Shifa: A Milestone of Western 
Metaphysical Thought, p. 104.
2Al-Farabi, Kitab a I-Jam' Bayna Rae' al-Hakamayn,( The Book Combining the two Sages' Opinion ),p.28.
3F.E. Peters Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition in Islam, pp. 170-171
4 A Jewish convert to Islam, his Hebrew name was Nathanel.
5Many bad and inaccurate translations were given to this book such as "The Book of what has been Established by Personal
Reflection", I have put the right Arabic translation above.
6 F.E. Peters ^ristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition in Islam, p. 172.
7Ibn Rochd, The introduction of Ibn Rochd's ,The Incoherence of the Incoherence, Vol 1, p xxxiii.
'The second largest part of the Shi'ah community.
2 F.E. Peters .Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition in Islam,p.\16.
3 Ibid.l01.
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was given by Arabic logicians to Greek tradition. In such a work AI- Khawarizmi treats , 
mimesis as a type of knowledge having logical and epistemological interest I . In the same 
context, the ninth-century mathematician Ibn Hatim an-Nayrizi(c.875-940 AD) composed in 
Arabic Euclid's book, and Arabic sources also mention a book of Archimedes' on parallel 
lines,2. There is no room for doubt that Hellenism gave birth to a new era of philosophy in 
Islam, and this philosophy, in its tum, created Muslim theology. In the middle of this 
transmission of ancient wisdom to the Muslim world, no one would deny that the heavy 
impact of such philosophy came from Peripateticism and Peripatetic philosophers. This does 
not mean that before the transmission of such a philosophy, there were no religious debates 
and theological disciplines. On the contrary, the Islamic credo is very rich thanks to the 
revelation manifested in the Holy Qur'an and Hadith (the prophetic tradition),but what 
happened is that this Greek philosophy rekindled all the old-new debates and issues that were 
the bone of contention between all the Islamic theological schools. The clear evidence of the 
existence of a very rich Islamic tradition even before the adoption of Hellenistic doctrines is 
the emergence of science of Kaiam(natural theology) that replaced philosophy that was on 
the decrease as it was not accepted in many stages of Islamic history. Furthermore, 
philosophy at those stages was associated with negative connotations such as unbelief, 
heresy and apostasy. 
Many Islamic sects will later on borrow materials from the Greeks either in order to defend 
their stances or refute the doctrines of their opponents, ranging from Al- Mu'tazilites, 
Mu'rjia, Ai-Quadarites, Ai- Jahmiyyah, Ai- Ash 'rites to Al-kharajites and Ai Batiniyyah. 
There are many theses associated with these Islamic groups, and which were borrowed from 
the Greeks such as the denial of the divine attributes and the eternity of the Qu'ran, but such 
attributions are not always true. What is beyond doubt is the Mu'tazilites unmistakable debt 
to Greek philosophy in two areas, which are the epistemology, and the metaphysics of atoms 
and accidentsl. No one can deny the influences of Greek tradition on Islamic scholars, but 
what we have to draw the attention to is that many doctrines and cultural aspects came to the 
Arabian Peninsula even before the emergence of Islam especially from the Indian and the 
Gnostic influences. For instance, the Islamic atomism appeared independent from theology.2 
I Seymour Fledman,Rescher on Arabic Logic, Journal of Philosophy, p.72S. 
2 A.I . Sabra ,Thabit Ibn Qurra on Euclid's parallels Postulate ,p.13. 
I F.E. Peters ,Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition in /slam,p.140. 
2Ibid., 143. 
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Undoubtedly, the materials coming from ancient wisdom contributed to the growth of 
Muslim scholastic theology. In this context, Ibn Rochd was here and there somewhere 
between the impact of the Hellenes and especially his master Aristotle and all the other 
Muslim theologians. Platonism is also present in the works of Ibn Rochd by interpreting the 
Republic relying on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and in the same time against the 
background of the Physica, De Anima and Metaphysica. We have to mention that for Ibn 
Rochd, the Republic was not just a substitute for Aristotle's Politics, but also a manual for 
the best government 1 .
We have to mention that the study of medieval Islamic philosophy is still in an embryonic 
stage. Many texts remained unread in the Eastern and Western libraries, but they are now 
gradually being rediscovered and published. This problem rises because there are few critical 
editions and many of the printed texts are based, like the editiones principes of Greek and 
Latin classical texts, on one single manuscript. Likewise, the number of commentaries are 
very limited and the number of reliable translations very small. Till the time being, it is 
extremely difficult to find a standard work like E.zeller's philosophie der griechen exists, 
and what proves that is that no reliable attempt worthy of mention has been made to 
summarise the knowledge of Islamic philosophy since the T.de Boer's History of philosophy 
in Islam translated into English 50 years ago. Moreover, not all the Islamic philosophers 
from Al-kindi (9th C) to Ibn Rochd(12th C) had translations of most philosophical texts 
available to them especially those studied in the Greek Neo-Platonic schools of the 5 th , 6th 
and the 7th centuries AD. We are not talking here only about the works of Aristotle, but also 
of his Late Greek commentators like Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius, 
Ammonius, Simlicius, and Jhon Philoponus. In the absence of these vital texts, we cannot be 
sure of the size of the influence of these late philosophers' texts on the Arabic and Islamic 
theology. Hence, every single new text of Arabic translations of Greek philosophical texts, is 
of a crucial significance as it help us to understanding both the history of philosophical 
terminology and the work of Islamic philosophers as there is no dictionary of Arabic 
philosophical terminology 1 . In this regard, the famous works of Najm ad- Din Abu al-Futuh
1 E.l.J. Rosenthal Jiverroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic, p.15.
1 Richard Walzer, philosophical surveys, VIII: A survey of Work on Medieval Philosophy, p. 175.
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Ahmed ibn Mohammed ibn al- Sari known as Ibn as-Salah(- d.l 153-54 AD) 1 in mathematics 
astronomy and physics have survived in manuscripts at Istanbul, Leiden, and Oxford; none 
of these works has been translated ,edited, or even adequately studied. There is no room for 
doubt that such works would bridge many intellectual gaps existing in the original works of 
the Hellenes and the works of medieval philosophers2 .
*The Jahmiyyah were the followers of Jahm Ibn Safwan al- Samarqandi (d.745-746 AD) and considered pure fatalists 
(Jabriyya). Jahm express his heretical beliefs in Tirmidh (Uzbekistan) and was executed by the Umayyad governor of Balk 
and Juzajan. Salm Ibn Ahwa: al-Mazini. in Marw (Turkmenistan). Like the Mu'tazilites, he rejected the eternal divine 
attributes, but he also held other heretical beliefs. For example, he was one of the first to say the Qur'an was created, having 
learning this idea from his Damasche teacher Ja'd ibn Dirham (d. 124 AH). Another belief attributed to him is that Paradise 
and Hell are transient. A number of beliefs are sometimes falsely ascribed to him, according to Imam Al-Kawthari, and 
people sometimes hurl the name Jahmiyya as an insulting epithet upon any disagreeable opponent. Certain believes held by 
Jahm Ibn Safivan do take one out of Islam unto unbelief, as do some of those held by the Karramiyya(On\ine: 
www.sunniforum.com/forum/archive/index.php.28927.html. Access Date : 05 May 2008.
* As Aristotle's thinking was suited to the Syro-Arab conceptual approach to philosophical thinking, his teachings emerge 
as a source of reference to them. They were especially interested in his principle: All what exists, including the soul itself, 
exists by intelligence. This formula proved itself to be quite attractive to the Arab mentality which stressed the approach of 
knowing things as they really are. Thus in Aristotle, Muslim found the great guide, to them he became 'the first teacher'. 
Having accepted this a priori, Muslim philosophy as it evolved in subsequent centuries merely chose to continue in this vein 
and to enlarge on Aristotle rather to innovate. It chose the course of eclecticism, seeking to assimilate rather than to 
generate, with a conscious striving to adapt the results of Greek thinking. Quadarites, for instance, stressed the doctrine of 
free will, while the Jabrites denied it Sifatites argued for the eternal nature of the attributes of God. While the Mu 'tazilites 
denied they were eternal. The Murji 'ities stressed that human actions must not be subject to human judgment, while their 
opponents, the Wa'dites, insisted on the condemnation of man in his life before the day of the judgment. The kharajites 
played down the importance of the role of secular leadership, i.e, the caliphate which they considered merely a human 
institution, while the Shi'ites went so far as to consider their imam as divine.(Caesar,E. Farah .Islam : Beliefs and 
Observances, pp.204-207)
* Muslim sects_the Ismailis (Arabic: Ismilivah), in particular that interpreted religious texts exclusively on the basis of 
their hidden, or inner, meanings (Arabic: batin) rather than their literal meanings (zahir). This type of interpretation gained 
currency about the 8th century among certain esoteric Shijte sects, especially the Ismailis, a religiously and politically 
schismatic group. The Ismailis believed that beneath every obvious or literal meaning of a sacred text lay a secret, hidden 
meaning, which could be arrived at through ta\vil (allegorical interpretations); thus, every statement, person, or object 
could be scrutinized in this manner to reveal its true intent. They further stated that Muhammad was only the transmitter of 
the literal word of God, the Qu'ran, but it was the imam (leader) who was empowered to interpret, through ta 'wil. its true, 
hidden meaning (Online Encyclopedia Britannica: www. britannica.com./batiniyah. Access Date: 05 May 2008).
1 Not to be confused with the muhadith (the expert in the science ofHadith: The prophetic tradition) Ibn as-Salah as- 
Shahrazuri (1181-1245 AD).
2 A.I. Sabra ^ twelfth Century Defense of the Fourth Figure of Syllogism, p. 15.
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9.2 Muslim Philosophers' Contributions to the Further 
Development of Hellenistic philosophy; 
9.2.1 Ibn Rochd between Commentary and Originality:
hi all our discussions throughout the whole thesis, we talked about the Hellenes, their 
wisdom and their originality in all disciplines of knowledge, but the real debates and 
controversies with Muslim philosophers do cover the area of Metaphysics. The latter is the 
science of the prime principles and the prime causes. The main cause of the unconscious and 
the involuntary divergence between Ibn Rochd and Aristotle is the Neo-Platonic influences 
exercised upon philosophers in general and Ibn Rochd in particular. Such divergence was 
also the outcome of the influences of the apocryphal texts that were authentically 
Aristotelian 1 . These divergences are most obvious in God's essence, His nature and His links 
with the world and in eschatology. Despite these divergences, we have to mention here the 
originality of Ibn Rochd in comparison with Aristotle in particular and all the other 
philosophers in general.
Despite the tremendous respect of Ibn Rochd to Aristotle as a great source of truth, he does 
not consider him as infallible2 .Ibn Rochd was not a servile commentator3 as it seems to be, 
for he opposed his master in a plenty of issues and sometimes he refuted altogether many of 
Aristotelian basic principles. He stated in many occasions the weakness of Aristotle and his 
successors' observations. Alternatively, he remediates such weaknesses by presenting his 
own observations. For instance, those regarding stars, winds climates, earthquakes, grain 
germination, the characteristics of certain animals, the influence of climatic agents upon 
tints, hair of divergent human races, and so on . These Rochdian outstanding observations 
contributed to the development of two sciences closely linked to all philosophical topics, 
which are mathematics and logic, even if mathematics is Ibn Rochd's weakest part, as it is 
with Aristotle of course. Ibn Rochd did not contribute a lot to the Aristotelian induction. 
However, he elaborated the system of schematic figures used in logic by other philosophers. 
Ibn Rochd followed all the other philosophers in their efforts to amend certain Aristotelian 
weaknesses by opposing very often Al-Farabi and most of the time Ibn Sina and Al - 
Ghazali. 2 Ibn Rochd also exposed the works of Plotinus who was confused by the Arabs with
1 Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (A VERROES) ,p. 257.
2George F. Hourani ^ verroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p.637.
3Leon Gauthier ,IBNROCHD (A VERROES), p.263.
'ibid.
2 Ibid.,pp. 258-259.
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Plato. The exposition of these works bridged the gaps in many Aristotelian works'.In order 
to enrich the Aristotelian notion of 'location of body' defining it as 'the immobile and 
immediate limit of an enveloping body', Ibn Rochd had to examine a very controversial 
question: How can we apply such a definition to the celestial spheres? If every sphere has a 
location of the sphere that it is developing it immediately, the supreme sphere or the physical 
world as a whole has not got a location. Ibn Rochd resolve this thorny problem by admitting 
with Ibn Baja that the difference of the location of a sublunary body, the location of a 
celestial sphere should be heard not as the concave surface of the hollow sphere that 
envelops it, but as the convex surface of the sphere that envelops. Accordingly; the location 
of heaven as a whole is the surface of the terrestrial globe 2 .Such Rochdian deep analysis 
does not surprise us at the time being, but it intrigued many philosophers at those times and 
until the seventeenth century. The German scholar Gerhard Johann Vossius (1577-1649) said 
about Ibn Rochd, "He was called the commentator par excellence, who without knowing 
anything of Greek, penetrated so felicitously into the mind of Aristotle3 ."
In astronomy and cosmography, Ibn Rochd defends certain Aristotelian views by fiercely 
attacking the Pythagoreans. He dissipated the ambiguities with ingenious proofs and 
irrefutable arguments. However, his works in this regard were not entirely innovative for he 
relied on the physical and metaphysical Aristotelian principles and the polemic eccentric and 
epicycles hypothesis'.In medicine, and precisely in the therapeutic posology, Al- Kindi is the 
author of psychophysics theory that we find in all the psychophysical works of Weber and 
Fetcher. All over again, Ibn Rochd had to go against some of the principles of this theory by 
stating that we cannot combine in all possible cases a medicine that is exactly measured 
according to heat, cold, humidity, and dryness'. The originality of Ibn Rochd in physics was 
not that big as he followed the path of his Greek master Aristotle in all physical aspects 
ranging from light, colours to vision, nerves, and brain, but the big and the pure originality of 
Ibn Rochd appears in theology3 . No wonder, already in the thirteenth century and before the 
name of Ibn Rochd became so familiar, William of Auvergne (1228-1249 AD) hailed him as 
'the most noble philosopher' (philosophus nobilissimus) in a time when he was still called by
'Leon Gauthier .IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.260.
: Ibid., .pp.260-261.
' Harry. A Wolfson, ,The Twice-Revealed Averroes, p.384.
'Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (AVERROES), p.261.
2 Ibid.,p.262.
- Ibid., p.263.
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many scholars such as Dante Alighieri(ca. 1265-1321 AD) as 'he who made the grand 
commentary (il gran commento) 1 '. The Rochdian strong point was in theology, as this divine 
science requires more rationality in which Ibn Rochd proves to be a big mind. That is why, 
the task of Ibn Rochd as a commentator became here more and more sophisticated, as he had 
to find a sort of reconciliation between the stiff intellectualist monotheism of book XII of the 
authentic Metaphysics of Aristotle and the elaborated trinitarianism of the Neo-Platonic 
texts'. Such reconciliation will prove either that these theological works belong to the same 
author, or the original texts of Aristotle were distorted. Ibn Rochd was aware of the 
possibilities and the difficulties of establishing such reconciliation. His predecessors such as 
Ibn Sina and Ibn Tofayl inclined in their esoteric books to the 'False Aristotle' and the Neo- 
Platonism, while Ibn Rochd inclined to 'the authentic Aristotle', but he interpreted and 
completed him by many indications and hints to the false Aristotle3 . If Ibn Rochd defended 
his Greek master Aristotle and corroborated many of his doctrine, Ibn Arabi advocated the 
philosophy of Plato against the Muslim theologians and philosophers who were ignorant of 
the word philosophy1 .
9.2.2 The Rochdian Theological Contributions:
If we do take, for instance, the Aristotelian God Who is the substantival Reason, the thought 
of the thought, ignoring the universe, to be an eternal become with Ibn Rochd compatible 
with the Holy Quran by means of a rational interpretation of symbols and allegories. A God 
more living , more acting, efficient cause and at the same time a final cause of movement 
and the universe; and the universal motor, with the intermediary of the daytime movement. 
He is the agent; omniscient of a transcending science in terms of the generality and the 
individuality alike; indefectible providence, eternal producer of an eternal world; giving the 
existence to all beings, He is eminently all beings, as He is the complete and the integral 
being. Therefore, Logos or, the intellect is the Aristotelian God Who is not -in the eyes of Ibn 
Rochd- in addition to the negative and relative attributes, a positive attribute qualifying a 
substance, but the being itself of the Divinity2 . Concerning the process by which God
'Harry A. Wolfson ,The Twice-Revealed Averroes, p.374.
2Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.263.
3Ibid., p.264.
'Stelzer Steffen, Decisive Meetings: Ibn Rochd. Ibn Arabi and the Matter ofKnowledge,p.20
2 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (AVERROES), p.264.
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produced all the beings of the universe, Ibn Rochd totally opposed Aristotle in the view 
stating that God has no transitive activity. Likewise, he was against the philosophers who 
went on to say that the one could only generate one. That is why, only the first celestial 
intellect emanates directly from the divine Intellect. Afterwards, all other celestial intellects 
emanate one from another until the active Intellect emanated from the sphere of the moon. 
Ibn Rochd expressly disproved with this Neo-Platonic view represented by many 
philosophers, and of Ibn Sina was one of them 1 . According to Ibn Rochd, the one can 
directly generate an indefinite multitude. The nine separate intellects are caused by each 
other in a hierarchic order taken from The Divine, not by the efficient cause, but by the 
definite cause and the final cause. To elucidate more his view about God, Ibn Rochd 
established a comparison with the Aristotelian esoteric order. The hierarchy of these 
intellects, and the harmony they are charge with among the beings of the sublunary world 
under the commandment of the supreme chief is comparable with those of an army, or a city, 
or a family. These are the differences that distinguished the Rochdian God from the god of 
the other philosophers on one hand and the Aristotelian god on the other hand 1 . It is of a 
paramount importance to mention here that when we are trying to establish such 
reconciliation, in order to be objective, we have to look at all the Aristotelian works in all 
disciplines of knowledge. Sometimes you can come across an idea or a particular concept 
which is repeated again and again in Aristotle' work, this gives us the impression that the 
works were written by the same author. Furthermore, at times, you many encounter that the 
whole concept of a certain doctrine in a certain work is compatible with another one in a 
totally different work. This is rational evidence that we are here before the same 
philosophical thought, which is more likely to be of the same author. Ibn Rochd was not the 
only one who sees that there is no collision between religion and philosophy, al-Farabi in his 
book Tahsil as-Saada ( the Attainment of Happiness) went even further by praising 
philosophy and considered it as the first of all sciences . Philosophy covers all the areas of 
the existents with irrefutable evidences to teach both al-Ammah( the masses) and the al- 
Khassa (the people of knowledge). The former rely on their intuitional and perceptional 
knowledge, while the latter use their insight and rational investigation2 to study thoroughly 
both philosophical and religious subjects.
1 Leon Gauthier ,IBNROCHD (A VERROES) pp.264-265.
1 Ibid., p.265.
2Al-Farabi, Tahsil as-Saada, (The Attainment of Happiness),pp.83-84.
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9.3 The Rochdian Establishment of Compatibility 
Between Religion and Philosophy; 
9.3.1 Historical and Religious Backgrounds of the Scholastic Problem;
We have to bear in mind that the persecutions exercised against Ibn Rochd towards the end 
of his life were an isolated fact in the history of Islamic philosophy. There were periods in 
the Eastern part and the Western part alike of the Islamic empire, relatively in favour of 
secular sciences and philosophy. These were the ages of peace and prosperity ruled by an 
enlightened and powerful khalif (leader of the state) who gives protection and support to 
these kinds of sciences 1 . If we do take, for example, the Eastern part of the Islamic empire, 
in the eight and the ninth centuries of our era , the eight or the nine 'Abbassid khalifs' who 
,from al-Mansour to al-Mutawakhil2 favoured ,and during almost one century, the spread of 
Greek sciences and philosophy in Islamic world. This task was achieved thanks to a 
tremendous movement of translations done by Nestorian Christians from Greek into Arabic 
either throughout a Syriac translation, or directly from Greek into Arabic.
The same situation was in the Western part in the twelfth century when Almohad khalifs 
were accustomed to have long speculative interviews face to face with their favourite doctors 
and philosophers 1 . The decadence of Khalifat facilitates the choice of bold thinkers between 
the small potentates of a benevolent ruler like in the first half of the ninth century, the Emir 
of Alep Abu al-Hassan Ibn Hamdan(916-967 AD) famous by Seifad-Dawlah 2(The sword of 
the State). The latter was the protector of Al -Farabi, and the possibility to escape the 
disfavour of a dissatisfied protector, or the fanatic hostility of his subjects like Ibn Sina. 
There were very difficult periods where roused fanatism was directed against the dissidents 
at all levels: Religious inquisition, imprisonments, executions, and tortures. The famous 
philosophers who were occupying positions as jurists and theologians escaped death and 
torture except Al- Farabi and Ibn Tofayl who suffered in a particular stage of history 
disgrace, prison, internment, confiscation of private libraries, the destruction of books of 
metaphysics, logic and sciences by burning them into pieces on the public places of
'Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p. 17.
2The last of the nines, the Khalif al- Motawakkil and because of political motives, he also did not minimize the importance 
of the study of sciences, of medicine and the works of translations (See G.Sarton introduction to The History of Science,. 
Baltimore, 1927-1931, SVol.I, p.583.)
1 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p. 17.
2Seif ad-Dawlah is also the pseudo of the rulers of the Abbassid dynasty.
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Baghdad, Seville and other cities 1 . In the middle of these disastrous events, no one can 
escape the pressure of the clerics either he is knowledgeable, from the masses or even a 
khalif. In the East; al- Mutawakkil, and under the influence of the terrible reaction of the 
orthodox, confiscated Al-Kindi's library. In the West, the Almoravid Sultan 'Ali Ben 
Youssef( 1106-1142 AD) accused the famous philosopher Ibn Baja of atheism and 
imprisoned him. Later on, the Almohad khalif Abu Youssef Ya'qoub Al-Mansour(c.l 160- 
1199 AD )constrained hi 'protege'(protected) ibn Rochd to be under his sway 2 .Abd-al-Malik 
Ibn Wahib of Seville, contemporary of Ibn Baja, was forced to reduce his teachings to the 
first elements, and afterwards, compelled to renounce all his studies and his intellectual 
activities of a philosophical nature. Later on' Ibn Wahib' was executed for nothing but his 
philosophical teachings3 . The core of the problem lies in the nature of a religion that is based 
on revelation and that of philosophy built upon reason. If a Muslim philosopher wants to 
adopt, analyse, or write about any philosophical question even the harmless one such as the 
categories of Aristotle or his theory of syllogism, he should start his task by establishing, 
with the help of revealed texts, that the study of philosophical sciences is allowed by the 
divine law. At the same time, he has to make sure that the human reason and the revelation 
emanated from God are not contradicted, and religion and philosophy are two different 
expressions of the same truth. Taking these precautions is the fundamental problem of 
scholasticism, defined as the agreement between religion and philosophy '.Ibn Sina in his 
'Isharat wa Tanbihat(R.emarks and Admonitions) explained this problem by stating that it is 
not a defect that philosophy goes wrong or when its students or explainers do some mistakes. 
Human thought is not infallible, but the defect, all the defect, is to build religious norms on 
philosophical bases that are not fully interpreted and investigated to be judged as true and 
reliable2 . The religion revealed by the prophets has no other target other than teaching people 
how to submit themselves to their creator and how to obey His commandments. Religious 
basic teachings urge them to abide by celestial laws and divine norms sometimes by threats 
and other times by promises. As creatures, we are requested to contemplate the universe and 
its astonishing wonders to penetrate into the divine attributes, but not everybody can reach 
this ultimate truth, only truth seekers and those who are knowledgeable, and with special
1 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A VERROES ),pp. 17-18.
2 Renan jlverroes et L'averroeism, p.32.
3 Ibid.
1 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p. 19.
2 Ibn Sina , Isharat Wa Tanbihat,(Remarks and Admonitions),p.40.
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mental faculties. However, if you do not belong to that category you have of course the 
revelation available to you to reach that truth without taking the trouble to look for it, analyse 
it, or deeply understand it. Otherwise, they have to wait for supernatural proofs or 
metaphysical evidences like miracles to make them closer to that ultimate truth, which is not 
easy to find out because of their restricted mental capacities, limited intellectual potentials 
and innate psychological acceptability. It is worth noting that the full credit goes to our 
philosopher Ibn Rochd in establishing a melodious harmony between philosophy and 
religion, this is the most original doctrine of philosophy.
It is for the very first time in the history of human thought that such a doctrine edifies upon a 
rational base a complete scholastic philosophy in terms of theory and practice 1 . Ibn Rochd in 
Fasl al Maqal(The Decisive Treatise,) treats the role of philosophic speculation in religion by 
establishing that the law does not prohibit speculation regarding the nature of the world and 
its creator, but rather, urges such speculations. Such sophisticated task can only be done 
through syllogistical reasoning '.This Rochdian theory of rationality or the doctrine of 
double truth (the belief in one truth that can be reached in two different ways) combines both 
religious and ethical reasoning2 . According to Ibn Rochd, both the Scripture and the tradition 
make a teleological study of all truths, so the efficient type of teleological study can be 
achieved through demonstrative reasoning that requires knowledge of logic. Any truth can be 
learned through the law by three divergent manners, depending on the capacities of every 
individual, which are the demonstrative, the dialectical, or the rhetorical reasoning. Ibn 
Rochd illustrated this point by emphasizing that whenever there is a conflict between the 
Scripture and demonstrative reasoning, the former has to be interpreted allegorically on 
condition that this allegorical interpretation must not contradict Muslim Ijma'( consensus)3 . 
Another problem, which is not less serious than the previous ones, faced philosophers 
embracing ancient wisdom is that of the diversity of religious sects and the political trends. 
This differs from one place to another and from the Eastern to the Western parts of the 
Islamic empire as we have mentioned before. In the East, the situation was favourable 
because of the relative tolerance generated by the diversity of races and sects, the leniency of
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.266.
1 N.Gaulb ,The Hebrew Translation ofAverroes 's Fasl al-Magal, p.92.
2 Ibrahim Najjar ,Ibn Ruchd 's Theory of Rationality,?. 191.
3 George F. Hourani ^verroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p.636.
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the first Abbassid khalifs and the multiplicity of protectors. On the contrary, in the West, 
and under Almohad dynasty, uniformity of belief, the burning fanatism of the popular 
masses, the narrowness of spirit and the intolerance ofAndalusi doctors, urged the Western 
Muslim philosophers to discuss and resolve the scholastic problem. Ibn Baja could not finish 
this tiresome task because of a premature death. The task was sketched by Ibn Tofayl and 
accomplished by Ibn Rochd 1 . The agreement between religion and philosophy does form the 
principal idea and the organizing principle of the philosophical curious novel of Ibn Tofayl 
'Hayy ben Yaqdhan ' (The Living Son of the Vigilant/ The predecessors of this philosopher, 
Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Baja expressed in sparse texts such a harmony existing 
between religion and philosophy. Ibn Tofayl consecrated an ad hoc work to the scholastic 
problem to find a suitable solution, but if the question of the agreement between religion and 
philosophy is the essential subject of his "Hayy ben Yaqdhan ", it is not at least the exclusive 
subject. He treated this question under an exoteric form of a novel in which the author does 
not present a solution explicitly; rather, he indicates this in between the lines. According to 
Ibn Tofayl, the concepts incarnate in characters: Hay ben Yaqdhan , the hermit and the good 
king Salaman flanked by his pious companions representing respectively philosophy , the 
enlightened faith , mechanical belief and their relations, and their adventures symbolise the 
natural links between philosophy, theology and the naive faith 1 .
9.3.2 The Rochdian Syllogism, Analogy and the Theory of Demonstration:
Ibn Rochd did not only accomplish the works of Ibn Tofayl and Ibn Baja regarding the 
theory of the agreement between religion and philosophy, he also proposed solution to 
another problem that neither his aged contemporary Ibn Tofayl, nor his predecessors have 
thought or, at least, talked about it. It is a problem of a social nature with the same 
seriousness and it was the outcome of the fierce war between philosophers and theologians. 
This is the evil that can strike in every single society and especially in the Islamic one, which 
all its laws and regulations, moral civil and social legislation, at the time, were based on 
revealed texts and their interpretations. An exegetic divergence about a revealed text 
regulating a collective action can ignite insurrections, civil wars between the popular masses,
1 N.Gaulb ,Tlie Hebrew Translation of Averwes'Faslal-Maqal, p. 19. 
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (A VERROES), pp. 19-20.
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and generate sects, political factions, massacres, advent and decadence of dynasties. In 
chapter three of Fas\ a-l Maqal. Ibn Rochd emphasized that the target of the scripture is to ' 
teach the majority'.That is why, dialectical and rhetorical arguments prevail. In such 
arguments, concepts are introduced either explicitly or through symbols .In case of symbol 
employment, it is up to the person to understand the inner meaning of that particular symbol, 
otherwise; he has to remain content with the literal meaning. This is the main reason why 
philosophical interpretation of the text has not to be given to people incapable of 
understanding it, as it will weaken their faith in the literal meaning. Ibn Rochd concluded his 
point by stating that schisms and opposing sects arose in Islam because of these false 
allegorical interpretations given by the Mu 'tazilites and the Ash 'rites'.
Ibn Rochd, with his theory, seeks to establish in Islam the perpetual peace between religion 
(religion not theology) and philosophy on one hand, and between the political-religious 
parties, that with the application of this theory would lose in the future, according to him, 
every opportunity to take shape on the other hand. Ibn Rochd presents and resolves the 
scholastic problem under his general and theoretical aspects in the first of the three treaties 
concerning the links between religion and philosophy". In order to define the natural links 
between religion, philosophy and theology, Ibn Rochd will have to start by defining these 
three disciplines. The philosophy can be defined as ' the reflected study of the universe and a 
work of art that helps to know the artist' (Traite Decisive, p.l, 1.13 to 1.15} who is only God. 
The religion is a set of revelations that are passed to prophets to teach people, under the form 
of sensible symbols, the right science and the right practice: The right science means the 
knowledge of God and all things, as they are especially the religious law, the bliss and the 
agonys of the hereafter3 . The right practice means the accomplishment of the actions causing 
the bliss and the abstention of those causing the agonys (Ibid., p.22, 1.25). 
Philosophy and religion are not different at all concerning the subject, which is knowing 
God, the universe and life, but they are different in the way they perceive that subject, which 
is only the method and the strategy. According to Ibn Rochd, such an agreement between 
religion and philosophy should not make us believe that the Scripture is unnecessary to all 
philosophers as the ordinary ones, due to the distractions and temptations of society, need
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.21.
2 Common people, the masses or ordinary people in general are referred to as 'al -Jumhur' to mean those who have a little 
grasp of knowledge, or those who are not schooled in logic or philosophy. 
'George F. Hourani ^Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p.637. 
: Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.21. 
3Ibid., pp.21-22.
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the Scripture to assist them until they achieve the main objectives of philosophy'.At this 
particular point, we can talk about theology, which is a general speculation like philosophy, 
but a speculation about the revealed texts, not directly about the beings of the universe, a 
speculation about the universe as seen throughout the revealed texts2 . The Islamic religion 
invites to a deep and rational study3 of the universe (Traite Decisive, p.l, 1.23-24), which 
means the study of philosophy. That is the task; Ibn Rochd was trying to perform by 
exposing many Qur'anic Verses supporting the study of all sciences of contemplation: 
"They not consider the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and what things God has 
created, and that it may be that their doom has drawn nigh? In what announcement after this 
will they then believe?''."
This is an open invitation to contemplate all the wonders of the universe, like in the 
following verses:
They not see the clouds, how they are created? And the heaven how it is raise high? And the 
mountains how they are fixed? And the earth how it is spread out? so remind thou art only 
one to remind, thou art not a warder over them2 . "
Ibn Rochd quoted many other Qu'ranic verses to show that there are many indications to use 
philosophy as a tool for reconciliation and for the call to the Almighty God: " Call to the 
way of thy lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in the best 
manner. Surely, thy lord knows best him who strays from His path, and He knows best those 
who go aright3." We do deduce from this Qur'anic verse that the call to the Almighty God 
has to be with Hikma (Wisdom), which is another synonym of philosophy. Therefore, 
philosophy, according to Ibn Rochd, is about finding in the revealed book the order to 
cultivate it. It is not philosophy in general; it is not any philosophy, for instance, a 
philosophy of Arabic and Islamic origin based on monotheistic inspirations, but a philosophy 
of Greek and pagan origin such as the Aristotelian philosophy as we understood it mixed 
with Neo-Platonism, suspect of polytheism and even pantheism. It is a simple way of
1 George. F. Hourani jtverroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p.637.
:Leon G&u\h\er .IBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.22
3We have to mention that the Qu'ran is teeming with a plenty of verses that are conveying the same message to men and
urging him to contemplate in the kingdom of God by using the tool of reason, science and speculation: "And thus did we
show Abraham the kingdom of heavens and the earth and that he might be of those having certainty "(Chapter 6, verse: 75).
"Think not that those who exult in what they have done, and love to be praised for what they have not done, think not them
to be safe from chastisement, and for them is a painful chastisement". (Chapter,3 verse. 188)"
1 The Holy Qu'ran,Chapter7, verse. 185.
'Ibid., chapter 88, Verses. 15-22.
3 Ibid., chapter 16, Verse.125.
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reasoning where all these imported philosophical principles came from especially the 
syllogistic demonstration that came from the Aristotelian logic, and that it is not suspect of 
heterodoxy. According to Islamic principles, this reasoning is just an innovation and heresy 1 , 
and the systematic knowledge of the universe that the Qur'an urges people to acquire is the 
logical theory of demonstration that is an essential instrument to obey the divine orders2 . We 
have to deal carefully with this ancient heritage, in the sense that what is compatible with the 
religious truth would be received with joy and recognition; and what is not would be marked 
as a personal opinion of this philosopher, or that one and cannot be considered as a reliable 
source. (Traite Decisive, p.6, 1.10 to 1.13). It is a noble duty that the following researcher 
continues, relies or develops the works of his precedent one in order to achieve a very 
comprehensive knowledge of the studied discipline (Traite Decisive, p.3, l.to p.4, 1.2). Ibn 
Rochd himself was always using the method of authority and he was ready to judge by the 
speech of his master Aristotle. He concluded that the study of ancient books is compulsory 
by the divine law itself as the philosophical objective is the same as the divine law that urges 
us to reach the speculation leading to the real knowledge of God (Ibid., p.6,1.14 to 1.17). The 
only difference between philosophy and religion is that philosophy is more scientific and 
more direct and there is no room for allegorical meaning, whereas the Qur'an is more 
imaginative, and it is subject to symbolical meaning 1 . In the same context, Ibn Rochd went 
on to say that the theory of the Islamic right and its instrument ,the demonstrative juridical 
syllogism, did not exist in the earlier times of Islam in which the Greek -Arab philosophy 
and its instrument , the demonstrative syllogism, was prevailing. That is why, we cannot 
consider all these juridical innovations as heresies2 . If we do insist that those who created the 
Islamic law were good Muslims, then, those who provided us with this logic and this 
philosophy were unbelievers. Ibn Rochd replied that the instrument that serves for the 
purification does not make the religious act that is serving valid, provided that this 
instrument does fill itself the conditions of validity, even if it does not belong to one of our 
fellow believers. Ibn Rochd's method is based upon taking arguments from juridical 
syllogism, or reasoning by analogy (Qiyas: syllogism means in the first sense comparison 
and analogy). This is a sort of reasoning by which we extend to a new particular subject, or 
to a new kind of subjects, a legal qualification expressly conferred by a revealed text, to another
1 Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.23.
2Ibid.
1 George F, Hourani .A verroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy $.(&1.
2Leon Gauthier, IBN ROCHD (AVERROES). p.24.
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particular subject or to another kind of subjects '. This extension is obtained thanks to a 
previous induction to get rid of the 7//a'(this Arabic word corresponds to the Greek words: 
cause, principle and sometimes subject). This does not means the motive, which is not 
accessible to man to whom God pronounced this defence, or this order, but the subject of this 
order, or of this defence, the exact significance and the precise content of this absolute 
decree of the divine will. This 'ilia' when found, constitutes a general qualification applicable 
to analogical acts that generate a major universal source of unlimited number of syllogism 
comparable to the minor one. Such kind of analogy helps us to achieve many truths and 
establish a plenty of lawful judgements. For example, what qualification should be applied to 
any drink unknown at the time of the prophet? The Qur'anic Verse (92)' declares the wine 
drink as illegal, but the fresh juice of rapes and the vinegar declared as licit. The wine is then 
illegal as a fermented and intoxicating drink: Here it is the' ilia' source of all new defences 
successively applicable to other drinks other than the wine such as cognac, whisky, beer, 
cider, brandy and all the other so- called spirit drinks. This analogy is achieved by means of 
syllogisms of the following form: the major is that the Qu'ran prohibits the fermented and 
the intoxicating drinks. The minor is that it is a fact of experience and knowledge that the 
cider, for instance, is a fermented and intoxicating drink. The conclusion is that the cider is 
prohibited as wel!2 .Al-Ghazali in al- Qistas al-Mustakim( The Just Balance) provides us with 
some of the example where this Qiyas (analogy) is applied in both the right and the wrong 
places. If we so say, for instance, that the world has a form, then it is created by using the 
instrument of analogy of the house or all the other buildings, is wrong. The right analogy is 
that every thing that has a form is created and the world has a form, then it is created3 . Ibn 
Sina in Isharat wa Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions) provided us with all types of 
analogy some taken from the Aristotelian Logic and other created by Muslim theologians 
like the following examples: 'Every human being is an animal, and every animal is a body, 
then every human being is a body'. Every human being is an animal, and every writer is a 
human being indeed, then some animals are writers indeed.
'Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.2.
' "O ve who believe! Intoxicants and gambling (dedication of) stones and (divination by) arrows are an 
abomination of Satan's handwork: eschew such (abomination), that ye may prosper. Satan's plan is (but) to 
excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of 
Allah, and from prayer: Will ye not then abstainT\ The Holy Qu'ran, Chapter al-Maeda: The Food)
2 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.25.
3 Al-Ghazal; ,A1- Qistas al-Mustakim,(The Just Balance),p.77.
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9.4 Muslim Philosophers' Transmission of Greek Wisdom with aU its Aspects 
to Western Scholasticism: 
The doctrine of agreement between religion and philosophy inaugurates an area of great 
commentaries, after Ibn Rochd, Thomas Aquinas and his successors followed the same path. 
At the time, and for the elite, the scientific encyclopaedia was nourished with science and 
philosophy of the ancient Greeks with the exception of theology. That is why, Ibn Rochd 
seems to be destined for being the father or the real instigator of all complete system of 
Jewish and Christian scholasticism. The question that insistently imposes itself here is how 
this original ingenious theory skilfully presented by our Arab philosopher remained a 
stillborn system? This happened because during the last seven hundreds years, we did not 
encounter any philosopher from the Muslims, the Jews or the Christians who can resume it 
with his own efforts. Likewise, it did not find a historian to take the trouble to understand it, 
or even a researcher to mention it l . 
The first time importance started to be given to this Rochdian work is that when Christian 
and pagan thinkers began to discuss the unavoidability of conflict between Neo-Platonism 
and Christianity. That is why, this theory faded into oblivion to the point that we do not find 
anything about it until 1859 when MJ. Muller found and published the Arab text. It is 
worthwhile to mention that in the second third of the thirteenth century Raymond Martin 
occasionally published a Latin translation in his manuscript of his Pugio fidei printed in 
Leipzig four centuries later in 1687. In the appendix of his work, of four pages, there was a 
short note, relevant to an abstract of the Decisive Treaty about the knowledge of God of 
individual multiple and changeable matters, without any direct indication to the fundamental 
thesis of Rochdian scholasticism. The particular theory that he exposed was assimilable to 
Jewish or Christian scholasticism, and nothing proves that Raymond Martin himself had any 
knowledge about the other two treaties .Till this date of 1859, there was a complete 
ignorance of these two first treaties that have given birth to a great philosophers named Ibn 
Rochd. After that date, a huge number of interpreters entered in a vicious circle of all 
I Leon Gauthier ,IBN ROCHD (A VERROES), p.266. 
2Muhsin Mahdi ,Alfarabi against Philoponus,p.233. 
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possible misinterpretations to reach at last the real thought of our prominent Andalusian 
philosopher 1 . Thanks to Ibn Rochd, the reconciliation between philosophy and religion or 
between faith and reason became a naked truth in the theological scholasticism, while such 
reconciliation among Jewish and Christian traditions was still impossible. Such 
reconciliation based on Ibn Rochd's rational thought heavily influenced the European 
thought, and contributed to the religious reform and Enlightenment in the West.2At that time, 
you have to be a Muslim if you want to talk about this reconciliation. There was ,and still, a 
belief that revelation is useless if the one can attain the truths of religions without resorting to 
revelation, and definitely, he is wrong the one who think that there are a sort of discrepancies 
between the results of reason and the dogmas of the faith 1 . In this regard, Al-Ghazali, in his 
bookAl-Qistas al-Mustakim(The Just Balance), divided people, according to faith and reason 
to three main categories. Al-Ammah (The masses) who are people of security and the 
dwellers of heaven, AI-Khawase (the elites) who are people of intelligence and insight and 
Ahlu al-Jadali wa al- Shaghab (the people of dialectics), the followers of resemblant 
matters". The reconciliation was impossible among the Jews and the Christian because 
religion and theology are two different disciplines that are essentially distinguished and even 
opposed. The religion reaches an exclusive pragmatic end to make the social life of humanity 
possible and worthy. It does not teach a truth that the reason of philosophy is not capable to 
find out with its own tools. It is only a system of imaginative symbols . This task was 
extremely difficult in an environment that did consider theology as a perversion of religion, 
and a fearsome contagious disease. That is why, it is the duty of the authorities to protect the 
masses by keeping the theologians in a secret rigorous isolation. In the middle of this 
ideology, we cannot be astonished why such a theory did not success in the eyes of medieval 
scholars. Even if these medieval scholars knew the two Rochdian treaties, they would have 
never been engaged in their translation into Latin, as they would have treated them as a heap 
of monstrous impieties and sacrilegious doctrines. Scholars at those times would have seen 
such doctrines as unintelligible to the Christian mentality because of their ignorance of the 
structure of Islamic credo, but it is more likely that they have never known them, as the 
Jewish translators never recommended to Christians any translation of these texts and
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), pp.266-267.
2 Fauzi M. Najjar, Ibn Ruchd and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement, p.204.
'S. Nirenstein, The Phroblem of the Existence of God Between Maimoiniden, Alnus. and Averroes. p.397. 
2Religious matters whose meaning is open to divergent interpretations, which may lead to confusion and absurdity. 
3Al-Ghazali, Al-Qistase al Mustakim,(The Just Balance)p.62.
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without any attempt to translate them into Hebrew. If the Christians have known even a little 
about these texts, the echo of their dignation would have reached us, or at least, we would 
have read some of their commentaries or an indication to that in their writings'. Their 
absolute silence is a clear evidence of their total ignorance. The scholastic theory of 
philosophers shaped up for the very first time by Ibn Rochd was sunk into oblivion. All what 
is left from it is may be this contemptuous adage that the unbelievers kept repeating until 
nowadays without taking the trouble where this adage came from? "There must be a 
religion . " If there is nothing that we can rely on to confirm that the fundamental idea of the 
Rochdian scholasticism had exercised a direct influence upon the Christian scholasticism 
through the track of the Arabic-Latin translations, we have to know that such influence was 
there indirectly through the Arabic- Jewish translations. Stein Schneider mentioned the 
existence of a Hebraic translation manuscript of these two treaties. Munk, in 1843, and in the 
first edition of the philosophical sciences dictionary of Frank, Ibn Rochd's article, had given 
a brief and dry analysis of this Hebraic translation. Hence, we have to make a thorough 
research throughout all the Judaic-Latin literature of the middle age to trace such supposed 
influence. It is almost certain that such influence was exercised since the second third of the 
seventeenth century upon the great modern philosopher Spinoza through the intermediary of 
a Dutch-Latin translation of Ibn Tofayl's Hayy ben Yaqdhan. The fact is duly established by 
the works of many learners, W.Meijer , de la Haye, Von Dunin Borkowski and K.O. 
Meinsma in an article of the semi-monthly Magazine of philosophy Tijdschrift voor 
IVijsbegeerte, year 1920, entitled Overeenkomst van Spinoza's Wereldsbeschhomving met de 
Arabische Wijsbegeerle(Agreement of the System of Spinoza with Arabic Philosophy)2 . Not 
to mention that such influence was manifested, five centuries earlier, by Aquinas's concept 
of God teeming with materials borrowed from Ibn Sina and the Jewish theologian Mousa ben 
Maimon3 .Such Islamic medieval magnum opuses also influenced the works of Thomas 
Bukowski(13 lh century scholar) and especially those related to the eternity of the world. If 
we go back to W. Meijer, we found that he narrated how he came across an exemplary under 
the same opening following a Latin-Dutch translation of Hayy ben Yaqdhan of Ibn Tofayl 
with les Opera Posthuma of Spinoza4 . No wonder, as Spinoza came from a Jewish-
1 Leon Gauihier,IBN ROCHD (Al'ERROES). p.267-268.
1 Ibid., pp.268
2 Ibid., pp.268-269.
3 David B. Burrell ,Knowing the Unknowable God, p.507. 
4 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES). p.269.
-256-
Chapter 9
Portuguese descent, he was born in Amsterdam in Holland, this may helped him to have 
some access to the works of both Ibn Rochd and Ibn Tofayl, as some of the supposed Arabic 
texts were translated into Hebrew and Dutch. Spinoza formulated a theory of philosophical 
scholasticism analogous to -in certain aspects-that of Ibn Tofayl and Ibn Rochd. Regarding 
the remuneration of scriptures, Spinoza went on to say that they teach with narratives, not 
with reasons, the existence of God the Creator, the Wise, the Just, the Remunerator, and the 
Vindictive that man can be happy with His obedience. All those who obey God by practicing 
the justice and the charity are saved, and those who live under the empire of exquisite 
delights are lost .There are some important divergences between the theories of these two 
great minds. Spinoza finds in the divine essence itself, a double foundation, not only for the 
bliss of some spirits of the elite, but also for the eternity of the soul of every individual in the 
human species.
For Ibn Rochd, only the intellects of the philosophers stripped of personality and 
individuality can inhale the eternal existence and the eternal bliss not of the divine Intellect, 
but the active Intellect, universal agent of the sublunary world. It is about an important 
opposition between the Cartesian spirit of Spinoza and the Aristotelian spirit of Ibn Rochd. 
However, other divergences between these two theories of philosophical scholasticism came 
from the difference of religious environments2 . We have to bear in mind that Ibn Rochd in 
establishing his theory, he denies, as required by the Islamic credo, the previous Jewish and 
Christian revelations. Ibn Rochd was directly interested only in the texts of Islamic nature, 
and ignoring the texts of the bible and the gospel following the prophetic instructions stating 
that these texts were no longer reliable because of distortions and alterations. These 
alterations do not only eliminate the announcement of the coming of the prophet 
Mohammed, but also falsify the law at many levels, we do not know precisely how many and 
what they are3 .Even if, Ibn Rochd views of the compatibility between religion and 
philosophy were inside the Islamic credo, they heavily influenced the Western scholasticism. 
The reason behind this influence lies in the Rochdian theological system. He sees that the 
Islamic teachings urged Muslims to use all the rational tools and all the aspects of wisdom to 
call for God:
1 Leon GauthierJBNROCHDfAVERROES), pp.270.
2 Ibid.,p.271.
3 Ibid.
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"Call to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in 
the best manner. Surely thy Lord knows best him who strays from His path, and He knows 
best those who go aright1 .'"
The Rochdian system states that the Shan'a (Islamic law) calls for the path of truth, and if 
the evidential thought does not contradict that truth, then the truth does not oppose the truth, 
but bolsters it and testifies it . If we go back to Spinoza, we notice that he was not interested 
only in the texts and things of his hereditary religion, the Judaism that he fully treated, he 
frequently cites texts of the gospel or epistles of the apostles2 .There is another divergence of 
a paramount importance related to the characteristic of the prophets. The minutely practiced 
rites are the only subtle conveniences that can, if it is not God, perceive the instant intuition 
of a prophet. Thanks to the impact of his reason in his imagination, divine gift granted to 
prophets and refused to philosophers3 because every prophet is a philosopher, but not every 
philosopher is a prophet4 .
For Ibn Rochd, the symbolism of the prophets originates from the spontaneous impact in 
their privileged imagination of their eminent intellect. On the contrary, for Spinoza, as 
religion has nothing in common with philosophy, the religious revelation, purely 
imaginative, has nothing to do with the speculative reason. Therefore, Spinoza stresses more, 
than his Muslim predecessor, on the difference between the speculative reason and the 
prophetic revelation. With Ibn Rochd, the prophetic symbols kept certain assimilation with 
the sublime truths and the speculative realities that expressed them. They help the 
philosophers to formulate rational interpretations. With Spinoza, these imaginative symbols 
are more social and pragmatic than with Ibn Rochd, seems to have lost all contact with 
reason. In brief, the speculative reason and revelation have nothing in common5 .
Regarding the exegesis of the revealed texts, Spinoza and Ibn Rochd declare that the 
theology as it is was always conceived and practiced, the theology of theologians, ghost of 
philosophy is illegitimate, as its theories and its arbitrary divergent and fantastic conclusions 
have not to be thought to people. What is suitable to the religious teaching is the simple and
' The Holy Qur'an, Chapter an-Nahl ( The Bees. 16), Verse. 125.
'ibn Rochd, Fasl al -Maqal (Decisive Treaty , or Faith and Reason), p.7
2 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (A VERROES).Tf>.21\
- Ibid., p.38.
4Ibn Rochd, Tahafut al-Tahafiit. p.583
5Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (A VERROES), pp. 272-273.
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the pure religion found in the authentically books revealed to prophets with the exclusion of 
every addition and every rational interpretation' . From the parallel we have established 
between the two treatises, we do notice that the new religious system of both Ibn Rochd and 
Spinoza do coincide in the main lines. This is due to the direct and the indirect influence of 
both Ibn Tofayl's novel and Ibn Rochd's treaty on Spinoza's works by the intermediary of 
the Hebraic translation of 'Fast al- Maqal' (The Decisive Treaty) 1 . In order to establish a 
very comprehensive study of such influences, we do need a specialist armed with all 
qualifications, historian of philosophies and Muslim theologies, Jewish Christian, Arabist, 
Herbaist and Latinist to devote many years to strip all the posterior works at the time of Ibn 
Tofayl and the previous ones at the time of Spinoza printed or manuscripts".
There is another point here of crucial significance that has to be mentioned is that whether 
Ibn Rochd who first used the expression 'double truth, the Rochdians (the Averroists) or it is 
only an insinuation forged by their accusers. All the Christian scholars including the 
Rochdians made errors in dealing with the religious attitude of Ibn Rochd. They 
misinterpreted his theory because they did not know very well the two treaties that exposed it 
in details because of the feeble texts of Tahafut al-Tahafut'. hi the latter, Ibn Rochd alludes 
to his theory to give to the Jews and the Christians only an unfortunate idea that diverted 
from the beginning the Jewish-Christian translators to undertake of these two treaties a Latin 
translation3 . Whatever we do think about Ibn Rochd as a commentator, or as an innovative, 
he presented solutions to the scholastic question and added the ingredients helping us to 
achieve the agreement between religion and philosophy. On the contrary of his master 
Aristotle who did not, for example, offer the least sketch to the scholastic question. In this 
way, Ibn Rochd formulated the first system of philosophical scholasticism in Islam, scarcely 
glimpsed by his Muslim predecessors, as he declared that the philosophical and the scientific 
heritage grasped from the ancient Greeks should be accepted only under inventory profit4.
1 Leon Gauthier JBNROCHD (AVERROES), p.273.
1 Many scholars translated Ibn Rochd's work Decisive Treaty- as, faith and reason, as it is dealing with the agreement
between religion and philosophy, and it is used here in many occasions as Traite Decisive', which is the French translation 
of Decisive Treaty.
2Leon Gauthier .IBNROCHD (AVERAGES), p. 276. 
3 Ibid., p.278 
4Ibid., pp.279-280.
-259-
Chapter 9
This proves the big mind of our outstanding commentator, author of a triple treatise about the 
agreement between religion and philosophy, the big instigator of medieval Jewish and 
Christian Scholasticism and a victim of the legend of the impious Ibn Rochd. This is the real 
Ibn Rochd, importantly rationalist, but eclectic, understanding religion in his manner, 
concerned with each class, and the kind of religiosity that is suitable to its nature. For the 
vulgar, pure and simple religion is necessary for maintaining social order, for philosophers, 
the only worship of reason and the apodictic speculation, by which they take part in life and 
the eternity of the active Intellect. Superior to his Muslim predecessors, even if he benefited 
from their works to be more informed than Al  Kindi, Al-Farabi, and Ibn Baja, and more 
logical and more balanced than Ibn Sina. He denounced the mystic dreaminess, the doctrinal 
inconsistencies and the inadequate conceptions of theologians. He knows how to deal with 
the Aristotelian-Neo-Platonic eclecticism, frequent to all philosophers in the most perfect 
way .No wonder that the Rochdian doctrine of the agreement between religion and 
philosophy is employed to generate religious, intellectual, political, and social reform in 
Egypt and the Arab world2 .
Farah Antun (1861-1922) used Ibn Rochd's philosophical teachings to establish a secular 
state. He thinks that Ibn Rochd's philosophy is a strong endorsement for modern scientific 
thinking. The Tanwiriyyun3 (the Enlighteners) regard Ibn Rochd's philosophy as a weapon to 
struggle against Islamic fundamentalism and the contemporary Islamist discourse4 .Dr Murad 
Wahba professor of philosophy at 'Ain Shams' (University of Cairo) and the pioneer of the 
Egyptian enlightenment movement sees the problem of the developing countries in the 
absence of the tool of reason. He argued that the European Enlightenment liberated reason 
from all religious authorities. Ibn Rochd's philosophy helped breed the Enlightenment in the 
West, whereas it failed to do the same thing in the East. Wahba cites the example of the 
Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (1215-1250 AD) who ruled both Sicily and Germany; 
he ordered to translate all Ibn Rochd's works to combat the theocracy of the Catholic 
Church. Wahba sees in Rochdism, the double- edged weapon that would help and reach the
1 Leon Gauthier JBN ROCHD (AVERROES), p.280.
2 Fauzi M. Najjar, Ibn Ruchd(Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement, p.203.
3 Also called Wasatiyyun (advocates of Wasatiyah: Mediation)
4Fauzi M. Najjar Jbn Ruchd(Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement, p.203.
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same conclusion in Islam that Europe had reached in Christianity to separate the church 
from the state and to counteract the increasing Islamic fundamentalism. Unfortunately, Ibn 
Rochd's works were recognized in the West and his philosophy was given the true value, 
whereas we, the Muslims failed to grasp this precious heritage1 . That is how, Rochdism made 
a very important contribution towards European scholarly discourse that led to critical view 
of the revealed religion, the fact that gave birth to the European rationalism and 
enlightenment 1 . Furthermore, Rochdian rationality paced the way for the emergence of 
Thomism (theology of Thomas Aquinas) and scholasticism that led to Cartesianism(related 
to Descartes) which is the cornerstone of modern Western philosophy. On the other side, 
Arab secularists used ,and still use, Ibn Rochd's rationality to combat all forms of revivalism 
and traditionalism.
Attributing victory to reason by Latin -Rochdians or to faith by Arab-Rochdians2 is against 
Ibn Rochd' basic principles of the double truth theory that does consider both religion and 
philosophy as two foster-sisters. The discipline in which Ibn Rochd made the greatest 
contribution and heavily influenced the West is his doctrines about the nature of the soul. His 
views were debated by Alexander Achillini(1463-1512)and Nicoletto Veria(1420-1499). 
Such intellectual impact contaminated Pierre Pomponazzi (1462-1525) who used Ibn 
Rochd's works to find out whether evidence relying only upon reason could demonstrate the 
immortality of the individual's soul.
He concluded with Ibn Rochd that only with the help of both faith and revelation that the 
human mind could reach rational and convincing conclusions about the nature of the soul3 . 
Not to mention the works of Al-Ghazali and especially his magnum opus 'Makasid al - 
Falasifa (Aims of Philosophers) which had been translated into 70 Hebrew versions. The 
Rochdist fourteenth- century philosopher Moses Narboni relied on this book in many of his 
most read works". When you look at all these contributions of Muslim thinkers in all
1 Fauzi M. Najjar ,Jbn Ruchd(Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement, p.204.
'Wild Stefan Jslamic Enlightenment and the Paradox ofAverroes",p.380.
2Ibrahim Najjar ,Ibn Rushd 's Theory of Rationality, pp. 192-193.
3Stoen Harold , Why European stopped Reading Averroes, p.97
4Steven Harvey , Why Did Fourteenth-Century Jews Turn to Al-Ghazali's Account of Natural Science, p.359.
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disciplines of knowledge, we cannot accept any view denying such glittering intellectual 
arena even if such a denial is only about one branch of science like the view of Ahmed abdu 
khayr ad-Dine who praised the contributions of all Muslim thinkers in all disciplines, except 
in logic. He argued that Muslims did add nothing to the Aristotelian research in Logic
.Definitely, logic is a science that is associated with Aristotle, but Muslim logicians as seen 
throughout the thesis studied it investigated it, developed it and used it as a mental tool to 
prove the strength of their stances.
We have to bear in mind that we have cited here only the influence of Muslim philosophical 
and theological works on Western scholasticism, but the influence was bigger than that, as it 
covered all other disciplines of knowledge. In mathematics for instance, the works of an- 
Nayziri were translated by Gerard Gremona in the 12th century, and the interest was renewed 
in the 17 century by the English mathematician John Wallis who used the works of an- 
Nayziri as a proof to highlight the Euclidean postulate 1 . In Sufism (mysticism), the works of 
al -kibrit al -Ahmar (The Red Sulphur)2 Ibn Arabi attracted interests of Western scholars 
such as Swede H.S(Kleinere Schriften Des Ibn al-Arabi, Miguel Asin (El Islam 
Cristianizado: studio del Sufismo a traves de las obras de Abenarabi de Murcid), H. Corban 
(I'immagination creatrice dans le soufisme d'lbn Arabi)and A. E. Affifi ( The Mystical 
philosophy of Muhyid Din-ibnu Arabi)3 . In medicine, the books of Ibin Sina Ibn an- Nafis 
were translated into Latin and Ibn al- Haytham's works of astronomy and as-Sharif al-Idrissi 
in geography remained the main sources for Western intellectuals until the 16th century. As 
mentioned before, Muslim philosophers were not just commentators or transmitters of the 
ancient wisdom, but real contributors to the richness of human thought. The outstanding 
Muslim figure Abu Bakr Mohammed Zakariya ar-Razi attacked some of the doctrine of 
Galen (ca. 129- 216 AD) in his work 'al-Sukuk ala Jalinus'. Ibn Rochd, this time in 
medicine, opposed in his book 'KuUiyat'( Colliget Generalities) the anatomy of the heart 
and Ibn an-Nafis presented, for the very first time in history, an adequate explanation of the 
pulmonary circulation of the blood by rectifying the mistakes of Galen's theory of the
1 Ahmed Abdu khayr ad-Din .Kalimafi Tarikh al-Mantiq, (A word in the History of Logic),p.l93. 
' A.I. Sabra Jhabit Ibn Qurra on Euclid's Parallels Postulate, p. 14.
2 Is the pseudo of Ibn Arabi , we have to mention that the translation of Ibn Arabi's work ,Shajarat al-Kawn, as ,The Tree
of Cosmos or the Cosmological Tree is not an accurate translation as the Arabic word ,Kawn, here may have two 
meanings: The Cosmos and the Being. The latter is the one meant by Ibn Arabi.
3 Arthur Jeffery, Ibn Al-Arabi's Shajarat al -Kawn( The Tree of Being ),p.43.
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existence of perforations in the diaphragm through the discovery of this pulmonary 
circulation system. Likewise, Ibn al- Haytham rectified the mistakes of Euclid's stating that 
is the eye, which projects its light on the visible objects. The discoveries of Arab scientists 
poured down on Europe as rains to revive the scientific research that was paralysed and 
asphyxiated since the 9th century because of the theocracy of the church, the expulsion, the 
ban and the pursuit that exceeded every limit 1 . We would not go in details here, as it is not 
the purpose of the thesis, we wanted just to demonstrate that the contributions were massive 
and both philosophy and theology were just one side of this intellectual story.
9.5 Conclusion:
Philosophy or falsafa was born into the already swelling bosom of an Islam dominated by 
Amir al- Mu 'minin (the commander of the faithful), and at the same time supervised by a 
vigilant and pious rabbinate of lawyers and saints. That is why; the only secular masters to 
whom Muslim philosophers could resort belong to an entirely different culture, hi such an 
atmosphere, no wonder that there would be a clash between a philosophy coming from that 
secular Hellenistic tradition and the revealative potentials of a Scriptural Islam2 . Such a 
clash was not like that of Christianity, or Judaism against philosophy, as many Muslim 
theologians adopted the theories of ancient wisdom and tried hard to make them compatible 
with the pure Islamic teachings. No wonder that the vast majority of Greek doctrines became 
the basic tenet of Islamic sects such as Mu 'tazilites, Ash 'rites, kharajites, Batiniyyah and the 
list is so long to be all cited.
All Muslims teachers and disciples alike are familiar with the Greek magnum opuses such 
as Plato's Republic, Plotinus' emanation, Aristotelian logic, Socrates' transmigration of 
souls and so on. Such an influence could not be a reality without the establishment of a 
strong agreement between religion and philosophy, which was successfully done by Ibn 
Rochd. The task was not that easy as it involves many sophisticated processes that have to be 
passed to rigid theologians who were principally rejecting any outsider thought. According
1 Zaghlul an-Najjar,. Al-I'jaz al-Imifi al- Qur'an al- Karim, vol.1 ( The Insuperable Scientific Facts in the Holy Qu'ran,)
p. 17.
2F E Peters. , Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam, p. 186.
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to them, the religious messages and the revealative materials are enough to achieve a better 
and comprehensive understanding of all the aspects of life away of any negative, non- 
religious stances. That is why, the full credit goes to Ibn Rochd for the establishment of this 
agreement between these two disciplines .Such an agreement that had heavily influenced the 
Jewish and Christian Scholasticism and widely opens the gates for the revival of religious 
sciences.
The Rochdian syllogism, analogy, and the theories of demonstration were present in most 
Western works and especially the medieval ones. This refute the views claiming that Ibn 
Rochd in particular and Muslim theologians and philosophers in general were just a mere 
imitators. On the contrary, they fully contributed to the development of Hellenistic thought 
by original works that combined both philosophy and religion by giving birth to an 
independent Islamic thought that remained the basic source for medieval, renaissance and 
modern Western thinkers for centuries.
Undoubtedly, the big intellectual crisis in the history of Muslim thought is the apparent 
incompatibility between religion and philosophy. This situation divided Muslims into three 
main categories: Philosophers who adopted the ancient wisdom as it attained the truth, they 
argued that there is no incompatibility between it and Islam, and solved the problem by 
means of interpretations. The second category is the theologians who adopted the Islamic 
teachings, as the only and the unique face of truth. The third one is The Mutakallimin 
(Muslim theologians) who stood between reason and revelation and rationally understood 
Islam through the combination of philosophy and religion 1 .
Ali abu Mulhim, Al-Falsafa al-Arabiya : Mushkilat Wa Hulul.fThe Arabic Philosophy: Problems and Solutions) ,p. 19.
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We do notice from all debates that the doctrine of the eternity of the world is a thorny 
problem that rose throughout history hot controversies for a wide range of reasons. First, 
there is a sort of overlap between this doctrine and many others such as God's existence, the 
immortality of the soul, and the eternity of movement and time. Secondly, the polemics were 
not fierce only between what is secular and what is religious, but also between the religious 
sects themselves, and between the secular ones as well. Even if when we do discard the 
eternity of the world, the debates are so thorny to the point that we cannot find two 
philosophers or theologians of the same view. The creation can be out of nothing (ex nihilo) 
or out of something (ex materia). Islam does not deny the ex-nihilo creation, but in the same 
time teaches the creation from a pre-existing matter. If we do start by believing that God 
created the world out of nothing, we would not find it difficult to believe that He created 
other existents out of something. Besides, the creation was through a free divine will and not 
through a necessity, as no supreme wisdom compelled God to create. If creation were 
through the latter, this would have implied that God's Almighty is determined by need, 
obligation, choice and decision, which is impossible, as mentioned before, God does not 
need, choose, will, decide or He is under any obligation of whatsoever, He only does. That is 
why, He does need creatures, as creation will add or remove nothing from His Majesty and 
Kingdom, as He is all-perfect without it, in the sense that He was not imperfect before 
creation, and He would not have been less perfect if He had not created. Regarding 
creationism, undoubtedly those who deny the ex-nihilo creation, found extreme difficulty to 
substitute it for another theory of creation, all what they do just making some amendments to 
the same theory.
It is worth noting that between creation and eternalism stands the theory of emanation that 
it is a sort of bridge between a Peripatetic philosophy advocating the eternity of the world 
and the Abrahamic religions corroborating its creationism. Whatever the case, this theory 
failed to make a clear distinction between God and the world that proceeded from Him, 
which is exactly like the other face of the distinction between God's essence and God's 
existence. The belief in eternalism or creation is not a problem in itself, the real problem is 
the denial of a super cosmic power that is organizing and looking after our universe. The 
evidence of what we are saying is Ibn Tofayl who supported the eternity of the world and at 
the same time, he is for God's existence and Ibn Rochd who asserted that the world is 
eternally emanated from God, but within the scope of creationism. Another problem worth
-265-
General Conclusion
our attention is that when we discuss the eternity of the world, are we talking, especially 
from the point of view of the Abrahamic philosophers, only about the world we do know or 
the afterlife as well, as a restoration of order after chaos? We have to point out that the 
eternity of the world debates started between theologians and philosophers, but later on, the 
physicists themselves joined this everlasting intellectual arena. Many scientific theories in 
divergent disciplines do support either the notion of creation supported by the Abrahamic 
religions or that of eternalism supported by the majority of the Hellenes. If we do take, for 
example, the Big Bang theory, we would find that is compatible with the Qur'anic Verse: 
"Do not the Unbelievers see that the heavens and the earth were joined together (as one unit 
of creation), before we clove them asunder? We made from water every living thing. Will 
they not then believe? ! "
The Qur'an goes further by explaining not just the first primordial explosion that had given 
birth to the whole cosmos, but to its continuous expansion: "And We have spread out the 
(spacious) Earth'. How excellently We do spread out!2. "Likewise, the Holy Scripture explains its 
last destiny as stated by the Big Crunch and the Big Freeze:
"The Day that We roll up the heavens like a scroll rolled up for books (completed),- even as 
We produced the first creation, so shall We produce a new one: a promise We have 
undertaken: truly shall We fulfil it3. "
As mentioned in all chapters, the discussion of the doctrine of the eternity of the world has 
to pass first by discussing the origin of things that are making the melodious laws of our 
astonishing universe. This does not mean that the origin of the universe has to be material as 
it can be created both from something and nothing, from what is material and what is non- 
material, from the tangible and from the abstract:
"Is not He Who created the heavens and the Earth able to create the like there of?" - Yea, 
indeed! for He is the Creator Supreme, of skill and knowledge (infinite)!. Verily, when He 
intends a thing, His Command is, "be", and it is. "
Afterwards, the discussion has to be focused on the nature of these things making up the 
world in the sense that what are the factors that made them elements? In other words, can we
1 The Holy Qur'an, Chapter ofal-Anbiya' (The prophets),21. Verse.30.
2 Ibid., Chapter of ad-Dhariyat (The winnowing winds),51. Verse.48.
3 Ibid., Chapter al-Anbiya, (The prophets),2. Verse. 104.
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withdraw or add other elements at any stage in the future? Are these elements subject to 
priority over each other? We have discussed all these everlasting questions in the second 
chapter to come out with the conclusion that all what have been said by the Hellenes is 
somehow true regarding the nature of the elements if we look at them of course from that 
ancient perspective. Every single philosopher has its share from that supposed truth, as any 
fact has to be gradually achieved after the accumulation of hundreds of pieces of reality 
taken from previous doctrines and theories. Then, it comes the turn of evidences proving the 
existence of a creator, as this would imply the creationist nature of the whole universe. 
Accordingly, this would support the refutation of the eternity of the world. Whenever we 
discuss the notion of creation, we mention either God or nature, and we forget about 
ourselves (man). If we believe that there is anyone who is able to create, definitely, this 
creator would be man as he (man) made in two centuries what nature had done in million 
years regarding the composition, the making and transformation of many natural elements. 
Therefore, we are the most complicated agent in this universe without giving ourselves such 
importance. Someone may say we are part of the nature we are talking about, we would give 
him a positive answer, but we can (the human beings) separate ourselves from nature and in 
many occasions made it under our sway, and this is only the beginning of this human 
challenge. Unfortunately, man, as nature, cannot play that role of a creator simply, as he is 
always trying to create from what is already created. Undoubtedly, the discussion of the 
postulation of a creator plays a pivotal role in the understanding of all other doctrines.
You can call this creator whatever you like, an Organizer of a previous chaos, a Demiurge, a 
Prime Principle, an Unmoved Mover, a First Cause, a First Mover, a First Existent, a First 
Agent, or a Necessary Being, He is certainly the Ultimate Metaphysical Truth and the Final 
Mystery of life that has to be investigated. This does not mean that the focus point has to be 
God's omnipotence, or anything else connected with His Majesty ranging from essence, life 
and attributes, but His creatures and all the signs left by Him in the universe. It is quite 
irrational to try to know the creator, while we are still unable to unravel many of the secrets 
of His creatures and cosmic signs. Likewise, it is extremely difficult to study an Immaterial 
Cosmic Power, while we are completely incapable of decoding the enigmas of many material 
beings. We have to start by knowing the creatures to end up by knowing God, and not the 
opposite, starting by knowing God to end up by knowing the creatures, as the last process
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would take us nowhere. From this perspective, we do think that the traditional dictum 'think 
of God's creation and not of His essence' has to be prevailing. By starting our study from the 
knowledge of God, we are falling in the equation 'ignotum per ignotius '. We have no other 
option, at least at the time being, other than sticking to the view that God is all-perfect reality 
beyond the reach of change. This fact means that God bends the changes of time to His will. 
That is why, we are living in a world that is constantly changing, and a God that is, and He 
was and will remain always the same. We can only agree, to some extent and with few 
reservations, with David Burrell's description of God's unique nature through the use of the 
modern term 'simpleness'. This term implies no soul and no body, and makes no distinction 
between matter and form, no distinction between actual and potential identity of essence and 
God' essence, nothing gives existence to God and everything that has existence receives it 
from Him 1 . Ibn Sina, in his Kitab al -Hudud( Book of Limits), expressed the same view in 
an archaic manner when he says the creator, the mighty and the glorious, has neither a 
definition, nor a description as He has neither a genus, nor a difference. There is no 
composition in Himself and not affected with accidents. He is the Necessary Being that His 
existence cannot be from another; He is not subject to multiplicity by number, quantity, the 
parts of limit and the parts of supplementation. He does change neither in the essence nor in 
the accidents of essence2 . Al-Farabi in his book Am' AM al-Madina al-Fadila (Opinion of 
the People of the Righteous State) combined both David Burell and Ibn Sina's views of the 
Divine by stating that God is the First Existent and the First Cause of the existence of all 
other existents. He is the eternal with His essence and substance without the need to 
something else sustaining His eternity. He is not a matter or related to it in any form. He has 
no form, as form can only be combined with matter. If He had a form, His essence would 
have made of a composition of matter and form, which means that His existence had a cause. 
No reason or purpose caused Him to exist, but His existence is to accomplish this purpose 
and that reason. Otherwise, He would not have been the first cause3 .When it comes to the 
process of creation itself, the situation is even more sophisticated, as we do believe that God 
creates from something and nothing, what can be produced from matter and what is 
immaterial. He is above time and not bound by space (omnipresent and eternal), He is, as His 
attributes describe Him, The First before existence, the Last after eternity, beyond the
1 David B. Burrell knowing the Unknowable God, p.50.
2 Ibn Sina .Kitab al-Hudud,( The Book of Limits),p.l 1
3 Al-Farabi, Rae'Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila. ('Opinion of the People of the Righteous State),pp.25-26.
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meshes of energy and matter, not subject to divisibility or quantification, and He is the 
Omniscient Who knows everything the particularities and the universalities alike. Briefly, He 
is compared to nothing. Therefore, and logically speaking, we cannot know the nature of 
God's essence, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient with our qualities as an 
ignoramus being prisoner in space -time, with ephemeral wills and limited potentials. 
Furthermore, the premises taken from intelligent design do not prove only God' existence, 
but an Almighty God Who created everything with minute calculations without any room for 
accident, coincidence, chance or what we call a dice-playing God. This refutes the theory of 
evolution and all other naturalistic views of the nature of the world. In the same context, to 
avoid any difficulty rising from the law of causality stating that everything has to have a 
cause, we would say everything must have a cause except God who is self-caused through 
necessity, as He is the Necessary Being. Regarding His Oneness and Uniqueness, we cannot 
find better than the cosmological arguments. If we look at the wonders and the amazing signs 
of our universe, we would notice that they have many things in common which implies that 
they were made by the same maker regardless of his nature.
There is no room for doubt that the uniqueness of style proves the uniqueness of creator. 
This is obvious in the microscopic world in the sense that cells are the building block of life 
and atoms the building block of matter. The cell is made up of proteins that consist of five 
elements, which are carbon, sulphur, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. In all living beings, the 
cell breathes, grows, dies and born, and all their bodies have the same anatomical structure 
made up of veins and arteries. In all living beings, the nervous system is made up of brain, 
spinal cord and nerves, the digestive system consists of stomach, small and large intestines, 
the reproductive system comprised the ovary, the womb, the testicles and their canals, and 
the urinary system is composed of kidneys, bladder and urethra. In the microscopic world, 
every single cell is made up of one nucleus orbited by one or many electrons. The same 
system continues in the macroscopic world, as the moons orbit the planets and the planets 
orbit the stars and the star systems orbit the centre of the galaxy and the galaxy orbits the 
centre of the galactic cluster etc. All these orbits are anti-clockwise, and the smaller orbits 
the bigger. Besides, the orbiting bodies are always many and the orbited ones always one, as 
an emblem of the Oneness and the Uniqueness of the Creator. Similarly, the whole cosmos is 
made up of opposed dualities such as matter and anti matter, dark matter and visible matter,
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the positive and the negative, the male and the female, the light and the darkness, as a 
manifestation of the uniqueness of God to remain the only One above duality and plurality. 
The assertion that this intriguing universe as a melodious entity has an immanent, ineffable, 
transcendent maker is the core of the eternity of the world discussion, and the closest path to 
prove creationism. We have to shed more light on God's existence on the one hand, His 
relation with the entire world on the other hand including God-human relationship. Such a 
relationship is based on the notion of purposiveness, and we do mean by that just the 
resurrection, the hereafter, the reward -punishment equation, and the existence of evil. The 
discussion of all kinds of beliefs is also helpful, as monotheistic beliefs represented by the 
Abrahamic religions possess different concepts of the Divine from that of polytheistic ones. 
In the same regard, the eternity of time and motion evidences are of a paramount importance 
in understanding the eternity of the world, as space-time equation is equal to life postulation 
for none of the creation can exist out of its scope. Moreover, eternity and sempiternity can 
never be understood without discussing their constituents, which are timelessness, and 
necessity. That is why, the eternity of time and motion is equal to the eternity of the whole 
world and their creation means the creation of the entire system of living and existing.
All what have rekindled this everlasting debates about the destiny of the world is that our 
incapacity to overcome the space-time enigma. From this perspective, we do think that 
everything that is made out of matter has to perish-includes living and non-living beings- and 
everything that is incorporeal or immaterial is eternal. What makes us consider, for instance, 
soul, motion and time as eternal simply because they are abstract, unseen, and not tangible, 
in the sense that we do not know what are they made of? How do they operate? And how 
can we do interfere in their functions? This total incapacity leads us to elaborate all these 
assumptions about their eternity. After the discussion of all these doctrines, it comes the 
leading role of the immortality of the soul, which is of a crucial significance in the 
understanding of the eternity of the world. The rationale behind this importance is that the 
soul was always regarded as eternal since ancient times because of its separation of the body 
after death. As it is not seen decomposing like the flesh of the body or visible like smoke or 
breathe, it remained shrouded in mystery. Furthermore, the soul is considered as the main 
source of movement of all things not just the living beings(humans, animals and plants), but
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also heavens and all existents(stars, planets and all celestial spheres).The demise of the soul 
is a demise of movement, and consequently, a demise of all existents. All these speculations 
started from the visible relationship between body and soul as it is the only experience and 
observation that can man rely on to understand this existent so -called 'soul'. Regarding the 
dilemma of the soul we do not agree at all with the Socratian theory of the transmigration of 
souls, as this is impugning God's transcendence in the sense that He would be experiencing a 
crisis of souls' shortage. The human being lives only once to have one chance and every 
world has its own characteristics and dimensions, the fact that makes the interaction 
process between these worlds quite impossible, hi other words, there is no migration of 
whatsoever of souls not only between human beings, animals and plants, but also between 
the human beings themselves. The evidence that the nature of the soul is so sophisticated to 
be understood through the process of migration is the modern terms used to describe the 
human inner self such as moral, mental and psychological, which are only other synonyms of 
the word soul. After death, we can assume that there is a resurrection and the punishment - 
reward equation only if we do assume that the soul is eternal, and such assumption would 
lead us to believe that the whole world is eternal.
The idea that jumps into our mind here is that when we do prove that a part of the world is 
eternal is that mean that the whole world is eternal? Our answer would be, of course, no 
simply because in many occasions and in different experiences in our life we can prove that a 
part of something is true, but this does not mean necessarily that the whole is true. As stated 
before, when it comes to the empirical world, philosophy can be helpful only to grasp the 
religious revelation, but we cannot rely on its doctrines and theories to achieve clear and 
convincing results. Since the purpose of any Credo is not to persuade, but just to guide, you 
can use your reason to achieve that persuasion but on the condition that you are already 
guided by revelation. The Holy Qur'an goes this direction by urging man to use his mind and 
his reason to be convinced by the tenets of the Credo through the tools of observation and 
contemplation:
"Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of night and day,- 
there are indeed Signs for men of understanding. Men who celebrate the praises of God, 
standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation in
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the heavens and the earth, (With the thought): "Our Lord! not for naught Hast Thou created 
(all) this! Glory to Thee! Give us salvation from the penalty of the Fire 1 . "
There is no room for doubt that this incapacity is both intellectual and perceptional. This 
does no mean that there will come a time when we will be able to surmount it, as it has 
nothing to do with science and technology. Even if we do achieve a colossal intellectual 
progress, we will remain unable to decode the nature of time, motion and soul for they are 
made of other dimensions that they are not known to us, and science does not help in this 
matter. In the past, man was unable to unravel, for instance, the secrets of microscopic world 
such as bacteria and viruses, and the macroscopic one like galaxies and all the celestial 
spheres, but thanks to technology man becomes able to do that because of the invention of 
advanced technological instruments called microscope and telescope. We do come to know, 
later on, that this is a simple world to see, we could not do that in the past because our vision 
was so weak to see these tiny monocellular creatures, or remote celestial bodies and we do 
overcome such optical obstacle with the use of these technological tools.
The situation here is quite different with the trilogy time, motion and soul, as they are 
immaterial, and as we are material, we are next to two different worlds that they can never 
ever be interacted. We do belong to different worlds with different dimensions, and made of 
different matter: "He created man from sounding clay tike unto pottery, and He created 
Jinns from fire free of smoke2 . " If it happens that there is a sort of interaction between the 
two worlds, it is definitely not through science and technology, but rather through the will 
and the power of the Creator of these trilogy time, motion and soul. It is the same as our 
perceptional incapacity to know the nature of angels (as made up of light), Jinn and Satan (as 
made of a free smoke fire) and all the other unseen creatures. They belong to other worlds 
more complicated than that of motion, time and soul, and even more sophisticated than that 
of stars, galaxies, black holes and so on. In short, the story of man seems like someone who 
is looking for something in the wrong place, or someone who is peeping through the hole of 
a theatre's door. He can only see the very limited parts, which can be captured by his field of 
vision, and he cannot see everything not because of a defect, malfunctioning or a weakness 
in his vision, but because of the way he is looking and because that is all what he is capable
1 The Holy Qur'an, chapter Al-Jmran (The house of Imran), 3 Verses. 190-191
2 Ibid., chapter ar- Rahman (The Beneficient), 55. Verses. 14-15
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to see. That is why, everything we do discover, is relative until further notice as it is a local 
discovery of something within our reach, and in the scope of our intellectual capacities and 
perceptional potentials. This complete human incapacity to understand the nature and the 
function of immaterial things is a fact that no one can refute. However, human intellectual 
potentials are marvellous, at least from our point of view as humans, and would help human 
race to go further and achieve the best in the future to be up to the raised challenges at all 
levels. There are many Qur'anic predictions that man will conquer space to an astonishing 
levels, and only at that time, he would realise that he is ignoramus, as he will be faced by 
barriers and obstacles that cannot be solved -as mentioned previously by science and 
technology-and his fate will be like that of Jinns(spirits, Satans):
"O ye assembly ofJinns and men! If it be ye can pass beyond the zones of the heavens and 
the Earth, pass ye! not without authority shall ye be able to pass! Then which of the favours 
of your Lord will ye deny? On you will be sent (O ye evil ones twain!) aflame of fire (to 
burn) and a smoke (to choke): no defence will ye have: Then which of the favours of your 
Lord will ye deny? 1 "
That is how the difficulties and the obstacles are raised, in brief, we are not qualified and 
we will not be so because of our nature as human beings to know none of the nature of these 
things, which are beyond our horizons. We cannot even deeply penetrate into the inner 
meaning of divine messages conveyed to us either through holy books or prophetic 
revelations:
" He is the First and the Last, the Evident and the Immanent: and He has full knowledge of 
all things. He it is Wlw created the heavens and the Earth in Six Days, and is moreover 
firmly established on the Throne (of Authority). He knows what enters within the Earth and 
what comes forth out of it, what comes down from heaven and what mounts up to it. And He 
is with you wheresoever ye may be. And God sees well all that ye do. To Him belongs the 
dominion of the heavens and the Earth: and all affairs are referred back to God. He merges 
Night into Day, and He merges Day into Night; and He has full knowledge of the secrets of 
(all) hearts2 . "
1 The Holy Qur'an chapter ar-Rahman, Verses. 33-36
2 Ibid., chapter al-Hadid (The Iron, 57),Verses. 3-6.
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From this particular point raises the paramount importance of religious revelations in 
affirming the truths that can be discovered by philosophical and scientific researches. 
Religious revelations only interfere when philosophy in particular and science in general 
fails to provide us with the right and convincing explanation. This can only be achieved if a 
harmony between philosophy and religion is established. We have seen what can happen if 
such a harmony is missing when Al- Ghazali accused Muslim philosophers of unbelief, as 
they supported some of the Hellenistic views especially about eternity of the world, God's 
ignorance of particulars and the denial of bodily resurrection. There are many relative truths 
that we - the human beings- thought they are absolute. Such relativism is obscuring our 
thought and what is worse is that we can do nothing to surmount it. If we do take for 
example, the life-spam of celestial spheres, which is calculated by billion years, which is 
even longer billion times than the life of human race on Earth, we regard them as eternal, as 
we are unconsciously comparing their life-spam to ours. However, if we look at the 
constituents of these celestial bodies, we would find that they are even older than 
the celestial spheres themselves, but this does not mean that they are eternal in the sense that 
they born and die in a vicious circle like the life of human beings. The latter born and die 
every second, but their births do not mean they are eternal as individuals, but rather, as 
human race. Likewise, their deaths do not imply their mortality as human race, but as 
individuals.
The conclusion that we come out with from this reasoning is there is nothing called 
complete demise or total decay in our universe, we live in a vicious circle of lives and 
deaths, but does not mean eternity, as all the constituents of our universe taste death to live 
and live to die. There is another barrier facing us whenever we want to use our fertile 
imagination is that of modern physics. Since the Hellenistic period passing through the 
medieval one to the Middle Ages, all thinkers were completely free to investigate all 
doctrines and theories away from any direct scientific influences, as physics was still in an 
embryonic stage. Nowadays, it is extremely difficult to discard ourselves from modern 
physics, as it provides us with the answers of many thorny questions that bewildered us in 
the past, and it is still and would be able to play this pivotal role in the future.
*********************************************
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1. Religious-Philosophical Trends and Cosmological Theories:
Even if the Big Bang theory 1 was not formulated on the basis of philosophical or religious 
beliefs, there are many similarities between it and these philosophical- religious trends. 
Many theologians and philosophers alike may regard it as a correct explanation for the origin 
of the universe. Others consider the theory as the first cause or the first mover as it was the 
case thousands of years by the Hellenes, and primarily Aristotle. That is why; they can be 
described as modem mythicists. This does not mean that all theologians and philosophers are 
of the view that the Big Bang theory is consonant with the Holy Scriptures, but their views 
vary between those who see it inconsistent with traditional views of the creation such as in 
Genesis, and those who consider it as a support of the creation ex nihilo. A large number of 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim scholars accept the Big Bang theory as a possible description 
of the origin of the universe: nln the beginning, God created the heavens and the 
Earth2 . This truth was also asserted in the Colossians:
"For by Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and 
invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were 
created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all things consist (held 
together or ordered together 3. "
Some branches of rabbinic Judaism do agree that the theory goes hand in hand with the 
teaching of creation mentioned in the Kabbalah. Some modern Muslim scholar, in their 
turn, do believe that many verses of the Holy Qur'an are consistent with this theory "Do not 
the unbelievers see that the heavens and the Earth were joined together as one unit of 
creation, before We clove them asunder?
1 A process known as inflation can solve all these problems in one fell swoop (see reviews by Guth & Steinhardt 1984 and 
Linde 1994), and has therefore emerged as the most popular theory of what happened very early on. Inflation is a rapid 
stretching of space, diluting away monopoles and other debris, making space at and uniform like the surface of an 
expanding balloon, and stretching quantum vacuum fluctuations into macroscopically large density fluctuations that can 
seed galaxy formation. Since its inception, inflation has passed additional tests: CMB observations have found space to be 
extremely at and have measured the seed fluctuations to have an approximately scale-invariant spectrum without a 
substantial gravity wave component, all in perfect agreement with inflationary predictions( J.D. Barrow, P.C.W. Davies, & 
C.L. Harper eds .Science and Ultimate Reality: From Quantum to Cosmos, p.5).
2 Genesis: 1: 1
3Colossians 1:16-17
4The Holy Qur'an (chapter al-Anbiya'(The Prophets. 21), Verse.30.
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In Islamic sources, this compatibility is not only with the Big Bang theory, but also with 
the expansion of the universe "The heaven, we have built it with power. And verily, we are 
expanding it ". Likewise, there is a consistency with the big crunch theory and an oscillating 
universe:
"On the day when we will roll up the heavens like the rolling up of the scrolls for writings, 
as We originated the first creation, (so) We shall reproduce it, a promise (binding on us); 
surely We will bring it about2. "
Some theistic branches of Hinduism, such as Vaishnavism, conceive of the creation event 
with many similarities with the Big Bang. For instance; in the third book of the Bhagavata 
Purana (primarily, chapters 10 and 26), describes a primordial state which bursts forth as the 
Great Visgnu glances over it, transforming into the active state of the sum-total of matter 
'prakriti'. The other forms of Hinduism emphasize on a universe without beginning or end. 
In Buddhism, there is a concept of universes that have no initial creation event, but they go 
through an infinitely repeated cycles of expansion, stability, destruction and quiescence.
The result we do come out with after consulting the basics of these cosmological theories is 
that the ultimate fate of our universe can be oscillatory in the sense that it would undergo an 
infinite series of oscillations. Each one starts with a Big Bang and ends with a Big Crunch. 
The multiverse theory suggests a set of multiple possible universes, including our universe, 
comprising a physical reality. We have to mention that this hypothesis was always connected 
to physics, philosophy and science fiction.
What is striking here is that most of these scientific theories are compatible -to some 
extent - with the philosophical and religious tenets. If we do take, for example, the big bang 
theory, we would find that is compatible with the Peripatetic notion of the first mover, or the 
first cause. Likewise, it is consistent with the rabbinic and Christian teachings. This 
compatibility reaches its climax with the Islamic revelation as the Holy Qur'an does not only 
give clear indications to the beginning of the cosmos, but also to its end, which is consonant 
with the Big Crunch theory. The Big Crunch, the Big Freeze and the Big Rip cosmological 
hypotheses suggest that the ultimate fate of the cosmos is demise and destruction, which 
means that the world is not eternal, as it was indicated by many of the Hellenes. However,
1 The Holy Qur'an (Chapter ad-Dhariyat (Winnowing winds.51) Verse.47.
2 Ibid., chapter al-Anbiya'(The Prophets.21) Verse.104.
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there are other theories, which are supporting the idea of eternalisra when they are 
suggesting that there is a scenario when the world may be turning in a vicious circle starting 
by a Big Bang, ending by a Big Crunch, and then going back to another Big Bang and so on. 
This support of eternalism is also there when these theories are some of them suggest that the 
world will expand forever denying completely the occurrence of the scenarios claimed by the 
Big Crunch, the Big Freeze and the Big Rip. We have to mention here that those who 
support the theory of the Big Bang, for example, and at the same time the co-etemity of 
matter with God are confusing themselves and others. The Big Bang gave birth to matter, as 
before the supposed primordial explosion, there was only energy, and matter sprang from 
that energy to form the universe that we do know. Hence, matter cannot be eternal if we start, 
of course, from the belief in the beginning of the whole cosmos through a Big Bang. We 
have to point out here that the Islamic interpretations do support the scenario of the 
beginning of the world, its expansion and its complete demise denying any possibility of 
eternalism, which is supported by many of these cosmological theories. The philosophical 
theories and especially the Peripatetic one is consonant with the scenario of the beginning 
of the world and its eternity, which is also consistent with other scenarios about the fate of 
the cosmos suggested by other scientific theories, especially the theories that are suggesting 
that the shape of the universe is hyperbolic. These divergent interpretations of the creation 
and eternalism of the cosmos lead us to talk also about the nature of time whether it is eternal 
or created. If we do admit that the cosmos started by a big bang, we are admitting -to some 
extent- that time started at that particular point of time. Similarly; if we do assert that the 
cosmos would end by a big crunch, we are accepting the fact that time will have an end, and 
if we do not believe in this theory, we would consequently admit that time is eternal.
It is worthwhile to point out that many scholars, scientists and even the masses who take a 
position between eternalism and creation especially when we do talk about these 
cosmological theories. Hence, if any one does believe in the big bang as a beginning of the 
universe and the big crunch as an end of it, he is admitting the notion of the creation of time. 
Likewise, if he does believe in the big bang as a beginning of the universe, which will 
expand forever, definitely, he is an advocator of the eternity of tune hypothesis.
This assessment is not absolute because the basic of this analysis as a whole is so 
problematic. If we do only take the big bang and the big crunch theories as an evidence of 
the creation of time and the everlasting expansion of the universe as a proof of the eternity of 
time, definitely we are not completely on the right path towards a logical interpretation.
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We are analysing things that way because we do know whether there was a time before 
time or not, and we do not know likewise the time that would be after the end of time. Even 
if we do come to know something about this in the future, the situation would not be that 
clear because we cannot talk about two different times. Thus, time that was before time 
either it is time in its broad meaning, and the time we are talking about it here did not started 
altogether as it was always there as a continuation of time before time. Furthermore, there 
are other problems not less enigmatic from the previous one such as the nature of the Big 
Bang itself .We do not know if the big bang declared the beginning of the universe and time 
or it was merely the beginning of a period of expansion that came after a period of 
contraction. In other words, the universe may have undergone an infinite series of 
oscillations, each beginning started with a Big Bang and ended with a Big Crunch. 
2. The Amazing Soul of the Cosmos and the Astonishing Balance of Quantities
When Ibn Rochd was presenting all these arguments about the principle of corruptibility, 
the size of scientific discoveries was not big and amazing as it is nowadays and especially 
those related to the great balance wheel. In this respect, The Rochdian archaic arguments 
make us conjure up countless examples reinforcing his principle of corruptibility. We have to 
understand that the cosmos is not like a dustbin, but it is rather an amazing soul that can only 
proceed from an Intellect Who is responsible for the creation of the universe, and He is still 
controlling it. It is quite impossible to believe in the existence of both an order and a soul in a 
blind material process that occurred accidentally 1 .
The universe is homogeneous and melodious to a point that cannot be imagined .Chad 
Walsh (1914-1991) went on to say that we can ask anyone -either a religious or an atheist-to 
prove how this amazing balance is in his interest if life on Earth does need many conditions 
that are impossible to be combined with mathematical equations. However, we do find that 
these conditions do really exist in our planet, and urges us to believe in the existence of a 
tremendous rational energy behind this intriguing cosmos, and such energy is the main cause 
of these conditions2 . The postulation of these conditions does create this intriguing balance 
on Earth. As we have mentioned above, Earth is the most important world we do know as it 
comprises all these impossible conditions that do not exist elsewhere in the huge cosmos-as 
far as we know till the time being-.despite the bigness of the Earth- as it seems to us- it does 
not equal an atom from this colossal cosmos. If its size was less or more than what it is now,
' Wahid ad-Dine Khan, Al-Islam yatahaddah, (Islam Defies), p.62. 
2 Ibid.
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then life would be impossible on its surface. If the Earth, for instance, was in the size of the 
Moon, its diameter will be the quarter of its existing one, and its gravitation force will be the 
sixth of its existing one 1 . As a result of this virtual change; the Earth cannot hold water and 
air around itself as it is the case of the Moon where there is no water and there exist no 
atmosphere due to the weakness of the gravitation force. The decrease of the gravitation 
power of the Earth to that of the Moon will cause a big increase of coldness during the night 
until everything freezes on it, and the increase of heat during the day until everything burns 
on it. Likewise; the decrease of the size of the Earth to the level of that of the Moon, will 
makes it unable to hold a big amount of water , and we do know very well that the existence 
of a huge amount of waters is essential to the continuity of the seasonal equinox. 
Consequently, the process called the great balance wheel will be achieved. Besides, the 
atmosphere of the Earth will increase in the space and vanish. Then, the temperature of the 
Earth will reach its highest degrees to decrease to its lowest levels2 . If the diameter of the 
Earth was the double of the existing one, its gravitation force will be doubled, as a result of 
that the atmosphere that is 500 miles (804Km) away will shrink to less than that. This would 
make the capacity of a square inch to increase from 15 pounds (6.8Kg) to 30 pounds 
(13.6Kg) of atmospheric pressure. Such air pressure will negatively influence all the aspects 
of life in the Earth.
If, for example, the size of the Earth is doubled to be like the size of the Sun, the gravitation 
force will be 150 times bigger and stronger than the existing one. In this case, the atmosphere 
will be so close to the point that it will be only 4 miles(6.43Km) away in instead of the 
existing distance, which is 500 miles (804Km); this will increase the atmospheric pressure to 
one ton in every square inch3 . This scenario will make the existence of living bodies 
impossible in the sense that, from the theoretical point of view, the weight of an animal that 
is more that one pound-under the existing air condensation- will be 500 pounds (226Kg), and 
the size of human beings will decrease to be in the size of a mouse. What is striking here is if 
the latter scenario occurs, it will be quite impossible that the human being will possess a 
mind (intellect) as human mind does require many nervous tissues in his body, and this
1 Wahid ad-Dine Khan, Al -Islam yatahaddah, ( Islam Defies), p.62.
2 Ibid. 
3Ibid., p.63.
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system can work only if the size of the human being is at a certain level 1 . As we all know, 
the Earth finishes one lap around its axis every 24 hours and its speed in this rotation is 1000 
miles (1609Km) per hour. If we do assume that such speed decrease to 200 miles (321 Km) 
per hour, the length of our days and our nights will be 10 times longer than the exiting order 
we have now. Accordingly, the Sun will burn - because of its high temperature- everything 
on Earth during the day and the remaining will be frozen during the night .Our Sun that is 
considered as the source of our life, its temperature is 12.000 Fahrenheit(6648 Celsius), and 
the distance between it and the Earth is 93.000.000(149.662.053 km) miles. This big, 
continuous distance never changes by either decreasing or increasing.
There is a big wisdom behind this because if this distance decrease and the Sun became 
closer to the Earth by half the existing distance, for instance, leaves will be burnt on Earth 
instantly because of its high temperature. Likewise, if the distance between the two celestial 
spheres is doubled, the coldness resulting from this remoteness will destroy life on Earth. If 
another star existed instead of the Sun, which temperature is 1000 times bigger than our Sun, 
the Earth will be turned to a glowering furnace2 . We all know that these minute calculations 
and scientific predictions were not possible before the beginning of the twentieth century, but 
Al -Ghazali in his compendium called Rasa 'il al-Imam al -Ghazali (The Epistles of al- 
Imam Al-Ghazali) and his work Al-Hikma fi Mahhlukat Allah( The Wisdom behind God' 
Creatures) mentioned this startling balance of quantities . Al-Ghazali said God created the 
Sun for purposes that are not completely exposed to man. He made it for the succession of 
day and night on Earth. Otherwise, it would be difficult to perform religious rites. If the 
sunrise were continuous, everything on Earth would be burnt. The sunrise and the sunset are 
as a lamp used by the dwellers of the house (the Earth) to be lit for a time and darkened for 
another. The advance and the lateness of the Sun generate seasons and organize the lives of 
plants and animals3 . Likewise, the life of human beings will be organised and balanced 
between the works and the occupations of the day, the rest and the repose of the night "And 
made your sleep for rest, And made the night a covering, And made the day for seeking 
livelihood4."
1 Wahid ad-Dine Khan, Al -Islam yatahaddah, ( Islam Defies), p.63.
2 Ibid.,p.64.
3
lUIU .U-T
Al-Ghazali, Majmu 'at Rasa 'il al- Imam al-Ghazali,(Jhe Epistles of Imam al-Ghazali),p.7, Al-Hikama fi 
Makhlukat Allah( the Wisdom behind God's Creatures),p.31 
4The Holy Qur'an, chapter an-Naba '(The Announcement. 78), Verses. 10-11
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These arguments of Wahid ad-Din khan, and before him Ibn Rochd and Al-Ghazali, about 
the notion that everything in this cosmos is in the interest of man are bolstered by many 
Qur'anic Verses:
"Say have ye thought .If God made night perpetual over you to the day of resurrection. Who 
is the god besides God that could bring you light? Will you not then hear? Say have ye 
thought if God made the day perpetual over you to the day of resurrection. Who is the god 
besides God that could bring you night wherein ye rest. Will ye not see?'"
The same meaning is expressed in chapter Ya Sin:
"And a sign to them is the night: We draw forth from it the day, then lo! they are in 
darkness; And the Sun moves on to its destination. That is the ordinance of the Mighty, the 
Knower. And the Moon, We have ordained for it stages till it becomes again as an old dry 
palm-branch. Neither is it for the Sun to overtake the Moon, nor can the night outstrip the 
day. And all float on in an orbit2 .'"
If Al-Ghazali had exhibited these balances of quantities in a philosophical way, professor of 
geology Zaghlul an-Najjar (1933-...), exposed them in a scientific manner, hi his work al - 
Mafhoum al -Ilmi li a-Jibalfi al Qur'an al-Karim (The Scientific Meaning of the Mountains 
in the Holy Qur'an) expressed this amazing balance of quantities and the notion 'everything 
in his (the man) interest'. He argued that the cycle of the generation of the mountains 
rejuvenate the rock crust of the Earth, and achieve the gradual growth of the continents. The 
mountains provide the erosive factors with the sources of rocks they sculpt and erode for the 
rejuvenation of the earth's soil and enrich it with metals. We can see here that these 
sophisticated natural operations are not done in a mechanistic way, but to serve a holy divine 
purpose, which is the ease and the well-being of man3 . We are apparently standing on Earth, 
but our real position is that we are thrown on our heads, and in order to explain very well this 
situation we would say: Earth is like a suspended ball lived by man, and the position of 
people on this ball is different. The people of America will be under the people of India, and 
the people of India will be under the feet of the people of America. Our Earth is not stable, 
but it turns, as we mentioned before, at a speed of 1000 miles per hour, this makes our 
position on it as a grain that is put on the surface of a wheel that turns at high speed, so the
'The Holy Qur'an, Chapter al-Qasas(The Story or The Stories), Verse.71. 
2Ibid, Chapter Ya Sin.36 Verses .38-40b .JO v JB W
3Zaghlul an-Najjar M-Maflioum al-Ilmi li al-Jibalfi al- Qur'an al-Karim,(The Scientific Meaning of Mountains in the 
Holy Qur'an),p.97.
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Earth is susceptible to be thrown in space. However, this does not happen as we are firmly 
standing on it, so how can the Earth hold us as it turns at such high speed? 1 The answer to 
question is that there is on Earth a gravitation power, in addition to the atmospheric pressure, 
that is holding everything, and keeps us standing on Earth. So we are held from all sides by 
these two processes, and the atmospheric pressure that is on every square inch about 15 
pounds means that every human being does bear about 228, 40 pounds (103.60 Kg) of 
atmospheric pressure on his body. The human being does not feel this weight as the air is 
pressurising him from every side exactly as it happen when we are swimming in water2 . 
Isaac Newton , after his long readings and observations reached the truth that the bodies drag 
each other, but he did not give an explanation to that, and he admitted that he has no 
explanation to this phenomenon. Isaac thought that he did not find any explanation to his 
observations about the relation between these bodies. In fact, he has provided us with a very 
astonishing philosophical truth.
If nature was without soul, it will not be able to explain itself, as it is the case with a dead 
person, he cannot tell us anything. The entire natural and the logical explanations do not add 
anything just to expose a target, for the dead cannot be a target holder. Therefore, if this 
cosmos was not under the sway of an intelligent designer with sublime perception, where did 
this amazing soul come from? Our Earth is turning in space doing its minute task at the angle 
of 33 degree, this calculated turning generates the seasons and it is the responsible for the 
suitability of the most of lands on Earth for agriculture and life. If the Earth was not at that 
angle, the darkness will overwhelm the poles during the whole year, and the seas vapour 
becomes in the north and in the south, hi this case, all what will remain is the mountains of 
snow and deserts, which will make life on earth quite impossible 3 .Surprisingly, al-Ghazali, 
and without nowadays scientific tools, expressed the same idea when he argued that the 
change of the positioning of the Sun in the sky generates summer and winter. When the Sun 
goes down from the middle of the sky, the atmosphere cools down and winter arrives, and 
when it is positioned in the middle of the sky, the heat is scorching. Consequently, lives of 
animals and plants are balanced4 . It is worthwhile to mention here that if the logic of 
scientists was correct that matter had organised itself in this thorough and balanced manner, 
then we would be only surprised at this amazing calculations, and intrigued by such minute
Vahid ad-Dine Khan, Al-Islam yatahaddah, (Islam Defies), p .64
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Al-Ghazali, Mamu'at Rasa 'Hal-Imam al-Ghazali,( Compendium of the Epistle of Imam Al-Ghazali),p.7
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system! They said Earth was split from the Sun, which mean that its temperature was at the 
time of the split like the solar temperature which is 12.000 Fahrenheit. Then the Earth started 
to gradually cool down, in that period there was no connection between the oxygen and the 
hydrogen because of the high temperature. Such a connection between the two gases was 
achieved only when temperature of the Earth became 4.000 Fahrenheit (2204 Celsius). Only 
at that stage, water existed, and the operations of the other kinds of existences on earth 
continued more than one billon year. As a result of that, the gases of the space of the Earth 
migrated to the space of the cosmos, and the remaining of the gases were turned into water, 
attracted to the Earth, or remained in the form of atmosphere, but most of them in the form of 
oxygen and nitrogen 1 . This atmosphere in its condensation is one component, 2.000.000 
from the components of the Earth, not all the gases were attracted to the Earth, and not all of 
them were turned into an atmosphere. If this occurred, life on Earth would be impossible. If 
we do suppose the impossible, and life existed in such circumstances-the square inch bears 
thousands of pounds of atmospheric pressure-we would not be (human beings) as we are 
now, and our life would be different from the one we are leading now . We have to add that 
if the crust of the Earth were thicker by 10 feet than its existing one, the existence of the 
oxygen would be impossible as the crust will absorb it, and without it, animal life would be 
impossible. If the seas were deeper few feet more than the existing depth, the carbon dioxide 
and oxygen will be attracted and absorbed by water, hi this case, the existence of plants on 
earth would be impossible. If the atmosphere was milder than the existing one, meteorites 
will penetrate every day into the external atmosphere of the Earth, and we can see them 
lightening during the night, and they would fall in every part of our planet to burn it3 .
As these meteorites continue their travel at the speed of 40miles (64.3Km) per second, 
because of this high speed, they would burn everything on Earth that is penetrable until our 
planet became a sieve in a period of time that is not that long. Finally, we have to add that 
the atmosphere can only be penetrable by solar rays of chemical importance, and with 
reasonable quantities essential for the growth of plants, the formation of vitamins and the 
destruction of harmful germs. In the same time, this atmosphere prevents the other harmful
'Wahid ad-Dine Khan, AI-Islamyatahaddah, (Islam Defies), p.65.
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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solar rays from reaching usl.All over again, al-Ghazali in his Rasa'i/( Epistles) draw our 
attention to the intriguing balance of quantities regarding rainfall and water reservoirs. He 
argued that if Earth were stripped of mountains, it would have been extremely difficult to 
search for water. That is why, the Almighty God created the mountains to be a reservoir for 
waters to come out as springs and rivers. There are some mountains in which there is no 
place for water, in this case, snow is kept on its surface until the coming 
of the hot season when it melts down to take the form of useful rivers till the next rainfall2 • 
Ibn Sina joined this natural-religious arena in his book Isharat wa Tanbihat (Remarks and 
admonition) by stating that the existence of God is clear as that of the Sun. He went on to say 
that he believed in Him as his belief in himself, and the belief that the matter ,that is stripped 
of any sort of life and feeling, is the source of the entire cosmos full of life, creatures 
minuteness, excellence, and harmony is quite ridiculous. It is even more ridiculous than 
believing that this sucking child is the father of that senile person as the whole is bigger than 
the part without resorting to any kind of experience, where as proving that the part is bigger 
than the whole (when the iron stretches by heat for instance) is based upon experience3. 
The Islamic Holy Scripture supports in hundreds of Verses such amazing balance of 
quantities: "And if God were to amplify the provision for His servants, they would rebel in 
the earth; but He sends (it) down by measure, as He pleases. Surely, He is Aware, Seer of 
His servants4. " Likewise, in chapter of 'al-Hijr'(Rock city), The Almighty says: 
"And We send the winds fertilizing, then send down water from the clouds, so We give it to 
you to drink; nor is it you who store it u/." The same meaning is in chapter of al-
Mu'minoun(The Believers): "And We send down water from the clouc! according to a 
measure, then, We cause it to settle in the earth, and We are indeed able to carry it away 6." 
We can see clearly the consequences resulting from any disequilibrium in such quantities 
such as floods, scorching heat waves, storms and blizzards. Some, if not all, of these 
consequences are the result of the big quantities of harmful solar rays penetrating into the 
atmosphere of the Earth. The penetration of such solar rays is causing the phenomenon of 
global warming or what it is called 'the greenhouse effect' through the damage ofthe Ozone 
I Wahid ad-Dine Khan, AI-Islam yatahaddah, (Islam Defies). p.66 
2 AI-Ghazali, Majmu 'at Rasa 'if ai-Imam al-Ghazali (The Compendium of the Epistles of aI-Imam AI-
Ghazali),p.12. 
3 Ibn Sina, Isharat Wa Tanbihat,(Remarks and Admonitions),p.64. 
4 The Holy Qur'an, Chapter AI-Shura( The CounseI.42),Verse.27. 
5 Ibid., chapter al-Hijr( Rock city -Stoneland.I5), Verse.22. 
6 Ibid., chapter al-Mu 'minoun( The Believers.23), Verse. I 8. 
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layer. The list of examples supporting what al-Ghazali and Ibn Rochd were saying not only 
in man's life on Earth, but also in every single aspect of his life from biology to geology, and 
from cosmology to archaeology is inexhaustible:" And in yourselves , do you not see? 1 What 
is striking here is why all these physical laws are formulated in such a way to be in the 
interest of man and not the opposite? This explains why whenever there is a dysfunction in 
these laws; man is among the first sufferers of its consequences? Why is there no other life 
similar to that on Earth? If we do suppose, of course, that we are (the human beings) the only 
ones in this spacious infinite cosmos, those who disagree with this logical analysis, the 
burden is on them to refute such scientific truths, not religious revelations, to find convincing 
answers to these questions, or to look for alternatives elsewhere.
********************************************
The Holy Qur'an, chapter ad-Dhariyat (The Scatterers.51, Verse.21.
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